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This study would not have been possible without the 
sustained intellectual support and continued aid of two men, 
Professor John Paul Duncan, the director of this study and 
Professor P.. S, C. Northrop, whose political theory is the 
major concern of this study. It was our first exposure to 
Professor Duncan's teaching that determined chat this study, 
years later, would be an exploration in political theory. 
Since then our continued dialogue in ideas and Professor Dun­
can's complete generosity with himself, his time and his 
ideas even in the midst of well earned "vacations" has been 
an enriching and memorable experience and one for which we 
will be always grateful.
Professor Northrop also is responsible for the ex­
pansion of our intellectual horizons, since it was through 
his works and our conversations with him that the Platonic 
wisdom that virtue was knowledge in the light of the whole 
acquired.an entirely new and substantive meaning. If our
iv
study at any point has misrepresented any of his ideas, for 
this only we ourselves are responsible.
To my wife, Jean, without whose aid and involvement 
in our odyssey this work would not have been completed we 
hereby make acknowledgment. Gratitude is also expressed 
herein for the help and encouragement given by members of 
the dissertation committee which includes Professors Joseph 
C. Pray, Walter F. Scheffer, H. Kent Schellenger and William
H. Maehl. Finally to my parents in India, my brother Hemot- 
paul and my sister Malobika as well as my wife the extent of 
our "ultimate concern" for them and human beings everywhere 
is expressed in a borrowed piece of eloquence that we cannot 
surpass
Each of us is here for a brief sojourn; for what 
purpose he knows not, though he sometimes thinks he 
feels it. But from the point of view of daily life, 
without going deeper, we exist for our fellow-men-- 
in the first place for those on whose smiles and wel­
fare all our happiness depends, and next for all 
those unknown to us personally with whose destinies 
we are bound up by the tie of sympathy. A hundred 
times every day I remind myself that my inner and 
outer life depend on the labours of other men, liv­
ing and dead, and that I must exert myself in order 
to give in the same measure as I have received and 
am still receiving. --Albert Einstein
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THE POLITICS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF F. S. C. NORTHROP
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: A SKETCH OF NORTHROP, HIS WORKS 
AND THEIR RELATION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE
This study is in part an answer to a challenge. The
existence of the remarkable body of philosophical, scientific, 
political, social, anthropological, legal and aesthetic lit­
erature that constitutes the life work of Professor Filmer 
Stuart Cuckrow Northrop is by itself an example of a Prome­
thean adventure in sheer curiosity that few mortals are will­
ing to undertake. Although F. S. C. Northrop's works have 
received considerable attention on the part of scholars in 
various disciplines, systematic analyses of his ideas by stu­
dents of politics have been few and far between. Since it 
is believed that Northrop presents an important and in many 
ways a "new" theory of politics, the major purpose of this
study is to present a systematic exploration of those ele­
ments of his philosophy which deserve the careful attention
1
of scholars in the fields of political theory and political 
science.
A Biographical Sketch
A brief examination of Professor Northrop's activ­
ities clearly shows that his varied interests to some degree 
are reflected in his own academic training. He was born in 
Janesville, Wisconsin in 1893 and received his Bachelor of 
Arts degree from Beloit College in 1915 with a major in his­
tory. Intellectual curiosity rather than routine digestion 
of information was the key feature of Northrop's undergrad­
uate work. In speaking of this era Professor Northrop has 
stated
Robert Kimball Richardson had to be first on my 
dedicatory list. It was he who directed my under­
graduate major in history at Beloit College. In 
most other subjects, except chemistry, botany, and 
the art of writing under Professor George Clancy, I 
was an indifferent student; so much so that I won 
my Phi Beta Kappa key there late "in life" rather 
than even coming near it in college.^
Between 1915 and 1917 he did social work in New York 
City until his entrance into the Yale Graduate School. His 
studies were interrupted by service in the U. S. Army but he
^F. S. C. Northrop, Man, Nature and God; A Quest for 
Life's Meaning (New York: Pocket Books, Inc.), p. 9. Here­
after referred to as Man, Nature and God.
returned to receive his M. A. degree in philosophy and econ­
omics from Yale. The early concern for his fellow man that 
Northrop demonstrated in his social work once again led him 
into social service, this time to Y. M. C. A. work in Hong 
Kong and in Canton for two years.
During his studies at Yale Northrop further developed 
his interests in the "first principles" of any system of 
knowledge or any discipline. Just as at Beloit College he 
realized that there "is no fully understood history without 
philosophy"^ so also at Yale he began to see that social 
theories rest on certain fundamental pre-suppositions about 
"facts." This intellectual trait was further demonstrated in 
his graduate work at Harvard where he received a second M. A. 
in 1922 and a Ph. D. in 1924. His doctoral dissertation was 
entitled The Problem of Organization in Biology and involved 
both careful research in bio-chemistry under Professor Law­
rence J. Henderson and also philosophical clarity under Pro­
fessor William Ernest Hocking who has remained a life long 
friend. Merely earning university degrees was apparently not 
the major motive in Northrop's life. The lure of particular 
teachers and subjects led him into further post-graduate
^Ibid., p . 10.
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education. He studied philosophy of science under Alfred 
North Whitehead at England's Imperial College of Science and 
Technology soon after the completion of his Harvard studies.
A decade later Northrop, aided by a Guggenheim Fellowship, 
went to study mathematical theory at the University of Cam­
bridge. Still later he studied and did research at other 
Universities including Goettingen and Freiberg.
Professor Northrop's teaching career was primarily 
at Yale. He was an Instructor of Philosophy at Yale in 1923. 
His promotion to full Professorship took place in 1932. He 
was chairman of the Department of Philosophy from 1938 to 
1940. Then, in 1947 the Yale Law School bestowed upon North­
rop a rare honor. This School has special chairs for dis­
tinguished academicians in related fields who have something 
to offer for a broader understanding of the problems of law. 
Harold Lasswell, for instance, long has been the political 
scientist in residence at Yale Law School. Since 1947 and 
until June 1962 when he reached his 68th year and the retire­
ment age, Northrop had held the Sterling Professorship of 
Philosophy and Law. Among other temporary teaching positions, 
he has held visiting Professorships also at the University of 
Iowa, the University of Michigan, the University of Virginia, 
the University of Hawaii, the National University of Mexico
and the Australian University of Melbourne.
Northrop, all reports indicated, was an inspiring 
and exciting lecturer. It is this writer's experience that 
even at the age of 69, for instance, in a four day visit to 
the University of Kansas he kept audience after audience 
fascinated by the ease with which he moved from discipline 
to discipline. Several years ago in a featured article the 
"Yale Daily News" in praise of his teaching abilities stated 
that
Professor Northrop is perhaps the only man on 
the Yale faculty who can clarify Whitehead's theory 
of the universe, offer a perceptive analysis of 
what is wrong with American foreign policy, and ex­
plain the symbolism of Mexican art.3
In his lifetime Professor Northrop has received con­
siderable recognition of his standing as a scholar. A few 
examples will be sufficient for present purposes . Northrop 
was president of the Society of the History and Philosophy 
of Science in 1948 and of the Eastern division of the Ameri­
can Philosophical Association in 1952. In 1949 in apprecia­
tion of his understanding of the culture of Mexico, the Mex­
ican government decorated him with the Order of the Aztec 
Eagle. His contributions to political science were partly
3Quoted in news release of May 27, 1962 by Yale 
University News Bureau (New Haven, Connecticut), p. 5.
recognized by political scientists in 1953 when the American 
Political Science Association gave him the Wendell Wilkie 
Award for his book "The Taming of the Nations." In 1962 the 
American Council of Learned Societies honored him in their 
annual awards for distinguished accomplishment in humanistic 
scholarship. Several foundations, including the Guggenheim 
and Werner-Gren Foundations, have also generously supported 
his research work. Thus, the latter foundation for anthro­
pological research sponsored several of his projects, includ­
ing the international symposium headed by him at Burg Warten- 
stein, Gloggnitz in Austria in 1962 which was held to in­
vestigate the epistemological problems of cultural anthro­
pology. Finally, the U. S. government in 1958 sent him as 
the United States representative to the 13 nation South-East 
Asian Round Table Conference on Traditional Cultures and 
Technological Progress held at Bangkok, Thailand.
Apart from his other activities. Professor Northrop 
also has been a truly prolific writer. The bibliography 
which appears at the end of this study contains a fairly 
complete list of his writings. It should be noted, however, 
that he continues to write and edit even since his retire­
ment. For instance, a collection of analyses of methods in 
anthropology under his editorship is scheduled for publication
in the fall of 1964.
His early interest in the philosophical problems of 
science is demonstrated by the nature of his first book 
Science and First P r i n c i p l e s In this work he clearly 
states the theme that persists in all of his later works that 
theoretical implications of any scientific discovery are just 
as important as its practical applications. In summarizing 
his objectives in writing this first published work Northrop 
states
Science proceeds in two opposite directions from 
its many technical discoveries. It moved forward 
with the aid of exact mathematical formulation to new 
applications, and backward with the aid of careful 
logical analysis to first principles. The fruit of 
the first movement is applied science, that of the 
second theoretical science. When this movement to­
ward theoretical science is carried through for all 
branches of science we come to first principles and 
have philosophy. This book is a product of the last 
movement. Stated bluntly, it aims to determine pre­
cisely what contemporary scientific discoveries in 
many different branches of science reveal, and what 
all this means for philosophy.5
As his philosophical inquiry began to evolve from 
his own first principles, Northrop also became more and more 
interested in the problems of social science, without giving
^F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932). 
^Ibid., p . ix.
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up his interest in the natural science. Both The Logic of 
the Sciences and the Humanities^ and The Meeting of East and 
West^ which were first published in 1946 are works which are 
the products of this stage of his intellectual development. 
After the appearance of The Logic of the Sciences and the 
Humanities Northrop's works further showed an increasing con­
cern over both descriptive and normative problems in the 
study of politics. This did not mean, however, that he 
abandoned his broadev concern with other disciplines but that 
the immediate focus of his academic attention became focused 
for a time on the "facts" of politics.
QThe Taming of the Nations and European Union and 
United States and Foreign Policy^ were relatively modest at­
tempts at political analysis. Important and widely read as
F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and
the Humanities (New York: Meridian Books Inc., 1959). Here­
after referred to as The Logic of the Sciences.
^F. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West: An
Inquiry Concerning World Understending (New York: The Mac­
millan Company, 1960).
Q
F. S. C. Northrop, The Taming of the Nations: A 
Study of the Cultural Bases of International Policy (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1953).
gF. S. C. Northrop, European Union and United States 
Foreign Policy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954).
these two works have been they are vastly oversimplified 
statements of his political philosophy. Unless these two 
works are examined in the context of his other detailed 
statements of his politics they may provide the occasion for 
too naive an acceptance of his ideas or too hasty a rejection 
of his "intrusion" into political science. Thus, for an 
understanding of the first principles of Northrop's politics 
no one can afford to ignore The Complexity of Legal and Ethi­
cal Experience ; Studies in the Method of Normative Sub jects^^ 
and Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics.
These two bodies of socio-political theory in turn should be 
examined also as extensions of Northrop's broader conception 
of life and existence which appears as a synthesis and in sum­
mary form in Man, Nature and God.
This present study will itself take note of the 
caveats that have been given and will examine Northrop's po­
litical ideas in their related forms. It will first outline
S. C. Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and 
Ethical Experience; Studies in the Method of Normative Sub­
jects (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959) .
S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology and 
Practical Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960) . 
Hereafter referred to as Philosophical Anthropology.
12F . S. C. Northrop, Man, Nature and God, o p . cit.
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the bare essentials of Northrop's philosophy of science and 
society before turning to his political theory. Several 
factors necessitate this approach even though this study is 
done within the field of political science. The most im­
portant reason is that Northrop himself reminds us constantly 
that his own socio-political thought is a continuation of 
his reflections on science. Also he claims that this should 
not be surprising since man's socio-political experience has 
always been molded to a remarkable degree by his understand­
ing of the world of science. Second, a major task will be 
that of systematically presenting and carefully elaborating 
on Northrop's comments on related disciplines insofar as they 
affect his politics. Third, within the field of politics a 
study of Northropian philosophy will be made and may prove 
to be fruitful for several important reasons.
Northrop's "Contributions" to 
Political Science
Several "fields" within political science could be 
influenced by Yale's Sterling Professor of Law and Philosophy. 
Tjiese include value theory, methodology, jurisprudence and 
international politics.
Value or Normative Political Theory. Professor 
Northrop boldly proclaims that in this age of science
11
metaphysical theories have not outlived their usefulness.
The enduring questions of political philosophy do not them­
selves provide enduring answers. As man expands his dimen­
sions of experience he formulates new answers to the peren­
nial problems and his curiosity also leads him sometimes to 
ask new questions as well. Professor Northrop is one of the 
few social and political thinkers who simultaneously and with 
some competence accept the dynamic and changing world of 
science and yet maintain that man's metaphysically oriented 
political theories can be cognitively meaningful. Northrop's 
own normative theories about the ideal state, world order and 
"natural law" jurisprudence are speculative attempts at polit­
ical theory at a time when in spite of an increasing interest 
in political theory very little speculative work is being 
done. As Professor Dwight Waldo notes
. . . political theorists are not--with a few excep­
tions- -philosophers ; nor do they--with a few exceptions 
--attempt large creative or synthetic works of politi­
cal theory. Certainly few political theorists write 
for philosophical publications, and though many are 
learned in philosophy, seldom does a work in political 
theory consciously and carefully rest upon an ex­
plicit philosophical base.^3
Northrop is not only particularly strong in the area
Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United 
States of America: a Trend report (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), p.
49.
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that most political theorists, as Waldo notes, are particu­
larly weak but he also attempts to construct a political 
philosophy of purpose which as many scholars note is a para­
mount necessity in our times. As Alfred Cobban of University 
College, London, in his analysis of "The Decline of Political 
Theory" put it
And if political theory revives, if the idea of 
purpose is reintroduced into political thinking, we 
may take up again the tradition of Western political 
thought, and in doing so resume that "continuous 
transformation of morals into politics, which still 
remains politics," in which, according to Croce, lies 
"the real ethical progress of m a n k i n d . "^4
Methodology. Apart from his role as a theorist in 
the grand traditional style of speculative philosophers of 
politics, Northrop's works are also relevant for the student 
of "empirical" theory as well as other aspects of methodology 
Unlike many other speculative political theorists Northrop is 
familiar with the basic premises and objectives of "opera­
tional theories" in the "behavioral aspects" of the social 
sciences. His own discussion of "epistemic correlations" is 
an attempt in operational theorizing.
Many "empiricists" in political science bemoan the
^^Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory," 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXVIII (September, 1953), 
p. 337.
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dearth of operational concepts. David Easton, who has been
one of the foremost of such "empiricists," states that
If, for empirical research, we define a good concept 
as one that refers to an identifiable set of facts 
and that can be explained in terms of the operations 
needed to discover these facts, then a good part of 
the terminology used in political science falls far
short of this s t a n d a r d . 15 
Northrop's analysis of the pre-suppositions of operational 
concepts and their potential contributions could very well 
prove to be an important attempt to bridge the gap to which 
Easton has referred. However, at the same time Northrop's 
discussion of the limits of operationalism could provide a 
badly needed perspective for which some political scientists 
have been searching. The recent symposium on the limits of 
behavioralism in political science sponsored by The American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciencel* is one indication 
of such a search.
While the subject matter of methodology encompasses 
all the traditional fields of political science from local 
politics to the study of international organizations two
^^David Easton, The Political System; An Inquiry 
into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1960).
^^The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science;
A symposium (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, October, 1962).
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other fields will be mentioned where Northrop's conceptuali­
zations may be helpful.
Jurisprudence. Even though law schools also show a 
concern for the subject matter of jurisprudence, the latter 
has remained for both traditional students of politics as 
well as newer ones with persuasions similar to that of Lass- 
well, an important field for political scientists. Arnold 
Brecht takes note of this in the following set of passages.
Among the proper ends of state and government, 
justice has been given a high, if not top, rank at 
all times. Two axioms have been generally accepted 
without question: first, that the government's own 
actions ought to be just; second, that governmental 
institutions, such as law courts, ought to ensure 
the preservation of justice. . . .
Ideals of legal justice hence appeared on two levels 
according to whether they referred to the making of 
laws or to their application, with the term justice 
occurring in both, but in a different setting: the 
laws laid down by governments ought to be just laws; 
once laid down, they ought to be administered justly. 
The lawyers' minds have generally been fixed on the 
second aspect, the political scientists' on the 
first. But the basic question is the same for both: 
what is just, what is unjust?
During the last hundred years, political philos­
ophy and the philosophy of law have often been 
treated as though they were two distinct fields of 
thought. However, for the reasons just given they 
cannot be so separated.17
Arnold Brecht, Political Theory; The Foundations 
of Twentieth-Century Thought (New Jersey: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1959), pp. 136-137.
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Since, as Brecht notes, it is impossible to separate 
legal and political philosophy, the jurisprudence of the 
Sterling Professor of Law affects not only the generally 
practical aspects of law but the political theorists' concern 
with schools of jurisprudence as well. Northrop's "natural 
law" jurisprudence, it is believed, escapes some of the sub­
jectivism and mysticism of most natural law theories without 
succumbing to the lures of logical positivism, or non- 
cognitivism.
International Relations. Northrop's views on for­
eign policy and international relations are probably better 
known among political scientists than are some of the other 
perhaps more important aspects of his philosophy. Although 
Northrop's ideas on international relations would be diffi­
cult to evaluate without noting their relationship to his 
other views and we do not intend to survey these herein we 
can make certain tentative observations, on a basis of this 
study.
Northrop's emphasis on the ideological and cultural 
roots of foreign policies is somewhat unique amidst the gen­
eral pre-suppositions of students of international politics. 
That is, two groups of pre-suppositions seem to be part of 
the general trend within the field. One can be characterized
16
as being composed of theories which are based on some concept 
of "power." The other more difficult to characterize group 
consists of a variety of "behavioral" approaches. As Dwight 
Waldo notes
International relations study in the post-war 
decade is characterized by a movement away from 
"idealism" toward "realism"; by a closer relation­
ship with other fields of study, such as economics, 
history and especially sociology; by a strong in­
fusion of thought-ways and techniques from behav­
ioral science; by a decided increase in attention 
to theoretical problems; and by an eclectic and 
expansionist spirit.
Northrop's own eclectic background prevents him from 
being a special pleader for any one or single discipline. But 
even though he is, in his own particular way, an inter­
disciplinarian and an empiricist he is often critical of im­
mature empiricism and the rudderless ecclecticism that is 
according to him characteristic of many theoretical approaches 
in the field. Also, his examination of the limitations of 
any "power-political" approach is not done from the point of 
view of a subjective idealist. Rather, his own mixture of 
speculation and empiricism should prove to be a contribution 
to the literature in this special field.
l®Dwight Waldo, Political Science in United States 
of America, o p . cit., p. 56.
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A Note on Northrop's Organization and Style
Professor Northrop is often a difficult writer to 
understand because of his particular style. He seldom sacri­
fices accuracy for literary grace. Consequently, unless one 
is a very careful reader of Northrop*s prose and if one de­
pends on an intuitive "stream of consciousness," one is bound 
to be misled. The problem is particularly complicated also 
by his peculiar vocabulary. Here the influence of Alfred 
North Whitehead on Northrop is evident both in the terms of 
specific vocabulary as well as broader and more substantive 
areas of thought. Like Whitehead, Northrop feels that ordi­
nary language is often inadequate for fresh philosophical in­
sights . Although he does not claim that only a new and math­
ematical language can provide accurate means of communication 
he uses ordinary language in a very tortuous and involved 
manner. The problem of understanding him is further compli­
cated by his use of common-sense ordinary words to which he 
often assigns a radically different meaning. The word "in­
tuition" is a good example. Intuition or "intuitive" knowl­
edge is often associated with introspection or "hunches."
But Professor Northrop in his use of intuition means immedi­
ate apprehension not only of ideas but of sense data as well. 
Whenever there are concepts which have sense data as
18
referrents Northrop uses the term "intuition” just as readily 
as in the case of the private images of our own consciousness. 
Northrop also assumes, like many other authors, that in ap­
proaching one of his works his readers are familiar with some 
of his previous works. Consequently his articles studied in 
isolation will often seem bewildering, unless one is familiar 
with the professor's assignment of new meanings to old words 
which is done in a scattered fashion in several of his works.
Finally, one should be prepared for Northrop's fre­
quent repetitiousness. These repetitions may sometimes be 
irritating even to readers who are generally sympathetic to 
Northrop's philosophical position. For instance. Professor 
John Paul Duncan in reviewing The Complexity of Legal and 
Ethical Experience on the one hand is high in his praise of 
the importance of Northrop's philosophy for contemporary 
political and legal theory. He says:
How can we "really" (philosophically) know what 
the law--statutes, decisions, etc.,--ought to be?
Upon what basis does legal obligation really finally 
rest?
Professor Northrop's answer to these basic issues 
of jurisprudence is an important one--one of the most 
challenging in recent legal philosophy. First, he 
believes that we can find valid answers, which is 
more than the pure value relativists seem to believe, 
and second, he suggests a system of thought by which
19
we can do this.
Yet Professor Duncan coinnients on Northrop's style in 
the following manner:
It is too bad chat professors of philosophy, how­
ever, so often feel bound to make their very worth­
while and needed explanations so difficult. Professor 
Northrop, in particular, apparently bowing to the 
current American academic demand for more publications, 
explains his theory in this volume with needless and 
at times bewildering repetition, using as chapters 
reprints of his numerous previously printed articles 
on this subject, and adding a couple of new ones at 
the end. If he had done a thorough rewrite job, and 
even at the risk of slight error translated some of 
his philosophic jargon for the legal laymen, he would 
have performed a service sadly needed, for his theory 
is a sound one and his argument makes both life and 
the law have hope and s e n s e . ^0
Although Professor Northrop cannot be completely ex­
cused for his "bewildering" repeticiousness this tendency can 
be partly explained. Professor Northrop, like many others 
who offer "new approaches" to various areas of knowledge, is 
concerned about being accurately understood if not praised. 
For this reason he feels impelled at times to state and re­
state his theses while approaching philosophical problems 
from the vantage point of political science, sociology,
^^John Paul Duncan, Review of The Complexity of 
Legal and Ethical Experience. Oklahoma Law Review, Vol. 13 
(University of Oklahoma, 1960), p. 473.
20Ibid., pp. 474-475
2.0
physics, anthropology and several other disciplines.
In order to see how far Professor Northrop's works 
have actually been understood a brief preliminary review of 
the critical commentary by scholars in several disciplines 
may also thus be helpful.
Commentaries on Northrop
There is as yet no major secondary work which attempts 
to explicate or clarify or much less critically evaluate the 
philosophy of F. S. C. Northrop. Yet there are many impor­
tant, although often brief references to his ideas scattered 
throughout books and scholarly journals in a variety of dis­
ciplines in the natural and social sciences as well as in sev­
eral areas of humanistic scholarship. Some of the reviewers 
are careful and discriminating even while pointing out "flaws" 
in his theories. But at times some critics are far too sweep­
ing and uninformative in their evaluations. C. B. Marshall 
is a good example of the latter. In a review of Northrop's 
Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics, Marshall, 
abandoning the language of the academy, and with some humor 
and little care states
. . . Philosophical Anthropology gets the jump invar­
iably, runs rings around the adversary, and angles 
shots into the basket from all over the floor.
21
Practical politics scarcely lays a hand on the ball.
The final score is about 100 to zero. Northrop 
referees, leads cheers, and stars in all positions 
with his own special razzledazzle
Some of the soundest reviews of Northrop's works and 
ideas have been done by scholars who are not Americans . This 
is not particularly surprising, since Professor Northrop has 
something to say philosophically on almost every major cul­
ture in the world. Also some of his writings have been 
translated into several languages and his articles have ap­
peared in foreign scholarly journals. The Meeting of the 
East and West, for instance, has already been translated into 
Japanese, German and Spanish. This work is fairly well known 
in academic circles in various parts of the world. Jose Gaos, 
the noted Mexican philosopher and literary critic, is high 
in his praise of Northrop's basic approach to cultural prob­
lems. In particular, he speaks approvingly of the letter's 
analysis of the culture of Mexico which appears in The Meet­
ing of the East and West. Gaos is also hopeful that North­
rop' s work will eventually be more and more i n f l u e n t i a l . 2%
B. Marshall, Review of Philosophical Anthro­
pology and Practical Politics. New Republic (February 6,
1961), p. 26.
22 Jose Gaos, "Un Metodo para Resolver los Grandes 
Problemas de Nuestro Tiempo" Cuadernos Americanos. Ano VIII 
Vol. X LV. Mayo-Junio, 1949, p. 111. The lengthy critique
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Professor Gaos also notes that the very subject matter of 
Northrop's Inquiry in the area of the relationship between 
the "sciences" and the "humanities" is itself almost in­
finitely complex. Consequently Gaos is more willing to be 
patient with and receptive to Northrop's complex analysis 
than is C. B. Marshall. Gaos, also, seems to feel that the 
exercise of patience and receptiveness in this case is well 
worth the effort, since Northrop has something to say which 
is fresh and significant in the study of philosophy.
Some American social philosophers also seem to share 
Gaos' admiration for Northrop's intellectual integrity and 
unique point of view. Speaking of The Taming of the Nations, 
which in many ways is a less ambitious and more elementary 
version of The Meeting of the East and West, Thomas V. Smith, 
who has been Maxwell Professor of Citizenship, Philosophy 
and Poetry at Syracuse University and editor of Ethics, 
states :
. . . I am . . . impressed by his diagnosis, and am
even more impressed by the responsibility he assumes 
for a constructive prognosis.
I would personally rather be "wrong" with such 
an intrepid pioneer than to be "right" with the timid 
and fearful. Mr. Northrop's is no voice crying for 
miracles with Toynbee or lost in categories with
appears in two parts. The first part is in Cuadernos Amer­
icanos Ano VIII, Vol. XLIV, Marzo-April, pages 107-134.
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Sorokin. Philosophy in a grand and resolute manner 
moves through all that Mr. Northrop writes, but it 
is never radically divorced from science or out of 
sight of facts.23
Professor Smith’s last remark is important because it points 
out Northrop*s persistent concern for scientific facts. Pro­
fessor Northrop is not merely another socio-religious polem­
icist. Neither is he merely a special pleader for hypotheti­
cal worlds nearer to his own "subjective" heart s desire. His 
social and political theories are based on his philosophy of 
science, which in itself is a remarkable journey in human 
inquiry.
Professional commentators on Northrop's philosophy of 
science vary considerably in their estimates of the merits of 
his methodology. Thus some commentators are not impressed 
with the "newness" of the Sterling Professor s work. In one 
book review in which the authorship is not indicated, the re­
viewer claims
It is obvious . , . that Professor Northrop's 
"new" physical theory of nature is, with slight 
modifications, the monistic-pluralistic theory of 
atomicity and motion that Leucippus and Democritus 
evolved twenty-five centuries ago.2^
23%. V. Smith, Review of The Taming of the Nations 
(New York Times, November 9, 1952), p. 5.
^^Bookman, Reviewer not indicated. Review of Science 
and First Principles (October, 1931), pp. 213-214.
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Professor Sidney Hook is even more forceful in his skepticism.
However, while the reviewer for Bookman claims that Democritus
anticipated Northrop, Hook cites more modern thinkers, who are
hardly similar to Democritus, as persons who have already
stated what Northrop has to say. Hook is also critical of
the letter's attempt to relate science to a variety of areas
in human experience. He puts it thus :
. . . One must reluctantly conclude that there is 
not a single valid observation made by the author 
about scientific method which has not been said, 
and better said, by Peirce, Dewey, Cohen and Nagel, 
with whom he professes to disagree. It used to be 
objected to science that it leaves something out.
If we are to believe Mr. Northrop, it leaves noth­
ing put--not even the creatures of myth and
superstition.25
This study at a later stage will deal with the criticism of
Hook and others of a similar persuasion in detail. It is
sufficient to note at the present time that some reviewers
are not as skeptical as is Hook of Northrop's attempts to
stick close to science at various levels of knowledge. Thus,
speaking of Northrop's attempt to relate natural science and
cultural science, one reviewer says
The philosopher without science is empty, and 
the scientist without philosophy is blind . And let 
it be said in advance that Mr. Northrop's Science
25Sidney Hook, Review of Logic of the Sciences and 
Humanities (New York Times, January 11, 1948), p. 7.
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and First Principles is neither empty nor blind. 
Relativity, quantum and wave mechanics, the nature 
of life and the particular nature of man are tied 
together by a new monadology which seems to have a 
certain kinship with Bruno and his infinite worlds, 
and which is not afraid to acknowledge its debts
to the Greeks.26
Northrop's philosophy of science, Mr. Hook notwith­
standing, is one which several important commentators have 
found helpful in expressing or understanding some of the im­
plications of scientific procedure. Henry Margenau, Profes­
sor of Natural Philosophy and Physics at Yale University, 
cites several areas of the philosophy of science where 
Northrop's works are important. In his work The Nature of 
Physical Reality, Margenau gives high praise to Northrop's 
clear tracing of the intellectual movement which began with 
Newtonian physics and led to Lockean empiricism which in 
turn influenced social and political thought. Margenau 
notes
Northrop points out interestingly how Locke's 
philosophy is a natural sequel to Newton's physics.
This gives perhaps the clearest perspective in which 
Locke's epistemology can be viewed and indicates at 
the same time its science bound limitations.^^
2 6H. B. Smith, Review of Science and First Prin­
ciples . Saturday Review (June 20, 1931), p. 906.
27Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality;
A Philosophy of Modern Physics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1950), p. 48.
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Margenau also takes note of other aspects of North­
rop 's philosophy as "appropriate" explanations of various as­
pects of modern scientific procedure. These include the con­
cepts of "epistemic correlations,"^8 "concepts by postula- 
tion"^^ and Northrop’s experimental work together with Harold 
Burr^O of Yale's Anatomy Department in the area of applying 
field theories in mechanics and electrodynamics to some prob­
lems in biology.31 Northrop's theorizations in science are 
partly based on an intense and detailed study of the theories 
and methodologies of Albert Einstein and Alfred North White­
head. Although he was a close student of Whitehead, Northrop 
felt that in certain areas Whitehead's epistemology was in­
adequate and that Einstein gave a more clear and reliable 
theory. One such major area was the theoretical explanation 
of the simultaneity of spatially separated events. Northrop's 




^1r . s . Burr and F. S. C. Northrop, "The Electro- 
Dynamic Theory of Life," Main Currents in M o d e m  Thought 
(September-October, 1962), Volume 19, Number 1, p. 4.
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his works. In the Library of Living Philosophers series, 
the volume on Whitehead contains Northrop's critique of 
Whitehead's philosophy of science. As is well known, White­
head did not live long enough to answer the critics whose 
views appear in this volume. However, several students of 
Whitehead's philosophy have attempted replies elsewhere. 
Andrew Paul Ushenko of Princeton's Department of Philosophy 
is one such person. Professor Ushenko is particularly crit­
ical of Northrop's contention that Einstein's epistemology 
is more adequate than that of Whitehead in certain crucial 
areas, including the explanation of simultaneity. Prior to 
examining Northrop's position Ushenko states
An examination of Northrop's contention is in 
order not only because in the context of his inter­
esting article on "Whitehead's Philosophy of Science" 
the misinterpretation enjoys an appearance of plaus­
ibility, but also because Northrop may have succeeded 
in misleading Einstein.3%
Although it is not within the scope of our study to 
"resolve" the epistemological differences between Whitehead 
and Einstein, it is interesting to note that Einstein himself 
had great respect for Northrop's scholarship in the philos­
ophy of science in general and in Einstein's own method in
32paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein-- 
Philosopher--Scientist, Vol. II (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1959), p. 624.
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particular. Speaking of Northrop's article on "Einstein's 
Theory of K n o w l e d g e " a s  well as another article by a dif­
ferent author, Einstein states:
The essays by Lenzen and Northrop both aim to 
treat my occasional utterances of epistemological 
content systematically. From these utterances Lenzen 
constructs a synoptic total picture. In which what 
Is missing In the utterances Is carefully and with 
delicacy of feeling supplied. Everything said there­
in appears to me convincing and correct. Northrop 
uses these utterances as point of departure for a 
comparative critique of the major epistemological 
systems. I see In this critique a masterpiece of un­
biased thinking and concise discussion, which no­
where permits Itself to be diverted from the 
essential.34
Since part of Northrop's social and political thought 
hinges on his understanding of Einstein's science It Is also 
Important to take note of the fact that Einstein's understand­
ing of the eplstemologlcally different "stages" of science Is 
similar to the views of Northrop. Northrop Is at times at­
tacked for his scientific "positivism" especially when deal­
ing with "human v a l u e s . Y e t  Northrop, like Einstein, Is 
neither simply a positivist nor only another non-posltlvlst. 
In both men different cognitive theories play a part at
^^Ibld., pp. 385-409.
34ibld., p. 682.
3 % a x  Radln, Review of Ideological Differences and 
World Order (New York Times, March 27, 1949), p. 7.
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different points in scientific endeavor. In speaking of 
this in connection with the previously cited essay by North­
rop, Einstein explains this paradoxical epistemological posi­
tion thus :
He [the scientist] therefore must appear to the 
systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous 
opportunist: he appears as realist insofar as he 
seeks to describe a world independent of the acts 
of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon 
the concepts and theories as the free inventions of 
the human spirit (not logically derivable from what 
is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he 
considers his concepts and theories justified only 
to the extent to which they furnish a logical repre­
sentation of relations among sensory experiences.
He may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean inso­
far as he considers the viewpoint of logical sim­
plicity as an indispensable and effective tool of 
his research.
All of this is splendidly elucidated in Lenzen's 
and Northrop's e s s a y s .
Apart from natural scientists, an increasing number 
of social scientists and theorists are likewise beginning to 
evaluate the contributions of F. S. C. Northrop. Within the 
social sciences he is a controversial figure in several dis­
ciplinary areas. In the area of anthropology David Bidney 
has probably provided one of the most careful evaluations 
thus far of his work. Although Bidney has some reservations 
about certain particular aspects of Northrop's approach to
^^Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein-- 
Philosopher--Scientist, op. cit., p. 684.
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culture generally speaking he feels that Northrop's method 
"demonstrates that the professional philosopher has something 
significant to say on questions of cultural presuppositions."^^
Like Bidney, Professor Ethel M. Albert of the Univer­
sity of California at Berkeley is impressed with Northrop's 
contributions to theoretical anthropology. Speaking of his 
Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics she says
Primarily political theory and philosophy.
Professor Northrop's latest book is relevant to 
anthropology both because it assigns a critical 
role to the study of cultural philosophies featured 
in the title and because it contains, in effect 
though not in name, a theory of culture change and 
a conception of applied anthropology. Viewed from 
the unique perspective of Professor Northrop's 
theory, the relevant anthropological concepts as­
sume new and problematic f o r m s . 38
Albert, like Bidney, is skeptical of some of Northrop's
claims, but she also states;
Because his book is so rigorously logical and so 
intellectually honest. Professor Northrop has suc­
ceeded in making abundantly clear some of the real 
confusions and conflicts in the relations of the 
Western and non-We stern world, as much in anthro­
pology as in politics. The conflict between cul­
tural pluralism or relativism and the necessity to
0 7 David Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 169.
3&Ethel M. Albert, Review of Philosophical Anthro­
pology and Practical Politics, American Anthropologist 
(October, 1960), p. 1157.
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be identified with one’s own culture is becoming in­
creasingly apparent in anthropology; the problems of 
applied anthropology are forcing attention to the 
over-compensatory character of relativism as an anti­
dote to ethnocentrism; and the imbalances in anthro­
pological thinking consequent upon insufficiently 
acknowledged philosophical commitments have barely 
begun to be redressed.^9
Although some "empiricists" in anthropology and poli­
tics are skeptical of Northrop's "philosophical" intrusion 
into anthropology,40 an anthropologist of the stature of Clyde 
Kluckhohn feels that Northrop's analysis of the need for ob­
jective and "scientifically" discovered human norms is an im­
portant contribution. As Kluckhohn puts it.
It is the greac meric of F . S, C. Northrop to 
have pointed out the essential generalization:
"The norms for ethical conduct are to be discovered 
from the ascertainable knowledge of man's nature, 
just as the norms for building a bridge are to be 
derived from physics."41
Apart from anthropologists and sociologists42 North­
rop' s works have been subjected to scrutiny by several polit­
ical scientists. Professor William C . Havard of Louisiana
39lbid., p. 1162.
40gee Marion J. Levy's review of The Taming of the 
Nations, in World Politics (July, 1953), pp. 555-568.
41ciyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man (Greenwich, 
Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, 1960), p. 218.
4^See Pitrim A. Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an 
Age of Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), pp. 145-158 and 
244-259.
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State University takes note of the fact that Northrop is one
of very few American scholars who have attempted to explore
the area of what he calls "political anthropology."43 He goes
on also to claim that
. . o the notion of political anthropology which 
stirred Professor Northrop's imagination does raise 
theoretically relevant questions about the nature 
of politics and suggests the initial steps in a 
method of inquiry appropriate to these q u e s t i o n s . 44
Several other scholars, including T. I. Cook, are im­
pressed with Northrop's attempt to broaden the study of poli­
tics . In reviewing Ideological Differences and World Order 
Cook says
Yet in a real sense this is a book for, and 
needed by, the political scientist. For . . . our 
subject as a whole has tended to become narrow, 
its practitioners divorced , . . from fructifying 
immersion in the whole stream of culture, one of 
the sources of strength of the great political 
thinkers of the p a s t ,45
Northrop's descriptive methodology in the study of politics
has already achieved some recognition. William H. Riker of
the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
4^William C . Havard, "The Method and Results of 
Political Anthropology in America," Archiv Fur Rechts--Und 
Sozial Philosophie ARSP. XLVIl/3, 1961, pp. 395-415.
44ibid., p. 397.
4^T . I . Cook, American Political Science Review 
(December, 1949), p. 1268.
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refers to this in the following passage dealing with North­
rop 's method.
Certainly one should praise him for his emphasis, 
appropriate from a philosopher of science, on the 
necessity of deductively formulated, non-normative 
theory as a pre-requisite to descriptive investigation. 
Far too many political scientists and anthropologists 
blithely rely on so-called induction, which, as Russell 
once remarked, is just another name for g u e s s i n g . 46
In Northrop's attempt to apply his descriptive methodology 
to actual political problems, however, he faces a consider­
able division of opinion among students of politics. For 
instance, Northrop's emphasis on the importance of basing 
political institutions on cultural "living law" has been 
praised by several writers in the areas of j u r i s p r u d e n c e * ?  
and foreign policy. Drew Middleton, in one review,*® feels 
that Northrop's analysis of the pre-requisites for the 
political integration of Europe are especially noteworthy.
He goes as far as to say that "no political planner has made
^^William H. Riker, Review of Philosophical Anthro­
pology and Practical Politics. The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. LV (March, 1961), p. 155.
^^See Huntongton C a i m s  ' review of The Complexity of 
Legal and Ethical Experience (New York Times, December 6, 
1959), p. 24.
*®Drew Middleton, Review of European Union and U. 
Foreign Policy (New York Times, December 26, 1954), p. 3.
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a clearer, more incisive case for integration than this."49 
Other foreign policy experts, however, are more skeptical of 
Northrop's approach to politico-cultural problems. Hans 
Morgenthau feels that Northrop*s "basic assumptions of for­
eign policy are muddled and at variance with historical
fact."50
Since Northrop is by any standards a daring pioneer 
unanimity among his critics can hardly be expected. Some who 
have disagreed with him have appreciated his non-conformity 
to the narrow canons of political science scholarship even 
though his efforts may not always seem fruitful. One commen­
tator put it this way:
Mr. Northrop is a pioneer, and his contribution 
bears the marks, good and bad, of pioneer enterprise.
At the outset, theory inevitably outruns factual evi­
dence; as it did . . .  in the speculation of the 
ancient Greeks. Thus, the Greeks constructed a frame­
work of ideas for science which was to be implemented 
only after many centuries. . . .51
Northrop's complexity in style and methodology often obscures
the extent to which he is a speculator in political theory.
^9 lb id.
50nans Morgenthau, Review of The Taming of the Na­
tions , Chicago Sunday Tribune (November 9, 1952), p. 14.
^^Raphael Demos, Review of The Meeting of East and 
West, Yale Review (Winter, 1947), p. 374.
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Some critics who evidently have not examined his theory in 
its entirety have been at times far too eager to either 
praise or blame him. Whenever a scholar strays from the 
beaten track this is to be expected. But it is well to re­
call a remark that Alfred North Whitehead once made. He 
said:
The progress of philosophy does not primarily 
involve reactions of agreement or dissent. It es­
sentially consists in the enlargement of thought, 
whereby contradictions and agreements are trans­
formed into partial aspects of wider points of
view.52
With Whitehead's caveat in mind the ideas and specu­
lations of F. S. C. Northrop in science and in philosophy 
will be explored before an attempt is made to evaluate the 
extent to which he has contributed to the "enlargement of 
thought" in the study of politics.
^^Paul Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Alfred North 
Whitehead (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), p. 664.
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CHAPTER II 
THE CATEGORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
The definitive treatment of Northrop's philosophy is 
yet to be done. Nor does this work constitute that treatment. 
So varied are the philosophical interests of F, S. C. North­
rop that one finds critical commentaries on his philosophy 
scattered in journals and works in philosophy, science, an­
thropology, government, sociology, psychology, education, re­
ligion and several other disciplines. Most of the commenta­
tors, however, show evidence of having examined only fragments 
of Northrop's philosophical "system." Yet, to understand 
Northrop's views on even one specific problem, e.g., the va­
lidity of the Supreme Court's opinions in the desegregation 
cases, one must be aware of the basic elements of his total 
philosophy. The anecdote is often told that G. K. Chesterton, 
when enquiring about the merits of a vacant apartment, would 
ask the landlady, "Madame, what is your view of the universe?" 
Chesterton maintained that this would be a good clue as to
36
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how the lady actually kept the apartment. This story may 
not be true and the implied lesson incorrect, but it illus­
trates the same need of understanding "Northrop" in general, 
in order to comprehend his analysis of particular problems 
and studies in specific fields. Thus the following commen­
tary is necessary before proceeding with the configurations 
of his politics and jurisprudence. At the same time, for the 
professional philosopher this ensuing discussion could and 
should be expanded and extended, but this sketch of North­
rop 's ideas is intended only as a prelude to an examination 
of his relevance to the study of politics .
Northrop's philosophy is the culmination of many de­
velopments in both Western and Eastern philosophy. Like any 
other philosopher, he is deeply indebted to the influences of 
a host of thinkers. But the refreshing thing about Northrop 
is that he so often gives credit consciously to the sources 
of his influence. The introductory preface to Northrop's 
Man, Nature and God^ constitutes a painstaking analysis of his 
philosophical development and the many influences that helped 
shape his own particular synthesis .
. S. C. Northrop, Man, Nature and God (New York: 
Pocket Books Inc., 1963 .
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The Influences on Northrop's Philosophy
One of the major influences on Northrop was the 
philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. No writer can overes­
timate the importance of Whitehead for contemporary philoso­
phy. Northrop went to study under Whitehead when the latter 
was teaching at the Imperial College of Science and Technol­
ogy in England. His relationship with Whitehead was both per­
sonal and intellectual. One example will suffice.
Whitehead made it unequivocally clear to me 
that there must be a reconstruction of not merely 
the scientific but also the humanistic, including 
the religious and aesthetic, philosophical assump­
tions of the modern world. He convinced me that 
unless one "spends one's days and one's nights with 
Hume" and also understands concepts such as the 
"limit" and a "dx/dy" in the infinitesimal calculus, 
one will certainly go wrong, as did Oxford's well- 
intentioned Jowett.2
Whitehead's philosophy was particularly important in 
shaping the early interest of Northrop in the philosophy of 
science. Even in the letter's differences in his epistemology 
from that of Whitehead there is a tone of respect. We shall 
refer to the differences later in this chapter but the respect 
can be illustrated in this passage from the preface of North­
rop 's first major published work.
2Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 16.
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At times^ I have been forced to dissent from 
certain views which Professor Whitehead holds, but 
this has happened because of an attempt to provide 
a solution for problems which he revealed to me.
And even in dissent, I trust that I am following the 
true spirit, if not the exact letter, of his teach­
ing. But in the end, I doubt if the differences 
are as great as at first appears. For the most part,
I have but stated, in terms of the physical theory 
of nature, what he has uttered in terms of the func­
tional theory. In any event, there is no one with 
whom I would rather agree, and to whom I am more 
deeply indebted.3
Northrop's indebtedness to Whitehead lies in several 
different areas. Some of these can be briefly noted. White­
head made Northrop aware of the pitfalls of ordinary language, 
the necessity of rigor in the search for precision even in 
aesthetics and the social sciences as well. Also, Whitehead's 
constant attack on any theory which implies a bifurcation in 
nature left its mark on Northrop. Northrop's own attack on 
the artificial mind-body problem in religion and philosophy 
is an illustration of this.
Another person who influenced Northrop in his philo­
sophical development was A, Einstein. Einstein, like White­
head, exerted a personal as well as an intellectual effect 
on Northrop. In fact, Einstein's death was a personal tragedy 
for Northrop. Several scholars at the University of Oklahoma,
OF. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. xii.
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which he was visiting at the time, have clearly recalled how 
visibly moved Northrop was upon hearing of Einstein’s pass­
ing. Einstein's primary intellectual influence on Northrop 
was in the letter's epistemology--in the technical but cru­
cial question of how the mind finds the theoretical constructs 
or postulates with which it grasps reality. Therein lies 
also the essence of Northrop's disagreement with Whitehead. 
Briefly, Northrop claims that the ideas in scientific con­
structs can be speculatively introduced whereas Whitehead, in 
his understanding of the nature of reality de-emphasizes the 
"creative" role of the mind in the process of understanding 
the nature of the external world.
Besides Einstein and Whitehead, two other influences 
should be mentioned together. These are the lectures and 
ideas of Henry Sheffer and Junjiro Takakusu. The former was 
influential in the formation of Northrop's position of logi­
cal realism and the latter was important for Northrop's con­
firmation of his earlier understanding of radical empiricism. 
Henry Sheffer, who taught Northrop at Harvard, was also re­
sponsible for showing him the nature of concepts which have 
no immediate counterpart in sense data and which, according’ 
to Northrop, are peculiar to intellectual development in the 
Western world. Takakusu, who was Professor of Sanskrit at
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the University of Tokyo, together with other authorities on 
Buddhism and Hinduism, contributed to Northrop's understand­
ing of Oriental epistemology. These two presumably separate 
worlds of experience and ways of knowing are the subjects of 
Northrop's concern not only in his well known book The Meet­
ing of East and West^ but in other statements of his philos­
ophy as well.
The Platonic strain in Northrop's philosophy is 
partly the result of the influence of Professor Charles 
Montague Bakewell, who taught philosophy at Yale. Although 
Northrop modifies Plato's theory of knowledge, Bakewell was 
responsible for his understanding of Plato's theory of forms, 
When Northrop attacks an interpretation of Plato which makes 
the latter an intuitionist rather than a logical realist he 
is echoing his understanding of Bakewell's position. North­
rop, speaking of Bakewell's influence, states
. . . he introduced me to his beloved Plato and to 
Plato's Socrates who tells those who can read, that one 
cannot arrive at "the idea of the good" except as one 
has first passed through "the hypotheses of the previ­
ous sciences," all of which, if one takes the trouble, 
as so few humanists do, to turn back a few pages in 
Plato's Republic, will be found to be mathematical
^F. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960).
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natural sciences.̂
Many other important scholars in philosophy, and 
other branches of knowledge, have influenced Northrop through 
their writings.&
From Hocking the philosopher, to Iqbal the poet, 
from Margenau, the physicist to Asoke Mehta, the practicing 
politician, there is a wide divergence in the fields of knowl­
edge which are involved. Such a wide range of intellectual 
activity is indeed rare in our times . The age of specializa­
tion often holds in suspicion those scholars who, like North­
rop, hold that an integration of different branches of knowl­
edge is an important task in itself. But, for this reason and 
his "scientific” bent, Northrop can hardly be called an arm­
chair metaphysician. He does take the trouble of investigat­
ing not only the theoretical foundations of several different 
disciplines, but some of the brutal facts as well. As he him­
self states.
Hence, one must not be afraid to get one's philo­
sophical hands dirty and one's spirit disturbed by
5Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 10.
^For a more detailed and autobiographical statement 
of those whose influence was direct and in most cases per­
sonal, an examination of the introductory preface to Man, 
Nature and God would perhaps be fruitful.
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handling the unexpected brute subject matter of any­
thing that may, and usually turns out to be, very im­
portant- -be it neuro-physiology, bio-chemistry, mathe­
matics, symbolic logic, physics, religion, negative 
feedback mechanisms, morals in concrete decisions, 
painting, sports, practical politics, anthropology, 
poetry, and--yes'.--that most difficult subject called 
law, or even Asia and Islam. As the wise Hocking 
put it many times: "Everything is grist for the philos­
opher's mill
Thus, Northrop is somewhat of an anachronism in our 
times and he himself is well aware of it as is illustrated 
by the following comment on the variety of his interests.
Today such philosophy is sometimes derqgatorily 
and humorously labelled "service station" philosophy. 
The philosopher, whose Credo this book contains, is 
delighted to be a service station hand. There are 
two reasons: the first is that if the pre-Socratics, 
the mathematical Plato and his Socrates, the Stoic 
moralists and lawyers who transformed Western contrac­
tual legal science, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz,
Kant, and Whitehead, did not believe that it corrupted 
the superb : flour which they produced to have experts 
in other subjects bring technical scientific and 
humanistic grist to one's philosophical mill, who am I 
to do so? Second, my own independent study of natural 
science, mathematics, and other subjects for their 
own sake, as well as for their philosophical signifi­
cance, has made me suspicious of the worth of a philo­
sophical mill chat grinds little more than its own 
verbal philosophical gears, as does so much of both 
metaphysical and ordinary language philosophy today.®
Having briefly described the major influences on 
Northrop, we can thus proceed with an attempt at outlining
^Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 11.
®Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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his general philosophy. In this attempt our chief concern 
will be one of simply presenting an interpretation of his 
philosophy and contrasting it wherever possible with other 
philosophies which help us better to understand not only his 
system but ultimately his politics. In fact, since this 
dissertation is in the area of political science, it is in 
our discussion of his views on politics that we can attempt 
a clearer critique of his work from the standpoint of this 
discipline. In other areas such as his involvement in the 
natural sciences we can primarily hope only to clarify his 
position and reserve any "objective” resolution of the major 
problems, such as the differences between Northrop, White­
head and Einstein on relatedness in nature to some future 
effort.
The Importance of Epistemology
Northrop's treatment of epistemology is the key to 
his entire philosophy. This does not mean that Northrop 
concerns himself only with the way knowledge is obtained 
rather than knowledge per s e . As our explication unfolds it 
should become evident that his concern embraces a wide range 
of factual questions as well as normative problems. But the 
starting point in discussing him must be his epistemology.
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Northrop himself, in several conversations with this author, 
has stated that without a clear understanding of his episte­
mology there is the great danger of misunderstanding the sub­
stantive aspects of the rest of his philosophy. One such 
possible "misunderstanding" of his epistemology occurs in an 
article by a Thomist, William M. Walton, entitled "Concept 
Formation in Certain Empiricist Thinkers in A m e r i c a . P r o ­
fessor Walton in his conclusion attacks Northrop's ontology 
from a purely Thomist point of view^O in spite of the fact 
that Northrop says he consciously avoids as far as in humanly 
possible to be culture bound in his ontology. Yet Walton 
quite possibly misunderstands Northrop. Thus, describing the 
letter's epistemology, Walton states
The paradox lies in the fact that for an empiri­
cist like Northrop, who initially distrusts his 
senses, reality in so far as it appears to his senses 
or to instruments that are read with the help of the 
senses, is the ultimate basis upon which a hypothetico- 
deductive system of explanatory constructs rests for 
verification
The next chapter will illustrate in detail our own 
general comment at this stage, on Walton's disagreement with
9
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Northrop. Northrop's "ultimate basis" for verification ac­
cording to him is not a recourse to the sense world, but to a 
rigorous set of relationships between the world of the intel­
lect and the world of the senses which he terms epistemic 
correlations. Sense data directly verifies only those scien­
tific theories which depend on simple hypotheses which symbo­
lize sensed data to which they have relationships based on 
identity. But this is not the only kind of verification that 
exists. We never "sense" the identity of the concept of an 
electron. The senses are only partly and indirectly rather 
than "ultimately" the source of verification.
Walton's critique illustrates yet another reason for 
examining Northrop's epistemology. Northrop tirelessly ham­
mers away against any notion that a philosophy can be at all 
comprehended without an appreciation of the theory of knowl­
edge involved. This may be seen in the fact that Walton's 
ontological dissent is due to his Thomist epistemology while 
Northrop is using a different system. Walton himself illus­
trates this difference between Walton, the Thomist and North­
rop the non-Thomist in the following statement by him.
In the last analysis, then, there is no ontologi­
cal knowledge in the Thomist sense in which concepts 
are defined in terms of intelligible being, which, 
though perceived by the intellect of the philosopher 
through experiential data, does not depend on any
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methods of sense verification: "in divine science 
we should go neither to the imagination nor to the
sense."12
Unless the Thomist and the non-Thomist agree at least 
on the theories of knowledge being used, if not on a correct 
theory, any ensuing dialogue will remain a dialogue of the 
deaf. To prevent such a dialogue we will now attempt to ren­
der an account of the theory of knowledge on which Northrop 
depends.
The briefest description of Northrop's own episte­
mology is that it consists of "logical realism in epistemic 
correlation with radical empiricism."13 Although this brief 
statement contains the essence of Northrop's own theory of 
knowledge it is by no means a simple theory. Constant watch­
fulness has to exist to understand Northrop's thinking at 
every step. Even professional philosophers have, according 
to Northrop, misunderstood some crucial aspects of his 
philosophy. Logical realism or concepts by intellection and 
radical empiricism or knowledge through immediate experience 
are two separate worlds of discourse and Northrop is emphatic 
and even repetitious on this point. Yet, Professor P. T.
l̂ ibid.
l^Personal letter sent to author by F. S. C. North­
rop, 11-8-1962.
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Raju, the well known Indian philosopher and scholar, mis­
reads Northrop when in his excellent work on comparative 
philosophy he states that
Intellect and intuition are, therefore, not two 
separable factors of mind, and perhaps Northrop does 
not mean that they are separable.14
But Northrop does mean that these are two separate 
methods and that if intellectual concepts are mixed with sense 
experience simultaneously, any attempt to find a public world, 
that is, an objective external world is doomed to failure.
But before we discuss why he thinks there are 
reasonable grounds for holding this position, we must attempt 
a clarification of terms beginning with Northrop's descrip­
tion of categories in epistemology or listing the various ways 
by which we know.
In fact, Northrop's discussion and outline of his 
categories is his own method of approaching the central prob­
lem of epistemology by identifying the relationship between 
the knower and the known. William Pepperell Montague, the 
well known epistemologist, in briefly describing the "persist­
ing" central concern of epistemology states
Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, in­
cludes many problems and is consequently susceptible
^4p. T . Raju, Introduction to Comparative Philosophy 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press" 1962), p. 280.
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of many definitions. We prefer to treat under this 
title that phase of the knowledge relation which 
throughout the history of philosophy has generated 
she sharpest and most significant controversy. To 
what extent, if any, are the things and qualities 
of the world dependent upon their being related as 
ob.iect to a knower or subject?^5
Although Northrop to a degree would agree with 
Montague on what the central problem of epistemology actually 
is, he is different from Montague in categorizing different 
theories of knowledge. Northrop is searching for a theory 
that would be rigorous enough and technical enough so that 
it could relate philosophies based on different cultural 
stimuli without being distorted by the structure of language 
itself. Many theories are culture bound when they express 
themselves in terms like "consciousness," "spirit," "soul" 
or "hereafter" because these terms are not rigorous enough 
to transcend diverse cultural interpretations.
To avoid any culturalistic fallacies, Northrop asks 
one basic question. How does any theory, culture, philosophy; 
science derive its theory of knowledge? In answering this 
he sees several basic possibilities.
l^William Pepperell Montague, The Ways of Knowing 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), p. 32.
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The Various Possibilities in Epistemology
According to Northrop, the two most important major 
categories in any attempt to analyze meaning or relating the 
knower to the known are "concepts by intuition" and "concepts 
by postulation." By concepts he does not mean any fixed or 
particular kind of idea such as a hypothesis in physics. 
Northrop is simply interested in how meaning is assigned in 
any discipline or culture. He sees, therefore, that meaning 
is assigned anywhere either by postulation or intuition or 
still yet in combinations of these two methods. He himself 
illustrates this point
A concept is a term to which a meaning has been 
assigned. There are two major ways in which this 
assignment can be made. The otherwise meaningless 
term may be associated denotatively with some datum 
or set of data which is given immediately, or it 
may have its meaning proposed for it theoretically 
by the postulates of the deductive theory in which 
it occurs.16
By intuition Northrop means immediate apprehension 
or experience. We are immediately aware of the blueness of 
the sky, the greenness of the grass or the coolness of spring 
water. An attempt to find meaning or to communicate that 
which is based on apprehension or immediate experience alone
^^Philosophy-East and West, Edited by Charles A.
Moore (Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 172.
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involves concepts by Intuition. In precise terms and in 
Northrop's own words; "A concept by intuition is one which 
denotes, and the complete meaning of which is given by, some­
thing which is immediately a p p r e h e n d e d . gy "intuition" 
Northrop does not mean simply what laymen call "hunches." 
Intuitive knowledge is primarily "pure" sensed or felt ex­
perience without any intervening intellectual, formal or cul­
tural categories being allowed to distort the data our senses 
give us. Calling these data green, yellow or blue is a mat­
ter of mere convention between people who think they have had 
similar experiences of blue, green and yellow.
Apart from immediate experience there is yet another 
way by which it is possible to impart meaning to concepts 
and symbols. This consists of the use of symbols whose mean­
ing is entirely contained in the theory itself and therefore 
does not depend on immediate experience. No amount of imme­
diate experience can help us understand what Locke meant by 
"natural right." If we run around in "nature" with absolute 
abandon we may accidentally hit upon the idea of a natural 
right but we cannot be sure if it is the same as Locke's un­
less and until we have examined Locke’s philosophy in which
^^Ibid., p. 173
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"right" has a particular and assigned meaning. This last 
kind of meaning is found in what Northrop calls "concepts by 
postulations." As he precisely defines it:
A  concept by postulation is one the complete 
meaning of which is designated by the postulates of 
the deductive theory in which it occurs. Any con­
cept which can be defined in terms of such concepts 
we shall also call a concept by postulation.18
Some immediate implications for semantics can be 
briefly noted as consequences of these two categorizations.
To someone who has never seen a rainbow, no amount of image- 
less symbols can recreate the exact vision of the rainbow. 
Only by analogy and references to other intuitively common 
experiences can we even attempt to communicate the experience 
of seeing the rainbow. On the other hand, the abstract con­
cept of an electron cannot be known by experience alone, if 
at all. No amount of immediacy can substitute for mathemati­
cally precise definitions of electrons. These are two sepa­
rate worlds of discourse, postulation and intuition and they 
each have their own particular variations.
Concepts by Postulation
There are four possible ways, according to Northrop, 
by which postulated concepts can acquire their meaning. These
IGlbid.. p. 173.
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are termed by him (1) Intellection, (2) Imagination, (3) 
Perception and (4) Logical concepts by intuition. Each of 
these ways can exist in turn in two possible forms, monistic 
and pluralistic. "Monistic concepts designate a single all- 
embracing factor; pluralistic concepts designate many ex­
ternally related factors.
Before we proceed with the various methods of postu­
lation one word of caution is necessary. At the risk of 
being repetitious, and Northrop himself often takes that risk, 
postulation must not be conceived in terms of just any con­
cepts whatever. Only for those concepts whose meaning does 
not depend on apprehension or sense data alone can the term 
postulation be used. In a postulated concept the meaning is 
contained within the theory. The most important kind of con­
cepts by postulation are those which depend on the method 
Northrop calls intellection.
Intellection is the method which is completely image- 
less. Meanings given by intellection cannot be understood by 
sensing them or even imagining them. Their meaning, rather 
than their "empirical" validity, is contained in the concepts 
given in a theory and in the relations between them. Northrop
l^Ibid., p. 154.
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asserts that many concepts in mathematical physics are de­
rived in this manner. Most of us think ordinarily in terms 
of only a few dimensions, because we can visualize only a 
few; length, width and height. But beyond representing the 
sensed relationships of our everyday experiences some con­
cepts may go far beyond the recreation of experience. Mathe­
matics, for instance, may deal with some concepts which have 
no direct referrents . These conceptual schemes may be image- 
less according to Northrop. Their meaning must be found 
within the postulated theory. Thus he states
. . . the many-dimensional structures of mathe­
matical physics in those cases in which the dimen­
sions are greater in number than three, are examples 
of concepts by postulation which are concepts by 
intellection.20
Northrop illustrates this method by numerous examples, 
both pluralistic and monistic, from Plato to Einstein. This 
method, according to him, is peculiar to Western cultural 
development. The implications of this assertion will be pur­
sued later.
Imagination is a second method for deriving concepts 
by postulation. Here again as in intellection, sense data 




we can postulate by the use of imagination. These objects 
may never have existed as a sensed fact in the precise and 
complete way we think them, but these imaginary Ideas can be 
given meaning if we rigorously include them in a theory.
Centaurs, the atoms of Democritus, the Platonic 
regular solids of Book XIII of Euclid, and the atomic 
models of Bohr's and Rutherford's classical atomic 
physics are examples of concepts by postulation which 
are concepts by imagination.21
One might add that Northrop claims that intellection 
has displaced imagination as defined above as the major meth­
od of acquiring knowledge in physics in the Einstein era. The 
thesis which is at times expressed with subtlety and else­
where repetitiously is that intellection is the most "superi­
or" cognitive method as far as postulation is concerned. The 
implications of this for science, politics and law will be 
pursued in the proper context.
Perception is the most common method by which the lay­
man postulates reality. In this process there is a combined 
use of the senses and the imagination does the rest. This is 
still different from intuition or immediate apprehension. Most 
of the "objects" of the world of "common-sense" are known by 
this kind of perception. We do not apprehend simultaneously
Zllbid.
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all the aspects of the chairs we sit on, the cars in which 
we drive, or the planes in which we fly even though we think 
of them as "complete" objects each with several dimensions.
At this very moment I can "sense" only the top of the table 
on which I am working. But since the theory of what my table 
looks like has been verified so often by actually sensing at 
other times the legs, the bottomside and the back of the 
table, I use a shortcut in my awareness of my table. I com­
bine my sensed top of the table with the imagined rest of the 
table to construct the concept of the total table that I use 
every day. Unless one is somewhat sophisticated in episte­
mology it is easy to assume that we are only sensing chairs, 
tables or even wives and students whereas
As Berkeley and Hume have shown, and as we have 
previously indicated, "perceptual objects" are not 
immediately apprehended factors; they are postulates 
of common sense so thoroughly and frequently and un­
consciously verified through their deductive conse­
quences that only the critical realize them to be 
postulated rather than immediately a p p r e h e n d e d . 2 2
Logical concepts by intuition is the last category 
in the postulation series that Northrop discusses. This is 
any method that consists of the following two processes. One 
is that of experiencing sensed data directly. But to this
^ ^ i b i d .. p .  1 8 4 .
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intuitive aspect, a second step is added: that of a postu­
lated permanent status. Without this permanent status we 
would have only meaningless impressions from the senses.
This kind of method is considered as a borderline phenomenon 
between intuition and postulation. It is not quite percep­
tion because in perception the imaginative aspects are one 
step removed from the senses. The back of the chair which 
we do not see but which we could see would be an illustration 
of perception. In contrast, we do not see the "Unmoved 
Mover" in Aristotle's metaphysics which is a logical concept 
by intuition according to Northrop. For instance, he states:
There are also pluralistic and monistic logical 
concepts by intuition. "Hot," in the sense of the 
immediately apprehended sensation functioning as a 
"form of privation" in the physics of Aristotle, 
and the "eternal objects" of Whitehead in their re­
lation of disjunction to each other are examples of 
the pluralistic case. The "Unmoved Mover" of Aris­
totle's theology, in which the pluralistic forms are 
treated as a hierarchical unity is a monistic
example.23
In summary, therefore, Northrop's last category of 
postulates applies to any set of concepts where initial de­
pendence is on the world of the senses but where in reality 
is also finally conceived in the very same theory in terms 
of "unseen" and "unfelt" concepts which rounds off our
Z^ibid.. p. 185.
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understanding of what is really there. The supreme being 
who is the final cause in Aristotle's system is the result 
of this kind of conceptualization. So also, one might add, 
is any Thomistic philosopher including the Aristotelian St. 
Thomas himself, according to Northrop. For instance, this 
is well illustrated in the following passage from the previ­
ously cited Thomist, William Walton, who in describing how 
Thomistic ontological knowledge is obtained, stated that
. . . concepts are defined in terms of intelligible 
being, which, though perceived by the intellect of 
the philosopher through experiential data, does not 
depend on any methods of sense verification: "in 
divine science we should go neither to the imagination
nor to the s e n s e . "24
We have thus far attempted a brief description of 
Northrop's concepts by postulation. Before we begin to dis­
cuss critically the "correct" epistemology we must do justice 
descriptively to the other major category of concept forma­
tion which is termed "concepts by intuition."
Concepts by Intuition
There are several ways here also by which concepts 
can be derived intuitively from experience. These consist of 
four possible methods of seeing reality as (1) a differentiated
24An Etienne Gilson Tribute. Edited by Charles J. 
O'Neil. Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1959, p. 338.
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aesthetic continuum (2) undifferentiated aesthetic continuum 
(3) differentiations seen by inspection (4) field concepts 
seen by inspection.25 We shall briefly define each of these 
categories beginning with the differentiated aesthetic 
continuum.
Differentiated Aesthetic Continuum. Except when a 
particular content or meaning is assigned to the word aes­
thetic, Northrop ordinarily applies it to the world of pure 
sensation where there is an absence of constructs or any im­
position of meaning. This notion of the aesthetic element 
of life is a serious attempt on Northrop's part to transcend 
categories imposed by particular cultures. People anywhere 
generally see the immediate physical world around them as a 
continuation of colors, sounds and other sense data. Parts 
of our field of vision or our range of hearing are marked by 
intensities, focal points, clarity, distinction or as North­
rop puts it, "differentiation." On this point he feels that 
"it would seem that all people could agree on this as a cor­
rect designation of what one immediately apprehends, however 
differently they might analyze it as inquiry proceeds."
25F . S . C . Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and 
the Humanities (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), p. 99.
2*Ibid., p. 95.
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The Bantu might differ radically from the Scotchman 
in his attempt to assign meaning, value or importance to a 
part or all of the world of sensation. But both, unless they 
are physically blind, deaf and unconscious would see their 
immediate surroundings as an experienced quality, so long 
as they are not using concepts by postulation. This quali­
tative world has its shades and its differences but it is a 
basic datum which any philosophy or experience begins with. 
This kind of experience by itself can be extremely difficult 
to communicate exactly to another person even with the help 
of words since language itself structures reality. We can 
approximate perfect communication regarding our experienced 
qualities by trying to point or draw our friend’s attention 
to an immediately given factor, and thereby create a concept 
by intuition. If it were possible to have two persons who 
have left their postulations behind them, sitting one evening 
under the skies and if all of a sudden a shooting star occurs 
and one person points skywards and says to the other ’’Look'.
A flash" he would be attempting to express a concept by in­
tuition which is also a concept dependent on the differentia 
ated aesthetic continuum. He has pointed to one factor, the 
flash, among many other possible focii of attention. By 
pointing to the flash he has differentiated it from the
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blackness of the night, the swelling from the mosquito bites 
or perhaps the howling of pariahs. All these differentiations 
and their context is a basic sensation-based world of experi­
ence. Therefore, once again when a concept's entire meaning 
is contained in a reference to this world it is a concept 
tautologically speaking based on an awareness of the "differ­
entiated aesthetic continuum." Different people may see dif­
ferent "differentiations" at different times, but the concept 
of a field or continuum where there are some things that stick 
out more than others is the basis of other concepts by in­
tuition. The way other intuitive notions may be classified 
is on the basis of the factor which that notion is trying to 
emphasize or "abstract." Northrop is very careful on the 
meaning of emphasis or "abstraction" here.
By "abstraction" we mean, throughout this chap­
ter, the consideration of certain immediately ap­
prehended factors apart from their immediately ap­
prehended context; we do not mean the "abstract" in 
the sense of the postulated.27
This kind of abstraction is not imageless in nature.
A  shade of green or a screeching noise are both abstractions 
in an intuitive sense. There are several possible levels or 
ways of intuitive knowledge. These will be discussed in turn.
27Northrop, Logic of the Sciences, p. 96.
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do get their meaning. The second point is that although one 
can subjectively see Northrop's centaurs or one's own private 
mermaid it is possible to give logical and transmissible de­
scription of our imaginary objects. But the undifferentiated 
aesthetic continuum cannot be completely described by a set 
of logically related symbols to someone who has not known it 
first hand. Therefore, it is truly an intuitive concept 
rather than a postulated concept. Yet another way of abstract­
ing is the method known as the Concept of the Differentiations,
Concept of the Differentiations can be regarded as em­
phasizing exclusively what the previous method neglects com­
pletely. This is the set of particulars of immediately known 
existence. This should not be equated, it seems to us, with 
Aristotelian epistemology. Aristotle was enough of a student 
of Plato to hold on to fragments of Plato's theory of forms.
In contrast, Northrop's category here again is purely intui­
tive in two ways. It can refer either to sensed differences 
"outside" such as green, yellow or a whistle, or it can refer 
to introspected particulars which are also known directly, 
such as pains and pleasures. Perhaps this category can be 
better understood by examining our concepts and comparing them 
to one of Northrop's own statements on this subject. He says
The differentiations which one immediately ap­
prehends may be given (a) through the senses or (b)
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introspectively. The former we shall call concepts 
by sensation, the latter concepts by Introspection. 
"Blue," in the sense of the immediately sensed color, 
is a concept by sensation. "Wants" and the images 
of phantasy are examples of concepts by introspection, 
following Professor C. I. Lewis, "concepts by
inspection."28
The last intuitive method is that of the "Field Con­
cepts by Inspection."
Field Concepts by Inspection. This method of know­
ing apparently did not occur originally in Northrop's philos­
ophy. But it is another example of the intellectual serious­
ness of Northrop's search for knowledge that he modified his 
thinking to accommodate what he thought was good evidence. 
Once again, in typical fashion, Northrop exactly identifies 
the source of an idea or influence. He states "Professor 
George P. Conger has called my attention to an additional con­
cept by intuition which is obtainable from the differentiated 
aesthetic continuum by abstraction."29
This abstraction primarily points to only a certain 
factor among the other factors and yet somehow excludes an 
examination of other factors. During this process attention 
is not removed from the total field qua field. This is a
O QLogic of the Sciences, p. 98.
29charles Moore (ed.) Philosophy-East and West, p.
189.
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One of these is the "Concept of the Indefinite" or Undiffer­
entiated Aesthetic Continuum.
The Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum is primarily 
an "abstraction" from the first concept by intuution we had 
mentioned. Any concept that de-emphasizes the distinctions 
and refers completely to the total "field" or "continuum" is 
a concept intuition of this special type. This is a concept 
which often is the clue to meaning in many Eastern philos­
ophies and is extremely difficult, although possible, for a 
Westerner to grasp. More will be said of this concept and 
its implications later in our observation of religious as­
pects of Northrop's philosophy as well as of his attempt to 
analyze "Eastern" thought.
However, one possible question may arise at this 
point. Since some people may not actually "see" this con­
tinuum, is not this concept a postulated concept or a con­
struct like a centaur or a mermaid? If the answer is yes, 
then the consistency of Northrop's epistemological categories 
may be seriously questioned. But there is the suggestion of 
an answer to this problem in Northrop's discussion. The 
first point to be remembered here is that he is not dealing 
yet with the "objective" validity of this categorical method 
but that this is the actual way some philosophical concepts
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category which is difficult to explain. This may best be 
done in Northrop's own words.
It is a specific inspected quality in the aes­
thetic continuum with all other differentiations, 
but not the continuum itself, neglected. Such a 
concept by intuition we shall term a field concept 
by inspection. A philosophy which takes this type 
of concept as basic and sufficient will be positi- 
vistic in that it admits only concepts by intuition 
but will differ from most m o d e m  Western positivism 
by holding a monistic rather than a pluralistic 
theory of the immediately apprehended.^®
Unfortunately Northrop does not explain this concept 
in an elaborate fashion. He states that this conceptualiza­
tion occurs whenever there is "any instance" of differentia­
tions which is considered as "inseparable" from the undiffer­
entiated continuum. In a very brief statement he refers to 
two possible illustrations of the use of this category, "in 
this connection the philosophy of Bradley is suggestive, as 
is also Gestalt psychology."31
These two examples are in some ways unfortunate. 
Gestalt psychology is by no means so defined by psychologists 
that it can be clearly classified by anyone using Northrop's 




intuitive system. Thus the problem of using it may be illus­
trated by the discussion of Gestalt theory by the noted psy­
chologist Gardner Murphy. In analyzing the "essence" of the 
method of Gestalt, Murphy states "that aspect of Gestalt psy­
chology which seems to this writer to be most fundamental and 
at the same time most incompletely worked out is the defini­
tion of membership character."3% Next, Murphy goes on to 
illustrate two completely different approaches used by Gestalt 
psychologists without any clear "synthesis" of the two ap­
proaches into one category or concept. Thus,
At times one discovers in the Gestalt literature 
the conception that all the elements or component 
parts of a total need to be seen in their inter­
relations in order to understand the structure.33
If this is so, then Gestaltian theory as described here could
be adequately categorized as consisting of logical concepts
by intuition and would not need the seemingly vague category
of field concepts by inspection. Murphy goes on further to
discuss the ambivalence of the Gestalt theory regarding basic
fundamental assumptions in its theory of knowledge. Murphy
states that often right after Gestalt literature seemingly
32 Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern 
Psychology (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949).
33lbid.
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emphasizes relationship between éléments, a shift occurs.
On another page, however, one discovers that 
there are no elements or component parts. Each as­
pect or phase of the total manifests these attributes 
which each must possess if it is to stand at a par­
ticular point and function in a particular role; at­
tributes which belong ^  the elements themselves are 
not definable. If this second is true, then obvi­
ously the first is far from the mark.3^
In the light of Professor Murphy's remarks one could see this
second method as not involving concepts by postulation but
more nearly involving an intuitive method of seeing the
differentiations and the continuum. Because of the apparent
ambivalence of the epistemological aspects of Gestalt's
theory, Northrop's use of the theory as an example of field
concepts by inspection subjects the meaning of the category
to a variety of possible interpretations.
The only other hint of an example of this last con­
cept that is given occurs when Northrop lists without ex­
planation "the philosophy of Bradley." This reference, like 
the Gestalt example, does not clarify the seeming ambiguity 
of field concepts by inspection. Bradley is primarily known 
as an English idealist. Professor Montague goes further and 
classifies Bradley as being representative of "absolute 
idealism which, under the leadership of F. H. Bradley, had
34ibid.
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come to be the dominant form of thought at Oxford.”35 Monta­
gue proceeds to describe the absolute idealists in the follow­
ing terms :
According to the absolute idealists, the world 
as we see it is not the real world, but a world of 
appearance. The true reality, the Absolute, is an 
eternal and unitary system of experience in which 
our concepts and ideals are transcended and
transmuted.36
If Montague is even partly correct in his description 
of Bradley's philosophy there is certainly some degree of 
postulation involved. Assuming this conclusion to be correct 
field concepts by inspection seem to go beyond the require­
ments of concepts by intuition3? which by Northrop's own
35Montague, The Ways of Knowing. p. 135.
36 Ibid.
37gince this passage was written a telephone inter­
view with Professor Northrop shed some light on this problem. 
He said that although Bradley is an idealist the "ethical 
factor" in his philosophy was primary and distinctive and was 
"intuitive in character." However, he also agreed that Brad­
ley's philosophy had postulated characteristics as well. 
Seemingly, then, he is using only part of Bradley's philos­
ophy as an example of an intuitive concept by inspection while 
not including other aspects of Bradley's English neo-Hegelian 
idealism and its non-intuitive characteristics. This clari­
fies somewhat his use of Bradley as an example but still 
leaves the category of field concepts by inspection in an un­
finished and inconq>lete state. It still seems like a bor­
derline case between intuition and postulation. Also there 
is still a great danger in comparative philosophy of arbi­
trarily looking at part of a philosophical system and seeing 
field concepts by inspection while there might be other
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definition "gain their entire meaning from the immediately 
app rehended. ' ' 3 ®
A second possibility is that Northrop regards this 
as a borderline concept. Just as logical concepts by intui­
tion are diluted or weak forms of concepts by postulation so 
also Northrop may perhaps regard field concepts by inspection 
as a weak form of intuition approaching postulation but start­
ing with intuitively known reality. This last alternate 
meaning seems highly probable but one cannot help wishing 
that Northrop had avoided the chance of honest confusion and 
elaborated with "concrete" examples.
"Inspection" brings us to the end of the discussion 
of intuitive concepts. Care was taken to ensure that in our 
elaboration of these epistemological categories that a subtle 
unannounced shift into the "evaluative" mode of thinking was 
avoided as much as possible. What remains to be done before 
we proceed to Northrop's own "correct" epistemology is to ex­
plore briefly some of the implications and usefulness of this 
set of categories.
postulated factors which, if taken into account by a differ­
ent observer, may make the same philosophical system seem 
dependent on perhaps logical concepts by intuition (Telephone 
conversation, 2-16-1964).
38Northrop, Logic of the Sciences, p. 95.
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Some Implications of the Categories 
of Knowledge
Northrop has attempted to categorize all the possible 
ways with which men and philosophers have begun their search 
for knowledge. These ways are relevant in almost every field 
of human endeavor. Just as students of politics since Aris­
totle have known that man is basically a social or "political" 
animal, so also students of man, including anthropologists, 
have known that man is a symbol creating animal. Northrop 
is constantly aware of the role of symbols in man's social 
and personal experience. For this reason, irrespective of 
the nature of the subject of his immediate interest, Northrop 
keeps his epistemological tools always at hand.
Apart from Northrop's contributions in other areas 
his categorizations of ways of knowing are per se a signifi­
cant set of contributions to problems of classification in 
epistemology and semantics. The classes of concepts seem to 
be fairly clear and self-evident with some minor reservations 
that have already been indicated. Yet as indicated before, 
some academicians have at times erred in understanding them. 
Often the error is simply one of not reading enough of North­
rop, or reading him closely enough. A lesson in this mistake 
is the case of Pitrim Sorokin, Harvard sociologist, who
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although generally synçathetic to many aspects of Northrop's 
works, at times misunderstands Northrop's categories. Thus, 
Sorokin basically claims that the theoretic-aesthetic, or 
what is also called the postulation-intuition modes of know­
ing, are insufficient to account for a variety of methods of 
cognition. After stating his own system Sorokin states:
In the light of this theory, the main shortcoming 
of Northrop's dyad is that in his "aesthetic" form he 
unites two fundamentally different forms of cognition, 
truth, aspects of the true reality and of the cul­
tural super-systems ; Sensate and Ideational. Even in 
the foregoing brief characterization, the profound 
differences of these two forms is obvious; in no way 
can they be identified with each other and treated as 
one "aesthetic" form.39
Sorokin in his footnotes refers^® to passages from 
The Meeting of East and West alone for his sources of infor­
mation .
Yet in one of the very passages to which Sorokin re­
fers, Northrop makes clear that several types of concepts by 
intuition are possible.41 These concepts are "united" only 
when Northrop is showing the differences between them and
oq
Pitrim A. Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age 
of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951).
40lbid.. p. 336.
41p. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 447.
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several possible concepts by postulation which are "united" 
again only for contrast. But among concepts by intuition 
alone there are vast differences, and the same is true for 
the "postulated" concepts. It is precisely because of this 
that at least as early as 1939, long before Sorokin's elab­
orate commentary, Northrop had painstakingly worked out^Z the 
categories we have already discussed. Professor Sorokin ap­
parently operates on the basis of only partial information 
about Northrop's categories which involve many distinctions 
and not just "unities."
A  lesson to be learned is that these categories can 
have several possible uses. The first is that of providing 
a "descriptive" method in order to lay the groundwork for 
Northrop's own theory of knowledge which is taken up in the 
next chapter. Secondly, its attempt to meet the dire need 
for a "comparative" method for "comparative philosophy" can 
also be noted. Without a method or a common frame of refer­
ence the possibility of any objective comparison of philos­
ophies or cultures occurring is quite limited. We would be 
dependent on culture-bound "common-sense" alone to help us
^^See Northrop's 1939 presentation at University of 
Hawaii's East-West Philosopher's conference in Charles A. 
Moore, Philosophy-East and West, pp. 168-234.
73
understand another culture's philosophy, science, law, lan­
guage, religion, politics and many other complicated forms 
of social expression and even "behavior." Thirdly, the cate­
gories provide a semantical theory important to politics and 
law which we will take up later. Finally, the categories 
are crucial to an understanding of two things: (1) Northrop's 
philosophy of natural and social science, and (2) his specu­
lative and evaluative ventures in political theory and 
jurisprudence.
CHAPTER III 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND NATURE
Northrop's analysis of the various possible ways of 
knowing has been already carefully described. All philo­
sophical systems, political theories, methods and speculation 
can be classified according to Northrop by using his cate­
gories or by using combinations of these categories.
The discussion of these philosophical categories pri­
marily served as a prelude for our introduction to Northrop's 
own method and approach to an understanding of nature. His 
"natural" philosophy is crucial for an understanding of his 
ideas on "political" philosophy and without a thorough exami­
nation of the former the task of appreciating his political 
speculation can become unnecessarily complicated and diffi­
cult. The complication arises from the fact that Northrop 
maintains that all cultural and political ideologies or phi­
losophies make certain assumptions about what "nature" is 
like. "Nature," therefore, as men know it, has a variety of
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meanings relative to the ideas and assumptions of particular 
cultures. Yet a modern mature science, physics for instance, 
can give us today a glimpse of nature that is more "universal" 
in character and less relative and parochial, according to 
Northrop. Stated differently, his thesis is that the methods 
of modern science give us the most adequate view of nature 
that is possible and therefore can also help demonstrate the 
adequacy or inadequacy of the views of nature that exist in 
social and political theories. Northrop's analysis of modern 
science is primarily epistemological in character.
The emphasis on epistemology is one of several per­
sistent characteristics of Northrop. This does not mean that 
he completely neglects metaphysical questions about the sub­
stance of nature. Actually as he himself is constantly aware, 
being a professional philosopher, there are metaphysical im­
plications in all philosophical analyses, even in the attempts 
by complete positivists to bypass metaphysics. But he is 
even more concerned about the kind of metaphysics that leaves 
its epistemological tools unsharpened and crude, for these 
tools, crude as they may be, provide the basis for metaphysi­
cal systems. The best way, then, to understand any system 
of thought, whether it is speculative philosophy or a spe­
cialized social science is to analyze the method or
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epistemology involved. In some areas the epistemology may 
be specifically stated, as Plato often does in the Republic, 
whereas in other areas the epistemology used may be covert 
and difficult to extricate. The latter is particularly true 
of many aspects of the natural sciences. This writer has 
often been frustrated in his attempt to extract a coherent 
scientific method from discussions with "practicing" physi­
cists . Some have maintained that they primarily tinker around 
without any theory in mind and are therefore purely inductive 
in their orientation. And yet if this writer were to "tinker 
around" in a physics laboratory some rather bad physics would 
result.
An orientation towards epistemology, therefore, in­
volves acting as though one is "from Missouri" and being 
skeptical about a scientist’s attempts to describe his own 
method, even when a competent scientist is involved. The 
following passage illustrates Northrop's own skepticism on 
this point.
In this connection, Albert Einstein himself gives 
us very important advice. At the very beginning of 
a paper "On the Method of Theoretical Physics" he 
writes, "If you want to find out anything from the 
theoretical physicists about the methods they use, I 
advise you to stick closely to one principle: don’t 
listen to their words, fix your attention on their 
deeds." Obviously this is excellent advice, and, as 
we shall see, Einstein has followed it, illustrating
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all his statements about scientific method and episte­
mology by specific illustrations from technical scien­
tific theories and the technical scientific methods 
which they entail in their formulation, discovery and 
verification.1
Northrop's insistence on the primacy of epistemology 
is demonstrable in yet another example. In discussing White­
head's philosophy he criticizes any attempt to understand 
Whitehead which begins with the letter's Process and Reality. 
Whitehead's metaphysics, Northrop reminds us, follows from 
his epistemology or philosophy of science which Whitehead 
had clearly worked out in his The Organization of Thought 
(1917), The Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919), The Con­
cept of Nature (1920), and The Principle of Relativity (1922).
It has been necessary to remind ourselves of 
these historical facts because since then Process and 
Reality has been published. The novelty, imaginative 
scope, and metaphysical subtlety of this work have 
tended to cover up the earlier treatises, to the 
detriment not merely of a study and appreciation of 
Whitehead's philosophy of science but also of Process 
and Reality itself. For it must be noted that the 
last third of this work is given exclusively to the 
philosophy of science. Not merely in its chronologi­
cal origin but also in its final conclusion Whitehead's 
most systematic and definitive metaphysical book is
. S. C. Northrop, Einstein's Conception of Science 
in Albert Einstein; Philosopher-Scientist. Edited by Paul 
Arthur Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1949). 
Northrop's quotation from Einstein is from page 30 in a vol­
ume of his collected papers, entitled The World as _I See It. 
New York: Covici Friede, 1934.
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part and parcel of his philosophy of science.%
In this position that epistemology is more important 
than other more "substantive" aspects of physics and other 
sciences, Northrop's thesis finds added support in the writ­
ings of Henry Margenau, who has been a distinguished profes­
sor of Natural Philosophy and Physics at Yale. Professor 
Margenau, emphasizing the importance of epistemology, states
Metaphysics is an odious word in some scientific 
quarters. Its meaning has fluctuated widely through­
out the history of philosophy. But since Kant it has 
tended to designate two large branches of thought, 
ontology and epistemology. We hold with Kant that 
epistemology must precede ontology and that episte­
mology denotes the methodology of the cognitive proc­
ess . The methodology of science involves deliverances 
of sense as well as rules of correspondence, constructs, 
and principles regulating constructs. Having learned 
that the latter are not conveyed by sensory data and 
yet function in guiding experience, we should call 
them metaphysical principles in the m o d e m  sense of 
the word. Metaphysical principles, thus understood, 
are an inqportant part of all procedures which ulti­
mately define reality.3
Professor Margenau further illustrates and supports 
Northrop's claim that no science can neglect epistemology in 
yet another passage.
2Northrop, Whitehead's Philosophy of Science in The 
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Edited by Paul Arthur 
Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Conq>any, 1951), pp. 167- 
168.
q■’Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality: A 
Philosophy of Modern Physics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950j,
pp. 80-81.
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To deny the presence, indeed the necessary presence, 
of metaphysical elements in any successful science is 
to be blind to the obvious, although to foster such 
blindness has become a highly sophisticated endeavor in 
our time. Many reputable scientists have joined the 
ranks of the exterminator brigade, which goes noisily 
about chasing metaphysical bats out of scientific bel­
fries. They are a useful crowd, for what they extermi­
nate is rarely metaphysics--it is usually bad physics.4
Northrop is also equally critical of those theorists 
in physical and natural sciences who would neglect the find­
ings of fact that sciences produce and would build an episte­
mology out of sheer air. The briefest summary of Northrop's 
thesis on the relationship between epistemology and science 
is in a statement by Einstein which is echoed in Northrop's 
works.
The reciprocal relation of epistemology and science 
is of noteworthy kind. They are dependent upon each 
other. Epistemology without contact with science be­
comes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology 
is--insofar as it is thinkable at all--primitive and 
muddled.5
Northrop's epistemology is not, therefore, a piece 
of armchair philosophy, but as should be increasingly evident, 
is the foundation of his system and in turn it is dependent 
on an analysis of the "objective facts" that science uncovers.
4lbid.. pp. 12-13.
5paul A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein; Philosopher- 
Scientist (Evanston, Illinois : The Library of Living Philos­
ophers, 1949), pp. 683-684.
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We have briefly referred to the "ideal" epistemology 
previously as "radical empiricism in epistemic correlation 
with logical realism." To examine this more closely is our 
present task, and is necessary to an understanding of Northrop.
Radical Empiricism and Logical Realism are, according 
to Northrop, two different ways of knowing and when they are 
related together through "epistemic correlations" we have ob­
jective, scientific and valid knowledge about the world around 
u s . In contrast with these two valid ways of knowing is the 
erroneous method that is termed Naive Realism. At this stage 
a legitimate question may arise. What is the relationship be­
tween these three categories and the categories we had estab­
lished in a previous chapter?
In the first set of categories we have discussed, 
Northrop was simply describing various methods of cognition. 
The new categories are, however, part of his evaluative frame 
of reference. Radical Empiricism and Logical Realism together 
are "trustworthy" ways of knowing, whereas Naive Realism con­
stitutes an "untrustworthy" epistemology.
Naive Realism
Naive Realism in Northrop's terminology is broadly 
used to categorize any theory which does not clearly separate
81
"concepts by intellection" from pure immediate sense data. 
More specifically, it is any theory which assumes that obser­
vation, sensed facts, or "feeling" give us objective knowl­
edge. Actually the term is not exclusively used by Northrop 
alone. William Pepperell Montague, among others, also has 
used the term in his classic work on epistemology. The Ways 
of Knowing. Montague outlines three separate types of naive 
realism: (1) Extreme or Primitive Objectivism (2) Moderate 
or Common-sense Objectivism and (3) Relativistic or New Ob­
jectivism. According to Montague,
The objectivist holds that all the objects which 
are experienced exist physically or externally and 
are independent of mind: I contend that this doctrine 
is properly analysable into the following pair of 
propositions :
1. All experienced objects have an independent 
meaning or essence that gives them a status of pos­
sible physical existence.
2. All perceptually experienced objects (sense- 
data) enjoy a status of actual physical existence.&
Northrop's basic definition of Naive Realism is simi­
lar to Montague's. In the process of describing a philosophy 
based on observation Northrop defines Naive Realism in the 
following terms :
Such a method of knowing restricts the meaning 
of concepts to what is given purely empirically and 
directly with immediacy. To the philosophically
^Montague, The Ways of Knowing, p. 292.
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uncritical such naive direct observation seems to 
warrant the epistemology of naive realism with its 
belief in gross public objects independent of per­
ce ivers , possessing the qualities and shapes which 
one actually senses.7 [Italics provided.]
Northrop's discussion of Naive Realism and his analy­
sis of various naive realistic doctrines is far more exten­
sive than that of Montague or most other episteraologists.
At least two types of postulation and at least two 
types of intuition among the categories we have already dis­
cussed are naive realistic in their approach. These are (1) 
Concepts by Perception, (2) Logical Concepts by Intuition 
(3) Concepts of the Differentiations and (4) Field Concepts 
by Inspection. Each of these four conceptions depends in 
varying degrees on sensed or "intuitively" felt "facts" for 
providing knowledge or rather, put in a different way, immedi­
ate experience provides knowledge in these approaches.
Contemporary political science, as we shall see in 
detail later, provides many examples of Naive Realism in po­
litical theories and political concepts. The concept of 
"power" is a core concept in many political theories and ap­
proaches . "Power" in turn is the key to other aspects of 
political reality. Yet this concept is often used Naive
^Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, p. 193.
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Realistically because in defining the concepts sensed facts 
such as guns, felt or intuitively known facts such as rela­
tionships and theoretical terms such as capability are mixed 
together. The consequence of this mixture is that the con­
cept often will not have a "public" meaning, i.e., a meaning 
that anyone can accurately find. The literature on power is 
replete with examples of the mixture of "observation" and 
knowledge" within the various definitions of power. Inis 
Claude, in a recent work, uses "the term power to denote what 
is essentially military capability--the elements which con­
tribute directly or indirectly to the capacity to coerce, 
kill and d e s t r o y . R o b e r t  A. Dahl also mixes sensed "facts" 
and "felt" "facts" in his attempts to find a formalized con­
cept of "power." He defines his method partly in the follow­
ing terms.
. . .  I propose first to essay a formal definition 
of power that will, I hope, catch something of one's 
intuitive notions as to what the Thing is. By "for­
mal" I mean that the definition will presuppose the 
existence of observations of a kind that may not al­
ways or even frequently be possible.9
Charles Merriam's older theory of power also seems to
Q Inis Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations 
(New York: Random House, 1962), p. 6 .
^Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral 
Science, Vol. 2 (July, 1957), p. 201.
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mix what is observable^® with what is un-observable^^ in 
order to define the concept.
The usual concepts of "power" define the entity in 
terms of directly observed properties, at least in part.
Such an entity is defined in Naive Realistic terms according 
to Northrop's vocabulary.1% The code law of the Hindu caste 
system also involves Naive Realism, since rights and duties 
in that legal system involve sensed differences. The opera- 
tionalist theories of many behavioralists in political science 
also are Naive Realistic to some extent because their major 
concepts depend on direct observation to provide "meaning." 
Also, the theories of many respected political philosophers 
are regarded as naive realistic in character at least in part, 
according to Northrop. Thus, he categorizes Marx as a Naive 
Realist because Marxian social theory supposedly involves 
classifications such as "capitalists," "proletariat" which 
are based both on observation and theoretical "constructs."
As Northrop puts it.
l®Charles Edward Merriam, Political Power (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1934), p. 6.
lllbid.
S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology and 
Practical Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1960), pp. 
85-86. This work will be referred to as simply Philosophical 
Anthropology.
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Marxist materialism, as he and Lenin, following 
Feuerbach, emphasize, calls for a realistic episte­
mology. . . . the notion of an external material ob­
ject is a concept by postulation, not a concept by 
intuition. But description of evolving social in­
stitutions, following the historismus natural his­
tory tradition, calls for concepts by intuition. To 
combine the two types of concept as Marx has done 
is to talk nonsense. It is like saying that elec­
trons are pink.13
Putting Marx, Merriam, Dahl and others into the same 
category seems at first sight to constitute a considerable 
amount of oversimplification. But Northrop puts strange bed­
fellows together under Naive Realism whenever theorists de­
pend on direct observation for providing universal and 
"scientific” knowledge.
The Weakness of Naive Realism. Naive realism is the 
most widespread method used by laymen in many cultures. Many 
professional philosophers also are often naive realistic in 
their epistemologies. But in spite of its "popularity" naive 
realism is an imperfect method of knowing. At times it may 
be useful as a rough and ready method of knowing, but if we 
are searching for transmissible, valid and objective knowl­
edge, naive realism is an incomplete, ambiguous and mislead­
ing technique.
13p. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and 
the Humanities (New York: Meridian Books, 1939), p. 259. 
Hereafter referred to as The Logic.
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Naive realism is a subjective rather than an objac­
tive technique. It is subjective basically because of its 
very dependence on sense data automatically providing knowl­
edge of "objects" and concepts. Northrop is of the opinion 
that the data of the senses vary from person to person and 
sometimes even in the same person depending on his situation 
or organs. Since naive realism often claims objectivity and 
yet depends on sense data which vary from subject to subject 
it is basically an inconsistent philosophy. Here Northrop 
agrees with Hume also that sense data do not demonstrate any 
necessary relationships. As he put it.
As Berkeley and Hume showed the modern West and 
as Confucian, Buddhist and Vedanta Hindu philosophers 
showed the classical Orient, every factor which naive 
realism assumes to be the same for everybody and inde­
pendent of the perceiver turns out to vary from per- 
ceiver to perceiver and hence to be relative to the 
perceiver. The assumption, therefore, that radically 
empirical or naive observation gives objects inde­
pendent of the perceiver with qualities the same for 
everyone breaks down. In fact the common-sense 
theory of naive realism is self contradictory since 
its realism asserts the belief in public objects with 
qualities the same for everybody independent of the 
perceiver and its naive way of knowing gives only 
qualities and relations which vary from perceiver and 
whose e.sse est percipi. Clearly a theory which de­
fines subjects purporting to be independent of per- 
ceivers in terms of objects which vary from perceiver 
to perceiver is self contradictory.14
14ibid., pp. 193-194.
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Marx's concept of the "class struggle" can be cited 
as a relativistic or Naive Realistic concept. The concept is 
not a "public" entity since although it is "meaningful" when 
applied to the political dynamics of 19th century Europe it 
does not apply to the non-dialectical dynamics of Asian soci­
eties, according to Northrop. Also, the western political 
science concept of "interest group," while being suitable for 
"explaining" the American legislative process, would not be 
applicable with equal rigor to tribal politics in Africa.
Some Examples of Naive Realism. Naive Realism is re­
garded as an erroneous method by Northrop. Yet examples of 
naive realism occur in almost every culture and in almost 
every age.'
In the West, Aristotelian physics stands as one of 
the oldest examples of naive realism at work. His indictment 
of Aristotelian epistemology is not an attack on all of Aris­
totle's philosophy, as the following comment by Northrop 
demonstrates:
If I am greatly impressed with Aristotle, as I 
am, because (1) he is the founder of Western naive 
realistic, descriptive, natural history, biological 
science and because of (2 ) what he wrote about 
Proposition 1, Book X of Euclid and his predecessors, 
but am not equally impressed, as this book will make 
evident, by his theory of knowledge or his physics, 
metaphysics, and part of his theology, the blame for 
the latter judgement must not be placed by the
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reader at Bakewell's d o o r . 15
Aristotle is taken to task primarily because he 
clearly depended on sense data for providing his meanings 
and categories, for although Aristotle is often honored as a 
forerunner of modern science, Northrop regards him as prima­
rily a subjectivist since his dependence on the sense world
is naive. Aristotle in turn, as is well known, was a major
influence in St. Thomas' philosophy. Not until the coming 
of Galileo and Newton was naive realism to see the beginning 
of decay. According to Northrop
In Aristotle's physics the four elementary 
scientific objects, earth, air, fire and water, were 
defined in terms of the two pairs of sensed oppo­
sites, hot-cold and wet-dry. The important point to
note in this physics, for our present purposes, is 
that the scientific object in Aristotelian and 
Thomistic physics was defined in terms of sensed 
qualities. It was not an imaginatively known entity 
such as chemical element with the shape of one of 
the five regular solids of Plato's chemistry and 
physics. In Aristotelian physics the distinction 
between theoretically known nature and sensed nature 
was dropped. The real world of scientific knowl­
edge was the world given through the senses. The 
active intellect merely turned the particular sen­
sations given through the senses into universels 
entering into the universal propositions of scien­
tific knowledge.16
l^Northrop, Man, Nature and God, pp. 10-11.
. S. C. Northrop, "The Implications of Traditional 
Modern Physics foi; M o d e m  Philosophy," Revue International 
De Philosophie (April, 1949). Burxelles, p. 1.
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Other naive realistic philosophers of science are 
strange bedfellows. Thus, St. Thomas^^ with his mixture of 
sensation and reason and the Marxists^® with their fusion of 
matter and mind are, to Northrop, in varying degrees Naive 
Realists. Similarly, the Indian Charvakian materialists^^ 
are in the same camp as the non-materialist Alfred North 
Whitehead.20
Of course, there are great differences among the var­
ious possible naive realistic philosophies. But insofar as 
they depend on the sense world for "objective” knowledge, they 
can be classified together and to that extent they do not pro­
vide truly scientific methods. This does not mean that these 
philosophies are inadequate in other limited areas of philos­
ophy and some particular problems of science. Aristotle's 
epistemology, in spite of its "limitations" at an abstract 
level, is adequate for classifications in science or what 
Northrop calls the "natural history" stage of science.
l^Northrop, Meeting of East and West, p. 264.
IBlbid.. p. 2 2 1 .
1 QNorthrop, Complexity, p. 196.
^^Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 211. Whitehead's 
concept of "eternal objects" is a good example of Naive Real­
ism, since according to Northrop, these objects are combina­
tions of sense data with abstract patterns and teleology.
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Naive Realism is not limited to the philosophies of 
the sages. Our "common-sensical” everyday world is to a re­
markable extent a naive realistically established world. The 
tables, chairs, wives, planes are all objects which are known 
naive realistically. Yet, these are subjective apprehensions 
of the world around us simply confirmed by long experience. 
However, to use Northrop's example, the "objective" greenness 
of the grass can be changed to another color by a simple oper­
ation on one's eye. Reality in the naive realistic world then 
depends on one's vantage point. The Japanese play "Rasomohon" 
contains illustrations of this end effect of naive realism. 
Given the same event the various characters in the play have 
completely different and yet for the most part "honest" find­
ings of fact. Each character abstracted his interpretation 
from reality as he saw it and since the frame of reference of 
each was different, "objective" truth remained mysterious, il­
lusory and unattainable.
The naive realistic world, therefore, is a subjective 
world since sense data precedes and then helps form concepts. 
Since sense data vary from person to person, we cannot have 
knowledge that is, in Arnold Brechts' terminology, transmis­
sible. To have transmissible knowledge we must have a frame 
of reference that does not vary from person to person. The
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sense world cannot provide that frame of reference. An il­
lustration that is one of Northrop's favorites can show his 
position on this point.
It is easy to show that we do not know with our 
senses the public now-ness of even two spatially 
separated events which are within the local horizon 
and no farther apart than a relatively few miles. 
Consider the following example:
Imagine two loud and very sharp explosions which 
occur eight miles apart. Suppose, also, that a level, 
straight road, upon which we and others are standing, 
connects the places of the two explosions and that a 
person. A, is at a point near the easternmost explo­
sion, a person B, is midway between the two explosions, 
and a person, C, is at a point near the westernmost 
explosion. Suppose, also, that the three people are 
from the bush of some un-Westernized, isolated spot in 
Africa and, therefore, know nothing about the Western 
mathematical physics of acoustics with its concept by 
intellection theories and their technological gadgets, 
such as telescopes and Greenwich-time-set watches.
Let us then ask these three persons. A, B, and C, the 
following question: Did the two explosions heard by 
you occur at the same time, or not? Let it be noted 
that unless these three persons give the same answer 
to this question, then no one senses a public time 
even over the short distance of eight miles, to say 
nothing of over the spatial extension of the entire 
cosmos . 2 2
In a somewhat humorous vein Northrop goes on to stip­
ulate that an Aristotle, a St. Thomas and a Mortimer Adler
21Northrop has used this example in an interview 
with the author and it also appears in Man, Nature and God, 
pp. 211-213.
^^Man, Nature and God, pp. 211-212.
1
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should keep a close watch on A, B and C to "check" on the 
accuracy of their oppositions. The fact that Aristotle, St. 
Thomas and Adler are considered to be naive realists obviously 
has something to do with their being picked as the guardians 
of observation in this example.
The whole purpose of this example is clearly to indi­
cate that sense data do not give us scientific, objective and 
public knowledge. The three persons will in all honesty give 
three different accounts of the time at which the two explo­
sions took place, provided they are depending on sensed 
experience.
In short, even within the local horizon, sensed 
newness, i.e., sensed temporal simultaneity, is not 
public newness. Hence, we no more know a public 
time through the senses as given in naive observation 
than we know a public space. But for any object to 
be an external object, i.e., a public object the same 
for all knowers, it must be in public space and time.
It follows that even if, as is not the case, any ob­
ject given to our senses were, qualitatively and 
imagefully, the same object for all observers, that 
object would not be an external public object.23
Many other examples of naive realism can be given 
but it would be more fruitful to proceed with the alternative 
to naive realism. ^  has been indicated, there are three dis­
tinct stages in the "correct" scientific method ; logical
23̂Ibid,
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realism, empiricism and epistemic correlations. For an un­
derstanding of the epistemology of Northrop these stages 
should not be fused together. Neither should each be re­
garded as an adequate tool by itself. Each of these will be 
discussed in turn.
Logical Realism
Logical Realism is a portion of Northrop's philosophy 
which probably provides the greatest difficulty in clearly 
understanding him. No brief "definition" can make logical 
realism into a clear concept in spite of the fact that in 
many ways it is not a novel concept.
Logical Realism springs from the assertion that there 
are and there can be concepts which are not at first per­
ceived in the senses. In this respect Logical Realism is 
identical with the process that involves in Northropian terms, 
"concepts by postulation which are concepts by intellection." 
Not all concepts by intellection are necessarily based on a 
Logical Realistic frame of reference but if we first discuss 
the validity of concepts by intellection we can then venture 
into judgments on Logical Realism.
The Need for Concepts by I n t e l l e c t i o n Concepts by 
intellection are not completely modern inventions. Plato and
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several pre~Platonists were well aware of the basic needs for 
concepts by intellection. Plato's epistemology, according to 
Northrop and many other authorities, involved a theory of forms 
which did not depend on sense data for its meanings. Northrop 
notes that
As Socrates noted in his exposition of the di­
vided line in Book VI of Plato's Republic, to get 
ideas that give objective naturalistic scientific 
knowledge and provide the common meanings necessary 
to define a common law or justice and goodness, the 
same for all knowers, we have to drop all i m a g e s . ^4
Some modern interpretations of Plato have categorized 
him as an idealist without clarifying the exact epistemologi- 
cal base of Plato's idealism. For instance, A. E. Taylor in 
his brief but incisive study of Plato observes that
The "theory of knowledge" is thus the very centre 
of Plato's philosophy. He takes his stand upon the 
fundamental assumption that there really is such a 
thing as "science," i.e. as a body of knowable truth 
which is valid always and absolutely and for every 
thinking mind,25 ^
\
Taylor's understanding of Plato's epistemology is similar to 
that of Northrop and is evident throughout the former's work. 
The Mind of Plato, including the following passage:
ey /
Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 228.
^^A. E. Taylor, The Mind of Plato (University of 
Michigan Press, 1960), p. 36. Ann Arbor Paperbacks.
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It is primarily from mathematics that Plato has 
derived his conception of science and its concepts and 
their relation to the world of experience. Now, as 
Plato himself reminds us in the Republic, the visible 
diagrams of the mathematician are only aids to the 
imagination; they are not themselves the true objects 
of his reasoning.26
The use of Platonic deduction was, as Northrop shows 
repeatedly and as many other people are aware of already, 
gradually de-emphasized in the Western world with the rise 
of Aristotelian and later Thomistic philosophy. But with 
the rise of modern science Northrop sees more frequent usage 
of concepts by postulation which are also concepts by intel­
lection. The brief name for these concepts is "constructs,” 
Northrop's position that theoretical imageless constructs are 
crucial to modern science finds acceptance among several re­
spectable students of science. The Yale physicist and phil­
osopher, Henry Margenau, for instance, supports Northrop in 
the following statement.
The passage to orderly knowledge involves the 
positing of constructs, which are the rational elements 
to which datai experience is made to correspond. An 
external object is the simplest construct which we 
habitually set over against most kinds of sensory aware­
ness. Others are geometric forms, numbers, and most 
of the refined entities of modern p h y s i c s . 27
^^Ibid., p. 49.
27Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality, pp. 72-73
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Einstein also, in several statements of his own 
philosophy of science, seems to indicate that "pure thought" 
or constructs may be given an independent value of their own. 
He has stated that "since . , . perception only gives infor­
mation of this external world or of 'physical reality' in­
directly, we can only grasp the latter by speculative means."28
Einstein, for example, in another statement says that
We have thus assigned to pure reason and exper­
ience their places in a theoretical system of physics.
The structure of the system is the work of reason; 
the empirical contents and their mutual relations 
must find their representation in the conclusions of 
the theory.29
According to these thinkers, then, there certainly 
seems to be a separation between the "intellectual" aspects 
of the scientific method and the "sensed" aspects of the same 
method, and this distinction is an important one for North­
rop 's philosophy. Whether this distinction is a completely 
valid one or not is not our central concern but belongs 
rightly in the province of philosophers of science. We can 
only indicate that "reason" in the sense of mathematical
2 8Quoted in Northrop, The Meeting of East and West,
p. 294.
29Quoted in "Einstein's Conception of Science,"
Albert Einstein; Philosopher-Scientist (New York: Tudor Pub­
lishing Company, 1949), p. 392.
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"imageless" thought, according to these several distinguished 
philosophers of science and scientists, is crucial to modern 
knowledge. The consensus among Margenau, Einstein, Northrop, 
and others seems to indicate this. The role of concepts by- 
intellection at least seems to be an important one. Modern 
"mature" physical science does seem to need the creation of 
constructs which are unambiguous logically related factors 
which leaves nothing to subjective perception of sensed data 
of the particular observer or set of observers. But whatever 
may be the value or initial stimulus or source of a construct 
it itself must be theoretically constructed by "intellection" 
and "deductive" logic or else we would have a Naive Realistic 
hypothesis, and our knowledge of a public world cannot be 
based on such a theory which simultaneously fuses sensed data 
and theoretical data. Particularly this is true in our pres­
ent age where in the physics of electrons and in the laws for 
modern corporations we cannot sense all aspects of reality.
Concepts by intellection marks, therefore, the point 
where Northrop according to his own claims parts ways with 
his teacher, Alfred North Whitehead. According to Northrop, 
Whitehead's "theory of extensive abstraction"^^ always even
30The analysis of Northrop's position is based pri­
marily on private conversations with Professor Northrop 
during his April 1963 visit to the University of Kansas.
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according to Whitehead never loses sight of the sense world. 
Whitehead's method, it seems, is adequate when there is a 
complete and exact identity between the sense data a theory 
calls for and that which is actually observable. As North­
rop stated it, "for abstractive theory-relatedness in events 
in sense world must be i s o m o r p h i c B u t  when we deal with 
phenomena that are not completely or directly observable, 
naive realism or abstractive theory cannot give us reliable 
public knowledge. For modern "unseen" entities a new kind 
of construct which asserts more than "intuition" i.e., sense 
data or feeling can give us and which is imagelessly stated 
is necessary. This is true for understanding "electrons" or 
"quantum physics" and even "simultaneous" events which are 
separated by time and space.
Earlier in this chapter we gave the hypothetical ex­
ample of two explosions and three sets of observers at dif­
ferent points giving their description of the time of the ex­
plosions. Just relying on sense data the three observers 
cannot fix a time that is public and objective. According to 
Northrop, in this situation and other cases of establishing 
the "simultaneity of spatially separated events Whitehead
31lbid,
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holds that simultaneity is given in t u i t i v e l y " w h e r e a s  
Northrop, relying on Einstein, maintains that only for events 
occurring side by side is intuition adequate.
Without resolving the differences between "extensive 
abstraction" and "concepts by intellection" we hqve given a 
brief description of Northrop's understanding of "constructs " 
Briefly, Northrop's "constructs" or "entities" are concepts 
whose meaning is given and assigned by theorists in any 
science within a deductively formed set of meanings without 
depending on the sensed world. He frequently affirms, and we 
shall examine and elaborate on this later, that man's mind is 
not merely a Lockean tabula rasa or blanked tablet. The very 
structure of man's neurophysiology allows various logically 
related concepts to be formed without reference to sense data. 
This means that man has a kind of a priori way of knowing in 
his nervous system but the a priori is not simply "synthetic" 
in character. It is more "analytic" since the categories or 
values can be freely constructed and logically related. North­
rop argues that people find it difficult to understand a logi­
cally realistic concept because by sheer habit most of us are 
used to thinking in terms of sensed data. He expresses his
^^Ibid. It must be noted that Northrop uses "intui­
tively" to mean "directly known through the senses" or 
"through feeling."
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argument in the following manner :
Let me take the problem of the difficulty people 
have in recognizing that logically realistic concepts 
aren't given through the senses. I believe this goes 
back to the fact that in the modern world, still 
trapped in people’s brains^ is the tabula rasa--a 
theory of the knower. Once you admit the knower to be 
a tabula rasa or, as Aristotle did, mere formless 
matter, before it gets knowledge, then it follows of 
necessity that no concept we have can gain its mean­
ing in any other way than through the senses.
Einstein's concept of "space" and "time," Plato's 
"ideas" and "atomic ratios" are cited by Northrop as exam­
ples of Logically Realistic concepts in science and philos­
ophy. Since political science and legal theory, according 
to him, has not made sufficient use of Logical Realism it is 
difficult to find many precise examples of Logical Realism 
in the literature of these fields. For illustrative pur­
poses, Northrop himself uses Stoic Roman concepts of "legal 
man" and "contract" as examples of political and legal Logi­
cally Realistic constructs.
The Stoic Roman concept that "legal" man is "univer­
sal" man has no meaning whatsoever in our directly observed 
world. We can only "see" black men, white men, eyeless men, 
two eyed men and men with sensed q u a l i t i e s T h e r e f o r e
3 3F . S . C . Northrop, Cross-Cultural Understanding: 
Epistemology in Anthropology (New York: Harper Co., 1964), 
p . 348.
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"universal" man was "any" man or man qua man whose rights 
were not dependent on his physical characteristics. Stoic 
Roman contracts also were Logically Realistic in character. 
This was particularly true of "verbal" contracts wherein 
legal relationships did not exist between sensed categories 
of light skinned Brahmins and dark skinned untouchables. In­
stead the emphasis was on the imageless form or procedures 
of the contracte The substance was left in a variable form. 
The emphasis was on p r o c e d u r e s . ^4
One problem remains before we proceed with other as­
pects of the philosophy of science. This deals with the 
question of the reality of "constructs."
Constructs and Reality. The necessity for constructs 
in physical science does not automatically mean that philos­
ophers of science are in agreement as to the "real" status 
of constructs. On this question Kantians, Neo-Kantians, 
Platonists and those who think like Northrop suggest a number 
of alternatives and a wide divergence exists between people 
who otherwise agree on the necessity of analytically and log­
ically rigorous methods.
For a full discussion see F. S. C. Northrop, The 
Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience (Boston: Little, 
Browiv and :Gompany, 1959) , pp . 216-229 .
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Some positivistic persons maintain that constructs
are simple common frames of reference that have been simply
adopted for semantic convenience. For instance,
. . . Poincare, at least as frequently interpreted, 
and Duhem affirm that such concepts are mere sub­
jective linguistic conventions upon which people 
of common sense and science must agree if they are
to communicate.35
In Kantian philosophy, on the other hand, constructs 
would operate beyond the world of phenomena and therefore we 
could not really know this world except through categories 
which are fixed, rigid and yet a priori. Neo-Kantians, how­
ever, have moved away from Kant’s concept of necessary cate­
gories to more flexible categories. Northrop notes that
Cassirer and Professor Margenau hold that although 
concepts by intellection are not realistic and ontolo­
gical, they have a much more important and even neces­
sary function than the linguistic conventionalists 
suppose. This additional function is that the concepts 
by intellection enjoy a neo-Kantian als ob [as if] reg­
ulative status.36
Professor Hans Reichenbach, the well known philosopher 
of science, also denies any permanent reality to constructs.
He describes his position in the following terms:
We must regard our statements about unobserved
^^Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 216.
3^Ibid., p. 216-217. See Chapter 21 of Margenau's 
The Nature of Physical Reality which touches on this problem.
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objects not as verifiable statements, but as con­
ventions, which we introduce because of the great 
simplification of language. What we know is that 
if this convention is introduced it can be carried 
through without contradictions; that we assume 
the unobserved objects to be identical with the 
observed ones, we arrive at a system of physical 
laws which hold both for observed and unobserved 
objects.37
Einstein also seems to deny Kant's fixed categories 
of mind and regards constructs as products of philosophy 
which are or can be created and then introduced. Einstein's 
position is apparent in the following passage from his words:
The theoretical attitude here advocated is dis­
tinct from that of Kant only by the fact that we do 
not conceive of the "categories" as unalterable 
(conditioned by the nature of the understanding) but 
as (in the logical sense) free conventions. They ap­
pear to be a priori only insofar as thinking without 
the positing of categories and of concepts in general 
would be as impossible as is breathing in a v a c u u m . 38
While the authorities we have discussed for the most 
part seem to support Northrop as to the necessity of con­
structs they seem to cast doubt, in varying degrees to be 
sure, as to whether constructs actually exist in nature. Yet 
Northrop's logical realism asserts that constructed scientific
^^Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 179.
^^Albert Einstein, "Reply to Criticisms," Albert 
Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Vol. II (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1959), p. 674.
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entities are not merely hypothetical objects like ghosts but 
are part and parcel of reality. Therefore ’’constructs” are 
not merely epistemological tools but have ontological status 
and implications also. He is obviously Platonic in this re­
spect although he differs from Plato in a manner we shall 
later describe.
If constructs are mere conventions, then Northrop 
sees this as a new solipsist position. If we ’’agree” on a 
framework we can have approximations of reality. If there 
is no agreement we have no reality. Logical realism claims 
to explain reality without "agreements” and with some cer­
tainty. Logical realism does not postulate at any one time 
all of reality but constantly and progressively moves towards 
total reality.
When so stated with care in terms of asymptoti­
cally approximating toward but never perfectly 
achieving its logically realistic limit, the logi­
cally realistic interpretation of concepts by intel­
lection has the two following merits : (1) It ac­
counts for the subject-to-change-with-further-empir­
ical-information character of such theories. (2 )
With an additional empirically verified assumption 
about the existential import of scientific objects, 
it makes it meaningful to say that the rocks were 
here on this earth, geological ages in the past, 
when there were no Poincares present to specify a 
linguistic convention and keep it constant or any 
Cassirers to project symbols.39
39Northrop, Man, Nature and God, pp. 225-226.
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The logical component of Northrop's Logical Realism 
seems to be more easily defensible than the Platonic Realism 
of the theory. In his defense of Realism Northrop’s involved 
language is clearly his own worst enemy. He seems to imply 
at times that total Reality lies "beyond” the successions of 
constructs which we use to grasp it. This seems to require 
at times, although Northrop does not seem to mean it, an act 
of faith on the part of man. Man is required to believe in 
a system of forms for which there is no available macro-cosmic 
construct as of yet, except in the religious aspects of North­
rop 's philosophy which does not directly concern us in our 
present inquiry. It is sufficient to note in passing that as 
one observer put it
To Northrop nature is creative, for the facts of 
nature are not man-made. The creative "source of the 
making" may be called evolution, God, Allah, Kahweh, 
Brahman, Nirvana, Tao, or the source of the jen, the 
name varying with the philosophy of the culture in
question.40
This particular thesis of Northrop's, that there is 
a nature which is independent of even the "mathematical con­
structs "agreed" upon by men, seems to be an intriguing one 
from a philosophical standpoint. But, since this thesis does
^^Paul Douglass, "Northrop and Curricular Reform," 
Improving College and University Teaching (Oregon State 
University, Autumn, 1963), Quarterly Journal, p. 194,
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not seem to add to or detract from an understanding of the 
substance of Northrop's political theory, we do not intend 
to deal with it directly in our present analysis.
In summation, for the later discussion of Northrop's 
politics the following are the elements of logical realism.
(1) Imageless constructs imply more than the immediate ob­
jects of knowledge and therefore involve ontological and not 
mere epistemological knowledge. (2) There are at least two 
justifications for this : (a) All constructs depend on onto- 
logically real men, scientists and perceivers; we ourselves 
are not figments of the imagination, (b) The increasing 
knowledge of nature through constructs implies that there is 
a real nature about which we slowly learn more and more. (3) 
Therefore scientists are not engaging in mythology but in 
understanding the actual ontologically real nature around us.
Although Northrop's dependence on thought and intel­
lect has been noted as being Platonic, unlike Plato, Northrop's 
venture in the philosophy of science does not end with a 
theory of forms. The world of empiricism and the senses also 
play a role as important as the process of intellection.
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Radical Empiricism
Thus his Radical Empiricism is a "component" of re­
ality and knowledge separate from intellectually known enti­
ties . In making this distinction Northrop is still operating 
in the Platonic tradition. Radical Empiricism is a method 
of knowing the immediate world of our senses. Northrop 
demonstrates his debt to Plato to the extent that
Plato merely continued what Democritus had initiated, 
analyzing the unobservable atoms of the Democritean 
theory into the intuitively given continuum which 
provided their "matter" and the ideal mathematical 
ratio which determined their geometrical form.
Democritus' and Plato's distinction between the 
"sense world" and the "real world" is an example of 
our distinction between what is given to immediate 
apprehension as denoted by concepts by intuition 
and what is proposed by deductive scientific and 
philosophical theory as designated by concepts by 
postulation.41
The sense world in Plato's philosophy was a world of 
flux and decay and the process of obtaining reliable knowl­
edge would do well to avoid it. Plato does seem to make a 
distinction between knowledge and sense perception when he 
tries to separate them into separate categories of episteme 
and aisthesis. Professor Crombie notes that
Aisthesis therefore cannot be identified with
41Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Human­
ities , pp. 87-88.
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episteme. Episteme is to be looked for in the sphere 
of doxa, in the sphere where "the mind concerns it­
self with things that are, itself according to i t s e l f . "42
Attention should be drawn at this point that there are differ­
ences of opinion among scholars regarding what Plato meant 
regarding the sense world and the "mathematical" world of 
knowledge. Northrop’s claim that Plato meant that no reliance 
on sense data was included in Plato’s own theory of knowledge 
is in sharp contrast to an interpretation expressed in 
Crombie’s Examination of Plato's Doctrines. Professor Crombie 
is concerned that doxa may be erroneously understood to mean 
some independent purely intellectual faculty.
Verbally this is a bad description of doxa, for 
it suggests that doxa or knowledge of the external 
world is something that the mind achieves by its own 
resources; and this suggests the picture of aisthesis 
and doxa as parallel "faculties," the former putting 
us in touch with sensible objects, the latter giving 
us some kind of intellectual intuition of arta or 
things that are really real. However congenial this 
may be to certain conventional pictures of Platonism 
it must be rejected.43
Whatever Plato's own position may have been, one thing 
is certain. Northrop himself maintains that in the physics 
of this era since the coming of Einstein Radical Empiricism
I. M. Crombie, Examination of Plato's Doctrines, 
Vol. II (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 26.
43lbid., pp. 26-27.
109
has a special role to play but only at an independent "stage" 
of scientific procedure.
Radical Empiricism consists of whatever we are aware 
of, with immediacy and without the mind adding to or inter­
preting whatever our consciousness or senses deliver to us. 
This kind of awareness has several implications for art, re­
ligion and aesthetics. But in science radical empiricism 
gives us awareness not of entities or objects but mere quali­
ties or successions of sense data. It perceives a blurry 
continuum or panorama; depending on where we focus our senses, 
distinctions and differences begin to appear.
By sense data Northrop means those deliverances of 
smell, sight, sound, taste, touch and feeling of which we are 
aware without any learned categories of thought actually 
structuring reality for u s . He takes great pains to demon­
strate that our everyday world of square tables and round 
moons is influenced by forms and categories which are by­
products of particular cultures. Without these forms we would 
see only transient, perishing and successive images.
Again, Northrop accepts Hume's thesis that this world 
of "sensibles" does not itself demonstrate causality. Although 
he later shows the inadequacy of the Humean position in modern 
physics on the question of what pure sense data shows, he
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accepts the Humean position completely. Real empiricism 
shows no necessary relationships. When we think we "see” 
causal relationships it is primarily a result of previous ex­
perience of successions of data which have been reinforced 
by memory as Hume has attempted to show.
No one in modern times makes us aware, as does 
this notable Scot, of what we would be left with by 
way of factually warrantable beliefs if all that is 
directly and indirectly warrantable is restricted, 
radically empirically, to what is given either in- 
trospectively or through the so-called outer senses.
This is why anyone who has not been wakened from 
his naive "dogmatic slumbers," as were both Kant 
and Einstein by their reading and studying of Hume, 
is likely to keep his mind in the narcotic and 
dogmatic stupor which is naive realistic slumberland.
Hume's position, while sound at one level, is not ac­
curate at another level from Northrop's view-point. Every 
working physicist even if he is Humean in his subjective 
preferences largely ignores Hume in his daily work. Causal 
relationships is varying degrees are involved in p h y s i c s . ^5 
These causal relationships are, however, existent because of 
imageless mathematical relationships which are carefully de­
fined. Only logical realism or intellection can postulate 
causation objectively. Hume himself, as is commonly known,
^^Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 173.
^^See Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality, pp.
389-426.
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left his empiricism in his library and acted as though there
were "causes /' But Hume was aware of only naive realistic
causes rather than logically realistic causes,
. . , in his appeal to what he did "in practice,"
Hume was correct on one point. He saw that meaning­
ful knowledge of a personal self, which is, in some 
sense, the same person today that it was yesterday, 
and of external objects in public space and time, is 
not given by direct introspection or observation 
radically empirically through the "inner or outer" 
senses and can be known only by means of indirectly 
confirmed theory. What he overlooked is that if 
his appeal to what happens pragmatically "in prac­
tice" is not to contradict his correct description 
of what is radically empirically the case in fact, 
he must add to his nominalistic semantic premise, 
inherited, via Bishop Berkeley, from Locke's Essay 
Concerning Human Unders tanding the additional 
epistemological thesis that there also logically 
realistic, indirectly and pragmatically confirmed 
concepts by postulation that, in whole or part, are 
concepts by intellection.46
Northrop's critique of Hume's empiricism is somewhat 
different from that of Whitehead. Whitehead attacks Hume 
from at least two positions. First he criticizes Hume's con­
cept of what sense experience consists of. Professor A. H. 
Johnson, the distinguished student of Whitehead, illustrates 
the letter's position among other places, in the following 
passage.
. . . Whitehead offers very vigorous criticisms of 
this essentially abstract approach to the complex
^^Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 174.
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environment. In presentational immediacy (or to 
speak non-technically, in ordinary sense experience), 
there is a tendency to assign excessive importance 
to clear-cut, apparently unrelated bits of sense data. 
This is the basis of Whitehead's vigorous and recur­
rent criticism of Hume. For Hume, sense data are here, 
now, immediate, and d i s c r e t e . 47
Whitehead also chastizes Hume for his ambivalence in 
being a positivist in theory but not in practice. On the 
first point Northrop agrees with Hume that sense experience 
only gives "unrelated bits of sense data" while he concurs 
in Whitehead's criticism of Hume's ambivalence.
The paradox of Northrop's similarity with and yet 
difference from Hume with respect to relatedness and causal­
ity can be resolved by focusing our attention on Northrop's 
epistemology. It can be recalled that there is a distinct 
bifurcation in Northrop's theory of knowledge although he 
does not maintain that there is any ultimate bifurcation in 
nature. The bifurcation is between a theoretically known 
object and an immediately sensed image. The bifurcation is, 
however, resolved or reconciled by what Northrop terms "epis­
temic correlations."
For Northrop, then, "objects" in nature can be caus­
ally related. But this causality or relatedness according
H. Johnson, Whitehead's Theory of Reality (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1962), p. 79.
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to him cannot be directly observed. What is observed di­
rectly is only the sequences of lights, sounds, odors, tastes, 
sensations and feelings. The observation of these patterns 
and sequences is one example of Radical Empiricism at work. 
Radical Empiricism strictly speaking cannot be expressed 
without some distortion, but in ordinary language an observa­
tion that night follows dusk and dawn follows night is a "con­
crete" example of reality known in this manner. Mere observa­
tion does not warrant a thesis that the dusk "causes" the 
darkness. The darkness follows the dusk "today." But "to­
morrow" is another day and today's perceived patterns may not 
hold for tomorrow, from a Radical Empirical viewpoint. An 
incident from the political history of India provides another 
opportunity to illustrate the implications of Radical Empiri­
cism within the restrictions of language.
In the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny in India the following se­
quence and pattern of observed events seems to have occurred:^® 
(1) Greased cartridges were handed out to Indian sepoys by the 
British (2) Rumours to the effect that the "grease" was cow 
fat and pig fat originated in Dum Dum in East India near Cal­
cutta (3) Shooting and arson occurred in Ambala in the Punjab,
^^Michael Edwardes, A History of India (New York : 
Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1961), pp. 250-253.
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in Northern India. A Radical Empiricist will not see any 
causes in these events according to Northrop. Most people, 
including Hume, however, as we have seen, are not always Rad­
ical Empiricists. They do drag in "common sense." With 
"common sense" one may "know" that Hinduism and Islam have 
restrictions against use of cow fat and pig fat and therefore 
Hindus and Moslems are likely to have been incensed by the 
use of cartridges greased with these fats. In following this 
procedure the observer is not being radically empirical. He 
is introducing theories about Hindus and Moslems into the 
factual situation. These theories may be habitually "proven" 
or "assumed" but they are not sensed "facts."
Most of the "causation" that we see in our everyday 
world is seen naive realistically, i.e., we do not directly 
sense them. We observe them with the "common-sense," habits, 
categories and theories that our cultural upbringing help us 
sneak into our perception, according to Northrop. Thus far, 
he is still Humean and positivistic.
Northrop, however, does think that "public" objects 
in nature are causally related. But this relationship can 
be captured or discussed or "proved" reliably through the 
help of Logically Realistic theories, epistemically corre­
lated, i.e., connected in a special way, with what is
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observable» The "causation" and "relationships" in the ma­
ture sciences of today with the help of Logically Realistic 
concepts have bypassed the Humean critique of causality, ac­
cording to Northrop. Causality, then, can be theoretically 
known and indirectly verified. Causality is out there and 
does exist but observation alone cannot tell us how electrons 
will behave at some future time. Neither can observation 
alone tell us in a reliable manner what the behavior of a 
group of political actors will be like in the future. In 
physics.
More concretely, this means that the deductively 
formulated theory provides a time equation such that, 
by feeding the operationally determined empirical 
values of the concept-by-postulation, theoretically 
introduced independent variables of the state func­
tion into the equation, the values of these vari­
ables for a specific later time t£ are completely 
determined by solving the equation for that time t^.^^
For politics the implications of this view of caus­
ality are that if we want to go beyond mere observed se­
quences of political events mixed with common-sense and 
hunches we have to use deductively formulated concepts. In 
a later discussion we shall see how Northrop*s logically re­
alistic concept of "ideology" illustrates an attempt to find
S. C. Northrop, "Causation, Determinism, and 
the Good," Determinism and Freedom. Edited by Sidney Hook 
(New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 205.
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relationships and causation in human behavior.
The Radically Empirical world of immediate experi­
ence, in spite of its inability to show causality, has many 
uses both for science and for the humanities.
Ontology and Radical Empiricism. Immediate experi­
ence is of immense variety, and in a previous discussion we 
have seen that there are several different forms of "intui­
tion" of it. Not all of these forms of knowledge, however, 
give us public, objective or "realistic" knowledge in North­
rop' s sense. Nor does the existence of various forms of 
knowledge indicate that the sense world is only a world of 
appearance.
It is true that the sense world to Northrop is also 
a real world. It exists. Without the sense world we would 
be operating in a world of disembodied forms or phantasies 
of the mind. Even though the sense world is an extremely 
complex and confusing source of experience it cannot be neg­
lected or be considered "evil" or "unreliable" as it seems 
at times to have appeared to Plato in his search for knowl­
edge. The sense world, however, to Northrop is the world of 
pure fact. Facts exist but pure facts do not give ideas, 
good or bad. The "facts" of the sense world just are. By 
themselves they do not "verify" anything. As Northrop puts it
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Pure fact may be defined as that which is known 
by immediate apprehension alone. It is that portion 
of our knowledge which remains when everything de­
pending upon inference from the immediately appre­
hended is rejectedc Strictly speaking, as has been 
previously noted, “V e  can say nothing about pure 
fact, since the moment we put in words what it is, 
we have described fact rather than merely observed 
fact.50
Since we can only observe pure facts this does not 
mean that communication between observers is impossible» It 
is difficult but possible if there is a set of experiences 
that are common to the observers. If two physicists are in 
possession of common experiences of green they will be able 
to recognize separately and communicate together about green 
flashes in their experimental work. In spite of the inde­
terminacy of the sense world
Nevertheless, we can use words to denote it, 
providing we realize that these words are concepts 
by intuition which require us to find in the imme­
diacy of our undescribed experience, what the words 
mean » 51
With this caution in mind Northrop next attempts to 
clarify what is immediately given.
The Aesthetic Continuum. Thus he always applies the 
term "aesthetic" to whatever is immediately given in order
^^Northrop, Logic, pp. 39-40 
^^Ibid,., p. 40.
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to convey the image of pure sensory experience. The physi- 
cist-philosopher Margenau, in a tone similar to that of 
Northrop, describes the aesthetic component in these terms :
It is simply an element of experience distin­
guished from others by its spontaneity, by its 
relative independence from the other elements, by 
its irreducibility. Kant’s apt phrase, "the rhap­
sody of perceptions," describes it w e l l . 52
This rhapsody of perception appears within a contin­
uum or field of aesthetic materials for Northrop, "The com­
plex differentiated aesthetic continuum is ineffable and in­
describable and unconveyable to anybody who does not turn 
away from words and language to experience it and contemplate 
it with immediacy."53 In this continuum we are not all at 
once aware of all the distinctions that are present. We 
cannot simultaneously see the greenness of the grass near us 
and the exact shade of a color in the horizon. If we were 
to take in the whole continuum at one time we would see dis­
tinctions beginning to appear towards the center of the con­
tinuum with more and more blurring of the edges as we scan 
farther and farther away from u s , It is the center of the 
continuum, where distinctions exist as we focus our attention,
52Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality, p , 49,
53Northrop, Meeting of East and West, p, 333.
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that provides a key to or the radically empirical component 
of, scientifically known natural and political objects. The 
natural object "electron" shows its radically empirical as­
pect as "a colored curved line in the fuzzy aesthetic con­
tinuum"^^ of an experimental situation,. A political "object" 
like "Non-Dualistic Vedanta Ideology" with its Radically Em­
pirical ethics shows itself in the oehavior and actions of 
Gandhi mediating between various groups, amidst the continuum 
of colors and shades in an Indian village,
Northrop sees certain implications for religion, art, 
aesthetics in several aspects of the "continuum" but the 
everyday world of science according to him deals with "mater­
ials" which are at the center of the focus of our senses. 
There are several major implications for political 
theory in the concept of the "aesthetic continuum," which we 
will explore in a separate discussion. Briefly, the "aes­
thetic continuum" must be respected in and for itself in a 
political system. That is, political and politically created 
educational systems must be sensitive to the very "natural" 
human love for beauty. Also, the continuum seems to call for 
compassion in ethics and mediation in law, according to
^^Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, p . 445.
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Northrop.
Apart from the total continuum, the center of this 
aesthetic field Is Important for natural and social science 
for making sure that our "constructs" and "theories" are not 
merely ghosts and demons but haye something to do with real­
ity. At the center of our awareness or at terminal point of 
our sensory perception we begin to see clear differences.
The skin color of our wives or the waves on our radar begin 
to become clear. This world Is real but objects seen this 
way do not have complete, objective and Intellectual meaning. 
They cannot provide the basis for science because they can 
be only observed and only approximately described. They must 
be supplemented by constructs.
The examination of Northrop's scientific philosophy, 
thus far, has established the existence of two eplstemologlcal 
tools. The first was logical realism which gives us a public 
world but Is Independent of Immediate experience. The second 
Is radical empiricism which gives us experience but denies us 
public transmissible knowledge In most Instances. The problem 
then arises regarding the relationships between these two 
worlds. Unless this relationship Is approached with philo­
sophical clarity he claims we will end up In a modern version 
of the old body-mlnd problem or with a Frankenstein monster
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with one foot in Augustine's City of God and another in 
Hume's complex but material world. To give validity to logi­
cal realism sense data are necessary and to give sense data 
meaning propositions are necessary. Now, the relationship 
between these "realms of discourse" is determined by a com­
plex set of factors which Northrop terms "epistemic 
correlations."
Epistemic Correlations
At the risk of sounding repetitious, it must be em­
phasized that without at least a general understanding of the 
nature of epistemic correlations one would be misled in an 
attempt to understand Northrop's philosophy of science.
Stated briefly and in his own words, the process of obtaining 
epistemic correlations
. . . has to do with what the relation is between 
the unobservable, intellectually known, scientific 
objects and events in public spacetime, known by 
means of concepts by imageless mathematical intel­
lection, and the perishing, vivid, imagefully sensed 
qualities and relations denoted by concepts by 
intuition.55
Epistemic correlations are not merely simple super­
impositions of one kind of data on top of data obtained in a 
different method. This is often understood to be the case
^^Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 26.
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by laymen because of the very nature of the Indo-Aryan lan­
guage structure that much of the West has inherited. With 
the very common subject-verb-object grammatical construction 
there is the persistent tendency to think of the subject and 
the object as being "identical" especially when only the verb 
form "is" connects the two. Thus, the statement "sugar is 
sweet" tends to identify sweetness with sugar and oversimpli­
fies the correlations with which through habit we have come 
to rely on sugar for providing sweetness. This presents the 
great danger that a vital step in our understanding of nature 
is often overlooked or taken for granted.
In our world of common sense and daily perception and 
observation a weak and crude form of epistemic correlations 
constantly occurs but which we habitually overlook. Take for 
instance our understanding of a giant oak tree. On the one 
hand we may have a conceptual understanding of the category 
of an oak tree. On the other hand we immediately "see" the 
greenness of the branches and the brownness of the "body" of 
the oak. Our everyday language tends to make us think that 
the complex of brownness and greenness ^  an oak tree. This 
covers up a series of procedures or correlations that we have 
engaged in and which are reinforced by habit. We may have 
wondered during childhood what the other side of the oak
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looked like and we have repeatedly verified by a variety of 
correlations that the parts of the oak we do not immediately 
see are also "real" parts of the "real" oak we know. So com­
monplace is this procedure that only in the example of a 
Helen Keller are we made aware of the trial and error ridden 
complex process of obtaining knowledge about even every day 
objects.
Now in "mature" science the role of epistemic corre­
lations is far more conscious, subtle and also far more rig­
orous . Because of the complete "separation" of postulated 
objects from the sense data that are available the tying in 
of the two worlds must be carefully approached. There are 
several distinct steps involved in "deductive" science at the 
stage of epistemic correlations.
Procedural Steps. First, before searching for corre­
lations Northrop assumes, as we have seen, the existence of 
deductively obtained and imagelessly stated theories. When 
the various factors in a theory are carefully related then 
the search for theorems or logical implications begins, With­
out a deductive theory epistemic correlations are not really 
necessary. A statement like "Congress has two houses" does 
not need epistemic correlations. In a deductive theory, how­
ever, epistemic correlations are needed to bridge the gap
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between what is seen and the Logically Realistic postulates 
of any theory. Whenever there is a gulf between two differ­
ent methods of knowing these epistemic correlations enable 
one to make sure that out of the theory and the facts a pub­
lic object is created.
Since political science and most of the social sci­
ences have not reached the stage of deductively formulated. 
Logically Realistically defined theories it is difficult to 
find actual examples of epistemic correlations. Most polit­
ical scientists do mix up theories and sensed facts in var­
ious ways according to Northrop. Therefore in contemporary 
political science we have the absence of these kinds of cor­
relations and the concepts of political and social science 
often consist of sheer "nonsense," and "pseudo-solutions" are 
offered for pseudo-problems. Thus, he states:
A pseudoproblem or a pseudoanswer to a pseudo­
problem is one that arises because the different 
epistemological meanings of "the same word" are not 
distinguished and thereby kept in their respective 
worlds of discourse. When this occurs, nonsense 
results. Politicians and other people then suppose 
that the following expressions are meaningful:
. . . "Dialectical logic causally determines the 
political triumph of the dictatorship of the prole­
tariat." "Political power causally determines nor­
mative political decisions." "Economic facts de­
cide political issues." Contemporary political 
discourse in "the free" as well as the Communist 
nations is full of such nonsense, as is much present
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"social science."56
If an "adequate" theory has been constructed the next 
step is to discover "theorems." Theorems are logically re­
lated to the theories but they also assert ahead of time, the 
existence of certain facts. If the "facts" asserted by the 
theorems are found to exist then the epistemic correlations 
are successful. Northrop makes a clear distinction between 
theorems or operational definitions and postulated theories.
It must be emphasized, however, that in an in­
ferred, deductively formulated theory operational 
meanings are derived meanings obtained by way of the 
epistemic correlations. The operational meanings 
are not the basic meanings of the concepts constitut­
ing the deductively formulated theory. The latter 
meanings are derived from the basic concepts of 
mathematics and mathematical logic and from the images 
of the imaginât ion--even the most speculative meta­
physical imagination. As Albert Einstein has empha­
sized, the basic concepts and principles of science 
are not given empirically but are instead "free in­
ventions of the human intellect."57
A deductively formulated theory, then, according to 
Northrop does not automatically give rise to theorems. The 
search for theorems or necessary logical implications specify­
ing ahead of time what kinds of sense data would validate a 
thesis is a separate task which may well lag behind a theory.
^^Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, op. cit., 
pp. 32-33.
^^Northrop, Logic, p. 123.
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For instance:
Again and again in the history of science deduc­
tively formulated theories such as Albert Einstein's 
theory of the finite universe have been constructed as 
answers to theoretical questions, and at the time of 
their construction no conceivable operation for test­
ing them was at h a n d . 58
When theorems are discovered they usually assert the 
existence of empirical data which can then be either con­
firmed by empirical evidence or if sense data are not forth­
coming, the original theory must be abandoned as being less 
than an objectively valid c o n s t r u c t . These theorems or the 
correlations themselves are not perceived. What we perceive 
or fail to perceive as the case may be are the empirical 
sense data that the relations or theorems imply. The theo­
rems are logical implications which if borne out by the pres­
ence of the implied facts in turn "validate" a scientific 
theory. The facts or empiricism per se does not give us 
"public" knowledge. Objective and therefore scientific knowl­
edge is created by the logical theory once its implications 
are confirmed.
In physics an epistemic correlation occurs according
58Ibid., p. 130. In political science such theorems 
are almost non-existent.
SQNorthrop, Logic, p. 130.
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to Northrop in the Wilson cloud-chamber experiment. The de­
ductively formed theory of an electron led to a theorem which 
called for certain flashes to become visible. When these 
flashes occurred an epistemic correlation had taken place.
Northrop does not provide very many examples of 
epistemic correlations in the "immature" social sciences. 
However, here and there he hints at what some of the "crude" 
epistemic correlations might be. Let us assume that a deduc­
tive theory outlines and describes a "radically empirical" 
ideology in a nation. Then Rorschach tests can be used to 
confirm or invalidate the thesis. Also, until social science 
matures, theories asserting the existence of certain values 
in a society can be verified by "theorems" which predict 
certain responses. Then interviews or similar social science 
"operations" can confirm or deny the existence of these 
values.
Before we leave our discussion of epistemic correla­
tions some brief contrasts and comparisons with other forms 
of validation and correlation used by other scientists and 
philosophers may help us see Northropian analysis in the con­
text of other developments in the field of scientific
^^Northrop, Logic, p. 126.
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conceptualization about validity.
Epistemic Correlations and Other Forms of "Valida­
tion” o Epistemic correlations are partially the products, 
then, of deductively formulated theory. However, inductive 
techniques may also attempt to use a "weak" form of epistemic 
correlations. In the standard theories of induction the 
usual procedure involves first a general examination of the 
immediate facts that are available and then pragmatically or 
by trial and error one begins to emerge with conceptual 
statements about the actual entities.
The correlations in our everyday world also have an 
epistemic quality about them but they more closely follow in­
ductive procedures. Professor Northrop gives a clear example 
of this.
It often happens, early in a play, that one is 
unable to determine whether the directly inspected 
data which one notes backstage are merely two-dimen­
sional images of book-ends painted on a curtain or 
the correlates of the bookends of real three-dimen­
sional books located on a shelf. Hence, one is con­
fronted with the problem concerning whether the 
visual image which one inspects is to be epistemically 
correlated with merely a two-dimensional surface on 
a two-dimensional curtain or with one two-dimensional 
surface of a three-dimensional book. As the play 
develops one of the characters goes backstage and
^^Cohen and Nagel, ^  Introduction to Logic and 
Scientific Method, pp. 15-16.
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pulls out the book. The images associated with the 
latter act are compatible only with one of the two 
possible hypotheses concerning the epistemic corre­
late of the original data. Thus one interpretation 
is eliminated, the hypothesis of real three-dimen­
sional books is confirmed and the correct epistemic 
correlation is established.62
This "unsophisticated” inductive technique has its 
complicated counterpart in the theories of verification pro­
vided by advocates of "operationalism." Operationalism as a 
method generally involves forms of "correlations” also. 
Operationalism is similar to Logical Positivism in that 
Operationalism distinguishes between formal statements and 
empirical statements. The validity of formal statements 
rests ultimately on conventions. Empirical statements give 
forth "meaning” as a result of having concrete objects and 
events as referrents, These referrents are found and tested 
by the use of "performable operations,"
Operationalism has influenced not only physics but 
it has influenced the epistemology of the social sciences as 
well. Behavioristic psychology has felt the impact and so 
also has "empirical" political theory. The implications of 
operationalism in political science will be examined elsewhere.
Although there are several notable operational
^^Northrop, Logic, p.. 122,
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theorists, Nobel Prize winning physicist P= W. Bridgman is a 
fairly authoritative representative of the "school." Profes­
sor Bridgman gives considerable emphasis to the role of cor­
relations in operational theory. Correlations in operational 
theory involve arriving at the same terminus by several dif­
ferent routes. Northrop's epistemic correlations also in­
volve joining two separate routes together. However, opera­
tionalism does not separate a conceptual route from a "sen­
sual" one. All the sets of correlations involve the same em­
pirical world of discourse. For example, although opera­
tional methods can be extremely complex, the following dis­
cussion by Bridgman is a general but clear statement of this 
fact.
The world which we want to describe or reproduce 
is in the first place the world of direct sensation.
Our description is not complete unless we can specify 
what we see or feel or hear or smell or taste. What 
is more, this world which we are to describe is dy­
namic rather than static. What our senses give us 
changes with time, not only if we stay still, but 
more especially if we ourselves move about or manipu­
late. As we wait or move about or manipulate we 
find certain correlations between the reports of our 
different senses, or between the reports of the same 
sense at different times. The establishment of such 
correlations is the first thing we do in getting 
order and understandability into our world. The 
thesis that there are such correlations is perhaps 
the broadest "scientific" thesis that we can formu­
late.63 [Italics mine,]
^^P, W. Bridgman, The Way Things Are (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1961), p. 45,
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Northrop sees the basic thesis of operationalism as 
being also reflected in the theories of validation in philo­
sophical "instrumentalism" and legal "pragmatism." Therefore 
his critique of operationalism applies also to similar theo­
ries in other disciplines.
Professor Northrop is among the first to express his 
awareness of the importance of these operational definitions 
and experimentations. But he argues that operations, even 
when they are successful in reaching a "terminus" do not ex­
haust "objective" meanings in science. Unless there is first 
a clearly stated deductive theory there cannot be a public 
frame of reference. The experiments of laboratory scientists 
whether they be those of Bridgman, Newton, Galileo or ancient 
Gree, Arab, Hindu and Chinese ancient scientists can be per­
formed again and again in university classes or laboratories 
today. But the philosophies of science which these experi­
ments illustrated have not remained unchanged. New theories 
have explained the facts of old experiments and have gone on 
to explain new experiments and new facts as well. Correla­
tions in operationalism, therefore, since they merely relate 
sense data by themselves do not give us the most mature form 
of knowledge since the standard for the judgment of the suc­
cess or failure of an operation must be found outside the
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operation itself.
Although there is a difference between Northrop and 
operationalists on the role of epistemic correlations there 
are several reputable philosophers of science whose views 
are similar to these of Northrop on this point. Among them 
brief mention can be made again of Henry Margenau, and also 
Professor Hans Reichenbach.
Margenau's "rules of correspondence" like Northrop's 
correlations connect deductively obtained "abstractions" with 
sense data. Thus Margenau in describing the process states 
that "a rule of correspondence links what has here been called 
Nature to entities which we have vaguely termed concepts, 
ideas, reflective elements, and so f o r t h . ^4 These rules in­
volve a considerable variety of forms which are found by 
trial and error. There are no "natural laws" or Kantian a 
priori categories involved. Also these rules themselves are 
not simply observable themselves, a point which may seem dis­
turbing to many laymen. But the more we move away from our 
everyday world of common-sense towards rigorous science the 
rules become more and more important. Thus
In reification we take but a small step toward
64Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality, p. 69.
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concepts, in assigning mass we move a greater dis­
tance, until finally, in defining a state function, 
we make a flight of considerable magnitude into the 
very abstract,65
The identity of Margenau's "rules" with Northrop's 
correlations is obviously close. Margenau himself notes 
that
F. S. C . Northrop, in discussing the connection 
between the "empirical component of any complete ob­
ject of knowledge to its theoretic component," uses 
the very appropriate term "epistemic correlations" 
for these rules. When adopting this phrase occa­
sionally hereafter we shall remember that the cor­
relations do not have positive epistemic content, 
that is, do not confer validity upon knowledge in 
and by themselves , They have to be considered within 
a larger context of method before they become sig­
nificantly epistemic, and their acceptance is deter­
mined by the functioning of the conceptual apparatus 
which they generate.
Professor Reichenbach, in his own conception of the 
philosophy of science also sees a distinctive process of 
establishing correlations which he calls "co-ordinative defi­
nitions." Co-ordinative definitions, for instance, in modern 
geometry relate invisible forms to observation. Reichenbach 
uses many examples to illustrate his own understanding of 
modern scientific method. One of the best examples is his
^^Ibid., p. 63 
G^Ibid., p. 63
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discussion of the nature of g e o m e t r y T h e  parallel between 
Reichenbach's discussion here and Northrop's method is strik­
ing. In place of Northrop's "constructs" Reichenbach dis­
cusses "geometrical systems" which are "logically consistent" 
and whose "implications are analytic; they are validated by 
deductive logic." These "systems are not therefore based on 
empirical referrents." They are the products of creative 
reasoning.
The power of reason must be sought not in rules 
that reason dictates to our imagination, but in the 
ability to free ourselves from any kind of rules to 
which we have been conditioned through experience
and tradition.68
Reichenbach’s method of arriving at the "terminus" 
of objective knowledge by the use of "coordinative defini­
tions" is also like Northrop's "epistemic correlations" in 
that both depend on frames of reference not based on observa­
tion alone. Also both correlate, connect or coordinate two 
epistemologically different ways of knowing. Speaking about 
the futility of having a correlation or "congruence" found 
on the basis of sense data alone Reichenbach claims that
There is only one way to escape such ambiguities:
^^Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philos­
ophy (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 125-14.3
^^Ibid., p . 141.
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to regard the question of congruence not as a matter 
of observation, but of definition. . . . Definitions 
of this kind are called coordinative definitions.
They coordinate a physical object, a solid rod, to 
the concept "equal length" and thus specify its deno­
tation; this peculiarity explains the name.
Although Reichenbach and Margenau and other philos­
ophers of science have increasingly realized the importance 
of epistemic correlations Northrop formulated this aspect of 
his theory as far back as 1939^0 and therefore deserves con­
siderable credit for being a pioneer in clearly describing 
this process. The process becomes increasingly important it­
self as our world of experience becomes more and more complex 
and we deal with growing numbers of "unseen" factors and 
"structured" entities. Because of the increasing complexity 
of scientific "facts" as opposed to natural or "sensational" 
facts Northrop sees scientific inquiry as not primarily in­
volving one scientific method.
Scientific inquiry is a dynamic process and there­
fore one which involves a progressive use of more and more 
"objective" tools of investigation which are tailor made for
^^Ibid., p. 132.
^^See Philosophy East and West, Charles Moore (ed.) 
(Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 224.
136
each s t a g e ^ l  of our investigation. Therefore, Northrop is 
not suggesting that there is one simple "scientific" method 
for all inquiries or at all stages of the same inquiry.
In the early stages of a discipline mere observation 
or radical empiricism may often be the only method available. 
Then as men become more aware of the conçdexities of sense 
data a search for classification systems or a form of naive 
realism may be discovered as a more appropriate method. But 
as the "science" in a discipline of increasing maturity sees 
the need of less intuitive and more public, objective and 
predictive knowledge "logical realism in epistemic correla­
tion with radical enpiricism" becomes a necessity. Even then, 
the same investigator may not be involved in logical realism, 
correlations and empiricism all at the same time. Just as 
Einstein was not a "laboratory" scientist so also the average 
laboratory physicist may not be a theorist but an operational, 
"induction" oriented detective in search of epistemic 
correlations.
Our investigation of Northrop's philosophy of science 
has been modest in its objectives. It is not a definitive
^^The recurring theme of The Logic of the Sciences 
and the Humanities is that the "proper" scientific method is 
dependent on (1) the nature of the problem, (2) the stage of 
scientific inquiry.
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statement of all the implications of such a philosophy. 
Nevertheless, in spite of its brevity and the attendant dan­
gers of oversimplification it is hoped that this will set the 
stage for all the other aspects of Northrop's philosophy as 
they affect social and political thought.
CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURE OF HUMAN SOCIETY
In the course of our discussion of the principles of 
Professor Northrop's philosophy considerable emphasis was 
placed on the relationship of that philosophy to the natural 
sciences. For the sake of clarity in organization and in 
presentation, major problems in other divisions of philosophy 
were only marginally treated. Since we will presently begin 
our examination of Northrop's ideas on culture and society, 
one initial affirmation needs to be made in order to draw 
attention to the continuity in and inter-relationship between 
Northrop's views on science and culture. Professor North­
rop 's approach to cultural problems is an extension of his 
method of dealing with the issues of physics and other sci­
ences. This affirmation, it is hoped, will become increas­
ingly self-evident in our present journey.
In contrast to F. S. C. Northrop's approach, modern 
students of culture have tended to skirt, avoid or neglect
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the exact relationship between man's experience of nature 
and the character that man made institutions and ways of liv­
ing have imparted to man. Particularly in the large educa­
tional institutions the gap between these areas of knowledge 
is most striking and evident. Northrop, on the other hand, 
consciously uses his philosophy of science to approach the 
special problems of "cultural" man. Also, he maintains that 
this should not be surprising since despite our present mul­
titude of disciplines and approaches man himself has always 
shown a tendency of applying his knowledge of nature to his 
relationships with other men in the setting of a culture. To 
explore this claim, an examination of Northrop's conception 
of "culture" is crucial.
Culture as a Unit
Beginning with Aristotle, social thinkers in the West 
of otherwise different persuasions have more or less accepted 
the proposition that man by nature was a political animal. 
Flattering as this may seem to the province of political sci­
ence the context of Aristotle's dictum also demonstrates that 
the "political" was really synonymous with the "social" in 
the days of the Greek polis. The academic disciplines of our 
current epoch would therefore regard man in the Aristotelian
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sense as a "cultural” animal,, The "homeless," "hearthless" 
man in our times is the man without a "culture."
Culture most commonly is regarded in everyday aca­
demic usage as being the construction by man of his way of 
living in his particular environment. The study of culture 
to a considerable extent "deals with man"s behavior and spe­
cifically with the ways in which human beings carry out the 
activities involved in daily living.
The general usage of the term provides no major con­
troversy. But when an attempt is made to provide a precise 
meaning of the term variations in focus and concepts begin 
to appear. This is due mainly to the fact that no respect­
able thinker claims that the nature of culture is self- 
evident. Propositions and frameworks for understanding are 
necessary. As an elementary text in anthropology states,
. . . culture is an abstraction from behavior or 
with material artifacts, such as tools, containers, 
works of art, and other artifacts that people make 
and use. The anthropologist cannot observe culture 
directly; he can only observe what people do and 
say and the processes and techniques they employ in 
the manufacture and use of material artifacts . 2
1Ralph L. Beals and Harry Hoijer, ^  Introduction to 




The concept of culture is a broader abstraction than 
"politics" according to most students of culture. Politics, 
religion and social inter-action are special manifestations 
or cases of the total cultural system for Northrop and anthro­
pologists in general. Kroeber sums up the consensus on this 
point when he states:
The other social sciences recognized culture in 
its specific manifestations as they became aware of 
this or that fragment or aspect of it--economic or 
juridical or political or social. Anthropologists 
became aware of culture as such. From that they went 
on to try to understand its generic features and their 
results
As we move away from the general notion of "culture" 
and attempt to find specificity, Northrop’s position becomes 
distinct and unique and stands in sharp contrast with some 
other points of view. The differences arise when academicians 
attempt to isolate the essential or crucial factor or basis 
of human culture. The differences occur even in the simple 
concept "culture areas." The definitions of culture areas 
vary from that based on simple geographical location, or a 
technological category to that of specifying an ideological 
basis as in the case of Northrop.
Thus Northrop's conception of culture stands in the
3A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1948), p. 12.
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sharpest contrast with that of the school of anthropology in 
which Professor Leslie A. White of the University of Michigan 
belongs. Professor White, like any competent anthropologist, 
sees culture as an extremely complex system. In his concep­
tualization he sees four major "components of cultural sys-
«
tems: technological, sociological, ideological, and sentimen­
tal, or a tt i tu d i n al ^  In the dynamics of a culture these 
components interacting together, much like our physical proc­
esses. contribute to the "behavior of the cultural system as 
an organic whole--as breathing, metabolizing, procreating, 
etc., are processes carried on by a biological organism as a 
whole."5
The various components of culture, however, are not 
each other's equal in significance and importance. White, 
like many other social scientists, tends to isolate "technol­
ogy" or the methods of obtaining "food, protection from the 
elements, and defense from enemies," as the key factor in 
culture and claims that this in turn molds and affects the 
other components or categories. As he puts it,
. . . the fact that these four cultural categories 
are interrelated, that each is related to the other
^Leslie A. White, The Evolution of Culture (New 
York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), p. 18.
^Ibid., p. 19.
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three, does not mean that their respective roles in 
the culture process are equal, for they are not. The 
technological factor is the basic one, all others 
are dependent upon it. Furthermore, the technological 
factor determines, in a general way at least, the form 
and content of the social, philosophic, and sentimental 
sections.&
Briefly, therefore. White clearly paralleling Marx 
considers "ideas" as factors which are dependent on the tech­
nological element involved. Ideas or philosophies are post 
facto verbalizations of experience. Cultural change then in 
this light takes place as technology changes and will leave 
its imprint on philosophy rather than the other way around. 
White quite positively declares that this "means that as the 
technological structuring of experience changes, the philo­
sophic expressions of experience will change."7
F. S. C. Northrop's conception of culture in its 
briefest possible synthesis is rooted in an emphasis on "idea­
tional" components rather than in technology or in social in­
teraction by themselves. Thus he is not a Marxist on this 
point. Each culture has an inherent "unity" to be sure. But 
this unity is not just a sum total of its parts. The unity 
is provided by a set of philosophical "pre-suppositions,"
GIbid., p. 19.
7Ibid., p . 23.
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like dialectical materialism in the case of Soviet Russia 
which together in turn has a logical unity or wholeness, at 
least for the people in the particular culture involved.
These "primitive postulates" or pre-suppositions are not 
"caused" in a mechanical sort of way by technology or geog­
raphy. Their meaning is given by various types of specula­
tion by men as they go about building the artifacts of cul­
ture. Lenin's elaboration of Marxian dialectics for Soviet
Russia's institutional pattern would be a case in point.
The postulates of the culture in a primitive sort of 
way is the basic "philosophy" of a culture. This philosophy 
in turn "molds" the cultural experience of man in a variety 
of areas. Varying from White and others Northrop clearly 
summarizes his position by saying:
In short, a single culture is not made up of five
independent economic, political, legal, religious and 
aesthetic assumptions but of a single set of assump­
tions of which the economic, political, legal, re­
ligious and aesthetic are parts. This single set of 
assumptions is the philosophy of a given normative 
culture . 8
From Leslie White's vantage point Northrop's position 
is a highly questionable one. The following remark by White 
could well have been directed at social thinkers of a
g
Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Human­
ities , o p . cit., p. 275.
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persuasion similar to Northrop’s.
But if one explains technologies in terms of 
ideas, the ideas are either unexplained or are ac­
counted for by appeal to other ideas, which amounts 
to the same thing.9
On the basis of Northrop's theory, an answer to 
White's criticism involves several distinctions. Northrop, 
in talking about the "unity" of a culture, is not referring 
to the sum total of all the ideas present in a culture but 
is concentrating on the "primitive" or basic ideas which are 
not logical implications of or do not follow from any other 
set of ideas or from technology. Also from Northrop’s view­
point many anthropologists are not clear as to the meaning 
of technology. At times technology seems to involve at least 
partly "relationships" between various mechanical instruments. 
This alone would give some status to the role of "ideas." At 
other times White claims that "technologies can be explained 
in terms of the physico-chemical mechanical means of adjust­
ment of one material body to another."10 Idea systems or 
"ideologies" hence are primarily "rationalizations" of exper­
ience rather than the makers of experience.
There are, of course, a number of important and noted
^White, The Evolution of Culture, o p . cit., p. 19. 
lOibid.
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scholars who, although they constitute a minority in this 
"empirical" age, treat the problems of cultural ideologies 
with some of the respect that Northrop believes these ideas 
deserve. Professor David Sidney, the theoretical anthro­
pologist, for instance vigorously affirms that
The analysis of the metacultural postulates of 
a given culture, whether deductively inferred or 
intuitively conceived, is essentially a philosoph­
ical, or meta-anthropological, undertaking and as 
necessary a part of anthropological science as is 
the collecting of empirical data. To appreciate 
properly the philosophy of life and Weitanschauung 
which serve as leitmotifs for a given culture re­
quires some measure of philosophical discipline 
and insight, which necessitates that there be pro­
fessionally trained philosophers working in the 
social sciences as well as philosophically minded 
social scientists. . . .
The point is one, however, which requires re­
statements for our times, because social scientists, 
in their ill-considered attempts to imitate the 
radical positivism and empiricism of the natural 
sciences, have largely tended to neglect this philo­
sophical perspective.il
Furthermore, much of the suspicion of a "philosophi­
cal" approach to culture is a reaction against the type of 
approach in the past which was superficially "intellectual" 
and which paid too little attention to the "empirical." Also, 
previous "intellectual" approaches tended to over-simplify
^^David Sidney, Theoretical Anthropology (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1953) ,  p p .  1 6 8 - 1 6 9 .
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the "mind" of man by categorizing it in "rational" or "irra­
tional" terms. On the other hand the empirical reaction in 
anthropology as well as in other social sciences is at times 
pursued with almost religious fervour. Professor Sidney in 
describing this contrast says:
If some of the nineteenth-century ethnologists 
and sociologists tended to go to one extreme by 
attempting to explain native thought in intellectual- 
istic terms, the modern tendency.is to go to the op­
posite extreme by failing to reckon with intellectual 
wonder and theoretical specualtion as significant 
factors in the developments of native t h o u g h t .
Northrop*s position, on the other hand, attempts to 
combine the "intellectual" approaches of the past with the 
"empirical" methods of the present in dealing with the nature 
of culture. His claim that theoretical presuppositions "de­
termine" the institutions and values of society has much "in 
common with other contemporary philosophers, such as White­
head, Cassirer, and Dewey. . „ But Northrop*s views
are also supported by findings of persons in several areas 
of anthropological inquiry. In particular the observations 
and conclusions of Clyde Kluckhohn, the late Harvard anthro­
pologist, provide major support; and justification for the
12Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology, p. 168.
l^Ibid., pp. 169-170.
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cultural theory of F. S. C. Northrop,
Available Evidences of Unity and 
Purpose in Culture
Kluckhohn, in his study of the culture of the Navaho 
Indians, established the existence of a unifying philosophy 
whose assumptions molded the apparent and empirically veri­
fiable aspects of Navaho behavior. The elements of this 
philosophy are extremely difficult to verify empirically be­
cause these philosophies are to a considerable degree insti­
tutionalized and have become essential parts of daily experi­
ence, However, Kluckhohn explains the évidence as follows:,
Synthesis within a culture is achieved partly 
through the overt statement of the dominant concep­
tions, assumptions, and aspirations of the group in 
its religious lore, secular thought, and ethical 
code; partly through unconscious apperceptive habits, 
ways of looking at the stream of events that are so 
taken for granted as seldom or never to be verbalized
explicitly,14
He also adds that this exists not only for the Navaho but in 
other cultures as well:
In sum, the way of life that is handed down as 
the social heritage of every people does more than 
supply a set of skills for making a living and a 
set of blueprints for human relations. Each
^^Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Philosophy of the Navaho 
Indians." Ideological Differences and World Order, F. S, C, 
Northrop, ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p, 
358.
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different way of life makes its own assumptions about 
the ends and purposes of human existence, about ways by 
which knowledge may be obtained, about the organization 
of the pigeonholes in which each sense datum is filed, 
about what human beings have a right to expect, from 
each other and the gods, about what constitutes fulfill­
ment or frustration.15
In support of his own thesis about the "mind" of a 
culture Northrop cites findings in other areas of science as 
well. This evidence is elaborately described in several of 
his works.IG The "essence" of it seems to indicate that hu­
man behavior is more than "a mere response to the stimuli of 
sex or hunger, with philosophy a mere pseudo-rationalization" 
after the "fact." Man's mind is not a mere passive mechanism 
which translates incoming stimulus into outgoing responses. 
Northrop, in fact, argues that stimulus-response types of 
analysis are being increasingly abandoned in psychology and 
cites the works of the psychologists Walter S. McCulloch and 
Walter Pitts, the Spanish neurologist Lorente de Nd and many 
others^7 to illustrate the poverty of simple behaviorism. As
^^Ibid., pp. 358-359.
^^See Philosophical Anthroplogy and Practical Poli­
tics , p „ 42, and Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience, 
pp. 102-124.
l^Elaborate citations and references of the articles 
and books of the various psychologistsj neurologists and 
others are listed in The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, pp. 307-358 and Philosophical Anthropology and 
Practical Politics, pp. 357-358.
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he puts it :
McCulloch and Pitts have shown, however 5, that recent 
neurological research and theory necessitate the re­
construction of Hull’s behavioristic psychology in 
crucially important ways. They noted that if the 
nerve cells or neurons of the human nervous system 
were ordered linearly, then the stimulus would com­
pletely determine the response, and philosophical con­
cepts would have the irrelevance in human behavior 
which many previous thinkers have supposed to be the 
case. In technical terms, the stimulus of the sensory 
neuron would fire the intervening cortical neurons in 
the linear net, which in turn would fire the motor 
neuron, thereby producing the overt, muscular behavior­
istic response. Thus the stimulus alone would deter­
mine the behavior, the intervening cortical neurons 
being merely carriers of the impulse from the stimulus 
to the motor response. 1 °
The "mind" he claims, then, has other characteristics 
besides that of a linear net. Thus Dr. McCulloch noted that 
some evidence already existed for believing that cortical 
nerve cells are often found in the form of a c i r c l e . I m ­
pulses from the nerve cells connecting the cortex with the 
senses would enter the circle at one point. An impulse would 
later leave from the other side of the circle in order to 
transmit the "command" of the cortex to various parts of the 
human body. In between the input and the output there ex­
isted a time lag during which the cortical counterparts of
l^Northrop, Complexity, p. 109.
19Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, p. 51.
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the initial impulse would "reverberate" around. McCulloch 
and Pitts see in the existence of these reverberating circuits 
the sicentific or "public" version of what Northrop calls a 
"privately introspected and remembered idea."^® McCulloch 
then constructs his theory of "trapped universels" which 
carefully and logically postulates the "knowing mind" of man 
which "structured" reality on the basis of a set of symbols 
"trapped" in his cortex.
In addition Northrop notes that McCulloch*s theory 
of "trapped universels" is itself a scientifically valid con­
struct because it is based on the current "correct" scientific 
method which we have previously described. He even carefully 
retraces step by step McCulloch's procedural stages to illus­
trate this point. Thus the theory of "trapped universels" is 
an "indirectly confirmed theory" and has to be since we do 
not directly see cortical neurons just as we do not directly 
see electrons in physics. The "logical realism" of Mc­
Culloch' s work, according to Northrop, was present in the 
earliest and most vigorous stage of his work.
McCulloch also began, as early as 1923, to en­
visage the ordering of nerve cells and the neural 
firings in any animal's cortex as ordered in ways
ZOlbid., p. 48.
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that possess the logical and mathematical formal 
properties of the primitive logical relations of 
Principia Mathematica, , . .
McCulloch learned also from Fitch how to think 
with formal logical rigor about discontinuous and 
continuous processes, , , , Hence the earliest 
formulation of the formal logical structure of 
neural nets was by McCulloch and Pitts,
The radical empiricism of this theory is of course
contained in the concept of the immediately introspected or
felt idea or "universal," In Northrop's own words,
. . . the concept "universal," regardless of its 
content, refers to an idea or meaning the content 
of which (though not the truth or falsity) is in­
trospected, and hence is a concept by intuition, ,
Finally, there are several "epistemic correlations" which 
relate the unseen and unfelt world of cortical neurons ar­
ranged in a circle and felt ideas, images, recollections and 
picturial representations in the human mind. Thus, one set 
of "operational" verifications occurs in cybernetics and 
computer technology. To summarize this point briefly, North­
rop states that
Upon one fact all builders of calculating ma­
chines and students of the nervous system are, how­
ever, agreed. A neural net of sequentially firing 
nerve cells as simple as that of a reverberating
^^Philosophical Anthropology, p, 47,
Z^ibid., p, 44.
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circuit does have the formal properties necessary 
to be the epistemic neurophysiological correlate of 
the introspected memory of a particular meaning or 
idea.23
McCulloch and Pitts both, therefore, give a theoretical ac­
count of the internal cognitive operation of the c o r t e x . 24 
In order to further justify his thesis about the 
"knowing" mind, Northrop depends on the investigations of a 
team of behaviorists for an understanding of the external 
behavior of the human nervous system and the brain. It is 
true that McCulloch "proved" that the cortex was constitu­
tionally a symbol creating mechanism but McCulloch did not 
directly touch on the question of the actual relationship of 
the structure of the "mind" to the external world. However, 
Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow focused 
their attention on the external behavior of mechanisms like 
the human nervous s y s t e m . ^5 Rosenblueth and his associates 
regard the nervous system of man as an active rather than a 
passive system. By an active system they mean one "in which
Z^lbid., p. 53.
^^Dr. No's demonstration of the existence of neurons 
arranged in a circle is yet another form of operational 
verification.
25A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener, and J, Bigelow, "Be­
havior, Purpose and Teleology," Journal of the Philosophy of 
Science, Vol. 10 (1943), pp. 18-24.
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the object is the source of the output energy involved in a 
given specific reaction.26 The nervous system is not only 
active but also displays purposeful behavior. The nervous 
system is goal oriented. That is, it directs itself to the 
attainment of goals through "voluntary acts" which they de­
fine in the following manner:
. . . the purpose of voluntary acts is not a matter 
of arbitrary interpretation but of physiological fact. 
When we perform a voluntary action what we select 
voluntarily is a specific purpose, not a specific 
movement. Thus, if we decide to take a glass contain­
ing water and carry it to our mouth we do not command 
a certain set of muscles to contract. . .; we merely 
trip the purpose and the reaction follows auto­
matically .27
The trio go on finally to claim that evidence shows that the 
human system also has one additional characteristic. This 
involves a negative feedback mechanism by which the actual 
responses of a system in this case our nervous system, are 
gradually directed closer and closer towards the goal or pur­
pose that is ingrained in the mechanism. From this finding 
as well as from the findings already described Northrop care­
fully draws some implications which tend to "corroborate"
9  A Quoted by Northrop in his article "Ideological Man 
and Natural Man" in Ideological Differences and World Order. 
Edited by F. S. C. Northrop (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1949), p. 419. Hereafter referred to as Ideological 
Differences.
o  7'Ibid., quoted by Northrop, p. 419.
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his thesis. Thus, the following observations can be made.
The Implications of Available Evidence. Rosenblueth's 
finding of the "negative feedback" system in the mind of man 
validates for Northrop his theory of the primacy of the pos­
tulates of a given culture in determining man's response to 
the challenges of nature and culture. The mind of man is not 
merely created by the natural environment or technology. Man 
constantly adjusts his behavior not merely by reacting to a 
stimulus but also by creating responses which will gradually 
attençt to fulfill his ingrained goals or purposes. Man 
molds the tools of life and is not just simply molded by 
these tools .
Man's goals and purposes are not b o m  out of historic 
necessity. They are his own creations. The fact that our 
motor neurons are the sources of the "output energy" of our 
nervous system indicates to Northrop that man is to a con­
siderable degree the instigator of his actions. Man is not 
a passive vehicle for the passage of stimuli into responses. 
Man's mind actively participates in the process.
McCulloch's findings provide Northrop with an under­
standing of how this active participation takes place. The 
presence of neural "symbols" or "reverberating circuits" al­
lows man to symbolize and internalize his ideas and ends. The
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symbols in our cortex do not all represent the same set of 
referrents. There are all sorts of possibilities in the type 
of stimuli we can symbolize. Our sensory neurons from each 
of our senses are constantly and simultaneously bombarding 
our consciousness or in other words our cortical neurons.
These cortical neurons in turn abstract, symbolize our exper­
iences and "trap" them for our reference in separate areas of 
the cortex for each of our senses. Northrop in this connec­
tion mentions that we already know the location of these 
areas. Stimulation by doctors of any one area "has the effect 
in the patient's concept by intuition consciousness of his 
sensing the species of sensuous image that is epistemically 
correlated with the brain area in q u e s t i o n . "28 These various 
sensory areas, however, by themselves provide a variety of 
simple concepts which would be unrelated if it were not for 
the "association area" of the brain. According to Northrop
In this area different trapped universels are 
spontaneously combined. Without this association 
area, imagination, the novelist's fantasies, de­
tective stories and, even more important, scien­
tific and philosophical theories and any knowledge 
of either ourselves as a public person or our ex­
ternal world would be i m p o s s i b l e .29
p Q^Philosophical Anthropology, p. 56. The stimula­




The association area is the source of creativity. It 
is here that different individual intellectuals and ultimately 
cultures associate data in a variety of combinations. The 
true speculators, according to Northrop, find unique ways of 
associating ideas at this stage of the "neural" story.
Then Northrop turns once more to McCulloch in order 
to receive support for the postulation that the associative 
areas send impulses to be trapped in circular nets "located" 
in the "higher areas" of the cortex. In these higher areas 
"of the cortex the empty, circularly ordered neural nets or 
their formal equivalents are so laid down at birth or ear­
lier before anything is trapped in them that they are re­
lated h i e r a r c h i c a l l y . "30 This hierarchy is significant for 
two reasons. One is that the fixed relationship between the 
locations of net possibly explains the possibility of deduc­
tive reasoning. The second is that it enables us to dis­
tinguish between basic values and other ideas of lesser sig­
nificance for u s .
Finally, depending on Kluckhohn and o t h e r s , N o r t h ­
rop states that when groups of individuals share an identical
30lbid., p. 58.
31pitrim A. Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age 
of Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), pp. 275-322.
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set of these basic values there exists a common culture.
A Critique of Ideational Unity of Culture. North­
rop 's use of such "evidences" from other disciplines makes 
the task of the critic an extremely difficult one and at 
times frustrating. Our present task is conceived in fairly 
modest terms. Only a general critique is attempted since 
only specialists in psychology, medicine, anthropology and 
cybernetics can be qualified to engage in a detailed exami­
nation of Northrop's conceptualization of the structure of 
the mind.
However, even a cursory examination of other inter­
pretations of the same evidences seems to give a degree of 
corroboration to Northrop's thesis. Thus, Northrop's de­
pendence on McCulloch and others for the view that human 
values are hierarchically arranged that the human mind knows 
universals and categories, is supported by other thinkers, 
e.g.. Dr. Percival Bailey, Director of Research at the 
Illinois State Psychiatric Institute in an article entitled 
"Cortex and Mind" makes the following observation.
However random may be the horizontal organization 
of the cortex, we must not forget that it has a very 
definite vertical organization in six layers. The 
significance of this arrangement is not known, but 
CraiklS supposed that it might imply a scanning mech­
anism, and this scanning was related by Grey Walter^Z 
to the alpha rhythm. Pitts and McCulloch^G have
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shown how such a mechanism might enable the cortex to 
recognize universals, such as chord regardless of 
pitch, or shape regardless of size. This ability is 
the so-called supra-sensuous reason--the power to 
indicate universals and relate them to another.32
Northrop also seems to be on fairly solid ground in 
his assumptions that the mechanisms of the human mind do not 
come automatically prepared with a fixed set of symbols with 
which to interpret sense data. These symbols are dynamically 
created in various stages of human development. The particu­
lar compositions or structures of man's feed-back mechanisms 
are not "given." As Dr. Bailey put it
The greater part of the cortex, then composed 
of neuronal nets arranged somewhat at random at 
first, completes its structural organization some 
time after birth and modifies its functional organi­
zation constantly by the interaction of new experi­
ence with old experience retained in the form of 
memories. In order for the cortex continually to 
alter its organization in this way, it is necessary 
that its equilibrium be dynamic, a multitude of parts 
being free to interact with one another after the 
manner of feedbacks. There is abundant evidence, 
since the initial demonstration of Hans Berger, of 
the dynamic nature of the cortex, and Grey Walter^^ 
has shown that it is possible, by altering the feed­
back relationships, to cause serious perturbations 
of its functioning, even epileptic attacks.33
Northrop's use of de No's findings also does not seem
52Jordan M. Scher (ed.) Theories of the Mind (New 
York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 5-6.
33Ibid., p. 5.
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to be arbitraryo Northrop depends on de Nd's and others' 
construct of circular neural nets for the theory that man's 
primary values are not determined by specific stimuli. The 
primary values which direct our responses are the products 
of complex symbolizing structures in our cortex.
Professor Clifford Geertz, Professor of Anthropology 
at the University of Chicago, in an article entitled "Growth 
of Culture" also seems to provide independent corroboration 
of Northrop's observations. The anthropologist states
One of the more encouraging--if strangely de­
layed- -developments in the behavioral sciences is the 
current attempt of physiological psychology to arouse 
itself from its long enthrallment with the wanders of 
the reflex arc (Pribram, 1960). The conventional 
picture of a sensory impulse making its way through 
a maze of synapses to a motor nerve culmination is 
coming to be revised, a quarter century after its 
most illustrious proponent pointed out that it was 
inadequate to explain the integrative aspects of the 
behavior of a sparrow or a sheep dog, much less that 
of a man (Sherrington, 1953, p. 170) . . . .  Advanc­
ing under the banner of "an active organism" and 
supported by the closed circuit anatomizing of Caral 
and de No' (1943), this new persuasion emphasizes 
the way in which the ongoing processes both of the 
brain and subordinate neuronal aggregates select 
precepts (Bruner, 1958), fix experiences (Gerard,
1960), and order responses (Lashley, 1951) so as to 
produce a delicately modulated pattern of behavior.
Professor Geertz also maintains that "human thinking
34ibid., p. 725.
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is primarily an overt act conducted in terms of the objective 
materials of the common culture, and only secondarily a pri­
vate matter." This position is remarkably similar to that of 
Northrop in that the latter maintains that, to the extent 
that human beings live with shared meanings, we do have a 
"public" culture.
It must be noted, however, that there is considerable 
opposition in academic circles to psychological and anthro­
pological positions similar to Northrop's. Some psycholo­
gists still cling to the stimulus-response framework by main­
taining that the "mind" of men is simply more of a complex 
set of abilities to respond to situations than had been first 
supposed. These situations themselves determine the mind's 
actions. Professors James Taylor of South Africa and Dr. 
Joseph Wolpe of the University of Virginia School of Medicine 
in the article entitled "Mind as Function of Neural Organiza­
tion," summarize their position by stating
. . . we do not recognize any form of mind that ex­
ists autonomously or independently of some behavioral 
substratum. Hence we reject every form of psycho­
physical dualism, and all derivatives and unacknowl­
edged relics of dualistic theory.35
In anthropology similar assertions are made by White 
3^Ibid., p. 218.
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and others when they maintain that the human systems of 
knowledge are dependent on the natural surroundings of man 
and/or the tools^G that he uses. These authorities provide 
formidable opposition to the ideational views of human cul­
ture . The argument seems to be far from resolved and our 
present inquiry is hardly the place in which to provide the 
solution. We can simply demonstrate that there is some evi­
dence and the views of some authorities in support of North­
rop 's contention that much of man's experience is bound up 
with his culture and this culture in turn is the product of 
some fundamental pre-suppositions which make up a "philosophy."
If the theories of the cortex are correct, then man 
does not simply represent in his mind the entire set of tools 
called technology. He can have ideas about technology. These 
ideas are not simply biological in character, either. Human 
creativity enters in at various stages. Cultural "evolution" 
is not purely determined by the organic development of man.
As Geertzstates it.
With the unequivocal triumph of Homo Sapiens and 
the cessation of the glaciations, the link between 
organic and cultural changes was, if not severed, at 
least greatly weakened. Since that time organic evo­
lution in the human line has slowed to a walk (Carter, 
1953), while the growth of culture has continued to
^^White, The Evolution of Culture, p. 23.
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proceed with ever-increasing r a p i d i t y . ^7
In any case, we have critically examined the bare 
essentials of Northrop's view of culture. For his views he 
finds considerable academic support and "empirical” evidence. 
But at this point he also strikes out away from many others 
with a unique and distinctive theory of the nature of cul­
tural unity and the process of cultural change.
The Key Variable in Cultural Unity
Cultural unity, as we have seen, is the product of a 
set of interrelated presuppositions generally referred to by 
Northrop as "ideology." We have already noted early in this 
chapter the particular way the concept "ideology" is used by 
him in contrast to the usage of White and others. But the 
uniqueness of Northrop to a considerable degree rests on his 
assumption as to what is the key factor in any given ideology, 
This factor unhesitatingly is isolated by Northrop as being 
the "philosophy of science" of any culture.
Each culture uses certain presuppositions about 
"science." These scientific conceptions are the ones which 
in turn mold our political and social presuppositions. After 
examining various occasions where science has determined
37Theories of the Mind, Scher (ed.), p. 725.
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values Northrop states:
All these considerations indicate that differ­
ences in ideology in the social sciences and the 
humanities are rooted in differences in the philoso­
phies underlying these ideologies and that the 
philosophies in turn are connected with the results 
of scientific inquiry and are always regarded by the 
people who hold them as called for by the scientific 
knowledge which they take into account. Put more 
concretely, what this means is that any people are 
impressed by the facts of their experience which 
fall within their attention. From these facts they 
derive, consciously or unconsciously, a specific 
scientific generalization or theory.38
Some scholars seem to make a distinction between 
Northrop's general theory of the role of ideas and his con­
ception of the role of natural science. The anthropologist 
Bidney, for instance, notes that
It is important at this stage to distinguish be­
tween the general thesis that native cultures reveal 
basic philosophical or metacultural presuppositions 
which serve to integrate their cultural perspectives, 
and the special contention that any given native 
ideology is based upon a specific philosophy of natu­
ral science. The general thesis is acceptable to 
most anthropologists, whereas the special theory is
not.39
Bidney acknowledges that Northrop's emphasis on the 
"ideational factor in the study of human cultures" is an im­
portant contribution to anthropological theory. But although
^^Northrop, Logic, p. 355.
^^Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology, p. 172.
165
there is increasing consideration being shown among social 
scientists for Northrop on this point, Bidney goes on to 
state
The question remains, however, whether in main­
taining that native cultures, together with other 
historical cultures, are based upon determinate 
philosophies of science he has not claimed too much 
and has not gone beyond the available ethnological 
evidence.40
Before we examine Northrop's own marshalling of evi­
dence in support of his theory, one initial classification 
should be helpful. Northrop does not maintain that all phi­
losophies of science within cultural systems are equally 
valid. Some philosophies of science may be "valid" only ac­
cording to a parochial group. We have already seen that only 
when scientific concepts are unambiguously and mathematically 
stated do we have a universal and public conception of science 
Also, each culture apparently "thinks" according to a philos­
ophy of science which is regarded by people of that culture 
as "valid." On this point Professor Bidney disagrees with 
Northrop's views on the importance of a culture's scientific 
philosophy, although he does accept the thesis that the "prim­




Perhaps part of the criticism of Northrop is due to 
a misreading of what he means by "philosophy of science." 
Although he obviously has some ideas about the correct "phi­
losophy of science" in a general way by the label of "scien­
tific philosophy" he means the presuppositions of any method 
of investigation which attempts to examine the relationship 
between man and the external world around him. Einstein's 
theories as well as Buddhist philosophy, attempt to find the 
relationship between man and nature. Consequently the term 
"philosophy of science" has a broader meaning and signifi­
cance here than is usually associated with it. This does not 
mean that all "scientific" attempts are equally valid at­
tempts but merely implies that all philosophies of science 
are after all philosophies of nature also. As human beings 
analyze the implications of their "attitudes" of "ideas" or 
"philosophies" of nature there begin to emerge conceptions of 
social, ethical and political theory. In short.
When the ontological results of the analysis of 
one's scientific theory of nature and the epistemo- 
logical results of the analysis of its method of 
verification are combined, one has a complete
philosophy.41
As noted before, natural science as conceived by
41Northrop, Logic, pp. 360-361.
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Northrop consists, therefore, of not merely the actual 
"facts" that a science deals with but the philosophical con­
sequences of the method that is i n v o l v e d . T h e  development 
and elaboration of the philosophical consequences of any 
"scientific method" or "theory of nature" can lead to the 
construction of a political theory on which political insti­
tutions can be based. Scientific ideas or ideas about nature 
are therefore the "first causes of political and social 
'facts'." To demonstrate the importance of "scientific" 
ideas as compared with political and social theories Northrop 
analyzes a variety of cultural doctrines throughout his numer­
ous books and articles.43
In fact, the validation of this portion of his thesis 
and its implications takes up most of the space of Northrop's 
analysis of the problems of society and politics. Conse­
quently we can hope to describe only in bare outline and in 
summary form Northrop's discussion of this aspect of his phi­
losophy and some of his examples.
Thus, Northrop often draws our attention to individual 
intellectual giants who have influenced cultural philosophy
^^Northrop, Man, Nature and God, p. 68.
^^The most ambitious attempt is in The Meeting of
East and West.
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but whose first disciplined efforts were in the direction of 
scientific inquiry. For instance, on one of many occasions 
he states:
The number of philosophers of the first order 
who were scientists before they became philosophers 
is notable. Democritus, Leucippus, Plato, Aristotle, 
Albert Magnus, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant are but 
a few. Professor Whitehead continues this great
tradition.44
However, individual philosophers do not concern us at the 
present time unless these individual philosophers have pro­
vided the intellectual underpinnings of particular cultures. 
One such philosopher is John Locke.
Locke and American Political Culture. Northrop 
claims that although the backgrounds of the early settlers 
and the influence of the frontier and other factors were im­
portant, the basic cultural norms of the United States to 
some extent find their genius in the philosophy of John Locke 
After citing historical evidence to demonstrate that Locke's 
influence on Jefferson was crucial and that the Lockean 
philosophy of the Declaration of Independence "had become 
the common property of all colonists," Northrop goes on to 
observe that
^^Northrop, "Whitehead's Philosophy of Science" in 
The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Edited by Paul 
Arthur Schlipp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company), p. 167.
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It is to the moral, the religious, and the poli­
tical consequences of John Locke's philosophical con­
ception of man and nature that Thomas Jefferson gives 
expression in the Declaration of Independence. In 
short, the traditional culture of the United States 
is an applied utopia in which the philosophy of John 
Locke defines the idea of the good.45
Next, Northrop rigorously sets out to prove that 
Locke's philosophy of man was the result of his epistemo- 
logical investigations of earlier scientific theories in 
general and Newton's conclusions in particular. Locke him­
self was "an experimental chemist and a physician and an 
intimate friend of Newton." One of the basic conclusions of 
Newtonian physics was that sensed qualities were not part of 
the furniture of nature. They somehow are connected with 
the observer of nature rather than nature per s e .
The warmth which we sense in the stove, the 
fragrance which we smell in the rose, and the red 
which we see on the flag, do not belong to the 
material objects at all, independently of the pres­
ence of the observer.46
If the observer is removed from nature, therefore, the 
sensed qualities vanish with him. Therefore Newtonian phys­
ics postulated three entities, the public object, the ob­
server and the sensed qualities which are dependent on and
^^Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, p. 71.
46 Ibid., p. 71.
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related to the observer.
Locke was concerned about the exact nature of the 
relationship between these three entities and "when Locke 
made explicit the complete consequences of the physics of 
his friend Newton, this experimentally verified physics was 
found to provide a theory not merely of physical nature but 
also of conscious m a n ."47 In order to explain and describe 
the relationship Locke began to conceive of the observer as 
being in possession of something called a mental substance. 
This mental substance, when it was affected by the material 
substances of nature, produced in the observer a conscious­
ness of sensed qualities. In subjecting Newtonian physics 
to epistemological analysis, therefore, Locke felt that the 
category of "mental substances" was the only one that did 
justice to the important scientific theory of his time. Locke 
thus arrived at a new conception of the state of nature.
Now Locke's conception of the state of nature, ac­
cording to Northrop, has a direct bearing not only on his own 
philosophy but on several aspects of American culture. Poli­
tical man in Lockean philosophy becomes defined as introspec­
tive man, a conscious animal who has an independent mental
47lbid., p. 77.
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substance besides a physical body which is part of the mate­
rial substances of nature. These mental substances are not 
part of our material universe. Therefore, unlike material 
substances, there are no "scientific," "physical" or "ob­
jective" relationships between the various mental substances. 
Northrop summarizes his description of Lockean mental sub­
stances in the following passage.
The modern Lockean scientific and philosophical 
theory specifies no relation between the many mental 
substances. In fact, the theory leaves their rela­
tion exceedingly ambiguous. All physical relations 
between people have to do with their bodies, and 
the latter are quite independent of their mental 
substances.
Political man became subjective man with his own 
separate political awareness and natural law was given the 
natural rights "twist." Each man became his own judge of 
what was politically good for him. Therefore, only as men 
"willed" to be bound by a set of political conventions was 
there the beginnings of political society.
Northrop goes on to trace the direct relationship 
between the Lockean concept of the free man and the Lockean 
concept of the justification of the existence of government 
being the preservation of private property, "where property
48Ibid., pp. 86-87.
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means not merely external material things but also one's 
material bodyl'^^ Northrop explains Locke's description of 
this relationship in the following manner.
Man, as a mental substance, by means of his body 
and other physical objects of nature, cuts down the 
forests, tills the soil, grows his crops, and builds 
his home. Other mental substances, with their native 
freedom and perhaps their more indolent bodies, note 
this accomplishment and, finding it easier to combine 
and steal the neighbor's home and crops and perhaps 
even to destroy his physical body, than to develop 
and construct their own, take the individual man's 
property. This is the reason why the modern free 
and independent man gives up some of his ideal and 
actual native liberty to submit himself to conven­
tionally prescribed laws of the state. As a free and 
independent individual he cannot protect his property.50
Since individual man enters into political society 
largely for the preservation of property, property rights of 
individuals remain beyond the dominion of the state.
Northrop goes on to illustrate how Locke's doctrines 
had important consequences for theology and resulted in the 
creation of the general religious milieu of toleration which 
affected even American Catholicism. The basis of religious 
toleration, like political freedom, was the atomic individual 
with his own separate mental substance which gave him his 




censored. Quakers, Congregatlonallsts, Methodists and Epis­
copalians, although different in their detailed ritualistic 
procedures, have this common ground in their theologies.
. . . with all these Protestants, whose earthly 
practices fall further and further away from the 
modern religious ideal, the professional clergy 
exists largely merely to remind one that one has 
this private, spiritual self, this introspectively 
given mental substance, in addition to the material 
substances of one's body and of nature, and not as 
in any way necessary to convey the meaning of re­
ligion or the means by which it can be actualized 
in one's life.51
The direct influence of Locke likewise can be di­
rectly seen in the American Constitutional system. In the 
United States, the concept of the Bill of Rights which pro­
tects the life, liberty, property and religious conscience 
of any man is an expression of Lockean natural rights. On 
the other hand other laws passed by "consent" are actual 
political versions of what Locke called mere "conventions."
In addition to the influence of Locke's epistemologi­
cal analysis of Newtonian science on political and religious 
ideology, his analysis also affected American "economic" 
culture. That is, American economic philosophy, indirectly, 
to be sure, but yet to a considerable extent, was the product 




The science of the traditional American business­
man was the Anglo-American economics which was reared 
in Great Britain by Adam Smith, Bentham, Maithus,
John Stuart Mill, Ricardo, Senior and Jevons. This 
economic science did not spring into existence without 
any previous intellectual causes. Adam Smith, who 
initiated the science, was a philosopher in the Uni­
versity of Glasgow and for the last twenty-five years 
of his life an intimate, personal friend of David 
Hume. Jevons, who put Anglo-American economic theory 
into its final traditional form, was explicit in his 
insistence that it was grounded upon the utilitarian 
hedonism of the philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Bentham's 
philosophy in turn was determined by that of David 
Hume. 52
But Hume's philosophy also did not spring into 
existence without previous causes. Instead, it was 
the result of pursuing one of the basic assumptions 
of John Locke's philosophy to its inescapable, logical 
consequences. This was done in part by Bishop Berkeley 
and completely by David Hume.
Locke also had a similar influence, in Northrop's 
analysis, on the "ideologies" of various factions of American 
political parties, and also upon some basic trends in early 
American art and other institutionalized aspects of American 
culture. This is not to say that Northrop claims that Locke 
is the sole maker of all the innersprings of American poli­
tical and cultural behavior. All sorts of other influences 
were also at work. But through his analysis, he does show 
that the "inner order" of various aspects of American life is
^̂ Ibid.. p. 111.
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rooted in a specific philosophy of science. This philosophy 
of science was that of Newton.
Newtonian science, however, did not automatically 
"create" American culture. The dominant pattern of American 
culture was created by political and social theories based 
on Newtonian science on the one hand and the habitual accept­
ance for the most part of these theories by Americans on the 
other. Newtonian science does not directly deal with value 
theory. But when Locke pursued and expanded on Newton's 
ideas regarding man's relationship to nature the result was 
a political theory which included notions of individualism, 
property rights, religious and political toleration, limited 
government and the separation of powers.
John Locke's theory, then, in turn became the pre­
vailing ideology or value system in the American colonies.
The Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights which 
bear the mark of Jeffersonian influence are evidences of the 
absorption of Lockean values. As Northrop repeatedly notes, 
Jefferson was a close student of Locke's philosophy. But 
Jefferson was not the sole Lockean of his time. Northrop 
maintains that Locke's fundamental political and social ideas 
were widely accepted in the colonies.53 What Jefferson
S^Tbid.. p. 70.
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apparently did was to give a clear statement of the philoso­
phy that became the dominant ideology of his time and which 
in turn was related to Newtonian physics as a result of 
Locke's work.
Without a Locke, Newtonian physics could have led to 
several other possibilities. The theory of Thomas Hobbes, 
for instance, was also based on an "interpretation” of New­
ton's physics. But Hobbesian theory was not the conceptual 
framework that the Jeffersonians used according to Northrop. 
The importance of Newton, Locke and Jefferson for American 
ideology dramatizes the inter-relationships between various 
elements which go into the building of a culture. These are 
(1) a theory of nature, (2) a social theory based on this 
theory of nature, and (3) the acceptance by people in a cul­
ture of the Social theory.
The American success in technological development, 
in Northrop's analysis, is to a considerable extent due to 
the first element, the Newtonian-Lockean theory of nature. 
Since nature in this theory is only indirectly known through 
deductively formulated theories, the search for more adequate 
"constructs" about nature is a continuing feature of American 
society. In other words, Americans are more likely to look 
upon nature as something to be challenged and conquered
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rather than something to be only contemplated and enjoyed. 
Nature, then, for most Americans is not merely an intuitively 
felt and enjoyed harmony, as indeed it seems to be among tra­
ditional Japanese, Chinese and Indians.
The second element is the unifying factor that gives 
the various socio-political institutions their basic purpose. 
This factor persists even though institutions eventually in­
crease in complexity. Thus, the Lockean theory of politics 
is important for an understanding of not only the politics 
of Jefferson’s time but today’s politics as well. To a con­
siderable extent, Northrop’s analysis explains the persistence 
of Lockean notions of private property in spite of the fact 
that the General Motors Corporation is hardly an institution 
which can be said to be the product of a single Lockean mental 
substance hewing out a piece of property from a forest with 
the help of physical labor.
The third and final fact, i.e., consensus, or habit­
ual acceptance of a political theory, helps provide stability 
in any socio-political entity. Without consensus any politi­
cal system is likely to be plagued by chaos and disorder.
Northrop maintains that his method of studying the 
ideology of a culture as its crucial variable is applicable 
to a ’’Western” society like the United States as well as non-
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Western Asian and African societies. This is due to the 
fact that he feels that other cultures' artifacts are related 
to their own unique theories of nature in somewhat the same 
way as American artifacts are related to Newtonian-Lockean 
philosophy.
Oriental and Primitive Cultures. A considerable por­
tion of The Meeting of the East and West is devoted to an 
analysis of Buddhist, Hindu, Shinto and other Oriental cul­
tures. Again, these cultures and their various ideological, 
social, political, legal and religious coiqponents are found 
to be based on specific philosophies of nature and science. 
Further, what applies to oriental cultures also applies to 
so-called "primitive" cultures. That is, primitive cultures 
also have philosophies of science and nature on which they 
base their ethics and social relations.
Even a so-called primitive and very matter-of- 
fact people order their relations to one another in 
terms of a specific set of shared meanings, i.e., 
their particular philosophy. Moreover, Kluckhohn was 
able to articulate the positive legal norms of the 
Navaho and found them to be related essentially to 
their cognitive natural p h i l o s o p h y . 54
Northrop's position that there exists no innate dif­
ference between "primitive illiterate" man and "complex
^^Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, p. 38.
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m o d e m " man in their basic ability to think of man's rela­
tionship to nature may seem astounding at first. But here 
he is supported by some anthropologists, including Kluckhohn, 
who do not see innate differences between various societies 
in their ability to create an underlying and consistent phi­
losophy. For example, Kluckhohn, in his article entitled 
"The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians," notes that
The publication of Paul Radin's Primitive Man 
as a Philosopher did much toward destroying the myth 
that a cognitive orientation toward experience was 
a peculiarity of literate societies. Speculation 
and reflection upon the nature of the universe and 
of man's place in the total scheme of things have 
been carried out in every known culture. Every 
people has its characteristic set of "primitive 
postulates."^5
Therefore, "primitive" thought according to Northrop 
and Kluckhohn also has a "logic" of its own, depending on a 
particular view of reality although its discovery by an out­
sider may be an extremely laborious and frustrating process. 
Northrop, however, seems to go a little beyond Kluckhohn's 
conclusions in an attempt to defend this thesis. In one 
essay he goes so far as to declare that
I question [he writes] whether there has ever 
been a society that had myth in any sense other than 
that of a metaphorical or aesthetic expression of
S. C. Northrop (ed.). Ideological Differences 
and World Order, p. 356.
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what was to it a literal empirically verified con­
ception of nature. It is not an accident that the 
early gods are connected with thunder, lightning, 
rain, and the sun.56
This position is questioned by Sidney, who is gener­
ally favorable in his reaction to other aspects of Northrop's 
philosophy. He says
Thus, in order to justify his thesis that all 
cultures are rationally integrated systems based on 
a philosophy of science, Northrop is apparently pre­
pared to rationalize primitive myths as being sci­
entific allegories, thereby returning to the type of 
mythological interpretation originally maintained by 
the Stoic philosophers, Francis Bacon, and the Ger­
man nature-mythologists of the late nineteenth 
century.57
However, Sidney's criticism is in some ways based on 
a misunderstanding of Northrop. The letter’s choice of lan­
guage is often unfortunate. Northrop often tends to make 
statements which seem startling at first sight but which be­
come meaningful when taken in light of other aspects of his 
theory. Thus, Northrop's views on myths are really logical 
extensions of his views on the role of the philosophy of 
nature which is in many ways similar to the concept of
^^Northrop, "Ethics and the Integration of Natural 
Knowledge," in The Nature of Concepts, Their Inter-relation 
and Role in Social Structure (Proceedings of the Stillwater 
Conference Conducted by The Foundation for Integrated Edu­
cation) , p. 127. Quoted by Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology, 
p. 173.
^^Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology, p. 174.
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metaanthropology which Bidney accepts.
Culture in any case for Northrop, is the construc­
tion of man rather than of "nature" in Professor Northrop's 
philosophy. Nature in the sense of ontologically real ob­
jects or in the sense of sensed data does not automatically 
demand that man create certain prescribed artifacts. Only as 
man draws implications from his understanding of nature does 
he begin to create the basis of his social world. The world 
of politics, therefore, is not an independent process of na­
tural behavior. The political system is one which together 
with other interrelated systems springs from an underlying 
philosophy which in turn rests on certain scientific assump­
tions . The paradox of human society is that while it in­
volves a world quite different from the world of science, it 
also depends on an understanding of the world of science. To 
understand this paradox one has to adapt and adopt tools of 
understanding of politics and society which are precise enough 
for the particular problems of the politico-social world and 
yet broad enough to relate this world to other dimensions of 
human experience. But this in turn depends upon a philosophy 
of science and man's view of nature.
CHAPTER V
THE STUDY OF POLITICS
The study of politics in our times is marked by an 
intense and persistent search for a clearer focus or meeting 
ground in which political scientists of varying persuasions 
can work in close cooperation. In spite of the restless 
search for a consistent core of politics and in spite of the 
increased concern about methodology political scientists 
have yet to arrive at a basic consensus regarding the central 
concern of political science. Professor Dwight Waldo of the 
University of California at Berkeley, in taking note of this 
state of affairs in the profession, has stated that
The mood of contemporary American political 
science is one of dissatisfaction tinged with hope­
fulness. There is a great amount of self-criticism, 
of stock taking, of discussion of methodology, but 
also of hopeful and enthusiastic pursuit of new (or 
rediscovered or refurbished) ideas and methods.
Contemporary political science might be said 
to be engaged in an intensive "quest for the real."
There are some who assert that the "reality" which 
is the proper study of political science is some­
thing ^ui ^ ener^, for example, that it is "power"
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or "the political process" which is the central and 
distinguishing phenomenon and concept of political 
science. Others might be said to seek some base out­
side political science itself upon which the discipline 
can be firmly rested. There are those, for example, 
who seek to base the study of politics on the methods 
of the physical sciences, or the concepts and data of 
the other social sciences. On the other hand, there 
are those seeking to rest political study upon founda­
tions of metaphysics or theology.1
Although the various alternatives may not be "mutually exclu­
sive" as Waldo points out,^ the differences in emphasis are 
often very considerable and the methodological gulfs often 
very real. Thus in spite of the remarkable growth in the 
field of political science within the United States,3 Ameri­
can political scientists are separated in their orientations 
by widely varying sets of theoretical presuppositions. The 
politics of F. S. C. Northrop if examined by political sci­
entists may help enlarge the intellectual context in which 
the methodological differences in political science may be 
not only examined in a clearer light but also partly resolved. 
But before we proceed with Northrop's contribution here it
^Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United 
States of America (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), p. 18.
Zibid.
^See Bernard Crick, "The Science of Politics in the 
United States," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Politi­
cal Science, XX, 3 (August, 1954), pp. 308-320, p. 308.
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will be necessary for some readers to review briefly some of 
the most fundamental differences among political scientists 
in their approaches to the study of politics.
Here what is often termed the "fact-value" problem 
must be regarded as an important but continuing question that 
has plagued political science as well as other disciplines at 
least since the time of Hume. This problem goes to the very 
basic raison d'etre of normative political theory. The modern 
Humeans or non-cognitivists in particular often characterize 
traditional political theory propositions as being emotive 
in character. The non-cognitive theorist, therefore, sees 
"objectivity" as being possible only at the "instrumental" 
level. "Ultimate" values are regarded as only subjective 
preferences which are not subject to cognitive validation. As 
Professor Felix E. Oppenheim, in the course of an incisive 
statement of the non-cognitivist position puts it
Non- cognitivism does not maintain that value- 
words, even in the intrinsic sense, are meaningless, 
but only that they have normative, evaluative, di­
rective, rather than cognitive meaning.
. . . Non-cognitivism denies the verifiability of 
intrinsic value-judgments but does not question the 
possibility or legitimacy of value-commitments, even 
in the social sciences, provided they are clearly 
characterized as s u c h . 4
4pelix E . Oppenheim, "The Natural Law Thesis: Affir­
mation or Denial?" American Political Science Review, Vol.
II, No. 1 (March, 1957), pp. 41-55, 50-51.
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In spite of the present popularity of this view and 
the attempt of most political scientists to avoid "value" 
studies some political theorists maintain that the search for 
"objective" values is not a futile pursuit and that the non- 
cognitivists are the real subjectivists. One political 
theorist, Professor John Paul Duncan, for instance, maintains 
that
. . . the denial of natural law by the scientific 
value relativists and the value non-cognitivists rests 
upon the subjectivist philosophical position that man 
is a relatively self-contained, value-creating animal, 
a unique, separate, subjective ego who in the Kantian 
sense trots about, either individually or in groups, 
placing blobs of value upon a factual world.5
Although Professor Duncan sees certain limitations in the 
position of most non-cognitivists he gives them considerable 
credit for bringing into focus the exact nature of the theo­
retical dispute. He says
. . . the crux of the philosophic issue concerning 
the validity of natural law is the same for any one 
of the varieties as pointed out in a previous note 
above, so in that each school must rest its case 
finally on the premise that somehow the "oughts" of 
life which are the real law reside in the nature of 
things, the facts of life, that "nature" exhibits 
JUSTICE. Whatever criticism may be made of them as 
"subjectivists" the scientific value relativists or 
value non-cognitivists from Hume to the present 
Vienna School and its followers have had both the
^John Paul Duncan, "Natural Law as Corporate Pur­
pose," Oklahoma Law Review, Vol. 13 (1960), pp. 274-287, 
p. 285.
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sense and the courage to see this fact and state it 
as the key issue.&
Another area of controversy centers around the dif­
ferences between the so-called behavioral and institutional 
"persuasions" in political science. The institutionalists 
usually seem to feel that politics and political reality is 
most aptly examined in the process of studying man's socio­
political institutions since it is through his institutions 
that man objectifies his wishes and desires and is affected 
by these institutions in turn. The institutional "approach" 
is often regarded by many as the "traditional" approach 
within political science. For instance, Avery Leiserson says
The oldest tradition in political science (as 
distinct from postulating and elaborating ideal 
forms of society and government) emerges in what may 
legitimately be called institutional analysis, i.e., 
the study of the historical, legal and structural 
development of political institutions, their modes 
of operation, and their differential efforts in terms 
of general types of organizational behavior.7
The "institutional" approach in one form or another 
has been regarded by many political theorists as being ob­
jectively the most important tool for finding the causes and 
clues to human socio-political behavior. However, in spite
Gibid., pp. 285-286.
^A. Leiserson, Parties and Politics ; An institutional 
and behavioral approach (New York: Knopf, 1958), p. 369.
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of the past "popularity" of the institutional approach there 
have been in recent years remarkably few articulated theories 
of politics and society which have indicated institutions to 
be their central concern. Instead it is the behavioralists 
who have been the most active in the methodological literature 
of our times. The behavioralists are hard to categorize 
since there are wide differences among their approaches. But 
certain general tendencies can be noted.
First, they claim to have made political science 
more "empirically" oriented. Dwight Waldo in the previously 
cited "trend" report illustrates this point in connection 
with dealing with the increasing concern for the "science" in 
political science. He says
The more recent, "harder" conception of science 
is associated with the term (or some variant of the 
term)3 "behavioural science" and the cluster of ideas 
and interests designated thereby.
Behavioural science is not strictly a political 
science term. In fact, most of the so-called behav- 
iouralists are trained primarily in some other dis­
cipline. They are devoted to a very strict interpre­
tation of the meaning of science. The focus of their 
attention is sharply upon "what can be observed"--the 
behaviour of humans.̂
A second tendency of behavioralists is to focus their 
attention on individual man and his "state of mind." As one
Q
Dwight Waldo, Political Science in the United 
States of America, o p . cit., p. 21.
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behavioralist put it,
The root is man. I don't think it is possible to 
say anything meaningful about the governance of man 
without talking about the political behavior of man-- 
his acts, goals, drives, feelings, beliefs, commit­
ments, and values.9
Although many behavioralists feel that they pay ade­
quate attention to institutions, in practice their concern 
is often with individual behavior. As one commentator has 
put it
Everywhere, in the literature we have examined, 
the "behavioral" approach is characterized by sym­
pathizers and critics alike as "concerned with indi­
vidual behavior or with action in small, face-to- 
face groups and . . .  a wide range of action not 
specifically relevant to any particular institutional 
context" (Truman, 1955, p. 209). So conceived "be­
havioral analysis" is identified with analysis of 
items of individual behavior, whether these items 
are responses to a survey questionnaire, categories 
of response in interaction situations or in speci­
fied communication networks, or alternate strategies 
adopted by an individual faced with the necessity of 
reaching a decision.^0
One final problem that is related to the controversy 
over "empiricism" and yet unique in its own right is the 
question of the relationship between political science and
^Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics 
(New York: Random House, 1963), p. 3.
^^Muzafer Sherif and Bertram L. Koslin, The "Institu­
tional" vs "Behavioral" controversy in social science with 
special reference to Political Science. Research Report. 
Institute of Group Relations, University of Oklahoma, Norman, 
1960, p. 5.
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other disciplines. For example, many scholars including Hans 
Morgenthau have maintained that the study of politics is a 
separate and unique discipline based on some central concept 
such as "power" or "influence." Professor Morgenthau argues 
that
Intellectually, the political realist maintains 
the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, 
the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks 
in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist 
thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the 
lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; 
the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral 
principles.H
In contrast to Morgenthau's attempt to carve an ex­
clusive role for the political scientist some political sci­
entists insist in reliance on other disciplines, particularly 
philosophy for providing insights into normative and descrip­
tive problems in political science. Professor Mulford Sibley 
often argues eloquently for the traditional cooperation be­
tween political science, philosophy and historical scholarship 
as well. Sibley has stated
The study of "politics" will necessarily involve 
all facets of human life and thought which have a 
bearing on or relate to the central concern. Thus, 
insofar as religious beliefs explain attitudes to the 
political world, they are of concern to students of
^^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 11.
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politics; and the systems of value preferences held 
in a given society must necessarily be studied if we 
are to understand the formulation and implementation 
of policy and the distribution of power. Policy and 
power distribution involve, among other things, the 
effectuation of value hierarchies in the institutional 
world. Then too, the study of politics, as of any 
other aspect of life, will always occur within the 
framework of a world-view of some kind. To compre­
hend politics, therefore, the student must keep in 
mind and be aware of the general framework of thought 
which characterizes the scientific and philosophical 
outlook of a given age.^2
Traditionally, of course, political science has fre­
quently relied on philosophy and what is broadly called his­
tory. But one effect of the rise of "empiricism" has been 
an increasing dependence on fields of psychology, sociology 
and anthropology, particularly among the behavioralists. In 
fact, the behavioralists often claim to be inter-disciplinary 
in their orientations. As Waldo notes
. . . behavioral science extends far beyond political 
science; it is an interdisciplinary movement or focus.
In it are met and joined students from other social 
sciences, such as anthropology, sociology, social psy­
chology, and economics, together with mathematicians, 
clinical psychologists, physiologists, geographers, 
and zoologists. In a sense and in some aspects it is 
a "unity of science" movement; its boundaries are 
indistinct and fluid.13
^^Mulford Q. Sibley, "The Place of Classical Political 
Theory in the Study of Politics: The Legitimate Spell of 
Plato," in Approaches to Study of Politics. Roland Young, 
Editor (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), p. 127.
^^Waldo, Political Science in the United States of 
America, o p . cit., p. 22.
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Still, with the intense concern with methodology and 
the "fluid" boundaries between the disciplines no clear inter­
disciplinary method has yet become accepted among students of
politics. Some observers seem to feel that a careful eclecti­
cism will continue to be a general trend at least in some 
areas of socio-political studies. As Professor Oliver Benson 
put it
This probably means that the future of the field 
will need to be as eclectic as its past, with the ex­
ception that where past eclecticism was based on
selection from the older traditional disciplines re­
lated to international studies: law and history, the 
newer eclectism [sic] will be based on a wider variety 
of subjects.14
Although Professor Benson warns that the "answer for research 
. . .  is not to be found in inter-departmental cooperation 
or cross-discipline research projects"!^ in practice inter­
disciplinary efforts have not yet rested in any significant 
degree on a common conceptualized framework. Thus Sherif 
and Koslin note
On the whole, interdisciplinary efforts in joint 
conferences and volumes have consisted largely of 
juxtaposing contributions by representatives of the
l^oiiver Benson, "Toward a New Eclecticism in Inter­
national Studies," Unpublished Report for Curriculum Study 
Project. Political Science Department (Evanston: Northwest­
ern University, March 1, 1955), p. 40, p. 29.
l̂ Ibid.
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various disciplines. It seems to us that one of 
the obstacles to effective interdisciplinary efforts 
is that conceptual approaches in the various dis­
ciplines are still formulated in terms of irrecon­
cilable dichotomies--dichotomies which are part of 
our intellectual heritage. . .
The foregoing discussion shows, therefore, that in 
this period of intellectual "restlessness” within political 
science any "new" approach has to contend with several differ­
ent "issues." But the three "issues" that we have attenqjted 
to isolate seem to incorporate to a degree other persisting 
but subordinate problems in what once was called the "master 
science." With this general framework in mind we can attempt 
to discuss and evaluate F. S. C. Northrop's approach to the 
problems of society in general and politics in particular.
The Political System
Northrop's own conception of politics is an extension 
of his views on culture. Culture as we have seen is basically 
regarded by him as a pattern of living based on certain value 
presuppositions about "science" arranged hierarchically.
These presuppositions provide the underlying unity among the 
various sub-systems of a particular culture.
lÔMuzafer Sherif and Bertram L. Koslin, "The 'Insti­
tutional' vs 'Behavioral' Controversy," o£. cit.. p. 3.
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The political system in Northrop's theory, then, 
does not turn out to be an independent variable but is inex­
tricably connected with the cultural system. The cultural 
system expresses itself in several "forms." Usually a cul­
ture, he claims, will exhibit at least five different forms 
or systems. Politics, economics, law, religion and art are 
systems that can be separated for scholarship and for con­
venience. It must be remembered, however, that they are not 
actually separated in reality according to Northrop. They 
are connected together by the ideational elements of a cul­
ture. Thus Northrop states
Each one of these normative theories is under­
stood when its specific economic doctrine, political 
theory, legal theory, religious doctrine and con­
ception of art are specified. . . . But the primitive 
assumptions of the economic theory of a given culture 
are intimately related to the primitive assumptions 
of its political theory, its legal philosophy, its 
religious doctrine and its art forms.17
The political system is, therefore, not only the 
various entities known among political scientists as groups 
or institutions but far more important, it is the set of 
values that are institutionalized and are being implemented 
as well. Politics is, therefore, a major form through which
S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and 
the Humanities (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), p. 
275.
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men regulate their own behavior in the light of the underly­
ing ideational goals. It is partly, therefore, also a tech­
nique of social control within the larger context of culture. 
Northrop puts it this way
. . . not everything with which the anthropologist 
or the sociologist concerns himself is relevant to 
the needs of the lawyer and the politician. The 
reason is that law and politics have to do with the 
intrinsic norms, or goal values, used by a people to 
order their relations to one another and to n a t u r e . 18
The legitimacy or validity of a political system con­
sequently too depends on its ability to implement its politi­
cal theory and its political norms. The element of "force" 
or "power" plays a secondary role in keeping the political 
system together. This does not mean, however, that political 
systems can dispense with authoritative patterns or institu­
tions . The elements of force and violence even are present 
in every system to help implement the norms. But the success 
of these norms depends primarily on how well they have become 
institutionalized. Thus, Northrop maintains that
This approach in no way entails pacifism. Even 
the sleepiest domestic community in either Gandhi's 
India or Holdemess, New Hampshire, has its police­
men. Usually also the state militia are not far 
away. The fact that law and political policies
18F. S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology and 
Practical Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1960), p.
25.
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receive both their justice and their effectiveness 
from the normative content of the living law and the 
living beliefs and habits of concrete men and women 
who together, in their individual creative thinking 
and acting, make that living law what it is, does 
not entail that physical implementation of both the 
living and the positive law is either mis-spent or 
unnecessary.19
Three sets of conclusions emerge from this portion. 
The first is that the political system is related to the 
cultural system. The second is that the political system is 
not simply a mere collection of institutions such as parties, 
courts or groups but is based on the ideational continuity 
among all these institutions. Finally, the success of the 
political system is based primarily on consensus and only 
secondarily on force.
Although Northrop is not a political scientist by 
training it is interesting to note that some of his views on 
the political system are to a degree parallel to those of 
many political scientists today. David Easton's conception 
of a political system as a unity is one such example. Easton 
suggests that
. . . there is already implicit the notion that each 
part of the larger political canvas does not stand 
alone but is related to each other part; or, to put 
it positively, that the operation of no one part can 
be fully understood without reference to the way in
19Ibid., p. 15.
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which the whole itself o p e r a t e s . ^ 0  
Also, like Northrop, Easton seems to suggest that the politi­
cal system is a convenient temporary abstraction from the 
total social context.
The very idea of a system suggests that we can 
separate political life from the rest of social 
activity, at least for analytical purposes, and 
examine it as though for the moment it were a self- 
contained entity surrounded by, but clearly dis­
tinguishable from the environment or setting in 
which it operates.21
Northrop's dependence on the living law with only a 
secondary emphasis on force also seems somewhat similar to 
the following statement by Easton.
Of course, a government may elicit support in 
many ways: through persuasion, consent or manipula­
tion. It may also impose unsupported settlements 
of demands through threats of force. But it is a 
familiar axiom of political science that a govern­
ment based upon force alone is not long for this 
world; it must buttress its position by inducing a 
favorable state of mind in its subjects through 
fair or foul m e a n s . 2 2
Thus, there is much in Northrop's political theory which would
correspond with Easton's characterization of political science
20David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of 





as the study of the "authoritative allocation of values for 
a society" where "authoritative" is "used to mean only that 
policies, whether formal or effective, are accepted as bind-
9 oing." However, since there are significant differences be­
tween Northrop's conception of the "science" of political 
and social science and the views of other empiricists, a 
brief examination of Northrop's discussion of the "logic" of 
the social sciences will help clarify Northrop's position.
Thus Northrop argues that there is no one "scientific" 
method if by science we mean the general pursuit of disci­
plined public knowledge. There are several different "valid" 
scientific methods. The validity of the method will depend 
on two major criteria, the nature of the problem and the 
stage or level of the scientific inquiry. He feels that the 
scientific techniques for the study of politics must be 
tailor made for the peculiar and unique field of politics. 
Simply and carelessly to borrow a scientific technique from 
one field and apply it to another will result in "scientism" 
rather than science. Thus, he states:
Again and again investigators have plunged into 
a subject matter, sending out questionnaires, gather­
ing a tremendous amount of data, even performing
21David Easton, The Political System: Inquiry into 
the State of Political Science (Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p.
133.
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experiments, only to come out at the end wondering 
what it all proves, and realizing after years of in­
dustry and effort that the real difficulty has 
slipped through their fingers. Others, noting the 
success of a given scientific method in one field, 
have carried this method hastily and uncritically 
into their own, only to end later on in a similar 
disillusionment.24
Therefore, Northrop urges that great care should be exercised 
in the process of borrowing "scientific" methods. He him­
self in his own adaptation of the methods of physics to the 
problems of politics attempts to exercise this care and cau­
tion himself making adjustments for the unique problems of 
politics.
Also, crucial to the appreciation of the "validity" 
of a method, Northrop goes on to argue, it is important to 
appreciate the stage or level at which the inquiry is operat­
ing. He suggests that within the same discipline, whether 
it be physics or politics, a scientific theory may be valid 
at one level and invalid at another level. As he puts it,
. . . the problem of the traditional treatises on 
scientific, concerning whether Bacon, Cohen or John 
Dewey has the correct conception of it, turns out to 
be a pseudo-problem. There is no one scientific 
method. John Dewey has the appropriate method for 
one stage of inquiry, even though he never pursued it 
fully. Bacon is correct for another stage, and Cohen 
for still another stage.
^^Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Human­
ities , p. 1.
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Such are some of the fruits of cultivating an 
understanding of logic and scientific method as they 
exhibit themselves in different specific scientific 
investigations, as compared with its cultivation in 
a vacuum or in the light of its character in one 
specific type of science, as has happened all too 
often in the traditional treatises on the subject.25
Problematic Differences between Science and Politics. 
As has been indicated, therefore, the "scientific method," 
which is applicable to any discipline, depends on the subject 
matter of the discipline according to Northrop. And the sub­
ject matter of political science is different from that of 
the natural sciences in one important respect. Although man 
and nature are immersed in the same physical continuum of 
reality man as a matter of fact is subject to a somewhat dif­
ferent type of causation than that of a stone or a tree. As 
has been stated elsewhere in greater detail, Northrop sees 
the uniqueness of man in his physical ability to create and 
live with symbols. This ability which can be explained in 
non-mystical and scientific terms according to Northrop is 
the key to man's behavior. Therefore any "scientific method" 
which is simply borrowed from physics or botany has to be 
adapted in order to do justice to the "ideological factor" 
in the behavior of man. Many humanists are often disturbed
25Ibid., p . ix.
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by the apparent neglect by scientists of what is often called 
the basic "spiritual” nature of man. Northrop to some extent 
may seem to echo their concern . The methods of physics can­
not be blindly applied to the problems of man but this does 
not mean that the arbitrary separation between the "sciences" 
and "humanities" is legitimate. If the methods of the natu­
ral sciences are adapted to take into account the ideological, 
crucial variable in man's "nature" a science of man is genu­
inely possible according to Northrop. Man's political ideas 
within the cultural setting are influenced by science anyway 
and therefore Northrop feels that the political scientist can 
neither ignore nor unhesitatingly imitate the methods of the 
natural sciences.
Also, the natural sciences deal only with "factual" 
problems. There is no need to take a public opinion poll 
among electrons or stones in order to ascertain their "be­
havior." As Northrop in stating the obvious says,
In natural science there are only problems of 
fact. Having found, upon the verification of Kepler's 
three laws of planetary motion, that planets move in 
an orbit which is an ellipse, astronomers do not face 
the normative problem concerning whether the planets 
should not do squads right in an orbit which is a
rectangle.26
26Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Human­
ities , p. 255.
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Political scientists, therefore, face not only the 
ideological variable but the fact-value problem as well. 
Unlike the mere problems of description, students have to 
deal with questions of prescription as well. Thus, Northrop 
states that
. . . social institutions, being in part at least 
man-made, confront the scientist with two different 
questions: (1) What is the character of social in­
stitutions in fact? This is a question comparable 
to the astronomer's question with respect to the 
solar system; and (2) How ought social institution 
[sic] to be? Even though murder and unemp1oyment 
exist, should one or the other or both be outlawed?
Even though actual social organization in a given 
society be monarchical, should it not be replaced 
by social organization of a democratic, a socialist 
or a communist form?^^
In fact, since the methods for resolving factual problems
and value problems are somewhat separate and distinct each
will require separate treatment.
Science and Description
Thus, Northrop attempts to impress upon students of 
politics and society that the process of describing political 
reality is far more complex than even a sophisticated politi­
cal journalist-reporter or researcher may initially suppose. 
Even if normative questions were completely left out.
Ẑ ibid.
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description also should involve a philosophically clear and 
scientifically valid methodology. Merely a concern for facts 
will not do, either.
It is Northrop's contention that even a search for 
"pure facts" cannot by-pass philosophical issues, even though 
the only "pure fact" that exists for Northrop is one that 
does not come with intellectual labels or categories attached. 
As he states it
Pure fact may be defined as that which is known 
by immediate apprehension alone. It is that portion 
of our knowledge which remains when everything de­
pending upon inference from the immediately appre­
hended is rejected.28
The initial stage of an inquiry must be marked, 
therefore, not by a search for facts but by what in pragmatic 
terms is called the "problematic situation." The problematic 
situation usually arises according to Northrop because of the 
failure of previous descriptive theories to do justice to the 
facts. It is not the failure of facts that creates a prob­
lem according to this analysis. It is the failure of theo­
retically described facts or "facts" which are postulated 
within a political theory. Therefore at this point the cru­




formulating testable hypotheses or even engage in Cartesian 
reasoning but to engage in a theoretical analysis of the prob­
lem at hand. Professor Northrop is here acknowledging his 
debt to pragmatism and indeed notes
John Dewey has the correct answer to our ques­
tion concerning the positive method to be used in 
initiating inquiry. His prescription is correct 
because it affirms a tautology, the tautology, namely, 
that one must begin inquiry with what one has at the 
beginning, namely, the problem. It is the problem and 
its characteristics as revealed by analysis which 
guides one first to the relevant facts and then, once 
the relevant facts are known, to the relevant 
hypotheses,^9
The importance of this analytical stage of inquiry 
in political studies can be seen from the fact that few 
political scientists in their methodological treatises give 
any great emphasis to the need for theoretical analysis of 
the problem at hand in the early stages of scientific in­
quiry. Many political scientists instead tend to emphasize 
the need for "hypotheses.” Arnold Brecht in his monumental 
work on "political theory" after cataloging different types 
of inquiry states:
Before we discuss these scientific actions, opera­
tions, or steps in detail,! several points should be 
made perfectly clear. In the first place, our enumer­
ation is not meant to express the postulate that 
Scientific Method proceed exactly in the given order.
29Ibid., p . 17
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On the contrary, actual procedure will generally begin 
with a tentative working hypothesis ventured upon not 
infrequently on the basis of an as yet most cursory 
knowledge of facts and used as a trial balloon to guide 
more systematic research. In the absence of conclusive 
data, the inquiry may even start out from a purely fac­
tual assumption.30
Thus Brecht does not seem clearly to recognize any 
need to begin with analysis. Northrop's concern with analy­
sis is, on the other hand, clearly stated, and this concern, 
very briefly, is due to several crucial factors. First, 
scientific inquiry is often needed because of the inadequacy 
of previous theory. Secondly, a conscious sloughing off of 
habitual modes of thought and conceptualization is good 
science. Finally, in certain problems of politics there is 
the very real danger of reading cultural values and meaning 
into the "facts" of a different culture. All three of these 
dangers can be met only by a careful analysis before making 
any empirical hypotheses. Further, such an analysis may save 
the researcher considerable time and inaccuracies in deter­
mining what should be the next step. Also, in some cases it 
may be learned that the problem must be analyzed chiefly due 
to logical inconsistencies in previous approaches. In other 
instances a simple empiricism may be in order with the usual
30Arnold Brecht, Political Theory (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 29.
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construction of hypotheseso Or, if there are normative ques­
tions involved in the problem, a distinct set of procedures 
may have to be followed, ones suitable for evaluative purposes.
The Natural History Stage of Inquiry. After the first 
stage of problem analysis Northrop maintains that disciplines 
generally tend to reach what he calls the "natural history 
stage." Northrop seems to imply that this tendency is a gen­
eral rule. Yet, he is far from a deterministic "evolutionist" 
in his general philosophical position.
The natural history stage is in any case marked gen­
erally by the use of inductive methods such as observation, 
description, and classification. At this stage the importance 
of theory is again noted. Even though the search for facts 
is still important this stage does not end by "finding" facts 
but by describing them. Since any described fact involves 
language and observations of relationships between facts there 
are bound to be, according to Northrop, propositions or theo­
ries involved. As he puts it
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that if one 
wants pure fact, apart from all theory, then one must 
keep completely silent, never reporting, either ver­
bally or in writing, to one's colleagues. For the 
moment one reports or describes what one has observed, 
one has described fact rather than merely observed, 
or immediately apprehended, fact. In short, one has ob­
served fact brought under concepts and propositionized.
And to have concepts and propositions is to have
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theory.
Although there are great dangers of being inaccurate 
in this stage of description, this is nevertheless an impor­
tant stage for scientific procedure» Science needs sheer 
collections of raw facts and classificatory systems, before 
it gets to the stage of deductively formed theory, which as 
we have seen before, is a characteristic of mature science. 
Northrop feels that among the social sciences psychology in 
particular has attempted to move to the deductive stage with­
out immersing itself sufficiently in the "description of dif­
ferent observable personality traits and types in the manner 
of the natural history biologists."32
Unlike psychology, the study of political science 
has been involved more intensely in the natural history stage 
of inquiry. Beginning with Aristotle's classification^^ of 
political systems based on such an inductively based category 
as the number of people who rule political science has been 
concerned for a long time, although unevenly, with the search
p . 36
31Northrop, Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, 
^^Ibid., p. 38.
O  O Northrop generally regards Aristotle both in poli­
tics and physics as a "naive realist" since the latter*s 
theories seem to rely on observation for knowledge.
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for facts. The "modem" aspect of this concern for "facts" 
can be seen in what David Easton calls "hyperfactualism" 
Easton states
Examination of the important political liter­
ature over the last half century or more reveals 
that students of political life have been captive 
of a view of science as the objective collection 
and classification of facts and the relating of 
them into singular generalizations.34
Using Northrop*s guidelines one can see many evi­
dences of the natural history method in several fields and 
sub-fields of political science. The traditional methods 
following Aristotle's example of classifying governments and 
institutions provide one set of examples. The usually fol­
lowed procedure in the study of constitutional law through 
the inductive study of cases provides another example. Also, 
the description of the size and constitution of various gov­
ernmental agencies and bureaus and the raw data of voting 
records are all phenomena peculiar to the natural history 
stage.
Important as the natural history concern for facts 
is nevertheless there are several inherent dangers at this 
level. One is that observers may be inaccurate in relating 
what they actually saw. Since the observer has to use
^^Easton, The Political System, op. cit., p. 66
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synbols and language there might be a loss of "factuallty” 
in the transition. The second problem is that at this level 
of analysis "naive realism"^^ is the prevalent epistemological 
tool. Consequently there will be some differences even among 
"sincere" observers in their description of the same situa­
tion. As a result, true objectivity is not very possible at 
this level of understanding. Even pure fact is elusive from 
an objective point of view. Northrop claims that
All that we can say about them is that we imme­
diately sense them. We apprehend the qualities as 
qualities, or their particular relations as particu­
lar relations, and nothing more. Certain qualities 
do not come with a tag on them saying "I am the sign 
of an external object beyond me which I qualify."
Nor do other qualities come with a tag on them read­
ing "I am purely subjective in o r i g i n . "36
Since pure facts are few and far between, natural 
history methods use inference in order to establish induc­
tively inferred facts. A "piece of chalk," "National Power" 
or the "Negro vote" are examples of inductively inferred 
facts because they mix sensed facts and assumptions about 
sensed facts. Pure facts cannot themselves provide a picture
Naive realism" is any theory which discusses 
"public" events and objects in terms of direct observation. 
Most inductive theories in political science like those of 
Lasswell, Almond and others are examples of "naive realism."
Of!Northrop, Logic of the Sciences, op. cit., p. 42.
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of Aristotle's monarchy. For the description of a monarchy 
inference and categories are needed which are based on ap­
proximations of pure fact. The method for checking the 
"facts" of inductive science often consists of constant 
checking and re-checking by different observers or by the 
use of dialogues between people who are ostensibly in the 
pursuit of "truth." Thus, in the average law courts the 
system of cross examination clarifies some of the errors of 
people who claim they saw the "facts" of a crime. Important 
as these methods are, the pursuit of "objective" science 
leads beyond the inductive to the deductive stage of inquiry.
As we have already indicated on a previous occasion, 
Northrop contends that the "advanced" sciences are at the 
stage where deductively formulated theory is an essential 
feature of scientific methods. Thus the theories of Newton 
and Einstein are deductively formulated theories in physics. 
For political science and social science to grow the primacy 
of deductive theory must be recognized, in order to pass be­
yond the "naive realistic" pseudo objective "historical" 
data and inductive inferences and r e a s o n i n g . S i n c e  we have
37Studies of pressure groups, bloc voting, or com­
parative studies based on "party structures" are examples 
of efforts where knowledge is inferred from what is observed 
and therefore is "naive realistic" in character.
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examined Northrop's analysis of the methods of science in 
detail elsewhere we need not repeat our previous discussion. 
It is sufficient to note the following summary by Northrop 
of the characteristics of a deductive system which attempts 
to portray reality objectively.
The methods are well known. They involve the con­
struction of a deductively formulated system. The 
basic assumptions or postulates of this system desig­
nate unambiguously what is proposed to exist. To 
this proposal or hypothesis, formal logic is then ap­
plied to deduce theorems or consequences. Among 
these consequences one seeks for certain theorems which 
define experiments that can be performed, such as 
Galileo's famous inclined plane experiment. The experi­
ment designated by the theorem or theorems of the 
theory is then performed. If in all instances the ex­
periment gives the result called for by the theorems, 
then the hypothesis is said to be confirmed and the 
entities and relations designated by it are said to 
exist. If the experimental result is negative, the 
hypothesis or postulate set is known to be false and 
some alternative hypothesis suggested by the data of 
the second stage of the inquiry, is put in its place 
and subjected to the same p r o c e d u r e . 38
An increasing number of political scientists seem to 
echo Northrop's emphasis on the need for deductive theories 
and their importance. The rise of "science" and "empiricism" 
therefore has not destroyed deductive logic but some author­
ities claim that deductive logic is more important than in­
ductive. Arnold Brecht, for instance, argues
61.
3 0Northrop, Logic of the Sciences, op. cit., pp. 60-
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It is utterly false, therefore, to say what is 
often heard, that Scientific Method has replaced de­
ductive (analytical) with inductive reasoning. Actu­
ally, deductive reasoning has remained one of the 
most important tools in modern science. . . .
If there be any order of rank between inductive 
and deductive reasoning, then the latter still de­
serves first prize as to logical validity. Inductive 
reasoning from mere samples, if ever so numerous, is 
never fully valid. . . .^9
Some behaviorists, of course, have been conceptualiz­
ing in terms of deductive systems, sometimes in the form of 
"models" especially in international relations. Professor 
Morton A. Kaplan in an unusually theoretical book on inter­
national politics observes
In a strict sense, a theory includes a set of 
primitive terms, definitions, and axioms. From this 
base, systematic theorems are derived. These theo­
rems should be logically consistent. The terminal 
theorems or propositions should be interpreted in 
such a way that the terms of theorems can be given 
unequivocal empirical references. Finally, the 
theorems should be capable of refutation or con­
firmation by means of controlled experiment or sys­
tematic observation.40
Although there are some points of departure, Kaplan's defi­
nition of scientific theory is in many ways similar to that 
of Northrop. One behaviorist who has examined a part of
39Brecht, Political Theory, o p . cit., p. 92.
4^Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in Interna­
tional Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), 
p . x i .
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Northrop's words more directly speaks with approval of North­
rop on this point. William H. Riker of the Center for Ad­
vanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in referring to 
Northrop says
Certainly one should praise him for his empha­
sis, appropriate from a philosopher of science, on 
the necessity of deductively formulated, non-norma­
tive theory as a pre-requisite to descriptive in­
vestigation. Far too many political scientists and 
anthropologists blithely rely on so-called induction, 
which as Russell once remarked, is just another name 
for guessing.41
Not all "behaviorists,” however, are convinced of the 
necessity at least at the present time of deductive theory 
in political science. Professor Heinz Eulau who is often an 
articulate special pleader in the "behavioral movement" notes
There are not many practitioners of the behav­
ioral persuasion in politics who believe that this 
is the right time for constructing logically closed 
deductive pictures of the political process. I 
have a great deal of admiration for these efforts, 
but I must confess to some doubt, not because I 
question the practicality of formal models or their 
suggestiveness in research, but because I suspect 
they are not as theoretically pure as their creators
insist.42
Many behaviorists, in spite of the "newness" of their
^^William H. Riker, Review of Philosophical Anthro­
pology and Practical Politics, American Political Science 
Review, Vol. LV, No. 1 (March, 1961), p. 155.
^^Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics 
(New York: Random House, 1963), p. 25.
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approach are still in what Northrop calls the natural history 
stage of preoccupation with facts although they deal with 
facts in a more complicated and rigorous manner than other 
previous institutionalists or " i n s t i t u t i o n i s t s T h e  natural 
history stage is necessary but it is only a prelude to the 
deductive theory stage. Also, the inductive behaviorists 
have been often concerned only with "action in small, face- 
to-face groups."43
Northrop, therefore, is to a limited extent similar 
to these behaviorists in question like Riker and Kaplan and 
others who are concerned with deductive theories about wider 
societal patterns. These latter behaviorists are more on the 
fringes of the behavioral movement when compared with those 
who are primarily microcosmic and inductive in their orienta­
tion, at least according to David Truman, Truman, after dis­
cussing those who study small face-to-face groups, notes
The formulation of theory of a more inclusive 
sweep has not been, strictly speaking, the object or 
the product of the efforts of the behavioral scien­
tist. That function has been left to the more his­
torically and philosophically inclined sociologist 
or anthropologist, concerned with reflections about 
the state of society, in the tradition of Max Weber
43oavid B. Truman, "The Impact on Political Science 
of the Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences," Introductory 
Readings in Political Behavior. S. Sidney Ulmer, Editor 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), p. 14.
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and Mannheim, or to speculative synthesizing like 
that of Talcott P a r s o n s . 44
In spite of these similarities with these latter be- 
havioralists, however, Northrop's philosophical training and 
approach places him beyond easy categorization as a behavior- 
alist or as a non-behavioralist in methodology. As a general 
rule Northrop is likely to appreciate the search for deduc­
tive theories on the part of any political scientist, behavior­
al or philosophical. Thus it is interesting to note that for 
him the need for deductive theory does not necessarily imply 
the end of speculative political theory. The role of the 
political theorist in speculating about political "reality" is 
in no way rejected by Northrop. However, the "traditional" 
political theorist is asked by him to insure that irrespective 
of the origin, source, or genius of the theory it should be 
carefully stated and logically coherent. Then when the de­
ductive system is completed logical inferences can be drawn 
and these "theorems" can be tested against the available 
"facts." Without these tested "theorems" however, deductive 
systems, whether made by Kaplan or by a Platonist remain for 
him mythical and hypothetical constructions.
However, according to Northrop just as some
44ibid., p. 14.
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philosophically oriented political theorists do not see the 
necessity of epistemic correlations as previously described, 
so also many "empiricists" in their "revolt" pay insufficient 
attention to the need for deductive theories. Logical posi­
tivists and "operationalists" often deny the possibility of 
meaning in any concept which has no direct counterpart in 
experience. Here Northrop is supported by others. Thus Pro­
fessor Abraham, in his important new work on methodology in 
the behavioral sciences, regards logical positivism, opera- 
tionism and pragmatism as variants of what he calls the school 
of "semantic empiricism." In defining the major epistemologi­
cal thesis of this school Professor Kaplan says
It is the view that to be meaningful at all a 
proposition must be capable of being brought into 
relation with experience as a test of its truth.
Its meaning, indeed, can be construed only in terms 
of just such experiences as provide a test. . . .
For semantic empiricism asserts that what cannot be 
known by experience cannot be said either, or more 
accurately, that there nothing more to be s a i d . 45
Extreme empiricists tend to question the need for deductive
theories and frameworks which do not directly have empirical
referrents. Northrop, in contrast, sees considerable validity
in the work of operationalists but only at a specific stage
^^Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Fran­
cisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 36.
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of science. The work of operationalists can be equivalent 
to the search for "epistemic correlations" but without a de­
ductive theory neither operationalism or any search for cor­
relations can give public or objective knowledge according 
to Northrop.
True, as has been already indicated, not all be-
havioralists or empiricists bypass systematic deduction.
Some, theorists are well aware that a concern of facts is not
enough, especially when there are a number of facts that have
become unmanageable. The natural history stage must then be
left behind because
It may be necessary also to regard the observ­
able data as entirely too gross, complex and crude 
to provide the entities or relations necessary to 
resolve the problem with which inquiry begins.46
Some of the statements of David Easton seem to sug­
gest that he would support Northrop's claim that rigorous 
theorizing must replace a concern for "facts" which has be­
come inappropriate. Easton states at one point
When the discipline was younger as an empirical 
science in our m o d e m  sense, the reservoir of fac­
tual knowledge was slight, the need for plunging into 
the collection of more data was great. , . .47
4^Northrop, Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities,
p. 59.
^^David Easton, The Political System, op. cit., pp.
93-94.
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He goes on to note the following:
Today, however, the condition and quantity of 
political knowledge has changed radically. Political 
science has accumulated bulging inventories of facts 
and their insistent pressure drives it towards an 
effort to draw these facts together into some mean­
ingful whole.48
Easton's own conception of the "political system" as a whole 
wherein there are inter-related parts is an example of an 
attempt to formulate a deductive system since "the operation 
of no one part can be fully understood without reference to 
the way in which the whole itself operates."4^ The works of 
Gabriel A l m o n d , ^0 Talcott Parsons^l and other "model" builders 
provide other examples of similar attempts at theory and sys­
tem building, These theories are examples of concepts which 
do not, in Northropian terms, refer directly to what is imme­
diately apprehended. Objects are theoretically constructed
48lbid., p, 95.
^^David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of 
Political System," World Politics, Vol. IX (April, 1957), p. 
383.
^^Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," in 
Political Behavior. Edited by Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Elders- 
veld and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), p. 
34.
51Talcott Parsons, "Some Highlights of the General 
Theory of Action," Approaches to the Study of Politics.
Roland Young, Editor (Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 
1958), p. 282.
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which "are known to exist by means of postulation rather than 
by immediate a p p r e h e n s i o n . "52 Speaking in terms similar to 
those of Northrop, Arnold Brecht also describes models thus :
Abstract wholes, such as "society," "economy," 
"markets," "capitalism," the "nation," the "collec­
tive mind," are "never given to our observation but 
. o . constructions of our mind." They exist only 
if, and to the extent to which "the theory is cor­
rect which we have formed about the connection of 
the parts which they imply and which we can ex­
plicitly state only in form of a model built from
those relationships»"53
Northrop*s acceptance of deductively theoretical 
orientations is not, however, unconditional. There are sev­
eral forms of deductive theories which are appropriate only 
in particular "stages" depending on the nature of the prob­
lem. If the problem at hand involves only directly observ­
able data such as the voting data in an election then the 
deductive theory may well avoid the need for epistemic cor­
relations. All the theory would have to do basically would 
be to make rigorous abstractions from the sensed world and 
then test these abstractions or theories again in the world 
of observation. Northrop calls such a theory "abstractive
p . 60.
53
52Northrop, Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities,
Brecht, Political Theory, op. cit., p. 524
219
deductively formulated theory He claims that such a
theory as well as other deductive theories are important for 
the social sciences but he does not think that the social 
sciences show any extensive use of deductive theories, at 
least of the abstractive type. Northrop may well have over­
stated his case at this point. In an amazing passage he 
states :
Only certain of the social sciences have to 
date achieved deductively formulated factual social 
theory. Economics has such theory in the case of 
W. Stanley Jevons' formulation of the science,^ and 
also in the case of the very similar theory of the 
Austrian school^. . . . Sociology to date has not 
achieved a deductively formulated factual social 
theory, even for s t a t i c s . 55
Since he does not. make references directly to the 
status of deductive theories in political science, it is 
difficult to fathom exactly the basis for his remark. It
5^Northrop does not provide a concrete example in 
political science of such a theory. But an example from one 
of the other social sciences may illustrate his point. Speak­
ing of the economic theory of the "Austrian School" and also 
Lionel Robbins, Northrop says: "By restricting itself to the 
generic properties of the introspected valuations, economics 
has accomplished something unique in the method of empirical 
science; it has attained deductively formulated theory which 
is empirically verified directly through its postulates with­
out the need of appeal to their deductive consequences." 
Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, o p . cit ,, p . 247.
55p. S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology and 
Practical Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), 
p . 95.
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can only be noted that if his remark on sociology is applic­
able to politics as well he has done his own theory an in­
justice by not elaborating on his criticism with specific 
examples from political science. Certainly, part of the 
theoretical efforts in political science towards system 
building and model creations go beyond "pure" empiricism and 
aim towards abstractively deductive methods, like those of 
Kaplan.
However, even if abstractive theories were prevalent 
they would not exhaust the possibility of even more advanced 
deductive theories. "Concepts by imagination" and "concepts 
by intellection" with their "indirect verification" or "epis­
temic correlations" are supposedly superior types anyway. 
"Imagination" and "intellection" are both unlike abstractive 
theories in that the first two do not depend on sensed facts 
or relationship for their deductively formed concepts. When 
we move away from the world of colors and sounds, pleasures 
and pains and become aware of other entities, "imagination" 
and "intellection" become important. And yet another reason 
for developing un-sensed concepts, according to Northrop, is 
that they have far more effective predicting power. As he 
put it.
Thus it happens that even when scientists solve 
the problem initiating inquiry in terms of the
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observable entities and relations and the deductively 
formulated theory of the hypothetically designated, 
rather than the abstractive type. The reason is that 
the appeal to such entities and their more timeless 
laws and relations often enables one, given a knowl­
edge of the present state of their subject matter, to 
rigorously and logically deduce the future state.56
Since in their descriptive methods the social sci­
ences are at a relatively immature stage, the distinction be­
tween "imagination and intellection" need not be elaborately 
treated again here. Once these disciplines, including polit­
ical science, are firmly at the deductive stage, these dis­
tinctions will become important. For the present, from 
Northrop's point of view the important thing to do is to try 
to graduate from the natural history stage of inquiry.
Northrop's own prescription for deductive theory is 
to pay attention to the key variable or variables and express 
these with such rigor that there will not be the great danger 
of smuggling in one’s own values at least for descriptive 
purposes. The key variable in political behavior is the 
ideological system of a socio-political entity. Unlike Marx, 
Mannheim, or the anthropologists of the Whyte school, North­
rop, as we have seen, isolates "ideology" per se as the 
crucial variable. If the primitive postulates of an ideology
^^Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Human­
ities , o p . cit., p. 116.
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are stated with sufficient deductive rigor he feels that at 
least this will be an added step towards more genuinely ob­
jective social science methods.
We shall pursue the application of Northrop’s fac­
tual theory in later discussions but one major political 
science "issue" once again should be noted. Even if a deduc­
tive system of political behavior were possible, what happens 
to the continuing fact-value problem?
Science and Values
The fact-value problem in its is-ought form is of 
course a problem that is peculiar to the social sciences.
The physical sciences do not have to deal with normative 
problems, Northrop maintains that since normative qi stions 
are peculiar only to social science and that the methods for 
studying the dynamics of a billiard ball will not by them­
selves solve the normative value problems of man.
The study of politics cannot exclude the study of 
values. On this question the major schools of political 
science seem to be in agreement. The preoccupation of schol­
ars like Easton, Laswell and others with problems of empiri­
cism does not exclude the study of policy and values . As we 
have seen, on the contrary Easton makes the study of policy
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crucial for his study of politics. Other political theo­
rists who are not "empiricists" have also traditionally main­
tained that the study of values is part if not the central 
concern of politics. Leo Strauss stands with the "policy 
students" when he notes that "Aristotelian political science 
necessarily evaluates political things; the knowledge in 
which it culminates has the character of categorical advice
and of exhortation."57
As we have said, the area where the consensus among 
political scientists almost hopelessly breaks down is on the 
question of the exact role of values in the policy and how 
to study them. It would be pointless at this stage to re­
capitulate the long history of arguments and exchange of 
"scholarly" vituperation that has often provided political 
science conventions with much heat and little light. Since 
our present concern is the theory of F. S. C. Northrop we will 
concentrate on his particular approach to the problems of 
value. Northrop's value theory is discussed in several areas 
of this work; therefore our task will be that of reducing 
his approach to value problems to a sharper focus here. There
57^60 Strauss, Epilogue" Essays on the Scientific
Study of Politics, Edited by Herbert J. Storing (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.), p. 310.
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are some inherent dangers in being brief and in simplifica­
tion. But it is hoped that our discussion of Northrop's 
value theory in several other areas including the "good life" 
and "natural law" will clarify some of the questions that 
may arise.
The heart of the value problem for Northrop lies in 
the problem of whether values can have cognitive meaning. 
Although questions of "bias" and "value" can creep into de­
scriptive studies Northrop feels that a deductive system 
rigorously stated avoids the relativity that "biases" can 
create. But the problem of cognitive meaning is a far more 
difficult matter. The problem of cognition actually appears 
often under varying other labels such as the fact-value prob­
lem, is-ought issue, the logical positivist-non-positivist 
argument and the natural law-empiricist arguments. In all 
these "debates" the same issue appears; is it possible to 
establish an objective "validity" of values? Also, is it 
possible to establish the truth or falsity of norms in an ob­
jective fashion? On the one hand groups of scholars gener­
ally "cognitive" in their approach have maintained that 
"there are normative statements in the area of law and poli­
tics which are demonstrably true or f a l s e . "58 Professor
5^Felix E. Oppenheim, "The Natural Law Thesis:
225
Felix Oppenheim on the other hand has summed up what is 
loosely called the non-cognitivist position in the following 
terms :
Non-cognitivism maintains that intrinsic value- 
judgments can be neither valid nor Invalid in a 
cognitive sense; i.e. that they are not capable, in 
principle, of test by reference to empirical evi­
dence or of proof on logico-mathematical grounds.59
Northrop's approach to the problem that Oppenheim and 
others have posed begins with an attempt to demonstrate the 
goal oriented nature of man's behavior. Keeping our previous 
analysis of culture in mind, Northrop theorizes that man's 
physical constitution makes him much more than an empty box 
caught between a simple stimulus-response pattern. Man "in­
terprets" his stimulus with his symbolizing properties. Many 
empiricists have accepted this type of description of man. 
Heinz Eulau, the behavioralist, taking cognizance of this 
states :
Modern behavioral inquiry has little in common 
with the physiological stimulus-response psychology 
of behaviorism which in some departments, sought to 
exorcise from social science what were considered 
"merely mental" phenomena-drives, motivations, atti­
tudes, defenses and so on. On the contrary, modern
Affirmation or Denial?" The American Political Science Re- 
LI, No. 1 (Mi
Ibid., p. 48.
view. Vol. I arch, 1957), p. 42 
59
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behavioral science is eminently concerned not only 
with the acts of man but also with his cognitive, 
affective, and evaluative processes.&0
Factually man does conceptualize his experience. But basic­
ally he does this in two ways. He discovers "facts" and he 
"evaluates" facts. The way he evaluates "facts" according 
to Northrop is through the basic ideology of his culture. It 
is within the context of culture that man looks at certain 
facts and passes judgment on them. Northrop attempts to 
categorize two types of facts, "natural" facts and "cultural" 
facts. Natural facts are "first-order" facts, that is facts 
that exist independent of perceivers. Regarding these "pure" 
facts it is meaningless to be "evaluative" ethically accord­
ing to Northrop. The blueness of what we call the sky cannot 
be intrinsically naughty, mean, or evil. The blueness just 
exists. Theories about whether some natural facts exist or 
not are per se non-normative theories. The cognitive meaning 
of these theories is therefore within the realm of proof.
One can demonstrate whether the "facts" proposed by a theory 
in natural science are there or if they are only asserted by 
subjective faith.
^^Heinz Eulau, "Segments of Political Science Most 
Susceptible to Behavioristic Treatment," in The Limits of 
Behavioralism American Academy of Political and Social Sci­
ence Symposium (Philadelphia: October, 1962), p. 30.
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Value theories, unlike the theories of science, do 
not deal just with facts; they deal with norms. These norma­
tive theories deal with what "ought to b e N o r t h r o p ' s  con­
ception of the legal-political system involves the thesis 
that man-made systems are based on normative cultural theo­
ries. For instance, the Russian political system is based 
on Marx's ideas on what society "ought" to be. Men construct 
their political institutions, laws, agencies, sanctions, re­
wards in the light of these theories. The separation of 
powers in the American system is logically derived from 
Locke's and Jefferson's concept of limited government which 
in turn was based on Locke's unique concept of "mental sub­
stances." What emerge, therefore, are cultural facts.
Since cultural theories create facts of human political be­
havior these facts are man-made and cultural facts for which 
Northrop uses the term "second-order" facts. A "whites only" 
sign in the south is such a second-order fact. Stones do 
not symbolize and create second-order facts. Only man with 
his neurological structure orders his behavior. Northrop re­
peatedly urges political scientists to keep in mind that 
there are two distinct levels of meaning for the term "is": 
the "is" of nature and the "is" of c u l t u r e . W h e n  we talk
^^That children are b o m  to women is an "is" in 
nature. The affirmation that the "first b o m "  has special
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about the gulf between the is and the ought we have to be 
careful about which of the two levels of meaning we are oper­
ating in.
Normative political theories are by their very na­
ture not based on the totality of second-order facts. Norma­
tive theories approve of some facts and disapprove of others. 
Thus the "naive realistic" legal theory of the south approves 
of whites marrying whites and disapproves of Negroes marrying 
whites. Theories, therefore, contain exhortations as well as 
affirmations. Even though people may in fact kill a president 
normative theories can contain fiats against the fact of kill­
ing. People may actually extort money from a governmental 
employee and yet a Hatch Act may regard such an act as "wrong." 
Since normative theories create political and social facts, 
Northrop regards it to be a futile venture to justify objec­
tively a political theory on the basis of what exists in 
political society. Thus an appeal to people in the Southern 
states to be truly Christian in their attitudes on the race 
question may be "practically" desirable if one wants a change 
in the status quo. But this appeal has no "objective" or
rights when made into an actual fact in a society is an "is" 
in culture. The latter is characteristic of the patriarchal 
groups in the Middle East, India and other "traditional" 
societies.
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"scientific" meaning whatsoever unless one is ready to prove 
that being "truly Christian" means to act in the light of a 
scientifically reliable theory. Thus he states
normative social theories, by their very nature, 
as conceptions of society not yet realized fully at 
which human beings are aiming, differ at least in part 
from the factual organization of actual society, it 
follows that they cannot be completely in accord with 
what is in fact the c a s e . 6 2
The "ought" of political life cannot be derived from 
the "is" of actual political facts alone. For instance, 
again by describing the existing racial prejudice in the 
United States one cannot deduce that racial prejudice "ought 
not to exist." To bridge the gulf between the is and the 
ought Northrop turns to the basic postulates of the ideolog­
ical system. These postulates contain certain presuppositions 
about the natural world. Thus Jeffersonian-Lockean theory 
sees nature in a three-termed relationship between mental 
substance, physical substance and sensed qualities. These 
scientific propositions can be in "error" since descriptive 
theories are subject to cognition. For instance, we can in 
science find out whether nature develops "dialectically" or 
not. Thus if these scientific propositions assert the exist­
ence of factors and entities which the methods of the mature
^^Northrop, Logic, op. cit.,, p . 331.
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deductive science show to be untrue any political speculation 
which is based on these propositions cannot be objectively 
valid.
The full implications of Northrop's dependence on 
first-order facts for the regulation of second-order facts 
will be treated in subsequent discussions. It is important 
to note at this stage, however, that he is not depending on a 
theory of wants, pleasures and pains. Political values are 
final results of our conceptualizations of the world around 
us and, if these assumptions are based on inadequate theories 
about nature, Northrop points towards the possibility of the 
falsity of the related political values and norms.
Before we speculate about the adequacy of Northrop's 
descriptive and evaluative theories, an examination of how 
Northrop relates his methodology to particular issues of 
political thought will further help illustrate his extremely 
complex approach to the study of politics.
CHAPTER VI
MAN, FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY
The examination of Northrop's philosophy of science, 
culture and his political methodology has given a synoptic 
view of the inter-relationships in his system between nature 
and culture as well as between culture and politics. His 
treatment of some of the enduring questions of political 
theory concerning the nature of man, his freedom and his po­
litical community, therefore, cannot be truly understood un­
less one keeps in mind that Northrop is attempting to create 
an integrated philosophy, i.e., one which will be adequate 
for examining man truly "in the light of the whole." Since 
Northrop does not claim that there is a real ontological bi­
furcation in nature he feels that philosophy and the special­
ized sciences must once again be coordinated as they were in 
Plato's Greece rather than compartmentalized as they are to­
day. As one student of Northrop's works pointedly remarked.
Is there valid ground today for compartmentaliz­
ing knowledge into bins labeled natural science,
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social science, and the humanities? Northrop says 
"No !" emphatically.!
Northrop*s "political philosophy" is, therefore, primarily a
convenient abstraction from his total philosophy.
A discussion of Professor Northrop*s political ideas 
might well begin by drawing a general picture of the present 
"concrete" state of politics as he sees it. Domestic politics 
within the United States or within other countries abroad as 
well as relations between countries are all part of a total 
chaotic situation in human affairs, as a result of not seeing 
the important role that ideologies play in political inter­
action. Another major reason for the chaos is the failure 
to exercise disciplined intelligence in this arena. Within 
the United States the conflicts and eruptions over the civil 
rights "struggle" are a case at hand. In illustrating this 
point Northrop states :
Domestic politics also is not what it needs to be.
The lack of foresight at both the state and federal 
levels in adjusting the cultural customs of the Old 
South to the unanimous decisions of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States in the de­
segregation cases and the resultant recourse to the 
military in full battle array with its breeding of 
bitterness suggests that the relation between legal
^Paul Douglass, "Northrop and Curricular Reform," 
Improving College and University Teaching (Corvallis : Oregon 
State University, Autumn, 1963), p. 193.
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decisions and social customs calls for more atten­
tion by ourselves and our politicians than it is now 
receiving.2
The neglect of the cultural, i.e., the ideological, 
factor is particularly apparent to Northrop in the race prob­
lems in the United States. But the United States is not 
alone in this dilemma.
In an era where nations are emotionally committed to
progress without examining what constitutes progress, where
nations use "incomplete"^ symbols of "freedom," "democracy"
and "social justice" without being clear on their meaning or
the operational methods needed to achieve them, Northrop's
description seems to be remarkably accurate:
Domestic events abroad reinforce this conclusion.
Since World War II as Africans, Middle Easterners 
and Asians have freed themselves from Western im­
perialistic domination, they have not returned to 
their medieval political customs in which they were 
ruled by theocratic Hindu maharajas, caliphatic 
sultans, Judaic patriarchs or African tribal chief­
tains . Instead, modern-minded leaders in the West­
ernized African, Islamic, Israeli and Asian cities 
have insisted on placing their domestic affairs 
under democratic control. . . .
2F . S . C . Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology and 
Practical Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960),p. 1.
3
An "incomplete" symbol is one which has no sensed 
referrent. Its "meaning" is assigned within a particular 
theory. Locke's "freedom" is different from Hegel's "freedom."
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The result is the political paradox i: The more 
these "democratic" governments are run by people who 
understand democracy and its m o d e m  ways and instru­
ments, the less representative of their people their 
"democracy" is: conversely, the more the masses of 
the people truly express their own beliefs, values 
and customs in their government, the more family- 
centered, tribally divided and tribally led and dic­
tatorial their new "democratic" nation becomes. This 
paradox defines the major domestic political problem 
of the nations of the world today, including, as 
Little Rock shows, even the United S t a t e s . 4
Thus the new nations or the "emergent" nations are 
only superficially attempting to "reform" their societies by 
the introduction of "new" values, according to Northrop.
But since he argues that values are outgrowths of particular 
epistemologies, Lockean values and Marxist values or any other 
values cannot be introduced successfully without the first 
"trapping" the accompanying frames of reference or episte- 
mological symbols which are at the base of the particular 
value systems that are to be introduced. Many of the new 
nations are therefore erroneously hoping to keep their "naive 
realistic" or "radically empirical" values without any com­
promise while they hope to introduce "technology" and at 
times "democracy." But if "technology," "modern science" or 
the "rights" of man are to become a reality, the cultural 
values of Asian and African society and the epistemological
^Ibid., p . 2.
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roots of these cultures will have to be altered to Include 
the "roots" that have gone into the making of Western tech­
nology and also those "roots" which have created democracies 
with Bill of Rights content. But Northrop sees very little 
evidence of sophistication in epistemology and value theory 
among leaders in domestic or international politics.
If this is indeed the state of affairs in the world 
today, what are the reasons why we are where we are? North­
rop provides a complex set of answers to this question which 
we shall gradually explore.
A  growing body of philosophers and political theo­
rists are also expressing their concern about the "anarchy" 
of values in the world today and are pointing toward "sub­
jectivism" as the chief source of our difficulty. "The Re­
vival of Natural Law" is a particularly good example of this 
concern.^
In his criticism of "subjectivism," however, North­
rop is rather unique in his approach. Unlike other critics
^The literature on this subject is vast. But the 
following works may provide the interested reader with a 
start in his enquiry. Charles G. Haines, The Revival of 
Natural Law Concepts, Cambridge, Mass.: 1930 and 1946. Lon 
L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, Chicago: 1940. A. P. 
D'Entreves. Natural Law, London, 1951. John Ching-hsiung Wu, 
Fountains of Justice, New York: 1955. F. S. C. Northrop, 
"Ethical Relativism in the Light of Recent Legal Science," 
Journal of Philosophy, LII, No. 23, Nov. 10, 1955, pp. 649- 
662.
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of subjectivism who approach the problem by depending prima­
rily on general metaphysical arguments, Northrop depends on 
his specialization in epistemology. Thus he charges that a 
commonly used but erroneous epistemology, applied to today's 
situation, is the "naive realism" of many political scien­
tists . He also maintains that this method or variations 
thereof cannot give us reliable or objective knowledge, i.e., 
knowledge whose meaning is clear to anyone and therefore is 
transmissible in character. "Naive Realism" he claims, rests 
upon the assumption that observation gives us knowledge. This 
completely overlooks the fact that observation gives us knowl­
edge only on the same plane or frame of reference.
This means that "observed" or "sensed" facts cannot 
be communicated to others exactly as they appear to be, un­
less others have had exactly the same sense experiences. 
Analogies do help but they can only approximate reality. Thus 
an astute observer, by observing the overt political actions 
of people in a particular country, can have some sophisticated 
hunches as to the "meanings" of politics there but he cannot 
give an accurate account of what he "saw" to others who did 
not "see" the same set of "facts" from the same vantage point. 
Only when symbols like those of mathematics or symbolic logic, 
whose meanings are unambiguous, are used, can there be a
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"public," inter-personal understanding of a description of 
political reality. The "feelings" of political observers 
who have traveled abroad when expressed in "naive realistic" 
everyday language have to be treated with some skepticism.
If we are not clear on the exact meanings of symbols 
used in communication, we are living in personal worlds of 
feeling and experience and with fleeting states of mind. Yet 
in spite of the utter failure of this form of psychological 
subjectivism, unexamined feeling and emotion is often made 
into the basic root of ohr political behavior. This is 
partly due to the bifurcation so often assumed between 
"spirituality" or "consciousness" and "matter" as metaphysi­
cally different categories. Thus the Lockean-Jeffersonian 
mental substance--physical substance dichotomy leads to some 
extent to the notion of "mind" and "body" as separate cate­
gories. Northrop, arguing against the assumption of the 
polarity of idealism versus materialism, illustrates the 
dangers of making the "psychical" characteristics of man and 
nature such as "feeling" or "consciousness" into cardinal ab­
solutes. This results in the rampant subjective emotionalism 
holding sway in our religious and political lives.
At this point a great danger arises : the tempta­
tion to forget one's scientific and philosophical 
principles and turn the psychical into a cause of the
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determinateness of experience. When this happens, 
art and religion and science degenerate into senti­
mentalism. One of the most important tasks of phi­
losophy is to [sic] clearly define the nature of the 
psychical, locate its place in the scheme of things, 
and keep it in that place. In this connection it is 
to be remembered that the determinate character of 
mind is as conqjletely conditioned by physical and for­
mal principles, as is the determinate character of a 
chemical element. All determinateness is physical and 
formal: the psychical contributes mere indeterminate 
experienced quality.&
In order to extricate ourselves from the morass of 
subjectivism Northrop emphasizes the need for objective meth­
ods, i.e., deductively formulated, in both descriptive and 
evaluative aspects of political science. His contribution 
to politics is rather unique in this respect. On the one 
hand, he would be rather critical of the pseudo-objectivity 
of much of the behavioral sciences particularly where it is 
shot through with "naive realism," like the inductive tech­
niques of Lasswell. For instance, he states "sociology to 
date has not achieved a deductively formulated factual social 
theory, even for statics.
On the other hand, he is equally critical of some 
natural law thinkers for their peculiarly vague and culture 
bound methodology. We will elaborate and develop Northrop's
^F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 262.
^F. S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, p. 95.
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natural law ideas in the discussion of his jurisprudence.
For the present discussion a brief illustration should be 
sufficient. Much of the revival of natural law jurisprudence 
particularly of the Thomist school as well as Leo Strauss' 
Chicago School would be good examples of evaluative frame­
works which are less than objective according to Northrop, 
even in spite of their claim that they excape relativism. 
Northrop, speaking of the Notre Dame Natural Law Institutes 
efforts in examining natural law in various cultures, states 
that
Every major culture in the world in its classical 
tradition affirms a natural law jurisprudence. This 
fact alone, however, is not enough to establish the 
thesis that natural law jurisprudence escapes the rela­
tivity of ethical and legal norms. In addition it 
must be shown that the content of the natural law ethi­
cal and legal norms in the different cultural traditions 
treated in this volume is identical with the content of 
the ethical and legal norms of the Roman Catholic natural 
law jurisprudence.o
This view is an extension of Northrop's semantical 
theory that the meaning of legal and ethical norms involves 
symbols which are relative to the epistemologies involved. 
Thus a Thomist's argument that there is a reason in nature 
and a Chinese philosopher's assertion that there is a
Q
F. S. C. Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and 
Ethical Experience (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959).
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universal pattern in nature only appears to constitute an 
agreement that there is a "natural law." But Northrop claims 
that the Thomist conception of what nature is and a Confucian's 
view of what nature is are different. For the Confucian 
nature is known with "intuitive immediacy" which is quite 
different from Thomistic "reason" and epistemology.
ThereforOg to be objective one's method of approach 
must fit the requirements of transmissible knowledge, without 
which we may have our private glimpses of truth without being 
able to give even an intelligible description of our compre­
hension of reality. One way of seeing what. Northrop insists 
upon in the way of "proper" epistemology in political theory 
is to examine his answer to the enduring question of ethical 
and political philosophy, "What is Man?" .
Man
Almost every political theorist deals with the con­
cept of the nature of man, in order to discuss "man" and the 
"state," "man and political values," "man and government" or 
"political man." Some are fairly clear in their treatment of 
man, while for others even the careful reader has constantly 
to dig through the particular philosopher's concept of man or 
simply note the definition as implied. Northrop himself is
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rather critical of many traditional thinkers who postulate 
the nature of man without bothering (1) to express their con­
cept in a disciplined logical and deductive manner, or (2) to 
state their concept in a manner which lends itself to some 
verification, through epistemic correlations. It should be 
noted in this connection that he is not against speculation. 
Being a professional philosopher he could hardly be against 
philosophising itself. But at the same time he urges that 
free speculation in the process of being stated for the bene­
fit of others be subjected to semantic clarity. To do this 
one has to have a minimum degree of competence in the meaning 
of words. Where words refer to sense data immediately appre­
hended the danger of mis-communication is not great. But the 
speculator's vocabulary, he claims, is so cluttered up with 
words which do not point towards immediately apprehended facts 
that words of this second type are the ones that cause the 
most frequent breakdowns in communication. Thus in discussing 
the nature of man he claims that one frequently runs into 
phrases like "body," "mind," "spirit," "consciousness," and 
a host of other incomplete symbols. Since these symbols are 
so frequently used laymen as well as professionals alike often 
unconsciously assume that these terms have fairly constant or 
invariable meanings. Inductively trained historians, for
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instance, can be easily led to make comparisons between dif­
ferent levels of cultural phenomena on the basis of dangerous 
yet rigid categories like "concept of soul" "nature of the 
hereafter" or even "law" whereas the actual method of arriving 
at meanings may vary from culture to culture„ Thus as we 
have noted, the presence of some "law" in "nature" is as­
serted by the non-dualistic vedanta Hindus or the Chinese as 
well as St. Thomas has, from Northrop's viewpoint, erroneously 
been regarded as proof that nature contains values by some 
respectable "natural law" scholars.
Northrop attempts to base his own concept of man on 
a philosophical awareness of the findings of the sciences, 
thereby avoiding the "culturalistic fallacy," as he uses that 
term. Man to him is a composite of all that we "scientifi­
cally" and "objectively" know about him, i.e., in the "light 
of the whole." His emphasis on the sciences does not result 
in viewing man as an isolated entity in himself. He is 
critical, for instance, of confusing the biological concept 
of man and the total man. In our present age of specializa­
tion he claims there is always the continuing danger of 
reifying the abstractions of our particular disciplines into 
absolute entities. Therefore, to him a fusion of the knowledge 
of various disciplines is essential for a greater understanding
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of the nature of man. His criticism of a purely biological
approach is evident in the following passage.
Furthermore, the organic character of the inorganic 
universe and of living things has been so firmly 
established by recent physics and physiological 
chemistry, that one must be very suspicious of all 
theories of biological organization which would 
locate its source wholly in internal entities, whether 
they be entelechies, or genes or organizers. At a 
time when certain physicists are threatening to throw 
all entities out of inorganic nature, and leave noth­
ing but mathematical equations and formal relatedness, 
it comes with something of a shock, to find so many 
contemporary experimental zoologists, locating the 
form of that most organic of systems, the living organ­
ism in nothing but internal entities.9
To avoid, therefore, the constricted view of man as 
seen in only one field one must be philosophically sophisti­
cated enough to integrate the findings of separate disci­
plines. The challenge that any "inter-disciplinary approach" 
for instance, within the "field" of international relations 
must face is that without explicit, clear consistent and 
philosophically sophisticated methods any approach for "inte­
grating" the social sciences clearly cannot succeed. A mere 
throwing together of geography, sociology, economics, poli­
tics and anthropology without having a shared epistemology 
does not give us a view of "man" or "nations" or "international
Q F. S. C. Northrop, Science and First Principles 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 214.
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politics."10 Nor does the focus on a single problem like
"Underdevelopment" or "South Asia" help. This becomes evi-^
dent again in examining Northrop's critique of the biological
concept of man.
Yet there is no reason why biological philosophy 
should be in such a state. Enough evidence is at 
hand to correct the one-sided overemphasis of the 
gene theory. The only difficulty is that one must 
cultivate the philosophical attitude of mind in 
order to know it .H
The reason for this has been mentioned in the narrow­
ness of our disciplines on the one hand and our philosophical 
inability to integrate them on the other. Northrop claims 
that this
. . . is inevitable. The chemist is concerned with 
the properties of gross matter, the physicist with 
matter and motion, the astronomer with stellar 
bodies, the student of thermodynamics with energy 
and its transformations; but the living organism 
is all these factors merged into a grand synthesis. 
Moreover, the essence of life centers in the cosmic 
forces which produce the synthesis, as well as in 
the local constituent materials themselves. Now, 
the science of the synthesis of the sciences is 
philosophy. Hence to understand life without look­
ing at one's local technical experimental evidence 
from the philosophical point of view is impossible.
l^The "inter-disciplinary seminars" that are held in 
state universities from time to time provide some examples.
^^Northrop, Science and First Principles, p. 214.
l^Ibid., p. 214.
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Man, therefore, even "physically” speaking is not 
just the "flesh" and "blood" individual entity but is a syn­
thesis of various other elements of nature. Therefore the 
mature scientist must not see man and nature merely from the 
confines of a particular "discipline" or viewpoint. Nature 
itself is not merely chemical, or biological or geological 
in character. The mature scientist, if he is interested in 
"man," must also subject to rigorous analysis all that is 
known about man. Here Northrop, being the philosopher that 
he is, maintains that analysis is the beginning of philosophy. 
Regarding this analysis of the "scientific" view of nature 
he has stated his argument at one point in the following 
manner:
Now, the science of the synthesis of the sciences 
is philosophy. Hence to understand life without 
looking at one's local technical experimental evidence 
from the philosophical point of view is impossible.
This does not mean that every experimental or de­
scriptive biologist should close his laboratory and 
study professional philosophy; it does mean, however, 
that the present approach to living things through 
intensive analysis must be supplemented with the con­
struction of a general accurate picture of the living 
organism in its actual physical, geological, chemical, 
astronomical and thermo- dynamical connection with the 
rest of nature.13
To take such a view is not "mystical" in the common
l^Ibid.. p. 215.
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and usual sense of the word. Northrop keeps both feet too 
solidly implanted in the sciences at all times to be called 
a mystic. He is simply saying that there is, at present, no 
one science of man and that constant integration of knowledge 
is needed. Man is partly his genetic factors but scientifi­
cally he is also a synthesis of nature. This synthesis is 
only intellectually known. It is not immediately given to 
the senses.
. . . the senses are always misleading the experi­
mental worker. Unless one is continually correcting 
and supplementing observation with a correct con­
ception of the general physico-chemical nature of life 
as a whole, which reveals it to be a complex hetero­
geneous physico-chemical equilibrium rooted as un­
equivocally in the physical and dynamical foundations 
of the environment, as in internal private genetical 
materials, the apparently solid character of living 
things causes one to regard them as a purely local 
entity. Then the notion arises that life is to be 
understood solely in terms of what is contained in 
the gross local body i t s e l f .14
In our discussion of Northrop's general philosophy 
we have treated his concept of man in greater detail than is 
attempted here. One problem remains for our present discus­
sion. If man is part and parcel of nature what role does 
his "free" will, if any, play in his interaction with other 
men, for instance in politics?
l^ibid., p. 215.
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The basic answer that Northrop gives is that the 
ability to symbolize in a variety of ways and categories, due 
to man's peculiar nervous system, gives man the ability to 
h^ve ideas. These ideas are the roots from which political 
action and political behavior spring. The brain does not 
come with meaning and symbols and values already in it . These 
symbols can be given meaning by the individual human being.
But most people are content with habitually living with the 
same set of symbols that society and its institutions have 
taught them. Institutions are the vehicles and instruments of 
societies' ideas, and institutions can help propagate the 
epistemologies, and the consequent ideas they rest on. But 
institutions, which are the result of man's ideas, are not 
mechanically deterministic. They are not the causes in every 
case for man's behavior. A man can, through reflection and 
knowledge, arrange his own symbols in a different way than 
most other men have done in society.
There are several implications for politics in North­
rop' s concept of man. Man is not by his very "nature" a 
political animal, an economic animal or a religious animal.
His "nature" leaves his cortical symbols undefined. When 
man's symbols are given meaning by other men or in the case 
of a genius by himself then he becomes a goal oriented man
248
who with other men with similar goals and purposes builds 
institutions, economic systems and patterns of politics. All 
of man's political institutions are "epistemic correlates" of 
his ideas. The institution of property is a reflection of 
the idea of property. In the United States, property as an 
institution exists because of the "trapped" Lockean episte­
mology in most people's minds. Institutions have no mystical 
character for Northrop. They are counterparts of men's ideas, 
instrumental means for fulfilling purposes. These purposes, 
however, themselves can be "good," "evil," "bad," "reliable" 
or "unreliable" from Northrop's "scientific" point of view.
Thus, for Northrop man simply because he is part of 
nature is not relegated to a pre-determined existence. This 
position again, it must be noted, is not that of a mystic. He 
attempts to justify this position by discussing the neural 
nature of man. Man is a dynamic creature whose "neural or­
ganization is a mixture of rigidity and f l e x i b i l i t y . "15 
Without this twin characteristic man would be either con­
stantly reacting in a purely conditioned manner or on the 
other hand would know only what appears immediately before 
him. If the former condition alone were true, the question
I S l b i d .
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of political and moral responsibility would evaporate. If 
only the last were true, the Humean analysis of man's ability 
to "know" would be the definitive one. In the light of this 
discussion an important question needs to be clarified and 
answered. If man is partly structured, i.e., physically, and 
partly unstructured, i.e., neurologically, what is Northrop's 
position on the question of the extent of man's freedom in 
dealing with the problems of politics?
The Problem of Political Responsibility
This seemingly philosophical question has immediate 
and practical implications for political science. Without a 
clear notion of the nature of human freedom, political sys­
tems which rest to some degree on consent cannot continue to 
function with clear guidelines regarding the "ideal" condi­
tions in which freedom can operate.
As Sidney Hook notes, the question of whether man's
nature is physically deterministic is related to the problem
of human freedom:
Whereas in the past the extension of the determin­
istic philosophy in the natural sciences was hailed 
as a support of human freedom because it increased 
man's power of control over nature, today belief in 
determinism in the social sciences and social affairs 
is feared by many because it increases the power of
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men to control other men.lG
Northrop's discussion of political freedom and re­
sponsibility is dependent on his philosophy of causation as 
particularly demonstrated in the physical sciences. As we 
have seen, Northrop's political man is never estranged from 
scientific man and the scientifically known universe around 
us. Therefore, in order to understand the extent of human 
freedom, we first have to understand the extent of mechanical 
causation around u s .
Laymen, in their usual common-sense references to 
causation and determinism, usually mean necessary relation­
ships between observed events as causes. Were this the only 
meaning of causation and were this alone true, determinism 
would leave very little room for human freedom. Fortunately, 
however, the possibility of freedom cannot be this easily 
dispensed with. Nature as known by mere observation does 
not provide true evidences of causation or relatedness. 
Without speculation and the exercise of intelligence we would 
see only the succession of perishing images following each 
other. Sunsets would follow sunrises and sunrises would
^^Sidney Hook (ed.), Determinism and Freedom in the 
Age of Modern Science (New York: Collier Books, 1958), pp. 
7-8.
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follow sunsets and apart from an aesthetic sensitivity to 
the world around us, we would not know a truly public world. 
As we have seen, Northrop believes that Hume's critique of 
causation is especially effective when applied to events seen 
by mere observation. In physics also causation as seen by 
mere observation has no major role to play. The perceiving 
of causation in human everyday experience or in the disci­
plined world of physics, requires the exercise of human spec­
ulations and therefore of freedom. Illustrative of this 
theme is the following statement by Northrop:
Since, as Hume showed, we do not observe any rela­
tions of necessary connection, two things follow:
(1) The concept of mechanical causation in m o d e m  
physics cannot be attained merely by direct inspec­
tion of a common-sense example or by so called 
"analysis" of the grammar of an Englishman's descrip­
tion of such an example; only temporal succession 
will be found by such a method. (2) Physical sys­
tems obeying mechanical causation can therefore be 
known only by deductively formulated, axiomatically 
constructed, indirectly verified theory.
Nature, therefore, in its public aspects is known 
speculatively. It is from speculation that we derive deduc­
tive models and then operationally verify them. The theo­
retical deductive system can be derived in a variety of ways.
S. C. Northrop, Causation, Determinism, and the 
"Good" in Human Freedom, Sidney Hook, Editor (New York: 
Collier Books, 1958), p. 205.
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This itself is of major significance for any discussion of 
human and political freedom. To be truly scientific one must 
have speculatively introduced theories. Operational and em­
pirical tests, whether in physics or politics can come only 
later. As Northrop himself states:
The universe in which we live is very compli­
cated. In order to obtain theories adequate to 
understand it, it is necessary to open the basic 
concepts of scientific theory to every possible 
source of meaning. Flights of the imagination, 
spéculâtion--both physical and metaphysical--and 
mathematical investigations not merely of this 
empirical world but, as Leibnitz and Bertrand 
Russell following him have noted, of all possible 
worlds are not merely permitted but r e q u i r e d . 18
This illustrates that man's curiosity and the theo­
ries with which he searches for reality do matter. Without 
speculation man can not know and this itself illustrates his 
moral responsibility. Whether it is truth in the natural 
sciences or knowledge about himself that man is seeking he 
is truly free to initiate his own theoretical inquiries.
There is no gap between the social and natural sciences on 
this question.
Hence, quite apart from the scientific evidence that 
determinism does not hold even for subatomic inorganic 
systems in quantum mechanics, there is evidence that
18F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and 
the Humanities (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), p.
124.
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scientific knowledge is quite compatible with moral 
responsibility and the rejection of the reduction- 
ism of judgments [sic] of right and wrong to causally 
deterministic antecedent factors.19
The ability to speculate that is inherent in man has 
two separate implications for political thought. The de­
scriptive political scientist like his counterpart in the 
natural sciences must speculate about the "is" just as Ein­
stein did or just as theoretical physicists do. Theoretical 
physicists in Northrop’s view are truly creative persons.
They do not merely observe and then relate their observations 
to each other. They speculatively create theories about 
nature. Therefore, the age of empiricism has not destroyed 
the need for speculative theory in physics or in politics. 
Mature science needs more speculation than science in the 
inductive or natural history stage of development.
Also, man’s normative political theories, too, re­
quire the work of speculative minds. According to Northrop 
man's "imperatives" or "oughts" do not come with labels fixed 
by nature. They, too, are the creations of man operating 
through his culture which in turn rests on man-made episte­
mologies . Man is a goal oriented creature but his goals to
19 F. S. C. Northrop, Determinism and Freedom, Sidney 
Hook, Editor (New York: Collier Books, 1958), p. 211.
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a considerable extent are his own creations. Man's politi­
cal theories can be creatively formulated. Also, the imple­
mentation of these requires the creative abilities of man 
again. Just as the discovery of epistemic correlations in 
science requires inventiveness, so also the discovery and 
construction of political institutions for the implementation 
of political values also require the genius of man. Man's 
freedom to speculate about what "is" and what "ought" to be, 
as well as the search for efficient institutions for their 
implementation arises out of the peculiar character of our 
nature.
Apart from man's freedom to speculate about the world
around him there is yet another aspect of man's freedom.
This has to do with the special type of human causality.
Thus, Northrop states:
Recent psychology has emphasized the importance of 
the unconscious portion of ourselves. From psycho­
analysis we have learned the value, if we would 
know ourselves, of bringing our dream life and the 
vast portion of ourselves that goes on unconsciously 
and automatically into the center of consciousness. 
Nevertheless this supplementation of introspective 
conscious psychology with the psychoanalytic psychol­
ogy of the unconscious does not take us to the truest 
and fullest nature of ourselves.20
20F. S. C. Northrop, A New Approach to Human Nature, 
Reprint of an article published in the Christian Register, 
January, 1954 and sent to author, p. 1.
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The fact is, Northrop insists that this nature is 
such that we do not operate only under the laws of causality 
in inorganic nature. Whereas changes in the systems of in­
organic nature can be predicted on the basis of laws of 
mechanical causality, an entirely different situation occurs 
in the case of man. In inorganic nature if we are able to 
isolate the independent variables at a given time we can with 
the help of mathematics predict the verifiable values of the 
system at a different time. Causality in inorganic nature 
is merely the relationship between two states of the same 
system at two different times.
Human nature, unlike inorganic nature, does not lend 
itself to this kind of mechanical causality. The kind of 
causality that governs man's actions to a significant extent 
is termed "logico-meaningful," a phrase Northrop borrows from 
Professor Pitrim A. Sorokin, the Harvard sociologist.21 
Briefly, what Northrop means by "logico-meaningful" is the 
epistemology with which man integrates the "facts" or "stim­
uli" of his experience.
Northrop is asserting that man is a "knowing" animal.
21Pitrim A. Sorokim, Society, Culture and Personality 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 145-149; 333-335.
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This for Northrop means more than it does to the layman;
The nature of logico-meaningful causality be­
gins to become evident when one pursues the analogy 
of Newtonian mechanics in the cultural sciences as 
far as it will go. Any natural system designated 
byNewtonian mechanics has its entities. %hey are the 
physical or scientific objects. The cultural sys­
tems also have their entities. They are the human 
persons and their physical environment. When in 
Newtonian mechanics, the postulates and values of 
the variables defining the state of any system are 
specified, the ordering relations of the system are 
made determinate. The mere specification, however, 
in any cultural system of the positions and moments 
of the persons in that society is not sufficient to 
specify the ordering relations which define the cul­
ture of those p e r s o n s . 2 2
An example of the scientific importance of recogniz­
ing this independent variable in logico-meaningful causality 
is the fact of the continuing tensions between Hindus and 
Moslems in the Indian subcontinent.
An example will suffice to make this clear. In 
many village communities of India, Muslims and Hindus 
have lived together for centuries. Most of the Mus­
lims are converts from Hinduism; thus racially the 
peoples are for the most part identical. Hence, the 
cultural differences between Muslims and Hindus which 
are so great as to necessitate the present division 
of the 19th century India into Pakistan and New Delhi's 
India are not to be explained by physical and genetic 
differences. The momenta and positions of the bodies 
of the Hindus and Muslims in any single village hardly 
account for the differences in their two cultures.
The position of Muslims and Hindus is identical since
22F. S. C. Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and 
Ethical Experience (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), 
pp. 105-106.
257
both are located in the same village. If one watched 
both groups walking down the street there might be 
slight differences in their momenta, but hardly differ­
ences sufficient to account for the differences in cul­
ture. In fact we would suspect that where differences 
in momenta between Muslims and Hindus in the same vil­
lage appeared, these differences would be the effect 
rather than the cause of the cultural differences.
Clearly the cultural ordering relations are not given 
after the manner in which the ordering relations of 
natural systems exhibiting their mechanical causation
are given.23
Northrop's thesis, therefore, essentially affirms 
that the key variable in human behavior is the meaning or 
philosophy that a person or persons use in integrating the 
raw data of experience.
His notion of the meaning of philosophy here refers 
to an inter-related set of postulates in man's cortex that 
governs his behavior in society. Is there any evidence that 
such a set of postulates actually exists and if so, can the 
content of the postulates vary from man to man and from cul­
ture to culture? For Northrop's thesis to be valid both the 
questions must be answered in the affirmative. If the answer 
is negative, obviously there are severe limitations to human 
freedom in politics or in other forms of social interaction.
For an answer, Northrop's theory relies on several 
relatively recent empirical findings in psychology,
^^ibid., p. 106.
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anthropology and c y b e r n e t i c s . 24 Thus as we have noted in 
our discussion entitled the "Nature of Human Society," North­
rop depends on Dr. Lorente de No, the Spanish experimental 
neurologist who "gave anatomical experimental reasons for be­
lieving that the nerve cells in cortical neural nets are 
ordered in circles as well as throughways,"^^ thus lending 
support to the thesis that man's ability to symbolize is far 
more complex than any simple stimulus-response pattern. But 
apart from medicine, Northrop finds that in cybernetics Von 
Neuman and Wiener discovered that circular networks or rever­
berating circuits were capable of memory and therefore of 
symbolization. Also, Warren S. McCulloch, the psychologist, 
and others have noted that the retained stimulus or trapped 
impulse in reverberating circuits is actually equivalent to
24Lorente de No, 'La Corteza Cerebral del Ratar,"
Trab. L a b . Invest. Biol. Univ. Madr. , 20, 41-78, 1922.
Warren S. McCulloch and Walter Pitts, "How We Know Univer- 
sals," Bull, of Math. Biophysics, 5, 115-133, 1943; "The Per­
ception of Auditory and Visual Forms," Bull. of Math. Bio­
physics, 9, 127-147, 1947. Warren S. McCulloch, "A Hierarchy 
of Values Determined by the Topology of Nervous Nets," Bull. 
of Math. Biophysics, 7, 90-93, 1945. Arturo Rosenblueth, 
Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose and 
Teleology," Philosophy of Science, 10, 18-24, 1943. Norbert 
Wiener, Cybernetics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1948).
25 F . S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology and 
Practical Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1960), p.
48.
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the basic ideas that are trapped in the minds of men. Put­
ting all these findings together Northrop concludes that the 
integrating aspects of our human nervous system contain a set 
of trapped symbols which in turn screens all the incoming 
stimuli from then on, and directs our bodies to react or "be­
have" in certain ways.
In Northrop's terms, then, the basic answer to the 
question of "freedom in man" is that man has the inward capa­
city to choose the basic philosophy, to determine values, to 
trap in the integrating area of his cortex and to conceptua­
lize the facts that he experiences. It is the form and con­
tent of man's philosophical and political symbols which make 
human causality logico-meaningful, without which "there is 
only a muscle twitch to stimulus; there is no morality."^6 
In creating the basic philosophy in each of us, all sorts of 
possible alternatives can and do arise. But it is peculiar 
to our own nature to be able to create these basic philoso­
phies and it is also peculiar to us that these can give mean­
ing to the millions of facts in our experience.
Only concepts can bring one fact of experience 
into relation with all other facts. The basic
0 AF . S. C. Northrop, Reprint of article published in 
the Christian Register, January, 1954, "A New Approach to 
Human Nature," p. 4.
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concepts generating the hierarchy of all concepts 
define a person's or a culture's philosophy.
One caution is to be noted. The foregoing con­
clusion does not mean that the moral life of the 
individual and the unity of any culture is a passive, 
purely receptive, mechanical process. With the al­
most infinite number of stimuli striking any human 
nervous system through the duration of a human life, 
the representatives of those stimuli which are basic 
and capable of being used to define, deduce or antici­
pate others cannot be discovered by mere receptivity. 
Different possible candidates for the status of being 
basic must present themselves and be tried out through 
trial and error.
There is, therefore, according to Northrop no purely 
"economic" determinism which gives us our ideological orien­
tation. No economic fact alone directly determines our be­
havior. There is always the ideological screening process 
that all facts have to go through before they can determine 
our behavior. Northrop's position then does amount to a 
theoretical argument for man's intellectual freedom and moral 
responsibility ^  a fact and not just as ^  ideal. In a 
later chapter we shall pursue individual man's responsibility 
in connection with Northrop's jurisprudence.
But man's freedom demonstrates itself in two distinct 
levels which are important. The first level is that of the 
creation of "cultural" facts. Here Northrop's nature-culture 
dichotomy should be kept in mind. Nature does not
^̂ Ibid.
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automatically give rise to cultural values. Thus as noted 
in India within the same geographic and economic setting one 
can create Islamic cultural facts and Hindu cultural facts. 
Man's artifacts are of "his own" making. Economic, political 
and social facts are not pure facts, they are more truly 
value-facts, that is, facts which are created by particular 
value or ideological systems. Therefore, whether the Soviets 
are eliminating the large farmers in Soviet Russia, or the 
United States Government is attempting to retaliate against 
foreign governments with economic sanctions for the appropria­
tion of American "private" property, cultural and ideological 
man qua man is really demonstrating his freedom to build his 
artifacts on the fruits of his speculation, erroneous as his 
speculation may be. However, it should be noted again that 
Northrop's theory does attempt to separate erroneous theories 
from correct theories.
Besides freedom at the cultural level there is yet 
another level of importance. This second level deals with 
man as an individual. In the case of individual man in most 
instances the trapped values of his culture do significantly 
determine his political and social behavior. This is again, 
not economic determinism but cultural determinism at work. 
Thus even the "individualist" in economics and society is
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demonstrating fragments of the philosophy of the "Wealth of 
Nations" and/or Herbert Spencer's "Social Statics." A  legis­
lator's concern which may be genuine, over the rights of Mrs. 
Murphy and her boarding house vis-a-vis the public accommoda­
tions section of the proposed Civil Rights Bill, can according 
to Northrop's theory be traced back to Lockean assertions 
about property.
The constitution of our mind, both "cultural" and 
"individual" is therefore a synthesis of our cultural values. 
Culture and society make elaborate attempts to inculcate in 
us their particular value system by trapping in our cortex 
the basic epistemological tools necessary to direct our be­
havior in a culturally accepted manner. The entire process 
of education in a gradual and subtle manner teaches us these 
cultural values. Culture itself is primarily the grouping of 
men with similar ideological orientations.
Since there is a common culture only when there 
is a common set of universels held by at least a 
majority of the people in the society in question, 
we now see why religious and secular education, be­
ginning in the mother's lap at childhood and carried 
on to maturity, are present in and a necessity of 
any culture.2°
Since cultural institutions do preserve the basic
p. 4.
2 8F. S. C. Northrop, A New Approach to Human Nature,
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intellectual roots of man's life, is not man then purely 
cultural bound? Are men not completely molded by the norms 
of their culture? Are men not therefore incapable actually 
of being anything other than their culture makes them? In 
answering these vital questions Northrop shows his Platonic 
influence and persuasion clearly. Basically he argues that 
most laymen in their daily preoccupations, and even the pro­
fessional in his field of academic specialization, are not 
really busy examining the forms of their culture; in this 
sense they are culture bound and "determined." But some 
rare individuals do demonstrate creativity. They are
creative in the second sense--achieved only by the 
sages of any culture--of discovering, expressing and 
conveying this philosophy. Thus man creates not 
merely all the artifacts which are culture, but also 
all the diverse mentalities and philosophies which 
guide him in the creation of the artifacts.29
Therefore, the challenge and the possibility of re­
creating the political and social assumptions of our times 
are always before u s . The task of course can be actually 
performed only by someone with the capacity and perseverance 
of a Newton, a Marx or an Einstein. Then there are also the 
problems of effectively institutionalizing the new set of 
assumptions in the place of the old ones as is evident in the
Ẑ Ibid.
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civil rights struggle especially in the South today. Here, 
too, creativeness in a practical sense, i.e., that is within 
the reach of many persons, is important.
This does not mean that Northrop is anti-democratic 
or that he is urging that Newtons and Einsteins be elevated 
into positions as "guardians" of society. He is simply tak­
ing note of the fact that the creative abilities of people 
vary and that political systems can ill afford to ignore this 
fact. As is noted in our later discussion, however, North­
rop 's own political ideals put certain "scientific" standards 
and limitations which creative people must meet before their 
ideas are to be implemented. Also, ideally Northrop sees the 
democratic legislative process in his system as the institu­
tion in which policy making must take place provided the con­
tent of the legislation meets these same "scientific" stand­
ards and limitations. The creative persons nowhere in North­
rop 's theory are supposed to represent or speak for the pref­
erences of others.30
Since this kind of creativity is very rare, society 
in order to pass on to better assumptions must keep open the
^^chapter VIII, "Science and Ideal Values" elaborates 
on this in greater detail. This point was again confirmed by 
a telephone conversation with Professor Northrop on 5-27-1964,
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avenues of intellectual inquiry. This of course presup­
poses a particular "ideal" set of institutions and will be 
discussed further in connection with Northrop's ideas con­
cerning the "good" state.
Although only the sages can recreate the intellectual 
foundations of one's culture, this does not necessarily con­
demn the layman to a menial existence. One misunderstands 
Northrop's entire philosophy if one assumes that Northrop 
would like to create a society where only the sages truly 
govern. Northrop's attempt to create an ideal cosmopolis is 
a far cry from Plato's Republic. One example of erroneously 
identifying Northrop's philosophy exactly with Platonism in 
this respect occurs in the writing of a professional philos­
opher, Professor Horace L. Friess of Columbia University. He 
states that:
The thought of gaining more intelligent control 
of culture has indeed lured many philosophers from 
the days of Plato to our own. The kinds and the 
amount of knowledge available have grown tremendously, 
but their employment for so complex an end is perhaps 
more difficult to oversee than ever. One suspects 
that even so elaborate an attempt as the recent one 
by F . S. C. Northrop (1893-) to find the key to cul­
tures in the logic of their sciences generalizes far 
too simply, and invites a m o d e m  version of control 
by philosopher-kings.31
31V. Ferm (ed.), A History of Political Systems (New 
York: The Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 595.
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The possibility of man's conscious trapping of his 
basic universale is always there for Northrop. Northrop, 
therefore, is speaking in normative terms based on the fact 
that freedom is possible. This does not mean that freedom 
as it is possible is an actual social fact. It is a natural 
fact and if societies and political institutions are not 
built on propositions based on this natural fact obviously 
the freedom of man can be easily crushed by the juggernauts 
of cultural institutions, as exemplified by "primitivism."
If social philosophies continue to assume that Man's ideolo­
gies are primarily reflections of responses,to stimuli in the 
external world, and if man is considered to be under the 
dominion of automatic responses to pleasure and pain, the 
march of God through history, an economically determined dia­
lectic or Hobbesian and Newtonian mechanical forces or "natu­
ral" laws like "supply and demand," then the natural fact of 
human freedom can be obliterated by the cultural artifacts 
and Leviathans created by erroneous political and social 
theories. Yet these theories even in their error are complex 
metaphysical and epistemological systems. To suggest, there­
fore, that intellectual care is needed to examine where our 
theories went wrong is hardly the same as arguing for socie­
ties controlled by philosopher-kings.
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The Rationality of Man
The foregoing is Northrop's approach to the problem 
of human freedom. But oftentimes discussions of human freedom 
are interrelated with the question of the rationality of man. 
Special pleaders for individual liberty, e. g ., often assume 
in different degrees the proposition that man is basically a 
"rational" being. John Stuart Mill, for instance, in moving 
away from his mechanical utilitarian heritage, argued indi­
rectly for the rationality of m a n . Kant's well known asser­
tion that certain rational notions such as the categorical im­
perative as the basis of reason are known a priori and as part 
of our very nature is another example of this. Also, many 
arguments for the existence of a natural law, as in Thomism, 
are based on the assumption that there is some inherent human 
reason which if allowed free play can discover rational laws 
in nature.
Although F. S. C. Northrop is also a special pleader 
for individual freedom and dignity, he does not assume _that 
man is "rational" by nature. Nor does he assume, like Nie­
tzsche, that man is "irrational" by nature. All attempts to
^^For a full discussion of Mill's departure from 
Utilitarian irrationalism see G. H. Sabine, A History of 
Political Theory, 3rd Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc., 1961), pp. 707-709.
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define man in terms of ''nominalistic" ethical adjectives 
"good," "bad," "rational" or "irrational," unless they are 
related terms in a rigorously formulated deductive theory, 
consist of asking an irrelevant set of questions from North­
rop' s point of view. The meaning of ethical adjectives can 
be derived only from the total set of propositions of which 
they are parts. Therefore Northrop, the empiricist, again 
refers to the objective evidence (as he uses this term) avail­
able, in order to discuss any aspect of human nature. Revert­
ing to the theory of trapped universels he based his discus­
sion on the "rationality" of man on the implications of that 
theory.
The evidence of the theoretical and empirical investi­
gations of the neurologists, psychologists and others referred 
to before give no indication whatsoever, he claims, that only 
concepts based on "right reason" or "rational models" are 
trapped by men. The varieties of ideas or symbols that can 
be trapped are almost infinite in number. "Rational" or "ir­
rational" being value laden terms can be used descriptively 
only in connection with the ideas that are trapped rather 
than merely to the fact that man has flesh, blood, cortex and 
neurons. For instance, he states
It would be an error to conclude, as some have
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done, that this conception of human nature is false 
because it is excessively rationalistic. Whether the 
content of a person's conscious mind or unconscious 
"trappings" are rationalistic or not depends upon the 
content [italics mine] of what is trapped.33
Stated in another way, the fact that man traps symbols is 
neither indicative of his rational, irrational, good or bad 
character. Only his symbols, since they are man made, can 
be "correct" or "incorrect" according to Northrop. Thus all 
sorts of ideas, concepts, symbols rational, irrational theo­
retical or aesthetic can be trapped:
As psychoanalysis shows, one can trap the epis- 
temic representative of a passion, an emotional dis­
turbance, a sexual feeling, an obsession or any other 
emotively charged past experience or image as easily, 
if not more easily, than one can trap the epistemic 
representative of a fence post, a piece of granite or 
the mass of an external object which we call the 
moon.34
The consequences for political theory are self-evi­
dent. One cannot assume the inherent rationality of man, 
particularly when the cultural system is itself irrational. 
The German Nazi ideology which itself arose partly from 
Fichte's legacy of voluntarism is basically an irrational 
type of thought. Not even a Gandhi could appeal to the inner 
"human" conscience or any concern for universal human rights
63
Q Q F. s. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, p
o A-■^Ibid.
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in the inner crevices of a true Nazi mind. Merely "balanc­
ing of interests," the legislative process, the Weimar con­
stitution, or merely creating the trappings of democratic 
institutions could not per se change the trapped impulses in 
the minds of the majority of Germans in the pre-World War II 
era.
In his analysis of the German mind Northrop sees 
Fichte playing a crucial role in its formation. Speaking of 
Germany before the end of World War II Northrop states:
To understand the Germans of our time is to 
realize that their culture was built predominantly 
on Fichte and Hegel, as Anglo-American culture has 
rested on Locke, Hume and A r i s t o t l e . 3^
In analyzing why Fichte's theory is at least in part respon­
sible for the success of Nazism in pre-war days Northrop 
makes the following comment :
Thus upon careful analysis, the freedom turns out, 
even for Fichte, to be not so much in the will of 
ordinary human individuals as in a transcendental or 
superhuman will which alone has freedom and which, in 
positing the ordinary human individual, at the same 
time limits that individual by its antithesis, the 
non-human ego, or nature. In fact, Fichte believes 
that a contradiction would exist in his theory did he 
not go on to the absolute will as a synthesis which 
embraces the human ego and nature, at the same time 
removing the contradiction between the latter which 
would exist were they taken as primary in their own
35Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, op. cit.,
p. 214.
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right. This absolute will is "pure freedom." It 
alone is unlimited and unconditioned. Human wills, 
on the other hand, are the mere expression of its 
activity.36
The Nazis were able to build the Nazi state on the 
cultural base provided for by the Fichtean concept of free­
dom in Northrop's analysis. Thus, noting the response finally 
given to the ideology of Nazism, Northrop states
This popular response was nourished by many 
items, not the least of which was the identification 
of morality with the free act of the will and its 
demands which Kant's Critique of the Practical Reason 
and the initial stages of Fichte's philosophy empha­
sized. In fact, the culture of the Nazis may be de­
fined as a Fichtean voluntarism which, rejecting the 
logic of dialectic appropriated by the communists, 
is developed along Nietzchean and pseudo-Darwinian, 
rather than Hegelian, l i n e s . 37
Similarly, from Northrop's point of view it would be 
an error to assume that unless Marxist-Leninist epistemology 
is modified, sheer economic facts, improved living conditions 
and ergo "mellowing" processes will bring about a fundamen­
tally different Soviet Union from the one that was involved 
in the Cuban crisis. This should not be interpreted to mean 
that Northrop is playing a fixed "national-character" game 




political systems. But political change cannot come about 
by some sort of natural evolution. Chinese and Indian poli­
tical systems in the past have had long histories of rela­
tively high cultural, ideological and political stability and 
without much natural "evolution" taking place.
For democratic theory, therefore, the Northropian 
lessons are equally clear as they are for other political 
"isms." Democracy cannot survive without a specific ideo­
logical orientation. Legislative processes, judicial systems 
or presidential power are some of the operational means for 
implementing particular policies provided the basic "con­
sensus" on the basic ideology is there. Although other ana­
lysts, D. Boorstin, for instance, are also very much aware 
of the role of consensus of ideological "givenness" in democ­
racy, Northrop attempts to analyze the specific nature of 
democratic ideology. For without this clarity, he claims the 
consensus can erode away. Even now Northrop feels that in 
our jurisprudential attitudes towards the Bill of Rights,38 
the "rights" of "minorities" and other vital issues, there 
is already in the United States the danger of increasing fuz­
ziness about the "primitive" assumptions of democratic
^®Such as the Frankfurter-Hand view of the "rights" 
in the Bill as "admonitions to forbearance" only.
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political theory. By merely building overt democratic po­
litical "gimmicks" and by pseudo-empirically studying and 
describing them a democratic system cannot continue to 
function.
Northrop's attempt to define political reality in 
terms of the overt behavior of people guided by their covert 
symbols and ideas leads him to an examination of the actual 
content of the institution within which so much of our poli­
tics takes place. This institution, the "nation" has a par­
ticular meaning in Northrop's political theory.
Nations and Political Groups
The terms nations and states are of course well 
known in classical categories of political science and polit­
ical theory. Before the rise of behavioral theory traditional 
political science's core concept has always been the "state" 
or in certain cases because of national "feeling" the term 
"nation-state." Northrop's own discussion of the nation-state 
is deceptively simple, but important. Basically he takes 
traditional political scientists to task for not constantly 
reminding themselves of the abstract nature of the concepts 
"nations" and "states." Immediate experience cannot give us 
any trustworthy knowledge of nations and states . Nations are
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not entities that we know with immediacy as in the case of a 
sunset. "Nation" and "State" are theories about facts or 
more clearly they are abstractions from the facts of experi­
ence. Political scientists, according to Northrop, often 
fail to make the important distinction between entities known 
with immediacy and entities known through theoretical concepts. 
If this distinction is not made the danger of reification of 
concepts occurs or "what Whitehead called the fallacy of mis­
placed concreteness."39 Then political scientists mistake 
concepts like "state" and "nation" for concrete physical en­
tities under the guise of "realism."
Thus when taken by themselves as the elementary 
concepts in foreign policy or international relations, 
as is done by Professor Morgenthau and Mr. Kennan, 
instead of being realistic or scientific concepts such 
expressions are abstract words that are confused with 
concrete things.40
The fact that many political scientists do confuse 
the theoretical entity "nation" with some "concrete" fact 
does not mean that the concept "nation" needs to be abandoned. 
The situation can be "simply" corrected by clearer "definitions" 
of the term or terms as the case may be. For "the nation" to 
become a scientific concept the important components of a
39F. S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, p. 76.
40Ibid., pp. 75-76.
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nation have to be clearly specified. Often what is specified 
clearly is only the physical components of nations like "natu­
ral resources" or "armed forces" together with an intuitive 
component such as "feeling" of unity. This is not a suffi­
cient description of national political system. Northrop fur­
ther regards usual working definitions of nations and states 
as being somewhat similar to knowing chemical compounds only 
through their relative weights. Just as a chemist could not 
go far in describing the behavior of interacting chemical com­
pounds if he knew only their weights so also political sci­
entists often go astray in dealing with inter-state, inter­
national or even inter-group politics by depending on limited 
abstractions like "power." By making this theoretical concept 
"power" the basic ingredient of another theoretical concept 
like "nation" or "politics" these entities are not clearly 
defined and yet political scientists continue to use them as 
concrete entities, thereby again reifying abstractions; cer­
tainly the variables of which they are composed are not 
clearly specified. Professor Hans Morgenthau, Northrop 
charges, is a particularly good example of this. Thus in at­
tempting to define a nation Morgenthau states :
A  nation as such is obviously not an empirical 
thing. A nation as such cannot be seen. What can 
be empirically observed are only the individuals who
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belong to a nation. Hence, a nation is an abstraction 
from a number of individuals who have certain character­
istics in common, and it is these characteristics that 
make them members of the same nation. Besides being a 
member of a nation and thinking, feeling, and acting in 
that capacity, the individual may belong to a church, a 
social or economic class, a political party, a family, 
and may think, feel, and act in these capacities.41
But Morgenthau's attempt to abstract a clear concept
of a nation is rather confused from a Northropian point of 
view. The major "characteristic” seems to be feeling and yet 
nowhere does Morgenthau attempt to devise any operational 
method for testing, measuring or objectively finding "feel­
ing." Nor is this surprising. Morgenthau's major "method" 
for determining descriptively or normatively any aspect of 
political reality is " i n t u i t i o n " 42 and "intuition" hardly
^^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd 
Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 101.
^^The "naive realism" of Morgenthau is evident in 
the following procedural rules that he provides with respect
to the giving of foreign aid:
However, an analysis of the situation in the recipient 
country and, more particularly, its projection into 
the future and the conclusions from the analysis in 
terms of policy can only in part be arrived at through 
rational deduction from ascertainable facts. When all 
the facts have been ascertained, duly analyzed, and 
conclusions drawn from them, the final judgments and 
decisions can be derived only from subtle and sophis­
ticated hunches. The best the formulator and executor 
of a policy of foreign aid can do is to maximize the 
chances that his hunches turn out to be right. Here as 
elsewhere in the formulation and conduct of foreign 
policy, the intuition of the statesman rather than the
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gives us trustworthy knowledge of unseen factors.
Because of the vagueness of the usual meaning of the 
term "nation" Northrop feels that the task of clearly isolat­
ing the key variables of this term is imperative before it 
can be of any use in the study of politics. Here Northrop 
is not opposing a non-existent opposition. But the overwhelm­
ing majority of textbooks on international politics demon­
strate a type of naive realism which amounts to the episte- 
mological assertion that observation and intuition give us 
objective knowledge of reality.
Northrop's own attempt to treat "nation" as a theo­
retical entity takes cognizance of such "facts" as that 
political entities have force, arms, resources, and other 
tangible realities that "realists" deal with. But on the 
basis of the scientific theories about the process of human 
cognition and its relationship to human behavior, Northrop 
goes on to isolate a commonly held value system as a key 
characteristic of a nation.
Stated as briefly as possible, a "nation" is any 
group of concrete, particular human beings who pos­
sess in the hierarchically ordered neural nets of their
knowledge of the expert will carry the day. [Italics 
mine] Hans Morgenthau, "Preface to a Political Theory of 
Foreign Aid," Why Foreign Aid? Robert A. Goldwin, Editor 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 89.
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brains a similar set of elementary trapped impulses 
(which are the physiological epistemic correlates of 
consciously or unconsciously memorized elementary 
ideas and postulates) for firing or inhibiting their 
motor neurons and thereby causing a similar cognitive 
behavioristic living law response to any given 
stimulus.43 [Italics mine]
Keeping in mind our previous discussion of the find­
ings of McCullough and others it becomes obvious that North­
rop is depending heavily on the concept of trapped universels 
for arriving at the construct, a "nation." Basic philosophies 
or rather elementary epistemological symbols when commonly 
held by a group of individuals gives the group its concrete 
identity, as well as the stimulus for its dynamics. Although 
basic philosophies are often characterized as "value systems" 
some important distinctions need to be made in order to avoid 
any misunderstanding of Northrop's thesis in the problem of 
defining a nation. What Northrop attempts to isolate is not 
a sum total of all the particular values that cultures, groups 
and nations hold. He is not dealing with all the range of 
attitudes or preferences that a person or people may have on 
topics as varied as capital punishment, income tax or the 
"best" ice cream flavor. The concern is directed more at the 
primitive concepts, the epistemological systems the methods
. S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, p.
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of knowing which in turn determines to a significant extent 
how we "think" about the particular problem of fact or value 
that we may be faced with,,
To illustrate the differences between those who are 
aware only of the role of values and Northrop, who attempts 
an empirical analysis of the role of values as well as the 
substantive content of value systems, a brief comparison of 
Morgenthau and Northrop should s u f f i c e . ^4
Morgenthau, for his part, takes cognizance of the 
fact that value systems or national characters to play some 
role in the behavior of nations. He states that
Of the three human factors of a qualitative 
nature which have a bearing on national power, na­
tional character and national morale stand out both 
for their elusiveness from the point of view of 
rational prognosis and for their permanent and often 
decisive influence upon the weight a nation is able 
to put into the scales of international politics.45
^^Again Morgenthau is picked as an example because 
of his influence in the field. If one only examines the 
works of many writers who deal with nations as actors in the 
political arena the influence of Morgenthau becomes more and 
more evident. An elaborate bibliography of international 
relations texts is not provided, but for the present the ex­
amples of writers like Liska, Organski, Hartmans, and Stoes- 
singer are cases in point. In their approach to the con­
ceptual problems of "nations" and "national power" they often 
reassert Morgenthau*s theses. Even when they dissent their 
genuflection towards Morgenthau is shown by the fact that 
their dissents are couched in Morgenthau’s terms. They dis­
agree with him more than they venture into independent theo­
rizations of their own.
45Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 126.
280
He admits with Northrop that "these qualities set one nation 
apart from others, and they show a high degree of resiliency 
to change."46
But unlike Northrop, Morgenthau does not attempt a 
systematic analysis of the origins of particular value sys­
tems . The latter explains that
We are not concerned here with the question of 
what factors are responsible for the development of 
a national character. We are only interested in the 
fact-contestable but (it seems to us) incontestable, 
especially in view of the anthropological concept of 
the "culture pattern"-that certain qualities of in­
tellect and character occur more frequently and are 
more highly valued in one nation than in another.47
Also unlike Northrop, Morgenthau is particularistic 
in his approach in that the latter attempts to discus frag­
mentary qualities of national character.
The "elementary force and persistence" of the 
Russians, the individual initiative and inventiveness 
of the Americans, the undogmatic commonsense of the 
British, the discipline and thoroughness of the Ger­
mans are some of the qualities which will manifest 
themselves, for better or for worse, in all the indi­
vidual and collective activities in which the members 
of a nation may e n g a g e . 48





is not what Northrop tries to emphasize. At the risk of 
being repetitious and yet to prevent error in understanding, 
it needs to be re-stated that Northrop is searching for the 
elementary, primitive and inter-related set of primary values 
which determine the secondary ones as well as affecting cer­
tain aspects of human behavior. The difference between a 
primary and secondary value is that the former "is elementary, 
primitive or basic if it is an idea that is used to define 
other ideas but is not itself defined in terms of other
ideas."49
Clearly groups are formed around sets of core "inter­
ests" but as Northrop states clearly and some social psychol­
ogists seem to indicate these interests consist of shared 
norms whose properties will vary from group to group and are 
not limited to any single principle such as "economic inter­
est." Although much of human activity consists of inter-group 
relations Northrop approaches the problem from a somewhat dif­
ferent approach than most "empirical" minded social psycholo­
gists . By training and by the nature of their discipline
49F. S. C. Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, p.
79.
Intergroup Relations and Leadership, Muzafer Sherif, 
Editor (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 4-5.
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social psychologists are more concerned with the process of 
inter-action between groups rather than in the kind of epis­
temological analysis of basic norms that Northrop is contem­
plating. Also, social psychologists have been primarily 
active more in the study of small social groups^l than in 
larger units like national entities. When an analysis of 
larger units is attempted it often consists of generalizations 
based on the findings of small group research. Therefore 
Northrop's attempt to treat national entities as behavioral 
units with common normative properties differs from the "in­
tuitive" approach of Morgenthau and others as well as from the 
empirical small group approach of some social psychologists. 
Also attempts to present statistically the characteristics of 
groups are different in their approach from what Northrop has 
in mind. Variables like age, economic class, occupation, 
education may be helpful in the inductive natural-history 
stage of social science. But to be truly an objective body 
of knowledge, political science has to move on to more dis­
ciplined and deductively formulated theories about variables.
The validity of Northrop's findings as well as an 
evaluation of his methodology is treated elsewhere. For the
^̂ Ibid.. pp. 13-14.
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present, therefore, we see clearly that Northrop is claiming 
that any attempt to study or speculate about the politics of 
groups must first clearly and without ambiguity define the 
key variable or variables that go into the making of a politi­
cal entity. Northrop's isolation of the "ideological factor," 
such as dialectical materialism and the evolutionary theory 
of nature and culture in Soviet Russia, in political behavior 
seems to be a step in this direction. He feels that objective 
methods are at hand by which we can specify accurately and 
deductively the ideological variables or properties of a 
nation.
The methods of studying values and ideological struc­
tures concerns us in detail elsewhere. In broad general terms 
Northrop's methods differ considerably from most of the be­
havioral treatments of ideology, consensus and value systems 
in that these treatments are usually far too introspective 
and therefore, naive realistic in their approaches. North­
rop 's search for the public mind leads him towards the arti­
facts of culture in which the public mind or the national
ideology expresses itself. Subtle and complex as the basic
value structures may be from the point of view of the political
C O Political institutions would be good examples.
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analyst without the clear specifications of these, the mean­
ing of the entity "nation" in domestic or international poli­
tics will be left in a sadly incomplete and even misleading 
state.
Thus far three major concerns of traditional politi­
cal theory were broadly treated from a Northropian point of 
view: the nature of man, freedom and the meaning of a nation. 
In essence he sees man as essentially immersed in the contin­
uum of nature. But at the same time man structures nature 
and therefore is an ideological creature. One does not have 
to end in solipsism to assert that the cognitive processes 
of man play a key role in his awareness of nature. Nature is 
not a collection of phenomena that speaks for itself. The 
implications for political theory of Northrop's position here 
are far-flung as indicated.
In the first place our knowledge of politics is con­
nected with our knowledge of nature, simply because man knows 
nature in different ways depending on the particular philos­
ophy of science that is used. Objective nature is outside us 
and so is politics and man understands them through symboliza­
tion. Political theorists in their speculative efforts have 
to specify clearly their epistemology or their theory of 
knowledge; otherwise they are exposing their speculation to
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the most serious misunderstanding.
In the second place any discussion of political man 
assumes also a particular understanding of the meaning of 
human freedom. We have attempted then to examine Northrop's 
attempt to construct a factual description of human freedom 
and possibility in the light of the findings of some social 
and natural scientists about the actual neural structure of 
the human mind. We shall explore the political and legal im­
plications of this in subsequent chapters. But for the pres­
ent the theory of trapped symbols casts a new light on the 
old dialogue between the positivists and non-posicivists in 
political theory.
Finally we have attempted to understand Northrop's 
approach to political groups and entities in general and the 
nation in particular. This will set the stage for our subse­
quent discussion of the ideal nation, the nature of law and 
rights and finally the practical conducting of domestic and 
international politics.
CHAPTER VII 
A QUEST FOR LAW
Students of politics have traditionally recognized 
and are also aware at the present time^ that the subject 
matter of law and the substance of politics cannot be arbi­
trarily separated, from either a practical standpoint or 
from a philosophical point of view.
The jurisprudence of F. S. C . Northrop is also based 
on the premise that the study of politics is intimately re­
lated to the study of law at several levels of scholarship. 
Both law and politics are sub-systems of the cultural pat­
terns of society. Both deal with human norms. Finally, both 
are methods of social control by which there "is an ordering 
of human beings with respect to one another and to nature.
Law and politics both deal substantially with our public
^See Arnold Brecht, Political Theory, o p . cit., pp.
136-138.
2 Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, op, cit., p. 11.
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selves,3 and yet they deal with personal and private ethics
as well. As Northrop puts it
. . . legal experience combines within itself the 
ideal and the actual in a way that is not true either 
for natural science or for personal morality and re­
ligion. Precisely because this is the case one must 
expect, . . . that an analysis of legal or political 
experience must take one to the sciences, social and
natural, or what is, on the one hand, and to personal
morality and to religion, on the other hand .̂
The separation of law and politics in Northrop's theory is 
therefore a matter of degree rather than of kind. Whereas 
law is generally the order in human relations or the "rules 
of society," politics is more particularly the method and 
the process by which the rules of the legal system are ac­
tively maintained and sometimes changed. Northrop's juris­
prudential interest leads him to conceive of law in such 
terms that it will be more truly a tool of comparative analy­
sis of the "rules" or public norms of any culture, western 
or non-western, "primitive" or "modem." His concern for a 
truly objective concept of law even for descriptive purposes 
can be seen in his skepticism of any theory of law which 
sees the element of force as being the crucial factor in law. 




theory of law, wherein force is regarded as the "natural" 
means for implementing rules. Hoebel sees law as being bas­
ically normative in character as does Northrop. That is, 
like Northrop, he sees the legal system in normative value 
terms. He says,
. . . selectivity in the building of cultures is 
done in accordance with a number of basic postulates, 
existential and normative. Social control is exer­
cised to guide the learning process; it rewards suc­
cess in adaptation to the norms and expectancies.
It penalizes failure in adaptation and deviation from 
the norms and expectancies. Law is an aspect of 
social control.5
Thus far Professor Hoebel's ideas seem to be valid
to Northrop. But as indicated, Hoebel goes further and sees
force as a "universal" constant in all legal systems . He
argues :
Whatever the idealist may desire or the nationalist 
fear, force and the threat of force remain the ul­
timate power in the implementation of law between 
nations, as they do in law within the nation or 
tribe . 6
At this point Northrop feels that Hoebel's dependence on 
force constitutes a shift from universality to a legal theory
^E. Adamson Hoebel, Man in the Primitive World (New 
York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1958), p. 481.
^Ibid., p. 485. Also see E. Adamson Hoebel, The Law 
of Primitive Man: A  Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).
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which is too particular and culture bound in its applicabil­
ity. Thus Northrop examines Hoebel's differences with the 
views of another anthropologist, Malinowski, and makes the 
following observation which gives the flavor of his own 
position:
What is the thesis of Malinowski, based on his 
study of the Trobriand Islanders, which Professor 
Hoebel criticizes with touches of feeling? It is 
that in Malinowski's book on these people, "the 
reader is definitely given to believe that law oper­
ates without the aid of physical force, although it 
does bind b e h a v i o r . T h e  writer must confess that 
the evidence given by Malinowski seems convincing. 
Moreover, Professor Hoebel's own material in his 
chapters on other primitive peoples supports the 
Malinowski thesis that in some cases, at least, 
force is not the source of legal sanction. In the 
case of the Ashanti, to give but one example. Pro­
fessor Hoebel writes that "the thought that his an­
cestors are watching him . . . is a very potent 
sanction of morality."16 Many similar examples 
occur in Professor Hoebel's data.^
Northrop's own search for "science" and "objectivity" 
in law shows itself in both the descriptive and prescriptive ' 
aspects of legal theory. However, in order to examine his 
unique jurisprudence at these two levels it will be helpful 
to see briefly some of the implications of his theory against 
the background of some of the major well known schools of law.
^Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, p. 98.
290
Legal Schools and Northrop's 
"Logical Realism"
Northrop discusses his own works in relation not 
only to Western legal theories but Oriental legal ones as 
well. In view of our present purposes the immediate discus­
sion will attempt to examine specifically only well known 
Western schools, and will refer to Oriental theories from 
time to time in largely general terms. The primary purpose 
here is to examine Northrop's jurisprudence first by empha­
sizing what it is not, in order to discuss the substantive 
and positive content of his ideal legal system in the next 
chapter.
Positivism. Positivism in the philosophy of law ap­
pears in several forms and systems. Although, generally 
speaking, positivists find considerable agreement in the as­
sertions that law and ethics are separate fields and that law 
is a "creation" of man through some authoritative institution 
such as the state,& there are varying positions within the 
"school." The most important theories of legal positivism 
include two which are usually labeled as the "analytical" and
Q For a somewhat fuller discussion, see W. Friedman, 
Legal Theory (Toronto: The Carswell Company, 1960), pp. 205- 
208.
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the "pure theory" schools of law.
The analytical school, or as it is sometimes labeled, 
the "imperative conception" of law, sees the existence of po­
litical authority armed with the weapon of violence as being 
basic to the administration of justice. This school, accord­
ing to the general consensus among scholars,^ was given its 
first clear statement by John Austin, although the theories 
of Hobbes and Bentham contributed to its rise. The legacy 
Austin has left results in varying interpretations of posi­
tivism but Professor Patterson notes that "ordinarily" all 
these positions tend to place the greatest emphasis on force 
or "enforcement"^^ as crucial for an understanding of how law 
works.
F. S. C. Northrop does not deny the role of force in 
many cases in achieving compliance with law. But what he does 
object to is the posture of positivism as the sole "objective" 
explanatory system of the phenomenon known as law. Northrop 
attempts to point out that Austinian positivism is in fact a 
culture bound theory since it is a logical culmination of
^See Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence. Men and 




English and later, American "empiricism." Speaking of posi­
tivism Northrop says
The main representative of this theory of legal 
values is the British jurist, John Austin. The 
designation of his legal philosophy as "positivism" 
is not an accident. It arises from the fact that 
this is the legal theory of traditional Anglo-Ameri­
can culture and that the philosophy of this culture 
is British empiricism, which is positivistic in its 
theory of scientific knowledge. Cultural values are 
positivistic in character when the meaning of the 
words "good" or "valuable" is given as a particular, 
inductively through the senses. This excessive em­
phasis on induction has the consequence also of 
making each science an independent science.
Austinian theory neglects to note the possibility of 
methods of law "enforcement" which do not depend primarily 
on force. Certainly the theory is not sufficiently broad 
enough to relate the legal system to the sources and sanctions 
of law, which lie outside the Anglo-American "state" or in the 
absence of a "state" such as a tribal society or a caste 
oriented policy. Northrop repeatedly urges his readers to 
note that "positivism" is a normative theory about law, rather 
than just an "accurate" description of all concrete legal ex­
perience. Yet since the theory has been so well assimilated 
into the fabric of American legal training and jurisprudence, 
he feels that far too many people fail to see clearly the
^^Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
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normative character of law and its cultural roots beyond the 
sanction of force. For instance, in the attacks on the Su­
preme Court since the New Deal era and especially in the case 
of the "Warren Court.,," critics have accused the court of pur­
suing at times theoretical and sometimes socio-economic con­
ceptions of justice. Northrop in several passages points out 
that even prior to the Warren era when the court supposedly 
stuck to the so-called "strict" conception of law as a com­
mand and was deferent to the legislature it was thus being 
faithful to a specific legal theory, that of Austinian 
positivism. Normative theory and the administration of jus­
tice are therefore at all times inextricably intertwined. 
Further, he attempts to show that through the influence of 
Professor Thayer at the Harvard Law School and Dean Swan of 
the Yale Law School positivism began to be entrenched in the 
training of young lawyers and judges such as Judge Learned 
Hand and Justice Frankfurter. The effects of this kind of 
training consequently can be seen in several areas of recent 
judicial and legislative experience, according to Northrop. 
Domestically, it certainly seems to explain the Learned 
Hand's and Frankfurter's tendency to see the primacy of the 
legislature's will over any permanent concept of "rights" 
e. g ., in the American bill of rights. That is, Austinian
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positivism with its monistic concept of sovereignty in its 
application to the American milieu tended to see simply the 
legislature as the basic source of law. In this regard it 
is interesting to note the following a n e c d o t e ^ ^  about Justice 
Frankfurter. The latter in his teaching days at Harvard Law 
School would often question his students as to the first 
thing that they "ought" to do when faced with an important 
question involving judicial review. When all the "amateur" 
guesses of his students had been exhausted he would brush 
aside their answers with a nod and would urge them to read 
the statute in question. He would then ask again what should 
be the second step a student of the law should follow and 
again at the end he would provide the "correct" answer: "Read 
the Statute." By the time the third round arrived, the stu­
dents of Frankfurter were of course well trained for answer­
ing that the judicial function is basically defined by the 
legislative act.
It is true, Northrop argues, that the errors of this 
form of "naive realism" are not great when the decisions of 
court and legislatures actually reflect the "social" and
l^The story was related by Professor Joseph C. Pray, 
Professor of government at the University of Oklahoma, who 
was then a graduate student at Harvard and was a witness of 
Professor Frankfurter's pedagogical technique.
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covert norms of the society in q u e s t i o n . B u t  when the 
laws like those which brought about the "noble experiment" 
of prohibition are completely contrary to cultural patterns 
they fail to exhibit effectiveness as techniques for social 
control. In the area of international affairs and foreign 
policy making, the consequences of positive law thinking is 
even more disturbing, according to Northrop.
With the increasing interchange of students and ex­
perts in law between various countries, the positive law 
orientation of most law schools is seen as truly outmoded. 
Since positive law training does not make one sensitive to 
the existing facts and varying premises of "foreign" legal 
systems, foreign students trained in the United States or 
United States experts are likely to engage in many more 
"noble experiments" in social change and with little likeli­
hood of success. Also, Austinian legal training is, from 
Northrop's point of view, likely to result, as it often has, 
in the view that the only law is domestic law. International 
law, then, often becomes for American Democratic and Repub­
lican lawyers alike, as well as politicians with legal
13An example would be the ingrained Lockean concepts 
of "rights" in the English legislative and judicial institu­
tions despite the overt acceptance at times of the Austinian 
theory of law.
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training, non-existent. One of the tragedies of American 
foreign policy making has been, according to Northrop, the 
fact that instead of utilizing the existing international law 
as one basis for political action, the Planning Board of the 
State Department has been in the hands of "black-letter- 
minded lawyers with the mentality of Acheson, Dulles, Herter, 
Nitze and Bowie, or theorizing power politicians such as Mr. 
Kennan."!^
Northrop's criticism of positivism is not limited to 
that of the Austinian School. The school of thought headed 
by Hans Kelsen with his concept of "The Pure Theory of Law"^^ 
is in many ways a more sophisticated attempt at creating a 
jurisprudence which attempts to separate law from other ele­
ments of social control than is the Austinian School. Pro­
fessor Edgar Bodenheimer, in noting this, has stated
Kelsen's doctrine is perhaps the most consistent 
expression of positivism in legal theory. For it is 
characteristic of legal positivism that it contem­
plates the form of law rather than its moral and so­
cial content, confines itself to the law as it is 
without regard to its justness or unjustness, and 
endeavors to free legal theory from all qualifications 
or value judgments of a moral, political, social or
^^Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, o p . cit.,
p. 227.
^^See Hans Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law and Ana­
lytical Jurisprudence," ^  Harvard Law Review 44, 1941.
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economic nature.16
Still, Northrop sees the Kelsenian theory as being 
inadequate on most counts (although adequate in some areas).
He finds the strongest appeal of "pure theory" lies in its 
search for some basis for the validity of law other than 
force alone. But Northrop finds major unresolved inconsis­
tencies in Kelsen's conceptual system. On the one hand Kel­
sen is concerned with law as merely the body of positive rules 
in political society. Therefore the "pure theory" is in one 
sense largely relativistic in character. The law of Nazi 
Germany logically in this theory is every bit as actual^? and 
valid as a positive system of legal order, as is the American 
constitutional system, even though in the realm of "private" 
ethics it might be an "unwise" one or even "immoral." There­
fore, as Bodenheimer notes, according to Kelsen "any social 
goal whatsoever may be pursued through the instrumentality of
16Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence. The Philosophy 
and Method of the Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1962), pp. 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 .
^^Speaking of "legal norms" Kelsen has stated the 
following: "These are not valid by virtue of their content. 
Any content whatsoever can be legal: there is no human be­
haviour which could not function as the content of a legal 
norm." Hans Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law" Part II. The 
Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 51, July, 1935, pp. 517-518.
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the law^® since the state itself is not conceived in ethical 
terms. Yet "pure theory" does not deal with only the "is" 
of human behavior; it also clearly recognizes that the "legal 
order is a system of n o r m s . B u t  these "oughts" are derived 
from other "oughts" in a hierarchical system of norms which 
finally rests on a basic norm or grundnorm.
From Northrop's point of view, Kelsen appears to be 
very confusing in his description of the concept of the "basic 
norm" and its relationship to a legal order. For example, on 
the one hand pure theory is relativistic with respect to domes­
tic law but it appears to modify its relativism with respect 
to the legal relationship between states. The international 
legal system approves or disapproves of a state's behavior 
under the authority of such a customary rule as pacta sunt 
servanda. ^  Within a state the legal norms are relative to 
the basic norm within a state. An "effective" communist sys­
tem is just as legal as an "effective" democratic system and 
yet a mysterious and seemingly dogmatic grund norm like pacta
18Bodenheimer, o p . cit., p. 101.
l^Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 110.
20See Charles Fenwick, International Law (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948), pp. b4-65.
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sunt servanda does stand guard over the behavior of states 
with an element of "oughtness” asserted as a result of "faith" 
under the disguise of a "hypothesis" on the part of positivists, 
The realm of "is" and the realm of "ought" are hopelessly con­
fused. Thus, Northrop observes
Lauterpacht and Kelsen sought, therefore, the 
type of content for the jural postulate or grundnorm 
which a positivistic philosophy of law can provide, 
Lauterpacht offers the proposition, "The will of the 
international community must be obeyed."9 Kelsen 
comes forth with the grundnorm, "The states ought to 
behave as they have customarily b e h a v e d . " 1 0
To assert either of these grundnorms is to admit 
explicitly that the positivistic philosophy of inter­
national law can make no contribution to the bringing 
of disputes, between nations under the rule of law to 
an extent greater than is, or has been done. A  more 
convincing demonstration of the impotence of legal 
positivism in international law can hardly be 
imagined . 2 1
The pure theory according to Northrop shows at least 
one other example of ambivalence. At times Kelsen seems to 
claim that sociological jurisprudence has nothing to con­
tribute to pure law and yet he often opens the door surrep­
titiously to sociological methods and factors. Thus Kelsen 
himself at one point speaks of the sociology of law in the 
following terms :
This only is certain, that such legal-sociological 
knowledge has nothing to do with the norms of the law
21Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, op. cit., p. 65.
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as specific contents.
Yet in another passage he seems to indicate the need for non- 
legal methods for judging the validity of legal systems. He 
asserts that
. . . a government which has come to power by revolu­
tion or coup d* etat should equally be recognized as a 
valid government in the sense of international law, 
provided that it is in a position to secure a substan­
tial observation of the norms which it has set up.
Positive international law thus elevates the principle 
of efficacy to the rank of a legal principle. This 
principle it is which determines the basic norm of the 
individual State's legal order.23 [Italics provided.]
Although Kelsen does not state it directly, "efficacy" or 
"substantial observance" does seem finally to rest on existing 
religious, philosophical and political values which Kelsen 
lumps under the category of "custom." Thus the search for 
the principle of "efficacy" contains intimations of sociologi­
cal jurisprudence and as one scholar notes: "How this minimum 
of effectiveness is to be measured Kelsen does not say, nor 
could he so without going deep into questions of political 
and sociological reality."24 "Efficacy" is a far more complex 
factor than Kelsen indicates the case to be. If by "efficacy"
O O
Hans Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law," The Law 
Quarterly Review, Vol. 50 (October, 1934), p. 480.
^^Ibid., p. 520.
Friedmann, Legal Theory, op. cit., p. 231.
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is meant effectiveness, standards for measuring degrees of 
compliance and the reasons for doing so seem to be called 
for, and here we are indeed turning to sociology as a base.
Our discussion of the theories of Austin and Kelsen 
does not exhaust all the possibilities in positivism, but it 
does help illustrate Northrop's jursiprudence in relation to 
this important school of thought, if only in a negative way. 
Similarly a brief analysis of Northrop's views in the context 
of the pragmatic school of law will help illuminate other as­
pects of his jurisprudence.
Pragmatism
Pragmatism in legal theory like many other "isms” 
cannot be easily characterized since it has many different 
versions and shows itself in varying forms. Speaking of prag­
matism Professor Patterson has stated
The "founders" of pragmatism were individualists, 
and recognized no authority over their ideas, Like 
all philosophic rebels, they agreed better on what 
they opposed than on what they believed. They did not 
so much reject traditional philosophic beliefs as 
deem them inadequate. Pragmatism, or parts of it can 
still be used to supplement other p h i l o s o p h i e s . ^ 5
Because of the various versions of pragmatism, our
25Patterson, Jurisprudence, op. cit., p. 476.
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task primarily is to examine Northrop's view of law in com­
parison and contrast with the major themes or persisting ten­
dencies in the jurisprudence of some major pragmatists, e. g ., 
Dewey.
John Dewey basically saw law as a problem solving 
process rather than simply a set of rules enforced by custom 
or force. Unlike the positivists, Dewey and others pay espe­
cially great attention to the societal factors in "pure" law. 
But law to Dewey is not merely a reflection of custom; "it 
involves an element which is additive and in a sense, as 
viewed from the standpoint of prior custom, creative.26 North­
rop would be in complete agreement with Dewey and others on 
this point. Northrop, like Dewey, is very conscious of the 
"evaluative" character of legal decisions. Therefore Northrop 
and Dewey are of one mind regarding the impossibility of any 
value-free approach to the solution of legal problems. Also, 
given the clash and confusion of values in law and politics, 
Northrop is very much aware of the value of the pragmatists* 
focus on "problematicism."27
The most significant difference between Northrop*s
2 6Quoted by Patterson, Jurisprudence. o p . cit., p.
229.
27Patterson, Jurisprudence, op. cit., p. 467.
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jurisprudence and that of most pragmatists is on the ques­
tion of the "correct” method to be used in "solving" a prob­
lem or showing the way out of the problematic situation. 
Northrop is high in his praise of Dewey's statements to the 
effect that "valuation can be an empirical process" and that 
it is possible to be scientific about e t h i c s . B u t  North­
rop feels that Dewey did not fully develop the full implica­
tions of his "scientific" method, at least in the area of 
long-range values and goals. Dewey's skepticism of natural 
law theories, while partly justified, led him to a position 
where his "ultimates" are placed in the context of inquiry, 
as is his idea of "truth."29 Legal values for Dewey arise 
from the need for solving the problem at hand. The values 
are to be picked on the basis of what "science" shows the 
possible consequences may be. In summarizing Dewey's state­
ments on this point Professor Murphy states:
In his insistence that any standard of judgment 
is to be evaluated in terms of the consequences of 
that standard when acted upon, Dewey uses the term 
"consequences" in a special sense. He means those 
consequences which are recognized to follow as
ZGibid.. p. 495.
29Jay Wesley Murphy, John Dewey--A Philosophy of 
Law for Democracy," Vanderbilt Law Review (December, 1960), 
p. 299.
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revealed by the operations of an experimental
situation.30
While this approach uses "science" in an attempt to 
escape ethical relativism at the problem solving, pragmatic 
and operational level, Nbrthrop maintains that pragmatism in 
law displays ethical relativism and also abandons science at 
the crucial stage of constructing a theory which would judge 
the success of "operations." Thus a crisis occurs in the 
process of evaluating the "consequences" according to North­
rop. Are the consequences to be valued on the basis of "sci­
ence," "intuition" (hunches) or some other criteria? If the 
criterion for judgment is the ability of values to solve 
"problems" this is unsatisfactory from the point of view of 
Northrop's legal theory. Northrop describes pragmatism's 
search for problem solving in the following terms:
At bottom, this theory of cultural values makes 
the solution of the problem in what Dewey calls "the 
problematic situation" the criterion of the good; Or, 
to put the matter more practically, it makes the 
bringing to equilibrium of the diverse competing ele­
ments in the social situation the criterion of the 
good and of cultural value.31
Northrop's dissatisfaction with problem solving as a
3°Ibid., p. 300.
31Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, op. cit., p. 46.
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basis for values arises for at least two different reasons. 
The first is that pragmatism is unclear as to the method for 
finding the scientifically "ideal" solution. He states
The answer to this question as given by Dewey 
himself in his Human Nature and Conduct is that 
only that solution is a "true" solution which re­
sults from sensitivity to, rather than dictatorial 
blotting out of, all factors and interests in the 
problematic situation. This amounts, however, to 
the admission (a) that all values are not in 
process and (b) that there must be at least one 
constant non-instrumental norm even in an instru­
mental philosophy of cultural norms, the non­
instrumental norm of objective sensitivity to every 
factor in the existential s i t u a t i o n . [Italics 
provided.]
In Northrop's view Dewey falls short of explaining clearly 
how "objective sensitivity" is to be achieved. In contrast 
Northrop feels that "objectivity" is possible both in de­
scribing legal norms as well as evaluating them.
A second line of argument that Northrop often uses 
consists of pointing out that pragmatists abandon their sci­
entific persuasion by depending "intuitively" (through 
hunches) on what could happen in the "long run"^^ for evalu­
ating norms. Also "really" to test the "operational" valid­
ity of legal theories by the pragmatic method Northrop claims
Ibid., p . 47.
^%orthrop. Philosophical Anthropology, op. cit., p.
101.
306
one would "really" have to turn over the guidance of legal 
and political systems for a considerable period of time to 
communists, fascists, "socialists," anarchists and others.
It is interesting to note that Professor Murphy in this con­
nection states:
Dewey observed that "it is astonishing and de­
pressing that so much of the energy of mankind has 
gone into fighting for (with weapons of the flech 
as well as of the spirit) the truth of creeds, re­
ligious, moral and political, as distinct from what 
has gone into effort to try creeds by putting them 
to the test of acting upon them."37 A system whereby 
all tenets, goods, creeds, formulas, methods were 
hypotheses and actively recognized and used with full 
recognition of this fact would mean that they (tenets, 
creeds) cease to be final and men would be insistent 
to put creeds to this test of action.^4
Unlike the problems of non-normative subjects the 
peculiarities of value problems cannot be solved completely 
under operational and experimental situations according to 
Professor Northrop. We have to search for a reliable method 
which will tell us ahead of time whether certain value sys­
tems are worth implementing or n o t . Otherwise far too much 
chaos can occur, particularly if an "erroneous" theory is 
allowed full play in human affairs. As he puts it:
Suppose . . . that one tests the Communistic 
theory in this pragmatic manner, as many "open- 
minded" Asians are now inclined to do, by giving
^Siurphy, o£. cit., p. 302.
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the Communists a chance to try their Communistic ex­
periment in one's nation. If this pragmatic experi­
ment is to be a real one, the Communists would have 
to be given complete control. Then, however, all ex­
perimentation might very well be over, since, if you, 
the private citizen, found that the Communist theory 
did not work for you, it would in all likelihood be 
you rather than the theory that would be liquidated 
as a result of the pragmatic experiment.35 [italics 
provided.]
Northrop himself thinks that there can and must be 
objective methods both for finding out what the law is, as 
well as for finding out beforehand what it should be. His 
own quest for reality in law leads him to sociological juris­
prudence, while his search for objective evaluation of goals 
and consequences leads him to a particular kind of natural 
law jurisprudence.
Sociological Jurisprudence
Thus, Northrop in his concern for finding out what 
exactly is the content of a legal system feels that science 
needs to be used. Therefore his search for describing law 
is an extension of "his" method of science, which we have
35Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, o p . cit., pp. 
101-102. It should be noted that Northrop is using this ex­
ample primarily as an illustration that without complete ex­
perimental conditions pragmatism is scientifically inadequate 
to judge a normative theory, even according to the standards 
of pragmatism itself. His own theory is justified primarily 
through epistemological criteria rather than experimentation.
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already examined. The "poverty” of positivism suggests to 
Northrop that man's legal relationships are determined not 
simply by the statutes or official actions of the "state" or 
any political entity with "force" as the major weapon but by 
factors outside the pale of formal legal decisions. In this 
regard he is sympathetic to the search for "actual" factors 
which create and enforce a sense of obligation. The study of 
these "factors" is often pointed out to be a major feature of 
the school often vaguely called "sociological jurisprudence."3*
The school of sociological jurisprudence as such, how­
ever, cuts across many different and sometimes conflicting 
theories about the law. These conflicts often arise out of 
varying "theoretical generalizations on the interrelation of 
social forces and legal evolution."37 Some specify "conflict­
ing interests"33 or "social interests"39 or "maximum satis­
faction of wants"40 as the key factor, while others point to­
wards a larger and more "macrocosmic" concept of "society" or
^^See Friedman, Legal Theory, o p . cit., pp. 194-204.
37lbid., p. 196.
3®Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence, o p . cit., p. 109.
39patterson, Jurisprudence, op. cit., p. 518.
^^Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence, o p . cit., p. 111.
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"culture”^^ as the important factor in the "real" laws "be­
hind" the "apparent" positive norms.
While Northrop can be partly placed in the school of 
sociological jurisprudence his theory should be distinguished 
clearly from some of the other approaches in this school.
Thus, for instance, because of Northrop's skepticism of any 
theory which claims to be "scientific" and yet depends on an 
epistemologically "intuitive" concept of felt "wants," he is 
separated from such figures as Roscoe Pound and Francois 
Geny, at least according to Professor Bodenheimer.^^ Also, 
his polemics against "inductive" methods distinguishes his 
approach from that of Harold Lasswell.^^ Arnold Brecht is 
partly correct in placing Northrop's jurisprudence in the 
same category as other theories of a "transpersonalist" char­
acter which rely on a concept of Kultur or c u l t u r e . 44 However,
4lBrecht, Political Theory, o p . c it., p. 304.
^^See Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence. o p . .cit., pp. 108-
111.
^^Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, o p . cit., p. 75. LasswellTs wandering between 
facts** and "theory" can be termed "naive realistic." For 
one example of this "wandering" see Harold D. Lasswell, 
"Strategies of Inquiry: The Rational Use of Observation,"
The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences, edited by Daniel 
L e m e r  (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), pp. 89-113.
^^Brecht, Political Theory, op. cit., p. 304.
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Brecht also states that
Writers as different as Kohler, Radbruch, Binder, 
and Alfred Weber of the German sector and Northrop here 
show a preference for Kultur as the recommendable 
standard, without however drawing radical conclusions
in detail.45
Brecht's categorization tends to blur the distinction 
philosophically between Northrop and others like Kohler who 
according to Brecht show a persistent Hegelian idealism. 
Northrop in fact as well as by his own admission is closer to 
people like Eugen Ehrlich and Underhill Moore rather than the 
German idealists. Professor Bodenheimer touches on this dis­
tinction in the following comment :
While Kohler's philosophy of law moved on the 
borderline between sociological jurisprudence and 
legal idealism, a thoroughly sociological type of 
legal theory was propounded by the Austrian thinker 
Eugen Ehrlich (1862-1922). Genuine sociological 
jurisprudence teaches, in the words of Northrop, that 
the "positive law cannot be understood apart from the 
social norms of the living l a w . "46
The concept of "living law" is a fairly well elabo­
rated concept, despite Brecht's passing comment to the con­
trary. In almost all of his books and articles dealing with 
law Northrop has discussed the concept of "living law" and 
has done it in detail.
4^Ibid.. p. 154.
46Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence. op. cit., p. 106.
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"Living law" as a term was borrowed by Northrop from 
the terminology of Eugen Ehrlich. Ehrlich regarded the "real" 
law of any society as being only partly evident in the offi­
cial pronouncements or positive rules of society. Ehrlich 
on one occasion has defined the "living law" in the following 
terms.
This then is the living law In contradistinction 
to that which is being enforced in the courts and 
other tribunals. The living law is the law which 
dominates life itself even though it has not been 
posited in legal propositions.^'
Like Ehrlich; Northrop also regards the actuality of 
law as being found in the social norms of people rather than 
in the "positivistic" sanctions of the state. Also, like 
Ehrlich, Northrop sees the need for regarding the living law 
as not being simply a set of sensed facts but as being prima­
rily the "inner o r d e r " 4 8  of all the public normative "facts" 
in any society. The "inner order," since it is "ideological" 
in character, cannot be found by simple observation alone. 
Ehrlich constantly urged a careful scrutiny of the "facts" 
of "life," commerce, customs and usages, and "associations" 
in society supplemented later by theorization and then by
^^Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the 




further observation,^^ to arrive at the "inner" relation 
between facts, which is not directly sensed. According to 
Ehrlich "a social institution is, however, not a physical, 
tangible thing like a table or a w a r d r o b e . " ^ 0
Northrop's own "sociological" jurisprudence while 
accepting the general "gist" of Ehrlich's theory attempts to 
expand on it and transform it into a more sophisticated and 
yet rigorous one by prescribing deductive methods to be used. 
The "facts" of Ehrlich's system were to be found in numerous 
contexts including wills, marriage customs, contracts, bank­
ing practices, the way inventories are kept in businesses, 
etc. At times Northrop's theory seems to have changed some 
of Ehrlich's "facts" almost beyond recognition. Thus North­
rop regards the living law as being primarily "ideological" 
in character, i.e., an inherently "logical system of ideas," 
whereas Ehrlich is so concerned with behavioral data that he 
is not always clear as to the origins of the "foundation of 
the legal order of human society."51 For Northrop the "living 
law" is one of the systems or forms of cultural order which
A9 Ibid., pp. 501-506.
^Ogee Ibid., p. ix.
^^Ibid., p. 502.
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the epistemology of a culture creates. The living law can 
be found by "tinkering around" with the legal, social and 
philosophical texts of a culture until the covert logically 
related philosophical system is "discovered." It is then 
to be rigorously stated. Then through epistemic correlations 
with the institutional facts (to which Ehrlich is referring) 
and with human behavior the hypothetical living law is veri­
fied. In the case of a people without a written language one 
would patiently have to "tease" out concepts as Kluckhohn did 
with the Navaho after years of living with them and then, sub­
jecting these concepts to "philosophical" analysis for finding 
what the relationships between concepts are as the Navaho him­
self "really" sees them. For the judgment that this is pos­
sible, as we have already seen, Northrop depends on a philo­
sophical analysis of the "findings" of some anthropologists, 
sociologists, psychologists and cyberneticians.
But apart from specifying the basic set of views on 
science, i.e., "ideology" as the crucial variable of the 
living law, Northrop has attempted to give sociological 
jurisprudence far more preciseness in methodology than 
Ehrlich attempted to do in his lifetime. The work of the 
Yale sociologist, Underhill Moore, however, clarified for
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N o r t h r o p some of the unanswered methodological questions 
about the nature of the "inner order" that the work of Ehrlich 
had suggested. Moore's efforts were directed at finding the 
relationship between normative symbols such as traffic park­
ing signs and human behavior. He found according to Northrop, 
that social scientists must pay attention to the "meaning" of 
symbols rather than treating symbols as mere stimuli. Still, 
since our present concern is not directly with the work of 
Moore,53 we will attempt to focus our attention on Northrop's 
own use of sociological jurisprudence.
According to Northrop the problem of how we can get 
law or what "ought to be" from society or from what "is," can 
be approached from several different "sociological" levels.
One level is that of the physical behavior of people in any 
social situation. Disciplined observation of people's be­
havior can give the decision makers in many instances a prac­
tical insight regarding the norms or laws that should be ap­
plied. Thus, a statistical note-taking or even "intuitive" 
i.e., naive realistic analysis of the tendencies of students
52See F. S. C. Northrop, "Underhill Moore's Legal 
Science: Its Nature and Significance," Yale Law Journal 
(January, 1950), pp. 196-213.
53For a list of Moore's work see Northrop, The Com­
plexity of Legal and Ethical Experience, pp. 305-306.
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to walk in certain patterns across the campus of the Univer­
sity of Oklahoma will give the engineers and decision makers 
a better guide in "planning" where sidewalks "ought" to be 
constructed. Similarly traffic lights, signs and driving 
lanes can be situated in such a way that the "expectations" 
of norms are not too far removed from the "actualities" of 
people's behavior. Since "expectations" are not always one 
hundred percent identical with "actualities" and discrepancies 
do exist, one level of approach to the is-ought problem is by 
reducing the difference between positive expectations and ac­
tual behavior. This level, however, is not sufficient, he 
thinks, for resolving other normative problems fully.
For the "statistical" approach loses precision as it 
is applied to increasingly larger problems where it is physi­
cally impossible to observe directly all the instances of 
physical behavior such as the "work" of Congress . As we move 
from the microcosmic campus to the macrocosmic political system 
we begin to face problems of dealing with entities which are 
directly unobservable. Therefore, deductively rigorous meth­
ods have to be used increasingly. Even for the microcosmic 
situation deductive methods can avoid the guesswork (as in 
the early work of Moore) of observation and poll taking. But 
for larger social situations in any case, deductive methods
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are even more essential. Speaking of Underhill Moore's early 
observational techniques Northrop notes that
His method of determining the inner order of 
society even at the present time. T% of the system, 
by observing the spatio-temporal total high-fre­
quency behavior of people in society is unworkable 
for a total culture. He applied it to simple cul­
tural phenomena such as parking on a restricted block 
on a street in New Haven, Connecticut. To determine 
the inner order of the behavior of 400,000,000 
Chinese in this manner is out of the question, and 
to do it for all the different cultures is even more 
impracticable.54
The essence of the deductive method for macrocosmic 
groups involves the specification of very few variables ac­
cording to Northrop, Ideology, i.e., a logically related 
structure of values here is suggested as the major variable. 
With the help of the ideological variable such as the "naive 
realism" of Hindu code law one is "saved" the trouble of ob­
serving the behavior of every single person in a social situ­
ation without sacrificing objectivity. Since some sociolo­
gists and anthropologists to a degree do accept the "idea­
tional" or "ideological" approaches of Sorokin and Kluckhohn 
rather than the "technological" approaches of Marxists, there 
is hope that sociological jurisprudence will be able to solve 
part of the problems of what "ought to be the law" by
S^ibid., p. 59.
317
illustrating the unfulfilled norms of the existing living law. 
By this method the positive law can be reformed by referring 
objectively to the overt behavior of people or the ideological 
living law of the group.
In spite of the achievements and promise of the soci­
ological school, however, Northrop claims that it has not been
able to produce objective methods by which the living law it­
self can be judged and new "scientifically" reliable values 
can be found. To deal with this problem he turns his attention
to his own unique natural law jurisprudence.
Nature and Law
Natural law jurisprudence is probably the oldest 
school of j u r i s p r u d e n c e . 55 The "school," if it can be called 
one, has had a varied history and this concerns us only inci­
dentally in our present inquiry. In recent years there has 
tended to be what is often called a "revival of natural law " 5& 
However, in spite of the persistence and tenacity of this 
movement, the methods of various natural law theories have
5 5See discussion of "Eclipses and Revivals of Natural 
Law Ideas" in Brecht, Political Theory, op, cit . p. 138
^^See "The Revival of Natural Law and Value-Oriented 
Jurisprudence." Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence, op. cit . , p.
126.
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not always shown a consistently clear "meaning" of the con­
tent of natural law. Partially as a result of this anarchy 
in the various meanings of natural law many contemporary po­
litical scientists and legal theorists have regarded the 
claim of the natural law schools with considerable suspicion.
Northrop can be classified as being within the natu­
ral law tradition, since he argues on behalf of the possibil­
ity of "reforming" actual law on the basis of criteria which 
are "objective" and "natural" in character. The particular 
manner in which he approaches the problems of natural law 
theory, however, makes him a "strange bedfellow" among most 
modern day advocates of this system, and certainly among 
medieval thinkers. Thus, Northrop differs from others often 
on the methodology, meaning and the content of natural law, 
and this to such a degree that the usual opponents of natural 
law cannot easily accuse him of being simply another 
subjectivist.
To begin with, Northrop himself admits that most natu­
ral law theories which claim objectivity are often sophisti­
cated defenses of subjective "value judgements," or culture 
bound methods of approaching normative questions. Also, he 
is often critical of the kind of reasoning which argues that 
since something labeled as "natural law" jurisprudence is a
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universal phenomenon in man's cultural experience, there is 
a single natural law already in existence or that the content 
of the law or the moral imperative generally is alic'dy pres­
ent in all societies. Thus, he states
Every major culture in the world in its classical 
tradition affirms a natural law jurisprudence. This 
fact alone, however, is not enough to establish the 
thesis that natural law jurisprudence escapes the rela­
tivity of ethical and legal norms.^7
Since, he insists, different cultures use widely 
varying epistemologies the content of the "natural law" may 
be completely different even though they may have superficial 
resemblances and similar "labels." For instance, modern 
Catholic natural law thinking is anti-secularistic in charac­
ter. Secularism in this context is often defined as divorcing 
government from God.^S Catholic natural law thinkers at times 
also see the existence of "natural law" in the religious phi­
losophy of other non-Catholic groups, wherein supposedly there 
is always a concern with a "higher order," "being" and "God." 
Yet as Northrop shows, leading Buddhist scholars, including 
Dr. Suzuki assert "that for the Buddhist tradition moral and
^^Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, op. cit., p. 168.
^^See Edward F. Barrett (ed,). University of Notre 
Dame Natural Law Institute Proceedings (Notre Dame: Univer­
sity of Notre Dame Press, Vol. V, 1953.
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legal rules have nothing to do with God, since Buddhism de­
nies such a b e i n g , "59 as an "intellectualized" entity, a 
rational "construct" or an anthropomorphic commander.
This persistent tendency to identify "universal 
norms" with the normative preferences of particular cultures 
is usually referred to by Northrop as "the culturalistic fal­
lacy." This fallacy is not peculiar to Catholic theologians 
or Protestant theologians alone. It is a fallacy that is 
common also among some social scientists who are themselves 
skeptical of theological natural law. The fallacies of the 
latter occur when they attempt to determine the normative 
social theory or what "ought to be" by applying the empirical 
methods of natural science to social and cultural "facts.
A proper distinction between cultural or "second order" facts 
and natural or "first order" facts which Northrop insists must 
be made for natural law theory to make sense. He attempts to 
draw the distinction in the following terms :
First-order facts are the introspected or sensed 
raw data, antecedent to all theories and all cultures, 
given in anyone's experience in any culture. Second- 
order facts are cultural artifacts: that is, they are
59Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience., op. cit■, p. 169.
60Ibid., p . 2 38
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the result in part at least of human theory of first- 
order facts.61
He also goes on to state in many of his works, 
speeches and articles that first order facts like planets, 
electrons or sunshine are the only facts that are incapable 
of error. They just are. They themselves do not demand an 
ethical system nor do they indicate what ethics ought, to be. 
However, when men "think" about natural facts and relate 
facts by propositions they make second order facts, These 
cultural facts are therefore man-made facts. The General 
Motors Corporation, the State Department and segregated rest­
rooms, e.g., are second-order facts,
When social scientists depend on man-made facts for 
finding value they are guilty to some extent of question- 
begging and being tautological in their theories since this 
depends on the "is" at the cultural level to provide the 
"ought" at the same level. But the cultural aspects of the 
behavior of men cannot themselves provide trustworthy bases 
for determining what cultural behavior ought to be , Still, 
according to Northrop, many academicians in sociological 
theory and jurisprudence base their "policy sciences" on just 
those observed cultural facts. Pound's search for "jural
61Ibid., p . 254.
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postulates''^^ or Lasswell's policy orientation^^ are examples 
of modern attempts to find the "oughts" from the cultural
"is
To avoid the question begging and false basis of 
natural law, "policy making" needs to find methods that escape 
ethical relativism and yet are truly "evaluative" in character. 
The major orientation that escapes relativism is "science" and 
more accurately "natural science." Therefore the search for 
an objective natural law must turn to this science according 
to Northrop. Science, or at least the physical sciences, deal 
substantially with public objects which do not symbolize. But 
as we have seen, man's neuro-physical structure enables him 
to formulate propositions about facts as well as to perceive 
facts. Therefore, in his very nature facts and propositions 
about facts are brought together. Since propositions about 
facts can be in error the questions of "badness" or "goodness" 
of things arise out of man's consciousness.
All this is not to say that Northrop's natural law 
theory is one wherein nature, independent of man, contains
62See Patterson, Jurisprudence, p. 516.
^^See Harold D. Lasswell, "Strategies of Inquiry:
The Rational Use of Observation," in The Human Meaning of the 
Social Sciences, Edited by Daniel Lerner (New York: Meridian 
Books, 1960), p. 89.
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"badness” or "goodness." The stars, the sun and the planets 
are not in error. Ontologically, they just exist. It is only 
man who is capable of error because of his ability to symbo­
lize freely the perceived world around him. The focal point 
of cultural values and the theories of natural sciences are 
in the cortex of man. Therefore, the essence of Northrop's 
natural law consists of examining the assumptions about nature 
on which cultural facts are built and evaluating them in the 
light of the most objective assumptions, i.e., natural science 
epistemology, that is available.
Thus, the "living law" of the South which "sees" 
black men and then puts them in a special class with regard 
to rights and duties assumes a naive realistic epistemology 
wherein "observation" supposedly gives "knowledge." Northrop 
maintains that "naive realism" is an inadequate epistemology 
with which to "understand" the "facts" of nature. Instead we 
need to use in value theory an epistemology which has been 
successful in explaining the "facts" of "nature" and "science." 
The precise aspect of "science" to which Northrop refers for 
the standard of evaluation is therefore not the myriad "facts" 
of science. Electrons can no more give an "ought" than the 
color of a sunset can give us law. It is speculation which 
uses the epistemology of science that can show us the w a y .
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Since man's epistemology is his tool for the conceptualiza­
tion of nature and other men at the same time, man's rela­
tionship with other men can also be as objective as his cur­
rent scientific understanding of nature.
The jurist, therefore, when faced with the problem 
of choosing between several sets of norms in an actual case 
can begin by examining the normative theories of which the 
various norms are parts. His examination of the theories 
should result in picking that theory which best "explains" 
or "relates" the objective first order facts of nature. Thus 
a logically realistic legal theory like Northrop's is super­
ior to the naive realistic patriarchal theory of the "Fil- 
merian South." However, it should be noted at this stage 
that Northrop at times seems confusing in his attempts to 
define first order facts. For instance, at times first order 
facts are limited by definition to "introspected or sensed 
raw data,"^^ such as the colors of what we call the "sunset" 
which are known by "experience." At other times he seems to 
include theoretically conceived objects among first order 
facts. Thus, he has stated that the fact that "any human 
being has a nervous system is a first-order psychological
^^Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, op V cit., p. 254.
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f a c t . "65 Since we do not directly sense or introspectively 
know our own nervous systems these must be "constructed" or 
"postulated" objects. This confusion of terms may, however, 
be more apparent than real. "First order facts" are both 
sensed data and "public objects" which are found by verified 
scientific theories. The general tone of many of Northrop's 
essays^G seems to indicate that those facts which natural law 
deals with are radically empirically sensed data as well as 
"objective" knowledge based on sensed data. Still the at­
tempt to validate a legal theory in terms of how well it ac­
counts for natural facts therefore certainly seems, at least 
in theory, to avoid the dependence on the culturally deter­
mined aspects of "political" behavior that other value ori­
ented legal theories depend on. But in practice the process 
of determining whether a "fact" is a cultural or a natural 
entity is an extremely difficult process, wherein logical 
analysis is necessary.
Conclusion
Despite this practical problem the jurisprudence of 
F. S. C. Northrop seems to be the most plausible attempt thus
G^ibid., p. 263.
66gee discussion in Northrop, Logic of the Sciences 
and the Humanities, o p . cit., pp. 286-287.
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far to find a theory which avoids both complete positivism 
on the one hand and the emphasis on intuitive faith on the 
other. Also, in spite of its emphasis on man as the maker 
of norms, Northrop does not assert that man is incapable of 
finding reliable values in ethics and in law. Instead, just 
as scientific epistemology demonstrates the natural rela­
tionships in physical nature, so also the application of this 
epistemology to society can show the relationships that 
"ought" to exist, but often do not, due to the incorrect con­
struction of social symbols. In spite of the broad natural 
law characteristics of Northrop*s jurisprudence he is not a 
special pleader for a system of values which is to remain 
"absolute" for all times. As man improves the understanding 
of his world, new and more adequate theories of nature will 
emerge. From these developments new laws of nature must dis­
place the inadequate norms of the past. But the displacement 
must be done with care or else man's old symbols, if treated 
without delicacy, may force conservative man to cling to his 
primitive law. Northrop*s jurisprudence, therefore, is a 
subtle combination of the scientific and philosophical 
"naturalness" of a natural law orientation and the practical 
concern of sociological jurisprudence, To explore further 
the nature of Northrop's naturalistic idealism it is necessary
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next to examine the substance of his theory of natural law 
and the related conceptualization about the essential forms 
and ideals of "his" political system.
CHAPTER VIII 
ESSENTIALS OF THE "GOOD" STATE
Despite the occasional appearance of a truce, the 
debate between "empirically" oriented positivists and non­
positivists in American political science is generally an 
intense and continuing battle. While the non-positivists 
are in the minority they often are not less contentious than 
their opponents. Professor Leo Strauss in a recent essay, 
for instance, has stated his views about the new empiricism 
with characteristic vigor. Thus., he states
Only a great fool would call the new political 
sceince diabolic:; it has no attributes peculiar to 
fallen angels. It is not even Machiavellian, for 
Machiavelli*s teaching was graceful, subtle, and 
colorful. Nor is it Neronian. Nevertheless one may 
say of it that it fiddles while Rome burns, It is 
excused by two facts: it does not know that it fid­
dles, and it does not know that Rome burns ^
Strauss and certain other political theorists in 
their attack on the new "science," have often failed in fact
^Herbert J. Storing, Editor. Essays on the Scien­
tific Study of Politics (New York:. Holt, Rinehart and Wins - 
ston. Inc.), 1962, p. 3 2 7 .
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to answer the main charges of the logical positivists 
against the "natural law thesis." Strauss's defense of clas­
sical political philosophizing in spite of its literary ex­
cellence, does not always state with clarity how the pursuit 
of values can avoid a purely subjective character. At times, 
Strauss seems to advocate the pursuit of "nature" rather 
than "convention."2 Yet elsewhere, he appears to resist the 
quest for any science of nature which is not Aristotelian in
Ocharacter.^
In contrast to Strauss' strong defense of the impor­
tance of political speculation and its "meaningfulness," 
some relativists are equally strong in their defense of com­
plete skepticism about "objective" values. Hans Kelsen, in 
an attempt to define relativism, has said
Philosophical relativism . . . advocates the em­
pirical doctrine that reality exists only within 
human knowledge, and that, as the object of knowledge, 
reality is relative to the knowing subject. The ab­
solute, the thing in itself, is beyond human exper­
ience; it is inaccessible to human knowledge and there­
fore unknowable.4
^Leo Strauss, "What Is Political Philosophy?" Jour­
nal of Politics, Vol. 19, August, 1957, p. 356.
3Storing, editor. Essays on the Scientific Study of 
Politics, o p . cit., pp. 308-310.
4
Hans Kelsen, "Absolutism and Relativism in Philos­
ophy and Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 
XLII, October, 1948, p. 906.
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A somewhat more moderate position with respect to 
values is one taken by non-cognitivists like Professor Felix
E. Oppenheim. Rather than seeing value questions purely in 
the light of the absolutist-relativist dichotomy, Oppenheim 
sums up the non-cognitivists' distinction between "intrinsic" 
and "extrinsic" value-judgments in the following terms.
Since non-cognitivism does not doubt the objec­
tivity of empirical knowledge, it cannot question the 
cognitive validity of so-called extrinsic value-judg­
ments, for the simple reason that these are not value- 
judgments at all, but empirical statements to the 
effect that something is an appropriate means to a 
certain end.5
The approach of F. S. C. Northrop to the problem of 
value theory in political and legal science is at times simi­
lar to each of the varying positions of Strauss, Kelsen and 
Oppenheim. Yet his uniqueness sets Northrop's value theory 
apart from all three of the approaches we have touched on. 
Northrop's awareness of the human need for political philos­
ophy would make him sympathetic to the position of Leo 
Strauss. But unlike Strauss, Northrop attempts to go to the 
world of science rather than to the language of."the market 
place," in search of political philosophy. With Kelsen,
^Felix E. Oppenheim, "The Natural Law Thesis: Affir­
mation or Denial?" The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. II, March, 1957, p. 50.
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Northrop would be skeptical of any value theory that would 
claim that its values are "true" for all times. However, un­
like Kelsen, Northrop would not settle for ethical relativism. 
Also, like Oppenheim, Northrop is aware of the possibility 
of cognitive validity for instrumental or extrinsic values.
The letter's natural law thesis attempts to show further that 
basic political norms can also have cognitive status. Oppen­
heim, in a polemical argument against the natural law thesis, 
certainly misunderstands Northrop's own position. Oppenheim 
states
Judges, no less than legislators, do indeed make 
value judgments (e.g., as to which of two conflicting 
interests is the more important). Certainly, "there 
is a set of specific values underlying our American 
legal order,"3 in the sense that there is a specific 
set of ethical norms which American judges have tradi­
tionally implemented in the absence of relevant statutes 
or decisions. However, the cognitive validity of these 
norms cannot be inferred from such practices : nor does 
the fact that judges do apply these standards rather 
than others prove that they ought to continue to do so, 
e.g., Northrop seems to maintain. To argue that some­
thing is objectively valuable because it is being val­
ued is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.&
As our discussion of Northrop's jurisprudence in the 
last chapter makes clear, Northrop does not maintain that 
simply because judges traditionally apply certain standards
^Oppenheim, "Natural Law Thesis: Affirmation or De­
nial?" o£. cit., p. 47.
332
this morally obligates them to continue to do so. Oppenheim 
has referred? to Northrop's remarks without apparently ex­
amining closely the context in which they appear. It is true 
that Northrop depends on certain existing norms for judging 
positive legislation. But this is only for "sociological 
jurisprudence." He himself is well aware that natural law 
jurisprudence is quite a different legal theory and must sup­
plement sociological evidence. Northrop's "natural law" does 
not depend on an examination of the techniques by which jur­
ists have traditionally chosen one set of legal norms over 
others.
The "natural law" thesis of Northrop begins with not­
ing the scientific fact, that men do have basic symbol-carry­
ing neurological structures. Since man exists in nature any 
theory, natural or otherwise cannot afford to ignore the 
basic physical nature of man. Additionally, since men use 
basic symbols for understanding the world around them neither 
the physical sciences nor the normative sciences can ignore 
the cognitive nature of man. Man's search for "ultimates," 
according to Northrop's use of available neurological evidence,
^Oppenheim indicates that his judgment is based on 
the following article: F. S. C. Northrop, "Ethical Relativism 
in the Light of Recent Legal Science," The Journal of Philos­
ophy, Vol. LII, No. 23, November 10, 1955, p. 652.
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is not purely a matter of "instinctive” preferences but is 
based on the symbolizing properties of his cortex. As North­
rop maintains, and as we have discussed elsewhere, the way 
the feedback mechanism of the cortex seems to work indicates 
that there are no a priori categories such as Kant believed 
existed. Our "primitive" or "ultimate" values can be ordered 
in a variety of ways. Some of the possible "ways" or cate­
gories of knowledge give us an increasingly adequate picture 
of ourselves, while other methods may be totally inadequate 
for giving us trustworthy knowledge. Thus, the "logical real­
ism correlated with radical empiricism" gives us trustworthy 
knowledge while "naive realism" does not.
Since man uses the basic symbols for science as well 
as for culture, according to Northrop man's scientific ideas 
are related to his cultural content. Also, since man's sci­
entific premises can be in error, so also can the premises 
of his normative theories be capable of error. The "facts" 
of nature themselves are never in error but man's proposi­
tions about facts can be erroneous. Finally, to the extent 
that a political theory asserts or necessitates the postula­
tion of certain "supposedly" existing facts, the theory may 
be correct or incorrect.
Political ideals in Northrop's theory thus can have
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a cognitive status if the epistemological assumptions within 
ideals are objectively examined. The "empiricists” have 
tended to examine only the isolated, existential and par­
ticular meaning of ideals. Nominalism in the form of naive 
realism, as Einstein's theory "demonstrates" to Northrop, is 
an insufficient and immature scientific method by itself. A 
scientific method for examining the "truth" or "error" of 
political ideals must be according to Northrop a "mature" 
scientific method, which goes beyond nominalism and connects 
the world of observation and the world of theory with "epis- 
temic correlations."
When a culture's legal theory is clearly based on an 
erroneous sicentific methodology, then Northrop maintains 
that it is "meaningful" to state that the norms of the culture 
are actually "false." For instance, the Roman Law system in 
the 5th century B. C ., according to Northrop, assumed as a 
premise for its patriarchal system, that the ability to pro­
create is peculiar only to the male. Such a legal system 
can be cognitively shown to be in error in the light of m o d e m  
science. Thus, Northrop notes;
We now know, however, from contemporary experi­
mentally verified genetic theory that the foregoing 
theory of the relative contributions of the male and 
the female to the determination of the inherited 
traits of children is false. Both sexes make their
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contribution to the genetic characteristics of the 
offspring.8
The validation of political and ethical norms must 
therefore depend on a use of "correct" scientific epistemology 
The logical positivists in their analysis of norms tend to 
use a radical empiricist approach. A positivist like A. J.
Ayer, for instance, can see no cognitive meaning in any ethi­
cal statement beyond its immediate factual content. Ayer de­
scribes the logical positivists' position by stating that
We begin by admitting that the fundamental ethical 
concepts are unanalysable, inasmuch as there is no
criterion by which one can test the validity of the
judgments in which they occur. . . .  we say that the 
reason why they are unanalysable is that they are mere 
pseudo-concepts. The presence of an ethical symbol 
in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content.9
Ayer's empiricism is an inadequate account of "scientific" 
method according to Northrop. The deductive theories of the 
natural sciences assert more than they can immediately and 
empirically prove. Radical empiricism is not enough to con­
stitute a scientific method for the value-free sciences, let 
alone for the value-ridden sciences.
Q
Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience , o p . cit., p. 265.
^A. J. Ayer, Language. Truth and Logic (New York; 
Dover Publications), p. 107. No date indicated for Dover 
edition.
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The most adequate epistemology of natural science is 
what Northrop has called "logical realism in epistemic corre­
lation with radical empiricism." This epistemology supposedly 
gives us an adequate understanding of the universe. Adequacy 
in this context is judged on the basis of whether the theory 
accounts for the natural "facts" that "public" knowledge, i. 
e ., science, is aware of. Northrop maintains that his ap­
proach to science accounts for the latest "facts" of the Ein­
stein era of relativity in physics as well as the "facts" of 
nature that man knew before the coming of modern physics, such 
as the aesthetics of the Orient.
If our political theory is to be in accord with "na­
ture," we cannot rely on only a subjective understanding of 
what nature is about. It is possible, of course, to be 
"schizophrenic" in our value orientations and be simultane­
ously scientific and anti-scientific. There is nothing under 
the heavens that can compel persons or cultures to have co­
herent and yet "reliable" value systems. But it is possible 
to know nature "correctly" and to use our method of knowing 
nature also to build rules for ourselves and for our society.
It should be continuously kept in mind that Northrop's 
natural law is not, then, of a nominalistic character. Par­
ticular values do not spring up in isolated fashion with a
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tag of reliability attached. "Justice" with a single nomi- 
nalistic referent or "goodness," in a similar fashion does 
not await us in the nature outside our minds. The "meanings" 
of "electrons" and other scientific objects are found only 
after examining complex and rigorous theories which are in­
directly verified. Only then does an "electron" become a 
public object rather than a subjective "tag." Also, as we 
have noted, natural objects like electrons, stars and planets 
cannot be "good" or "bad." Consequently, Northrop's natural 
law orientation leads him to assert that ethical "oughts" do 
not exist in isolation in nature. Values for Northrop exist 
in the context of scientific inquiry as they also do to some 
extent for Dewey and the pragmatists. But, as we have at­
tempted to show previously, Northrop attempts to carry science 
into the area of ultimate ends as well, beyond the immediate 
problematic situation.
"Ultimate values" must be understood, then, in the 
context of the philosophical and scientific system of which 
they are parts. The particular contents of justice, goodness, 
aesthetics, ethics and norms have the most reliable meanings 
within a speculative system using the latest scientific 
"method." This gives us an approach for searching for values 
which will be relative to the philosophy of science of our
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times, rather than for all times. Therefore the content of 
the "natural law" will vary as man's knowledge of nature 
varies. This does not mean, however, that these values are 
spurious or meaningless. They are as adequate as our under­
standing of nature will allow them to be. Northrop's version 
of natural law thus gives little comfort to the positivist 
and nominalistic "ordinary" language philosophers. But 
neither does it gladden the hearts of Thomistic natural law 
philosophers. In both cases, the reasons are essentially 
similar. Thomists with their Aristotelian epistemology and 
positivists with their Humean theory of knowledge are both 
using scientific methods which have been abandoned in the 
mature sciences.
Natural law thinkers in the older Thomist and reli­
gious and philosophical traditions have not in most cases 
made their peace with the developments in science since the 
era of St. Thomas Aquinas. As Scott Buchanan notes
Natural law theory avoids open conflict or criti­
cism of the academic going concerns that are committed 
to these methods, and it seems unable to comprehend 
and transcend them. The writings of Lon Fuller show 
the frustration that r e s u l t s . ^0
Northrop is by any standards an unusual "natural law" thinker.
^^Scott Buchanan, Rediscovering Natural Law: Fund for 
the Republic (Santa Barbara: 1962), p. 43.
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That is, he is simultaneously a natural law thinker as well 
as a figure familiar with the theoretical problems of science. 
Recognizing that Northrop has attempted to face the "formid­
able task" of reconciling science and values, Buchanan has 
also said that:
F. S. C . Northrop boldly states the outlines of 
current natural knowledge based on mathematical physics, 
connecting it with the long mathematical tradition from 
the Pythagoreans to the present. Still more boldly he 
allows such natural knowledge to extend itself to the 
human nervous system. He asserts that the latest 
neurology and the neurology immediately in prospect 
supply adequate physiological correlates of the rational 
human powers familiar in the humanistic tradition.
Also, Buchanan comments on the non-absolutist, and undogmatic
character of Northrop's political theory in the following
manner :
At present Northrop makes no claim that the natural 
law that he sees developing in his hypothetical con­
struction yields anything but hypothetical values, and 
there is at present a presumption running through his 
thought that nothing more is needed. One must wait for 
developments. It is of course possible that such ex­
plorations will make discoveries.^^
Northrop's "objective" values as we have seen are 
found by using the epistemology of science for venturing into 




of his theory in contrast to the subjectivism of many value 
theories have already been noted. But his theory also seems 
to raise new problems, particularly for political theorists 
who would "like" to use his framework or his guidelines for 
value inquiry.
Our discussion of Northrop's philosophy of science 
brought out the fact that his conception of science parallels 
that of Einstein, Margenau, Reichenbach and many others. But 
it also has serious differences with the theories of Cohen, 
Nagel, Bridgman and Whitehead, Scientists and |>hilosophers 
of science are far from unanimous about the current "correct" 
methodology in physics. Therefore, the task of the political 
speculator who would like to integrate science and political 
theory is not an easy one. The political theorist would need 
to devote a substantial portion of his scholarly efforts to­
wards finding out the "correct" philosophy of science for 
himself. To some extent he would have to resolve the method­
ological differences himself, in order to use science for 
discovering reliable values, unless he is willing to settle 
for faith in some "authorities" as opposed to others. Also, 
recent scientific developments have been very rapid in char­
acter when compared to previous historical "eras." Therefore, 
if political values rest on scientific epistemology, values
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are likely to be far more in a constant state of flux in our 
times than they have been, for instance, in the Middle Ages 
in Europe or in India until the coming of Islam. The task 
of creating political stability and keeping it that way for 
some time is going to be immensely more complicated than it 
has been. Keeping these practical problems in mind we will 
begin an examination of the results of Northrop's political 
speculation, based on his conception of "scientific method."
Ideal Values and the "Good"
Political System
Although much of Northrop's political theory deals 
with questions of methodology, he occasionally does indicate 
what the substance of "natural law" ideals and a state built 
on these, are likely to be like. Since his views are not 
stated always in a systematic manner the task of the analyst 
is indeed a difficult one. As his views on sociological 
jurisprudence indicate, he is very much aware of the stubborn 
"living law" facts of existing societies. Therefore the dis­
cussion of his political "idealism" or values should be re­
garded as primarily an attempt at understanding the "good 
society" through the application of his "modern" scientific 
epistemology. Thus, too, unlike the pragmatists, Northrop 
tries to show the "exact" direction long range reform should
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take, in order to have guidelines for changing some of the 
stubborn facts of existing political society.
As noted before, the word "state" has been a term 
that recent generations of political scientists have used to 
define the central institution in their discipline. Yet, 
the word state is not very frequently used by Northrop in 
his political essays and writings about the ideal political 
system. When he does use the term it is not usually clearly 
defined unless he is examining someone else's concept of the 
state. One suspects on the basis of the tone of some of his 
remarks that the word state for him refers to all the politi­
cal institutions which are the products of a particular 
socio-political theory, which in turn rests on a particular 
view of nature. The "meaning" of the term state for him 
varies with the theory involved. Thus he notes that the 
"Hobbesian state" is a somewhat different state from the 
"American Lockean Jeffersonian Democratic State" at least to 
the extent that Lockean and Hobbesian theories indicate the 
need for somewhat different political institutions.
The ideal "state" or the pattern of political insti­
tutions for F. S. C. Northrop must rest according to him on 
the most recently verified theory of nature and its ensuing 
political ideology. A valid political ideology, in other
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words, must through its epistemology account for all the 
"facts” of nature. Since the modern theory of nature, ac­
cording to Northrop includes "logical realism," the new po­
litical ideology must also be logically realistic in char­
acter. Logical realism of course is a particular "form" or 
"version" of the "abstract" type of thinking which is more 
prevalent in the Occident than in the Orient according to 
Northrop. This abstract kind of thinking, as we have seen, 
he sometimes calls the "theoretic component" of knowledge 
about nature. But the ideal society needs also to pay care­
ful attention to "radical empiricism" which is the "aesthetic 
component" of nature, or put in another way, the part of na­
ture that is known directly as sense data. Thus, Northrop 
himself states
That conception of good conduct and the good 
state is the correct one, valid for everybody, which 
rests upon the conception of man and nature as de­
termined by immediate apprehension with respect to 
the aesthetic component and by the methods of natural 
science with respect to the theoretical component ; 
procedures which, when correctly applied, give the 
same results for one person that they give for another .13
Presumably, such a state is a desirable one since its 
premises are based on the most current scientific philosophy.
13F. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West :
An Inquiry Concerning World Understending (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1960), p. 470.
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The reason why modern scientific philosophy "ought” to be 
followed is that all political theories contain assumptions 
about science and nature anyway, and since we can cognitively 
know what nature actually is like, we can also have reliable 
political theory about what "ought" to be in human behavior. 
Plato's politics was related to his physics, so were Aris­
totle's social ideas dependent on his "naive realistic" 
science. Similarly, all the political "isms" of life in turn 
rest on assumptions about science. This seems to be a form 
of "natural law" due to the way man uses his cortical symbols 
to understand everything "outside" him; bugs, bees, sunsets 
and norms. Since man uses his symbols both for science and 
for values, Northrop*s thesis is that if we shift and modify 
our symbols in keeping with what philosophers of science have 
found to be consistent with science in the age of Einstein, 
we shall have reliable values also.
The world of "fact" and the world of "value" are not 
two separate ontological schemes. They are actually recon­
ciled in the symbolizing capacity of man, according to North­
rop. But man's physical capacity to symbolize is partly un­
structured. Consequently what man can do is to structure the 
symbols and use them in such a way as to have an "adequate" 
view of nature. Concretely, they must see nature in the
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complex light of Einstein's physics rather than the archaic 
epistemologies of science such as Locke's tabula rasa or 
Marx's dialectical materialism. If the epistemology of 
modern science is philosophically and logically analyzed we 
will have a dependable theory of ideal politics as well.
Thus Northrop's own analysis of modern scientific theory 
leads him to a particular "form" of the "good" state.
The "Legal" Form of the Ideal State
That is, the law of Northrop's state must necessar­
ily be "abstract" and "contractual" in character since the 
society will not be basically tribal in form on the one hand 
nor anarchic in nature on the other. Here it is necessary 
to note the distinction that Northrop makes between a society 
based on a "law of contract" and a society based on a "law of 
s t a t u s . "14 I n  a law of status society the rights and duties 
of men are based on a "naive realistic"!^ epistemology. The 
legal codes are based on "naive" observation or "sensed"
l^The terms "law of status" and "law of contract" 
which are used by Northrop actually occur first in the work 
of the English historian, Maine. See Henry Maine, Ancient 
Law (London: John Murray, 1908).
^^"Naive realism" basically sees ideas and objects 
in terms of sensed qualities.
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categories and they assign rights and duties on the basis of 
the apparent biological characteristics of the persons in­
volved. Speaking of law of status societies, Northrop says:
In the countless ancient patriarchal familial and 
tribal nations, the individual person's religious, 
moral, legal and political rights, privileges, obliga­
tions and duties were defined by one's sex (patriar­
chal or matriarchal national rule and family headship), 
the temporal order of one's birth (primogeniture) and 
most important of all the color of skin of one's tribal 
ancestors. This is what Sir Henry Maine meant by a 
law of status society. The living law of all the 
peoples of the world, before the Stoic Roman lawyers 
and philosophers discovered Western contractual legal 
science, was of this character, as is most of the liv­
ing law of the Africans, Middle Easterners, and Asians 
today and . . . the Filmerian Christian component of 
the Old South.
A  contractual legal system attempts to avoid some of 
the erroneous naive realism of status oriented societies. Un­
like the statically fixed legal codes of naive realistic soci­
eties, contractual law introduces concepts which involve ab­
stract relationships between persons, rather than sensed re­
lationships alone. Contractual law allows society to be more 
dynamic in character since the referents of its symbols are 
not fixed permanently as sensed characteristics. The laws 
of this postulated kind of system "have much greater
16Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, op. jcit.,
pp. 9-10.
347
generality” than those of a status bound society. Northrop 
also sees a definite relationship between the fact that "con­
cepts by postulation” are more frequent in Western science 
and that contractual law is also Western in character. The 
technological civilization of the West owes a great deal, ac­
cording to Northrop, to the "concept by postulation” charac­
teristics of Western law, science and philosophy.
Northrop's "laws” then not only must be abstract and 
contractual in character, but must be as "imageless as pos­
sible. That is, his "state” must make sure that its "laws” 
do not surreptitiously introduce any sensed "status” concept. 
Such a state has much to l e a m  from the errors of the American 
legal system despite its contractual character. The "separate 
but equal” legal doctrine in the past and the actual and 
present predicament of Negroes, Puerto Ricans and others in 
the United States are incompatible with Northrop's theory, 
since "Negroes” and "Puerto Ricans” are known naive realisti­
cally. We "see” the physical appearance of a Negro and then 
classify him almost in the way Aristotle naive realistically 
classified flora and fauna.
Northrop's ideal legal system, therefore, must define
^^Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, op. cit., p. 188.
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basic legal rights and duties without any reference to the 
sensed differences between men. Since the color, the race, 
the caste, the family and the physical characteristics of 
man are examples of sensed attributes of man, they cannot 
provide the basis for the legal system. The goals of the 
legal system cannot be those of fulfilling the wishes or the 
desires of naive realistic man. The usual restrictions 
against unequal legal treatment for race, color, previous 
condition of servitude and religion in the constitutions of 
many m o d e m  "secular" states are examples of Northrop's kind 
of contractual law.
At this point one may wonder why Northrop is so con­
cerned about discussing laws of contract, since they are so 
prevalent in Indian, United States, and other constitutions.
The answer to this hypothetical query is that Northrop is at­
tempting to show that the postulates of contractual law do 
at times meet the standards of logically realistic episte­
mology and therefore to that extent are "scientifically" re­
liable foundations for law, but they also must be institution­
alized.
Legal terms in the Northrop system will exist in any 
case in the form of incomplete symbols. This means that each 
term or word or category will not have a direct naive realistic
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or empirical referent. The meanings are not single nominal- 
istic ones. The meanings of legal terms in contractual law 
vary according to the purpose, goals, and the ends of particu­
lar legal systems. The incomplete symbols of Northrop's law 
such as "man," "nation," "national interest," "rights" and 
"legal obligation" cannot have the same simple meanings that 
"common sense" and dictionary definitions tend to give them. 
Then, Northrop writes:
. . . an incomplete symbol has no meaning by itself.
Its meaning is to be found, consequently only by ex­
amining the formal properties or the syntax of the 
basic premises of the theoretically constructed system 
in which it occurs. Consequently, as Regius Professor 
H. L. A. Hart has n o t e d , 20 it is an error to ask, as 
most traditional legal theorists have done, for a defi­
nition of such legal w o r d s . 18
The above quotation describes what Northrop's terms 
are not. It is also necessary to describe them more posi­
tively. Legal terms, Northrop insists, must be of such a 
nature that they reflect the Stoic-Roman concept of "univer­
sal man" or more precisely "any man whatsoever." Since the 
Stoic concept of "any man" does not have an immediately 
sensed referrent it meets the standards of logical realism 
and is logically compatible with it. What this means
18Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, op. cit., p. 287.
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practically can be illustrated by one example. If the state 
has a law to the effect that "persons are entitled to a high 
school education" that state will be ethically good to the 
extent that the word "persons" does not refer to Caucasian 
or Negro men or women, since these are primarily sensed clas­
sifications and are therefore naive realistic and false sci­
entifically. Another example is that if the state decides 
that chicken stealing is a crime it cannot punish a Negro 
chicken thief by one standard and a Caucasian chicken thief 
by another standard, because once again the difference between 
the two thieves is based on naive perception and "Negro" is a 
"sensed" category which is incompatible with logical realism.
The substantive "democratic" character of such a 
legal system should become more and more evident. That is, 
his "democracy" is not that of a simple majoritarianism but 
it rests on an invariant and abstract "man-ness" in all men. 
This egalitarianism does not claim that men in actual sensed 
qualities are equal but that they must be considered equals 
in an abstract way, for society to work with abstract laws.
It should be remembered that many of the familiar concepts of 
American law are also similarly abstract, which is a feature 
of any contractual legal system based on a deductively formu­
lated theory of man; in this case Lockean man. The "University
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of Oklahoma" does not get its "right" to sign a contract for 
equipment from the mere fact that there is a campus with 
students wandering around on it. Instead the "rights" of the 
University, to sue, for instance, arise out of its legal char­
acter as a "corporation" or more particularly a state owned 
"corporation" in a contractual legal system. The university 
therefore is a legally created abstract entity. Also, the 
United States constitutional concept of "equal protection of 
the law" does not define its meaning in terms of the rights 
of black persons or white persons. If it did so, it would be 
falling into the naive realistic trap. Theoretically this 
protection is available to "any person," if one is to remain 
faithful to the deductive and theoretical concept of man.
Since Lockean-Jeffersonian theory is a deductive theory it 
does call for abstract and "theoretical" concepts of "man," 
"rights" and "law." Thus the fact that these concepts occur 
in the American constitution is not regarded as an accident 
by Northrop.
Northrop's state can have several different goal 
values as we shall see in detail in the next chapter. But 
whatever these values may be such as industrialization, aes­
thetics, entertainment or social harmony, the legal order 
must make sure that the process for attaining these goals
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does not distinguish between persons in naive realistic ra­
cial, religious or even "economic" terms. The goal values 
and the substance of laws as well, must be compatible with 
concepts by postulation which are required by scientific 
methods. To do this the legal system must make its laws ap­
plicable to everyone in form as well as in content. Thus, a 
law stating that whosoever has high cheekbones and straight 
coarse black hair cannot buy liquor without a permit may ap­
pear to be universal in form. The goal value in this case 
may be that of reducing the incidence of alcoholism. But 
since the content of the law is not really aimed at alcohol­
ism per se but classifies persons who are defined in terms of 
sensed qualities and racial characteristics (probably Ameri­
can Indian) the norm does not meet the standards of concepts 
by postulation. If the same law is modified to the extent 
that the racial criteria are substituted by "incomplete sym­
bols" such as "minors," "chronic alcoholics" the situation 
is i m p r o v e d , s i n c e  these symbols have rather indirectly 
sensed referrents just as electrons do.
In our use of such ordinary language and examples, 
however, there is always the danger of misrepresentation of
19 It might be noted that this amounts to a "scien­
tific" justification for much of the work of the Warren court 
in defining "equal protection."
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Northrop's ideas. Thus Northrop himself supplements his own 
ordinary language and illustrations with the language of sym­
bolic logic to express the key to the requirement for valid 
or "scientific" law in the state. He puts this as follows:
For any person 2 , for any object of intrinsic 
(goal value as distinct from instrumental value) 
normative judgment x and for any substantive con­
tent _s of either personal conduct or the living or 
positive law, to say that 2  of x is morally good and 
legally just is equivalent to saying that:
(i) X is in accord with a concept by postulation 
contractually constructed, determinate law L, which 
is universal in the sense that the law holds for all 
persons, i.e., is preceded by, to use the language
of symbolic logic, the universal quantifier (p), where 
(£)means "for any person whatever."
(ii) The substantive content 2  of this universal 
law (p) L is such that if its substantive content _s 
confers specified rights, privileges and duties upon 
one person, or one group of people £, then any other 
person or group of persons whatever must enjoy the 
same specified intrinsic normative rights, privileges 
and duties ; that is, not merely the law as a whole 
must be preceded by the universal quantifier (p) but 
also the substantive content _s within the law must be 
accompanied by a second universal quantifier (p) . ^ 0
It is clear that Northrop's general legal theory here 
does bear some resemblance to Kantian jurisprudence and North­
rop himself notes this from time to time. Thus the letter's 
"intrinsic-extrinsic" terminology smacks of Kantianism. The 
discussion of an "intrinsic" norm as a primitive norm or end 
and an "extrinsic" norm as an instrumental norm actually
20Northrop, The Complexity, pp. pit., pp. 275-276.
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contains echoes of Kant. Also the requirement of "univer­
sality” for both norms parallels the following description 
of Kant's jurisprudence by Huntington Cairns:
A hypothetical imperative is a principle of con­
duct on which we act, not because of its intrinsic 
merits, but because of something else, such as an end 
which we wish to achieve. A categorical imperative we 
accept for its own merits and not as a means to some­
thing else. Thus he arrived as his famouc conception 
that there is only one categorical imperative, namely:
Act only on that maxim which will enable you at the 
same time to will that it be a universal law. Kant 
followed this with a second formula to determine the 
end of the moral law: Act so that in your own person 
as well as in the person of every other you are treat­
ing mankind also as an end, never merely as a means. 2 1
There are, however, some differences between North­
rop 's jurisprudence and Kant's. The most fundamental differ­
ence is in epistemology. The Kantian concept of & priori 
does not appear in Northrop's epistemology. Since man's sym­
bolizing tools, i.e., his cortical neurons and the way the 
brain associates different impulses can be used in a variety 
of ways as shown previously, the Kantian concept of categor­
ical a priori is modified to a hypothetical a priori. In 
other words, Northrop sees man as a discoverer of varieties 
of ethical systems whereas Kant tends to see the moral order
21Huntington Cairns, Legal Philosophy from Plato to 
Hegel (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1949), pp. 392-393.
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as being actually outside the "creative" abilities of man.
Another difference between Kant and Northrop is the 
Kantian vagueness on the question of whether the content of 
legislation rather than only the outward form must be univer­
sally applicable or not. Kant, according to Northrop, seems 
at times to be skeptical with respect to possibilities of 
scientifically evaluating the legislature's will. Thus, 
Cairns describes the Kantian position here in the following 
manner:
In its dignity, the will of the sovereign legis­
lator, in respect of what constitutes the external 
mine and thine, is to be regarded as irresistible; 
and the judicial sentence of the supreme judge is to 
be regarded as irreversible, being beyond appeal.3 
Kant's view of the blamelessness of the legislative 
power involves a direct denial of the ancient con­
ception of natural law as a form of higher l a w . 2 2
Northrop, in contrast to Kant's ideal state trans­
forms Kantian private categorical ethics into a standard for 
public law. Thus, the general legal form of the state has 
to be applicable to "any man" whatsoever. The institution 
of hereditary slavery, for instance, could not exist in 
Northrop's state, ethically or politically. Kant, on the 
other hand, could probably disapprove of slavery in private
22Huntington Cairns, Legal Philosophy from Plato to 
Hegel, o p . cit., p. 444.
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ethics but would be hesitant in criticizing it as a public 
political institution (although ethically he insisted that 
man must not be treated as means). In contrast Northrop at­
tempts to reconcile private ethics with public and scientific 
morality. Thus in the current milieu of controversy in the 
United States over desegregation the Kantian would "know” 
only subjectively and ethically that segregation is evil. 
Northrop, on the other hand, is saying that segregation is 
ethically evil because it is scientifically wrong since it 
rests on naive realistic foundations. Therefore, political 
morality in the segregation issue is not a matter of "faith" 
alone but a "correct" conception of the nature of things as 
well. Thus, for Northrop a law which through generality de­
clares "segregation" to be the law of the land is being 
"universalistic" and "scientific" only in outward form but 
not in substantive content.
The ideal legal system, in summary, is basically de­
ductive, logically realistic, "universalistic," and Stoic- 
Roman in character. The bare outlines of the system that we_ 
have sketched has not yet been given a substantive character, 
although we have seen how Northrop in theory would approach 
substantive questions. This legal theory is in a sense "self- 
evident" in character, like the "natural rights" of
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Jeffersonianisin. The "self-evident” characteristic arises 
from the fact that the legal theory is deductive in nature. 
Therefore, to find out what is meant by a "right” in such a 
system, we cannot proceed by looking for a "right” in sensed 
nature as some political sicentists^^ tend to do. If we 
look for a natural law or right in "empirically” observed 
nature such as in the "tendency” towards "self-preservation,” 
we are liable to fall into the trap of "naive realism” and 
therefore as we have shown before, of relativistic subject­
ivism. Then we will have Jones’ natural right based on his 
own observation of nature and Smith may have a different na­
tural right based on Smith's own "sincere" observation.
But the fact that a legal term in the ideal legal 
system does not have an immediate referrent in sensed nature 
does not mean that it is cognitively meaningless. To find 
the meaning of "justice," we need to look at the deductive 
legal theory Northrop has in mind in which "justice" is de­
fined in relation to other entities of the theory. Existen- 
tially, by itself "justice" is an incomplete symbol, just as 
much as an "electron" is . "Justice" does not greet us during 
a walk in the woods and neither does an "electron.” The fact
23See Harry V. Jaffa, "Comment on Oppenheim." Amer­
ican Political Science Review, Vol. LI, March, 1957, pp. 54- 
55.
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that "natural rights" for Northrop are "self-evident" means 
only that their meanings are tautologically true, i.e., they 
follow from the basic premises of the theory. The fact that 
they are tautologically derived does not, however, make them 
meaningless, since epistemological analysis can show whether 
the "method" for arriving at value is reliable or n o t . An 
example should help clarify this position. Let us assume 
that we have two normative theories which deal with "justice" 
and that one theory is the Hindu theory of caste and the 
second is Northrop's legal theory. "Justice" in Hindu caste- 
theory often consists of the enforcement of caste rules. But 
since caste rules are based on biological differences includ­
ing color, they constitute an "erroneous" conception of nature 
as modern science shows it to be. "Justice" ideally for 
Northrop may be defined tautologically as "equal protection 
of the law" which is tautologically related to the concept 
of "abstract, universal man." The fact that this concept of 
"justice" rests on a logically realistic theory which is the 
theory used to define concepts in modern science makes it more 
reliable than the naive realistic caste theory of "justice."
The caste theory does not use the concept of "any 
man" but only refers to "Brahmin man" or "Sudra man." North­
rop 's concept of man refers on the other hand to an abstract
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constant in "man" which is only theoretically known. Just 
as in simple arithmetic one assumes that the numbers 1, 2,
3, 4, 5 have a basic constant without which we could not deal 
with the variables, so also white man, black man, healthy man, 
sick man all have an abstract "man-ness" in them, in a mathe­
matically oriented theory like Northrop's. We do not have 
to feel this man-ness. Instead the "meaning" of this "man" 
can be understood only in terms of the other concepts in 
Northrop's theory such as "rights" and "consent." However, 
expressed in the language of "common-sense," Northrop's con­
cept of man involves the argument that there is something in 
man which is not directly perceived, but which makes him co­
equal with all other men in spite of their sensed differences. 
Such a notion of man is "valid" partly because it is a concept 
that is not defined in terms of the erroneously and naive 
realistically "observed" qualities. Naive realism, as we have 
seen, is an erroneous epistemology since it depends on obser­
vation. As Northrop has attempted to show, "observation" 
amounts to guesswork in science. Therefore, in normative 
ethics, the implication is that because "naive realistically" 
we see black men does not necessarily and scientifically mean 
that we can inductively conclude that "black men are inferior," 
"black men are bad" or "black men are good." Observation can
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tell us that there is the blackness of some men and the "red­
ness" of others, but cannot show the relatedness of these 
categories to ethics.
Thus, Northrop's laws are not based on "observation," 
neither are they synthetic propositions, i.e., they are not 
propositions necessarily required by our "nature." Rather, 
they are analytic in character, i.e., they are related logi­
cally in a theory which is hypothetical to the extent that 
it is compatible with what we know of nature thus far. Also, 
the analytic legal propositions are meaningful to anyone, 
i.e., publicly or inter-subjectively, to the extent that any­
one who understands mathematics and logic can find out their 
"meaning" by examining the theory. What is meant by "jus­
tice" appears in the theory. No guesswork or "inner-eye" is 
necessary.
But this discussion of the "ideal" law thus far is 
primarily about the formal aspects of Northrop's legal theory. 
In order to delineate further the features of his thought we 
must turn to some of the other aspects of its theoretical 
foundations.
"Consent" in Politics
The deductive nature of the previously stated legal 
theory cannot practically speaking, alone make the naturalistic
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system work. To make the contractual system work there must 
be some form of a "contract” or "consent" according to North­
rop’ s theory. Northrop's most definitive and concise state­
ment on the need for "consent" In his system Is as follows:
Being postulatlonally and contractually construc­
ted, and hence merely hypothetical, the validity of 
any (g) L in which (g) ^  must rest on free implicit or 
explicit consent of the parties c o n c e r n e d . [italics 
mine.]
Consent in "implicit" or "explicit" form is important in
Northrop's state. Just as a deductive theory is indirectly
verified by inductively obtained "facts," so also legal and
ethical theory must have its indirect referrents in the minds
of men. Also, Northrop states that the requirement of consent
. . . tells us that for-me-ness or consent is es­
sential. This, let it be recalled, is a tautologi­
cally true or self-evident proposition of the law 
of contract, the reason being that, until consent 
is given, what is put into the contract by the con­
tracting parties is merely a fanciful or hypothetical 
"might be," it is not an obligatory for-me-binding
imperative.25
Implicit consent is not necessarily an active expres­
sion of approval since only "descriptive sociological and phil­
osophical anthropological jurisprudence can tell us w h e t h e r " ^ ^




consent exists or not. This version of the meaning of con­
sent is the most easily understandable. If a law says "Repeal 
prohibition for everybody" and this norm seems to be in accord 
with the "living law" of the majority, they are likely to con­
firm the practical wisdom of the legislation, by not protesting 
against the law, by buying liquor legally or by crowding the 
beer halls on "freedom's" night.
"Implicit" consent is therefore the consent people 
show by their objectively observable behavior. "Explicit" 
consent on the other hand, seems to be more "active" in char­
acter. An example of "explicit" consent occurs in the "legis­
lative" or lawmaking process when the majority's will, provided 
it is "valid," is able to "bind" the citizenry to the observ­
ance of the law. Then "any dissenter or minority group has 
the legal obligation to be measured by merely majority approved 
statutes of the legislature"?? provided they are universally 
quantifiable.
The problem that one faces with the majoritarian con­
sent to "good" laws is the problem of the dissenter and his 
"obligation" to abide by the statute which has the approval of 
the majority. Northrop shows his characteristic honesty in
^^Ibid., p. 298.
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recognizing this problem. He states:
The problem is how, in such a theory, to pass from 
the majority assent to a statute to the obligation of 
all-dissenters and assenters alike to accept the 
statute.28
Here, Northrop recognizes that empirically speaking 
there is no necessary connection between a majority's consent 
and the minority's obligation. His "justification" depends 
on two major arguments. The first is that if the content of
the good law is applicable to "anyone whatsoever" then every
s ingle legal person will be bound by it and the law will not
be arbitrary since it is universal in character. The second
argument that Northrop presents is that since a "good" stat­
ute is "good" or "true" for the majority that
. . . the criterion of legal obligation solves the 
problem of legal induction in legal science, pre­
cisely the same way in which Frege and Bertrand 
Russell^l solved the problem of mathematical induc­
tion in mathematical science. In both instances 
the problem consists in passing from what is true 
for some to what holds for all.29
The first argument is relatively clear since it is 
clearly analytic in nature, i.e., it follows from Northrop's 
deductive hypothetical theory. But the second argument is 




help illustrate the genuine difficulty that Northrop faces 
here. Let us suppose that there is a m o d e m  Socrates and a 
m o d e m  Aristotle each with a legislative proposal that is 
universal in form and also in content. This is possible, 
since as Northrop himself admits, "science" occasionally has 
two sets of theories which give "adequate" explanation of 
the same set of facts. If Aristotle is able to achieve the 
"consent" of the majority, Socrates as a dissenter is "bound" 
by the Aristotelian law.
It may very well be that the new Socrates’ theory 
"explains" or accounts for every single "fact" that is now 
known to exist, as well as does the theory of Aristotle. The 
insistence on obedience to the Aristotelian position simply 
because the "majority" wants it certainly would seem to be a 
tragedy from an intellectual and libertarian viewpoint. Part 
of the answer to this dilemma of consent and majoritarian 
tyranny appears to lie in the spirit of toleration which 
conceivably arises from the awareness by people in the ideal 
state that normative theories are not valid for all time.
They are tentative and always subject to the modification im­
posed by the dynamism of science.
However, toleration is not an absolute nominalistic 
"value" in the political theory of F. S. C. Northrop. The
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role of toleration operates in a way which is different from 
the idea of toleration in the Lockean theory which is so 
prevalent in the American social system. In the political 
theory of the eafly Locke "toleration" as Northrop persua­
sively s h o w s a r i s e s  from Locke's view of human nature. 
Locke's concept of minds as isolated mental substances which 
were unrelated to each other naturally led him to the conclu­
sion that no mental substance had the monopoly of "truth" and 
therefore could not impose its view of "truth" on others with­
out their consent. Since Locke's view of mental substances 
31is erroneous, a valid theory of toleration cannot be based 
on it. Northrop is very critical of the tendency in American 
politics to view toleration in the light of Lockean principles 
One consequence of this is the absence of reliable standards 
even among learned jurists like Justice Frankfurter for ad­
judicating between conflicting opinions about the "good."
Thus, the good tends to become identified for Frankfurter, 
seemingly and simply with the majority's "will."
Locke's concept of toleration, then, like his other 
concepts in political theory, are related to the premises of




his philosophy of scienceo This philosophy postulated a 
"three termed relationship" between "man" and the "nature" 
around him according to Northrop's analysis of L o c k e T h e  
philosophy of Locke asserts that these relationships exist 
between three factors in nature. One factor is the "mental 
substance" in each atomistic individual. The second is the 
physical matter of Newtonian physics and nature. The last 
factor is composed of the sensed qualities that we perceive.
Since mental substances are not physically related 
or tied in with each other, Locke proceeded to argue that 
the ideas of one mental substance are as "good" as the ideas 
of another mental substance. The absence of any method by 
which the validity of the "opinions" of atomistic man could 
be judged made toleration an absolute necessity in Locke's 
political theory. This theory according to Northrop needs 
to be modified in the view of Einstein's epistemology.
This new epistemology sees the relationship between
32Northrop's analysis of Locke and his effect on 
American ideology is an incisive one but it is far from be­
ing the only analysis. For a summary of other views see 
Bernard Wishy, "John Locke and the Spirit of 76," The Amer­
ican Past : Conflicting Interpretations of the Great Issues, 
V o l . 1. Edited by Sidney Fine and Gerald S . Brown (New York : 
The Macmillan Company, 1961), p , 108. Wishy, rather inaccu­
rately, sees Northrop (among others) as accepting "Locke’s 
works as a leading philosophic justification for modern 
liberalism."
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man and nature as a "two termed relation." These two terms 
are, as we have seen, the theoretic or postulated and the aes­
thetic or sensed components of reality. Man is not atomistic, 
therefore, since he is actually related to the continuum of 
nature by these two components.^3 The institutions of the 
new state must then rest on a new theory of toleration. 
Ideally, toleration by the judiciary, for instance, does not 
have to be shown to meet every opinion and every "subjective" 
interest of each man. Positively speaking, toleration needs 
to be shown, once again ideally, only to the varieties of 
values which actually postulate the "theoretic" component of 
things using logical realism. The avenues of inquiry for new 
deductively formulated values for man must be kept open in 
the legislative process and in other institutionalized "be­
havior" of man, such as in the area of "education." In sum­
mary, toleration ideally means that man and legislators have 
the freedom to speculate, i.e., to discover new aspects of 
the theoretic nature of things. But this does not mean that 
"toleration" is the basic formula that judges must use in 
resolving a "problematic situation" defined in terms of a
33
See Northrop, "Concerning the Philosophical Conse­
quences of the Theory of Relativity," Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. XXVII, April 10, 1930, pp. 197-210.
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"clash of interests." To recognize ideally a "clash of in­
terests" is to fall into the Lockean error of postulating 
atomistic man with his atomistic "will" as a cardinal legal 
absolute.
Thus the Lockean notion of atomistic man must be 
modified in the light of modern science which sees man as a 
focal point for the theoretic component of things and the 
aesthetic component of things. In making this point Northrop 
argues that,
The answer to the basic problem underlying the 
ideological issues of these times is, therefore, as 
follows: the aesthetic, intuitive, purely empirically 
eiven component in man and nature is related to the 
theoretically designated and indirectly verified com­
ponent, not as traditional m o d e m  Western science and 
philosophy supposed, by a three termed relation of 
appearance but instead W  the two termed relation of 
epistemic correlation . 3 4
The "theoretic" component of law, science and poli­
tics is, therefore, speculatively discovered, as Northrop so 
often insists. This gives the "form" of our laws and politi­
cal theories less than an air of finality and infallibility. 
Since our most sacred political assumptions can be in error 
no less than the physics of Aristotle, society must insure 
that the quest for new ideas, values, and theories remains
p . 443
^^Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, op. cit.,
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as part of the essence of the "scientific" state. The sci­
entific state, therefore, is far from an institution of static 
ideals, since "science" itself constantly searches for new 
theories, hypotheses and constructs.
Rather, the state is conceived in "pluralistic" 
terms by Northrop, in the sense that within the institution­
alized life of man varieties of speculation must not only be 
tolerated but encouraged. The essentially democratic nature 
of the ideal state thus becomes evident since it is only 
within a democratic state that the most active search for new 
social ideals as well as scientific theories can be continu­
ously carried on. Thus, "the principle of pluralism in its 
bearing upon the open society . . . .  must be kept in mind." 
Still it should be noted again, however, that "pluralism" and 
"democracy" in Northrop's theory are not precisely the same 
in meaning as many contemporary theories of democracy make 
them, where the reconciliation of subjective economic and so­
cial interests is regarded as one of the political functions 
of an "interest" oriented "pluralistic" society.
Rather, "pluralism" in ideas is one of the desirable 
"values" together with "universality" in the substance and 
procedure of legislation, as well as "consent" implicitly 
demonstrated or explicitly expressed. These values, according
370
to Northrop, are logical extensions of his philosophy of 
science.
However, quite apart from their formal scientific 
validity, political scientists may be concerned and rightly 
so about the types of institutional apparatus that would, 
ideally at least, bring these values into fruition.
Intimations of Institutions
The political scientist who by training has been 
primarily concerned with the descriptive aspects of the 
study of political institutions is likely to be disappointed 
in his search for the detailed blueprint of political insti­
tutions in the writing of Northrop. For the latter, in the 
speculative search for the political and social theory of 
tomorrow, has not paid a great deal of attention to the de­
tailed problems and complexities of a "reformed” political 
society. This does not mean, however, that he is unconcerned 
about the way institutions operate. In all of his writings 
dealing with actual societies that already exist he demon­
strates a continuing sensitivity to the need for political 
institutions as vehicles of ideals.
Important as institutions are, to Northrop, they are 
simply instruments by which ideals are actualized. The
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failure of institutions according to his theory is usually, 
therefore, only an aspect of a basic failure in laying the 
groundwork or the basic ideological foundations. That is, 
institutions are embodies "forms” and ideals. Consequently 
one of the pre-requisites of reform is being clearly aware, 
on the basis of scientific epistemology, of the ideological 
direction in which reform must take place.
The new ideology, like any ideology, in the sense 
that Northrop uses the term, will need a set of institutions 
to help actualize the ideals. Institutions are the "opera­
tions" and "epistemic correlations" of man's social and po­
litical experience and are necessary in somewhat the same 
manner that "operations" and "experimental situations" are 
necessary in the natural sciences. Just as "operations" are 
meaningless, according to Northrop, without the existence of 
a related scientific theory, so also institutions and their 
"procedures," "functions," "structure" or "behavior" are 
meaningless unless one examines them as embodiments of ideals 
Once again it is the "inner order" of the "facts" of social 
and political institutions that is crucially important for 
understanding the dynamics of society.
Also, institutions bridge the gaps between the theo­
ries on the one hand and existing social facts on the other
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as "epistemic correlations" connect the "constructs" with 
the "radically empirical." The warp and woof of institutions 
then is to some extent due to the existing stubborn facts of 
the older "living law." The United States Congress today is 
possibly a good example of this. It is one institution among 
many through which the Lockean conception of "universal" 
rights with some qualifications which we will note in the 
next chapter can through experimentation displace the "tradi­
tional" values of the American South. The recent election of 
the new Prime Minister of India also provides a somewhat over­
simplified example of how institutions can be the meeting 
grounds of the old and the new. After Pandit Nehru's death 
the Congress Party which plays the Western parliamentary role 
of the "majority party" proceeded to pick its leader in a 
most un-Westem manner. The new leader was "unanimously" 
elected despite the fact that the new leader Lai Bahadur 
Shastri did not even enter the "power struggle" actively on 
his own behalf, according to the available evidence.^5
Because of the fact that institutions do have to 
operate under existing conditions, Northrop deliberately neg­
lects to describe the detailed structure of the institutions
^^See The Hindu Weekly Review, Madras, June, 1964,p. 3.
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in the new society. In the process of changing from the old 
to the new, he implies, institutions will develop detailed 
characteristics that cannot be and should not be artificially 
and dogmatically postulated in detail beforehand.
Besides the allowance for existing facts, there is 
yet another reason for the incomplete sketching by Northrop 
of "ideal" institutions. The nature of the new scientific 
society as we have seen is essentially that of a "contractual" 
democracy. Northrop maintains^^ that in an ideal contractual 
democracy the detailed patterns of institutions must be 
worked out through the continuing pragmatic and contractual 
process, in the light, of course, of the correct epistemologi- 
cal system. In other words, the pragmatic "trial and error" 
to have meaning must refer to the standards imposed by logical 
realism and radical empiricism and their particularized values 
of "universality," "consent" etc. Just as in a contract the 
"meanings" are assigned by the contractual parties so also in 
the institutional context whether to have an Interstate Com­
merce Commission or not and the attendant details thereof must 
be worked out contractually through some sort of legislative
36Telephone conversation with author, 6-7-1964. One 
might add that Northrop is displaying a philosopher's concern 
both for (a) the need for new values in society, and also, (b) 
that we never know enough to postulate a system of order for 
all times.
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process, whatever its "label” might happen to be.
To expect that the details of institutions will be 
worked out contractually may seem as though Northrop antici­
pates extraordinary performances on the part of ordinary men. 
Actually, however, ordinary men provide the very necessary 
"consent” to and restraint on the "authoritative allocation 
of values” in the society, new or old, as we have already 
noted elsewhere in this chapter. But this does not mean that 
the efforts of creative persons who are fewer in number will 
go unnoticed and unused.
The person of unusual talent and of a speculative 
bent of mind will also be important and necessary in the proc­
ess of institution building as indeed he will be in the search 
for new intrinsic and instrumental values. But talented per­
sons should under Northrop's system by no means form an elite 
of "guardians” with the monopoly of violence power at their 
command. Ideally "talent” and "consent” will be complementary 
features rather than antagonistic elements. How such a fea­
ture is to be institutionalized is once again left by North­
rop to be solved pragmatically. There seems to be an assump­
tion in his theory that if the present "interest” group 
orientation and the naive realistic habits of people are 
changed, society will tend to accept the blending of
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speculation of the talented with the "consent” of the many.
At least, he argues that such a democratic theory,
. . . avoids the error present in contemporary demo­
cracy of producing quantitative conformity at the ex­
pense of variety, important chance variations, and 
creative individual originality. The expert insures 
the creative advance, the empirical verifiability 
and the quality which comes from thinking through the 
paradoxical problem present in any law which is made 
by, yet measures men. The many free people, any one 
of whom may become an expert provide the assent with­
out which the law suggested by the scientific experts 
would be a law of tyrants. The many provide the assent, 
also, without which the law of the community would fail 
to carry moral or legal obligation for its s u b j e c t s . 37
Thus, the details of institutions and their workings 
are not to be worked out beforehand but are to be developed 
in the contractual process of constant experimentation. The 
United States, for instance, although it falls short of North­
rop 's ideals in several areas is a partial example of a con­
tractual state where the theory of Jefferson and Locke did 
not specify the details of the necessary institutions. They 
were to be and still are being worked out later. Similarly,
the Soviet Union, which is also an imperfect but contractual 
38state has experimentally developed its institutions with
37F. S. C. Northrop, Book Review: "Sovereignty: An 
Inquiry Into the Political Good, by Bertrand de Jouvenel," 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 67, June, 1958, p. 1315.
38The contractual character arises out of two char­
acteristics (1) the "law" of the U. S. S. R. attempts to be
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Marxist-Leninist goal values in mind. In contrast to these 
status bound naive realistic societies tend to have institu­
tions which are not as extensively developed through constant 
experimentation.
As our preceding discussion shows, Northrop's preoc­
cupation with the "inner order" of institutions results in an 
almost deliberate neglect of concretizing the detailed struc­
tures of institutions. In other words his illustrations of 
how institutions "should" be structured are more negative than 
positive. Where he does suggest some positive institutions 
they are sketched in terms of the "functions" that they are 
to perform rather than their structures. In his constructive 
comments, the paradox is that he implies that certain insti­
tuât ions are necessary and yet these institutions are in name 
at least similar to the existing American legislative-judicial- 
executive patterns.
However, each of his "institutions" are to fulfill 
functions which are quite different from the ones they actu­
ally perform at the present time in the United States. Thus
universalistic at least _in form (2) there is a type of im­
plicit consent partly due to the pre-Leninist education and 
values of Kantian-Hegelian-Marxist philosophy according to 
Northrop. For a detailed discussion see Philosophical Anthro­
pology, pp. 258-280.
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certain institutions are necessary to perform the important 
function of policy making or legislation. The legislative 
process ideally, however, is a mixture of the "creative ad- 
vance"39 in values together with the "explicit consent" of 
at least the "majority." Thus, Northrop's concept of the 
ideal legislative process is quite different from the com­
petitive interest group system in which contemporary demo­
cratic theory about policy making so often advocates. Speak­
ing with disapproval of much of his recent democratic theory 
Professor Duncan has argued that
This holds that, if the structure of the struggle 
to secure the wants (now called interests) can be 
made sufficiently pluralistic and fluid, a democratic 
and relatively peaceful society is possible. The task 
of the political leader here is to compromise the in­
terest conflicts through promising a bit more to each 
than he can deliver but to give some satisfaction to 
each. If the conflict becomes too dangerous, he may, 
through his exercise of the state authority in the 
form of the centralized violence power, simply force 
acquies cence.
In contrast to the dominance of the function of 
reconciliation of "interests," the legislative process ideally 
for Northrop is a speculative scientific search for values
^^Northrop, "Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the Poli­
tical Good," o£. cit., p. 1315.
^Ojohn Paul Duncan, "Res Public Quam Bonum, Res 
Publica Quan Liberum," Oklahoma Law Review, August, 1964, Vol. 
XVII, No. 3,
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which overcomes "the paradoxical problem present in any law 
which is made by, yet measures man." This truly calls for 
the creation of new values rather than the reconciliation of 
existing values and "interests" which often pass for "natural" 
facts. The task of speculation calls for the contributions 
of the "best minds" possible rather than the talents of the 
"compromiser." What presents Northrop's theory from being a 
facsimile of Plato's is the everpresent need for "consent" 
in Northrop's theory. In such a theoretical system even the 
brilliant innovator must obtain the "implicit" and "explicit" 
consent of people through the contractual legislative process 
before speculation can become law.
Northrop claims that such a policy making process is 
neither undemocratic, nor anti-intellectual. Thus, he argues;
The very essence of popular acceptance of Ein­
stein's relativity theory and of quantum mechanics 
is that the majority of men who give their consent 
to these theories do not independently make the ob­
servations, the experiments and the logical deduc­
tions from axiomatically constructed postulates which 
are necessary to confirm these theories. Instead, 
they depend upon experts and upon experts checking 
the experts. In short, the many are brought to their 
assent by "the summons of a man" or a few men. No 
one would say that this procedure in natural science 
is undemocratic. To make the norms of social science 
cognitive in this sense is no more undemocratic.41
^^Northrop, "Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the 
Political Good," o£. cit., pp. 1 3 1 4 -1 3 1 5 .
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To ensure further that neither the Intellectuals nor 
any "tyrannical'' majority can legislate into existence values 
which violate the scientific epistemological theory and con­
sequent standards, Northrop urges the creation of a judicial 
institution or a system of courts. The task of the courts, 
too, are not to be conceived in terms of satisfying "inter­
ests" and "wants" but the major function of the judiciary 
ideally is to ensure that the substance and form of legisla­
tion meet the standards of "universality." The court ideally 
then is not to legislate directly and positively but is to 
exercise the "negative" function of ensuring that naive real­
istically or subjectively formulated laws are not made bind­
ing. Thus the courts are to be guided by the specific epis­
temology that we have discussed above rather than the positiv­
ism of Justice Learned Hand and Frankfurter or the pragmatism 
of Justice Holmes.
Finally, the new state will also need to fulfill the 
function of "administration" or "execution." This, too, must 
be understood in the terms of Northrop's theory rather than 
in contemporary American terms alone. As will be developed 
in the next chapter, the ideal state is not necessarily a 
"far country" or a distant utopia. Thus, the new state is to 
be a highly industrialized and technical society, although to
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be sure "technology” is to be supplemented by other "aes­
thetic” values. Nevertheless, the management of the indus­
trial complex will call for the twin skills of technical com­
petence and "moral" concern. Since ideally the new society 
will not be based on continuing antagonisms between the 
"private" interests of business and labor, or industry and 
agriculture, or rural and urban populations, the imagination 
necessary to apply experimentally legislative policy will be­
come crucially important in the administrative process.
The technological society, then, will need this ex­
perimental attitude and policy on the part of administrators 
both for the moving of mountains as well as for dealing with 
men. The administrators must be able to apply the legisla­
ture's directives about building roads, given the engineering 
problems that are inherent in building roads in particular 
areas. But also, the administration must be sophisticated 
enough in "sociological jurisprudence" and "philosophical 
anthropology" to understand the framework of tacit and im­
plicit consent and the "living laws" of various areas, within 
which they must operate. Too, moral concern must be infused 
throughout the administrative process to insure that human 
beings remain as ends in themselves. Thus, ideally, the ad­
ministrator must serve the "public purpose" of the new
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democratic state and not the gods of "efficiency" and cost 
accountancy" alone.
Here we have briefly introduced the term "public pur­
pose." To discuss the substantive content of "public purpose" 
it is necessary, however, to examine some of the actual val­
ues that the new state "ought" to implement.
CHAPTER IX 
SUBSTANTIVE ENDS AND PRACTICAL POLITICS
Thus far, Northrop's ideal state has been discussed 
at two levels: (1) the ideal legal "form," and (2) the gen­
eral institutional pattern. Since Northrop is primarily a 
philosopher rather than a political scientist, he often stops 
short of concretizing some of his ideal values. But on two 
points he is relatively specific about the values which are 
to be implemented "ideally," provided, as we have seen, these 
values have received the "consent" given "explicitly" or "im­
plicitly" by the people within a state. The first value is 
"technology" and the second one "aesthetic sensitivity."
These are counterparts of the "theoretic" or "postulated" and 
the "aesthetic" or the "sensed" component of the natural 
world. The implication is that since these "components" or 
values are "out there" in nature anyway all we have to do is 
"discover" various aspects of them and make them our "own" by 
"consenting" to them, and that we "should" do so.
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Technology. This "abstract" noun has various pos­
sible meanings. For Northrop, however, the term not only 
means "machines," "industry," "know-how" but also the epis­
temology which has ceased to depend on sense data and has 
moved on to "concepts by postulation." Such a definition 
implies, or at least Northrop himself makes much of the fact, 
that the rise of science and industry to a considerable ex­
tent is the culmination of the development of Western mathe­
matical thinking which from the Greeks to the present age of 
Einstein shows an increasing awareness of "non-sensed" nature 
that non-Western cultures supposedly did not possess. Thus, 
he notes
Students of the history of mathematics (Cohen 
and Drabkin, 1948) confirm also that, while many 
people previous to the ancient Greeks had discovered 
isolated propositions of Euclid, such as the Pythag­
orean theorem, it was the Greeks who first grasped 
the idea of proving these otherwise isolated findings 
by deducing them rigorously from a very small number 
of axiomatically constructed entities and relations 
and then using this way of thinking and knowing to 
understand man and nature empirically.̂
^F. S. C. Northrop, "Man's Relation to the Earth in 
Its Bearing on His Aesthetic, Ethical, and Legal Values," 
William L. Thomas, Jr. (ed.), Man's Role in Changing the Face 
of the Earth (University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 1053. 
Although Northrop's views in comparative philosophy do not 
concern us directly it should be noted that Northrop's thesis, 
that Western philosophy and mathematics basically involve 
postulation while Oriental philosophy does not, is a contro­
versial one.
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Although modern technology is primarily Western in 
character according to Northrop, he would make it into a de­
sirable value for the trans-cultural ideal state, i.e., poli­
tical systems can ill afford to ignore technology. Technol­
ogy should not and indeed it cannot just happen but it re­
quires the conscious development of "concepts by postulation" 
in the minds of men. This of course will place great demands 
on the educational system in any state.
The basic argument that Northrop seems to follow is 
that "technology" in the sense of an industrial civilization 
is part, of the "good" life. He clearly affirms that a society 
based on "aesthetics" or "concepts by intuition" alone where 
the sensed beauty of nature is a primary value cannot physi­
cally survive. Aesthetic civilizations, in other words, are 
liable to destroy the basis for physical survival. In a 
simplified but incisive manner Northrop makes the following 
comment :
But the ethics and aesthetics of a non-technologi­
cal society have their paradox also. Notwithstanding 
the affection of its folk for trees and all other
creatures of "Mother Earth," its people, owing to their
emphasis on family values, tend to produce more people 
than their instruments or their natural resources en­
able them to provide for. The consequence is, notwith­
standing their affection for trees, that they eat the 
green twigs of the trees in order to live. In this 
way China has become denuded of its forests, and the
rich top soil of its "Mother Earth" has been washed
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into the sea. The result is, not merely that mil­
lions upon millions of its trees have been destroyed, 
never to be replaced, thereby violating the cosmic 
equilibrium, but also that millions of its people die 
each year by starvation. The story of the non-techno­
logical civilization of India is similar. Owing to 
prolific breeding and for want of food, its people 
have turned hundreds of thousands of square miles of 
its once-forested or food-producing territory, ex­
tending from south of the Ganges Valley to the south­
ern portion of the peninsula, into almost a desert.
Egypt, where the situation and the cure are even more 
hopeless, tells the same story.%
Since modern "technology” is a "value" which arises 
out of the "correct" scientific method, particularly the 
technology of the "atomic" age, Northrop seems to indicate 
that this is a "reliable" value for a culture to adopt. A 
nominalist or a value-relativist may well note here that 
Northrop seems to imply that there is one value that is su­
preme "Man ought to survive.'" Taken as an existential value 
this cannot be "proven." But as we have seen, Northrop 
maintains that existential, and isolated ethical values have 
no "meaning" per se unless they are related in a system with 
other values which follow from the use of a given epistemolo­
gical system.
Northrop's lack of antagonism to "technology" makes 
his ideal state within the realm of possibility in our present
Ibid., pp. 1064-1065
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industrial age. Yet to him shçer industry is not enough.
Other political; moral and ethical questions are important,
too, in connection with industry, particularly at a time when
. . . manufacturers of calculating machines are 
already at the major breakthrough point in their 
research at which these teleological mechanisms 
are being transformed from merely calculating into 
"creatively imaginative" problem solving machines.^
Thus, his ideal state is not only far removed from a mythical, 
agricultural paradise. It is a highly technical society which 
has the real political problem of using its technical instru­
ments "properly." "Proper" use involves the integration of 
man's "natural" knowledge and his cultural behavior. Conse­
quently students of politics in such a situation must become 
cognizant of major developments in science and technology in 
order to realize the advantages and dangers inherent in the 
machine age. The arena of politics must include an awareness 
and conscious "guidance" of the technological instruments of 
our times. The study of politics itself must be reconciled 
with the study of science, i.e., specifically, modern politi­
cal science students "ought" to know the natural sciences as 
well. As Northrop notes
Since the time of Kant, the culturally artifac- 
tual humanities, including ethics, religion, law, and
-3Northrop, Man, Nature and God, op. cit., p. 53.
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politics, have been treated autonomously, as if their 
"facts" were the same as those of the natural sciences. 
(Many cultural anthropologists still illustrate this 
same state of mind.) Then, as happened historically, 
the distinction arises between the Naturwissenschaften 
and the equally independent or autonomous Geistenwissen- 
schaften, i e ., sciences of culture, society and the 
humanities. Forthwith, it becomes impossible for m o d e m  
man to get his moral, legal, political, or religious 
evaluative judgments into any meaningful working rela­
tion with his naturalistic beliefs or his nervous system 
and his body, since, on this "theory" they have no 
connection.4
Yet Northrop does not argue for society to be turned 
over to today's version of "scientists" since they, like mem­
bers of other disciplines, are "specialized" in their abili­
ties and unaware of the relationship between science and nor­
mative knowledge. Rather, the general tone of Northrop's dis­
cussion seems to indicate that an ideal society would have 
two major methods for the channeling of industry into "proper" 
purposes. The first method would operate through a citizenry 
so educated that it would realize the need for controlling 
the normatively neutral machines of m o d e m  industry. Thus 
the educational process would ensure that industry serves 
"socially" desirable ends. The second method of channeling 
industry would be a judicial process structured to guarantee 
that in the industrial society ^  one is used as a means.
^Ibid., p . 57.
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Although Northrop does not state his political phi­
losophy positively using the "labels" that political scien­
tists are accustomed to use, his political theory in its 
"pragmatic" attack on human problems contains certain ingredi­
ents of a "democratic socialism," or at least "New Deal" 
philosophy. However, these particular terms must be under­
stood within the context of our present discussion since 
Northrop does not use them himself. Certainly he is far from 
being a Marxist, particularly since he regards "dialectical 
materialism" to be an erroneous epistemology.
Technology and Public Purpose. Thus there are sev­
eral reasons for believing that Northrop in his gentle New 
England manner is something of an American version of a more 
thoughtful and scholarly member of the Fabian Society. His 
search for a "public purpose" is veiled in numerous passages 
and in a variety of ways.
In the first place, Northrop's theory of any culture 
is a theory of a public culture, one that has a (ideological) 
purpose of its own. Cultural meanings generally hold for 
almost everyone, at least with a few exceptions. To put it 
in his own words,
To know oneself is to realize that one is more 
than oneself. Hence, to be selfish is to be false 
to oneself. The reason is that communication between
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human beings is a major part of what it means to be 
a human being,
Without it, and the commitments to a common con­
tract that it makes possible, there would be no com­
merce; nor would there be a family, a church, a legal, 
and political nation, or, . . .  a culture. Only in 
the case of the creative scientist, philosopher, 
saint or artist of rare genius does the individual 
make the marital customs, the church, the university, 
the fine arts, or the legal and political community, 
instead of the customs, church, nation, and other 
cultural artifacts making him or her. In short, one 
is what others are.5
In the second place the entire legal system of North­
rop' s ideal state in form and in substance requires (1) con­
sent and (2) meanings and contents of legislation that are 
valid for everyone. Once again, therefore, if technology is 
to exist in such a state it must become an instrument that is 
useful, meaningful, valid, purposeful for any man whatsoever. 
Stated positively, this seems to call for a technology that 
serves a public purpose. That is, the ideal state cannot 
have technology that is used for the benefit of private indi­
viduals or self-interested groups of private individuals only, 
Further proof of Northrop’s public purpose or "social­
ism" is given in his views on Locke. While Northrop accepts 
the Lockean emphasis on the contractual basis of government 
and the general theory of individual rights and equality, his
^Northrop, Logic, p. 49.
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rejection of the Lockean mental-physical dualism (as a re­
sult of Einstein’s epistemology) has one consequence which 
is important to his idea of a truly "public" technology. It 
will be recalled that Northrop's understanding of Locke's 
justification of "property" is as follows:
Man, as a mental substance, by means of his body 
and other physical objects of nature, cuts down the 
forests, tills the soil, grows his crops, and builds 
his home. Other mental substances, with their native 
freedom and perhaps their more indolent bodies, note 
this accomplishment and, finding it easier to combine 
and steal the neighbor's home and crops and perhaps 
even to destroy his physical body, than to develop 
and construct their own, take the individual man's 
property. This is the reason why the modern free and 
independent man gives up some of his ideal and actual 
native liberty to submit himself to conventionally pre­
scribed laws of the state.&
Since the property that each mental substance appro­
priates through the work of the physical forces becomes its 
"own" property becomes a completely "private" entity. How­
ever, s,ince Northrop rejects the dualism in Locke and its 
"mental substance" in the light of modern physics the "pri­
vateness" of property also vanishes with it. This does not 
mean that property must be in the hands of the "dictatorship 
of the proletariat." What this amounts to is that "property" 
should remain an entity "really" owned by no one in particu­
lar but it can be used as the "scientific" legislative process
^Northrop. Meeting of East and West, op. cit., p. 95.
391
with its "public" morality determined. Therefore property 
could be used by other agencies or groups of individual than 
"formal government" provided that the technological instru­
ments, land and other physical aspects of property are used 
in a manner that is within the standards of the Bill of 
Rights of the ideal state. This as we have seen applies 
universalistic standards [the universal quantifier (£)] to 
the form of legislation in regard to people as well as the 
content--propertyo In very concrete terms, much of the con­
tent of present television advertising to the extent that it 
misleads people and uses them as "means" would be seriously 
questioned and reoriented.
Thus, neither in property nor in technology do a few 
people have the right to "manipulate" the vast majority of 
mankind as Northrop seems to hint that they are partly doing 
at the present time, although he only touches on this "ex­
plosive" aspect of today's private technology, noting that 
modern technology is increasingly expensive and also that 
military technology is an important aspect of it. Then in 
speaking of those who manage "communication engineering" he 
says
The senders [managers] are a very small class of 
human beings made up of two closely associated sub 
classes. The first of these is a very small group^
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since it includes merely the highest echelons of 
business executives who direct the manufacturing, 
management, and use of calculating machines and 
the communication networks. . . .  The other closely 
associated subclass is composed of the highest mili­
tary decision-makers and heads of similarly "hush- 
hush" research corporations who, thanks to taxpayers' 
federal funds put either directly or indirectly via 
the military at their disposal, are also able to 
buy and direct the use of these expensive machines.
The receivers [of the messages] are a very 
large group. These embrace all the rest of 
mankind.^
He briefly indicates that communication techniques 
have been thus far used far too much for "private" purposes 
by this small elite as well as other groups including the 
"publicity" officers of United States presidents, behavior­
istic psychologists and "Madison Avenue advertising men 
whose offices are often, for obvious reasons, in the same 
buildings with the broadcasting corporations."&
Although Northrop does not elaborate on these scat­
tered statements involving the concretizing of his ideals, 
if pursued to their logical conclusions such nations cer­
tainly seem to constitute a unique form of "scientific and 
democratic s o c i a l i s m . Certainly his views on property,
^Northrop, Man, Nature and God, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
^Ibid., p. 55.
The term is used here only to illustrate Northrop's 
theory by way of comparison with present-day political "camps."
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technology and the form of the ideal state indicate a pre­
occupation with "public purpose" that can mean only this po­
litical position in terms of logic. And yet except for judi­
cial review he places a great deal of faith in the "common 
man" particularly since the latter is going to be re-educated 
(in his ideal state) for "scientific" thinking.10
At any rate, one conclusion is clear--the implemen­
tation of "public purpose" operates within the public legis­
lative process, although the details of "how" the public pur­
pose is to be served and "instrumental values" connected with 
it are not worked out specifically in his political theory. 
Obviously, however, particular methods of institutionalizing 
"public purpose" would vary depending on various "practical" 
problems, such as the remainder of the existing ideology and 
the industrial and agricultural "potential" of any given state.
Yet further evidence of Northrop's scientific and
Northrop's democratic faith in every man is shown 
in the following passage: " . . .  there is a sense in which
any person is an original genius. The degree to which such 
is the case depends on the extent to which one is "from 
Missouri," doubting with Descartes all contemporary as well 
as traditional authority, weighing the evidence for, and 
the alternative theoretical possibilities with respect to 
past, present, or future claims upon one's allegiance and 
faith before further committing oneself." Man, Nature and 
God, o p . cit., p. 50.
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democratic socialism^^ appears in the following "synthesis” 
of the ideal values that "ought" to be implemented;
A free society, therefore, must do more than 
allow each person to vote, it must also as far as 
is possible allow the unique determinate traits of 
each person to come to fulfillment. Thus, to Anglo- 
American political freedom to vote and to Marxist 
economic freedom from want there must be added indi­
vidual physiological freedom to be o n e s e l f . [ I t a l i c s  
mine.]
This "physiological freedom to be oneself" that 
Northrop refers to is best explained by a brief discussion 
of one final "value" that Northrop proposes for the ideal 
state. This consists of sensitivity to "aesthetics." He 
himself notes that the "most important ground of freedom . .
. is in the aesthetic component of man's nature.
Aesthetics. To discuss the importance of "aesthet­
ics" in the ideal political system we need not deal in detail 
with Northrop's philosophy of "aesthetics" and its relevance 
for art and comparative philosophy.
Reality to Northrop, as we have seen, has two
^^He almost deliberately avoids use of any such term 
possibly because of (1) the suspicion with which the term is 
regarded in the United States and (2) various theories which 
are labeled "socialistic" and which have little in common 
with Northrop's theory.
p. 475
1 2Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, 0£. cit.,
^^Ibid.
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components, the theoretic and the aesthetic. The "aesthetic" 
component is the sensed and "felt" world around us. In fact, 
the various scientific methods depend on varying degrees and 
types of relationships between the theoretically known and 
what is known through the senses. But as we have also seen, 
Northrop has attempted to show that modern physics "relates" 
the "theoretic" and the "aesthetic" through "epistemic corre­
lations" or as it is otherwise known, "co-ordinative defini­
tions" or "rules of correspondence."
Even then, the correct "aesthetic" or "radically em­
pirical" component is not what is "commonly" sensed. The 
word aesthetic for Northrop means whatever is "immediately 
apprehended" by us when all cultural categories, classifica­
tions, and correlations are taken away. The colors of what 
we call the "sunset," the wetness of what we call "rain," and 
the sound of what we call "Niagara Falls" are all examples of 
aspects of reality that are "aesthetic." For the physical or 
social scientist the "aesthetic" awareness of the "flashes" 
or "curves" on radar screens or the bodily movements and be­
havioral actions of people also are part of the tools of de­
scription. But apart from helping people describe reality, 
the "aesthetic" is important in and for itself. What this 
implies is that the aesthetic is a "natural" source of beauty
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and p l e a s u r e , T h e  world of pure "intuition" or the "aes­
thetic" world is a world of "pure" feeling. Northrop finds 
only Oriental philosophies as being "truly" understanding of
this f a c t .
In the West although physical and social scientists 
are aware of the "aesthetic" aspects of reality and appreci­
ate its value for private enjoyment, we have made very little 
use of pure "aesthetics" in our public institutionalized life, 
Thus in discussing the influence of Lockean epistemology upon 
the West and in the United States in particular, Northrop 
argues :
Since Northrop's treatment of comparative philo­
sophical analysis of Buddhism and Hinduism as well as the 
"objective" aspects of "Nirvana" and "Moksha" or ultimate 
goals in these religions the reader is referred to the fol­
lowing literature as an "introduction."
The Meeting of East and West, op, cit., pp. 312-375.
"The Relation Between Eastern and Western Philosophy," 
in Radhakrishnan, Comparative Studies in Philosophy Presented 
in Honour of His Sixtieth Birthday. Edited by W. R. Inge and 
others (London: Allen and Unwin, 1951), pp. 362-378.
"Toward a Religion with Worldwide Transforming Power," 
in Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture. Edited by Lyman 
Bryson and others (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 
156-365.
^^Since Western "fundamentalist" sects who also claim 
"experience" of God to be a basic fact also mix postulated 
concepts of "Christ," "salvation," "heaven," etc. they are to 
be distinguished from Oriental religions in a Northropian 
analysis.
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In Descartes and Locke's original philosophy and 
in traditional Non-conformist Protestantism, colors, 
sounds, and pleasures were mere secondary or tertiary 
appearances masking the supposedly truly real underly­
ing material and mental substances. Thereby, the 
materials of art were given a superficial, phenomenal 
status and were enslaved by means of the use of geomet­
rically defined perspective to the handmaid's task of 
portraying the clear-cut, geometrically proportioned, 
three dimensional material object, whether it be the 
body of a human person in a portrait or the pot with 
its incidentally colored flowers in a still life.l&
A discussion of the merits of Northrop's "aesthetic" 
philosophy is a separate thesis in its own right. But for 
normative political theory the thesis that there is an aspect 
of nature that is known with "immediacy" and is important pub­
licly has two major implications. The first implication deals 
with institutions and the second with the related problem of 
"human freedom."
The institutionalization of aesthetics according to 
Northrop must begin in the educational process as does the 
institutionalization of any "value" in social philosophy and 
life.. Public education should thus insure, especially in the 
West, that children are taught an epistemology at a very early 
age, which will cause them to be aware of the fact and im­
portance of this aesthetics. They must be able to learn the
16
p. 118.
Northrop, The Meeting of East and West, op. cit.,
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clear distinction between the "brightness" of what is called 
the moon and appreciate it in and for itself and yet distin­
guish it from the volcanic, meteoric object scientists call 
the moon. Far too often in the West according to Northrop 
the two are fused together in everyday experience. Political 
and economic instutions must also make sure that this aesthet­
ics is institutionalized in the lives of adult citizens. At 
one "practical" level this implies that in our public build­
ings, highways, parks, gardens and rest houses sensitivity 
must be displayed to the need for rich and moving colors and 
sounds.
But at a more important theoretical level Northrop'3 
theory implies that modern political society must insure that 
by using technology for a "social" purpose man is released 
from merely earning his daily bread, thereby enabling him to 
pursue purely aesthetic and artistic pursuits.. These may vary 
from watching the sunset to the creation of new music.
Once again, therefore, Northrop displays his own unique 
"socialism"; a socialism that is not only industrial and tech­
nical but one that is very much conscious of aesthetics in 
that society must not provide "leisure" for only the few but 
for the many. Thus, he argues :
For as the masters of modern scientific theory
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make it possible more and more to lift the labor of 
the world from man to the machine and the waterfall, 
and thereby to meet the mdre material needs of man­
kind with fewer and fewer workmen, it thereby re­
leases in society an increasing proportion of men 
who can give their time to the investigation of the 
theoretic component., continuously improving the con­
ception of it and the scientific technology which 
flows from it, and to the artistic pursuit, por­
trayal, and analogical use of the aesthetic 
component„
There are of course practical difficulties of con­
structing an economic theory for implementing Northrop's 
"ideal." He himself does not suggest a detailed economic 
theory but since he regards economics as an "instrumental" 
science which "presumes" certain values, he thinks that a 
starting point would be to shift the presuppositions of eco­
nomics towards a broader concept of the nature of man. Thus
speaking of unemployment in the United States Northrop claims
All these considerations suggest that one of the 
major causes of failure to solve the problem of unem­
ployment and of poverty in a land of scientific abil­
ity and of plenty is that we have been conceiving of 
the economic problem in entirely too restrictedly 
economic terms. Thus, perhaps instead of economics 
being the key to the humanities, the humanities are, 
in part at least, the key to the solution of the 
problems of economics. For it well may be that it is 
only because we have had too narrow an economic idea 
of the good, and consequently have not brought forth 
the demands for creative work in art in both of its 
functions, in empirically verified scientific, philo­
sophical, and theological theory, and in the teaching,
^^Ibid., pp. 495-496.
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preaching, and artistic conveying of such trust­
worthy theory, that the buying power has not been 
placed in the pockets of those not required to tend 
the machines, which is essential to distribute the 
goods sufficient for all, which the comparatively 
few men directing the automatic machinery are able 
to produce
Furthermore, he urges that our attention be squarely 
placed on the necessity and the possibility of automated in­
dustrial society where "social purpose" rather than "in­
dividual ownership" will be the key criterion for instrumen­
tal values and institutions to implement.
But for those who might be fearful of this aim, 
Northrop also claims that the "radical empiricism" he es­
pouses reinforces democracy in a unique way. Thus as a re­
sult of his analysis of oriental philosophies he concludes 
that the "radically empirical" philosophical systems consist­
ently demonstrate an "intuitively"^^ known (i.e., directly 
known) equality of identity in man.
According to this radically empirical theory of 
first-order facts there is one factor in any radically 
empirically known natural object or human being which 
is the same for all, namely the all-embracing, undif­
ferentiated field consciousness in its indeterminate 
formlessness. Consequently, according to this field 
theory of first-order facts, all human beings are, in
^^Ibid., p. 495.
Intuition" here means "feeling." As shown in 
Chapter II, "pure feeling" is a concept by "intuition."
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their elemental, irreducible selves, not merely 
equal but identical . 2 0
Since most major philosophical systems in the West 
such as Hegelianism, Marxism or Lockean theory do not have 
"immediate apprehension" as the central epistemological tool 
it is perhaps difficult to understand what Northrop means.
But the task is not hopeless if one keeps in mind that most 
"radically empirical" philosophy regards reality in a "form­
less" manner. Thus speaking about the Indian philosopher 
Shankara who Northrop regards as a radical empiricist, one 
Indian scholar indirectly throws light on Northrop's thesis 
in the following manner:
Shankara repeatedly asserts that discursive in­
tellect cannot grasp Reality. Brahman cannot become 
the object of perception as it has no form, and it 
does not lend itself to inference and other means, as 
it has no characteristic mark . 2 1
Still, some concrete examples of the effects of using 
radical empiricism in actual life will help illustrate North­
rop 's thesis here. The mediational methods of Gandhi in 
avoiding the technical, determinate and abstract "rights" and 
instead simply bringing Indians of various castes and
O f)Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, o p . cit., p. 270.
2 1 Chandradhar Sharma, Indian Philosophy: A  Critical 
Survey (London: Rider and Company), p. 276.
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backgrounds together qua human beings is one example of an 
"intuitive" concept of man qua man leading to democracy.
Also, the mediation rather than the arbitration device that 
as the ethically "best method" of solving interpresonal prob­
lems in a Chinese or Indian village, or in other Buddhist 
countries, is another example according to Northrop. He il­
lustrates his point by a personal anecdote from his travels:
In Buddhist Bangkok in 1950 I found the Chief 
Justice of its Supreme Court and a former Chief Jus­
tice of its next highest court, the Court of Appeals, 
who ostensibly were applying that most abstract of 
Western law, the French Continental Code, assuring 
me that they refused often to hear the case and urged 
the disputants, if Thais, to settle their differences 
by themselves in the approved Buddhist manner. In 
one instance after two such refusals and two failures 
of the disputants to reach agreement by themselves, 
the judges declined a third time to proceed in the 
Western manner, with the result that the intuitive 
mediational way succeeded . 2 2
More specifically he explains the unique "intuitive" 
feature of this form of mediation as distinguishable from 
the adversary method in Western legal systems:
Not only is there no resort to a legal rule; 
there is also no judge. Even the mediator refuses 
to give a decision. Instead, the dispute is 
properly settled when the disputants, using the 
mediator merely as an emissary, came to mutual 
agreement in the light of the existential circum­
stances, past, present, and future.
22 Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience, op, cit,, p. 185.
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The word "future" is used advisedly. In this 
type of ethics and law there is no irrelevant evi­
dence; not even future possible evidence is neglected.
For always the mediator or the adversaries themselves 
will remind any disputant that it is better to settle 
for a little less today and preserve tomorrow's good­
will than to obtain more today and lose tomorrow's
goodwill.23
Furthermore Northrop insists the "intuitive" method 
spells the difference between the Hindu-Buddhist-Jain- 
Confucian mediational system and the out of court "settle­
ment" that United States lawyers often provide in divorce 
cases or pre-court counselling in marital problems. That is, 
in the case of Western lawyers even when dealing as mediators 
they often proceed by "determinate" rules upon which basis a 
lawyer lets his client know what his "legal rights" are. In
contrast to this type of mediation Northrop cites the case of
Francis Liu, a Chinese lawyer, who was a colleague of his in 
Yale Law School:
Liu at first was very unsuccessful in building up a 
law practice in Shangai when he tried Western type of mediation.
After the new client had described his case, he 
followed it with the question, "To how much, in the 
light of the facts, do you think I am entitled under 
the code?" At first Mr. Liu took this as a straight­
forward legal question. If he knew the statute most
likely in question, he gave the answer; if not he
looked it up and then gave the answer. What he
23fbid.
404
observed was that forthwith the client showed no 
further interest, politely withdrew, and often went 
out and settled the dispute with the other party 
for less than the statute provided. This happened 
sometimes even when the code to which appeal was 
made was a pre-Western ancient Chinese one.^4
Liu apparently finally discovered that he was not 
looking at the questions of his client from a "Confucian" 
viewpoint. He was really failing the subtle and indirect 
testing by his clients which were aimed at finding out 
whether Liu was a "good" lawyer in the ethical Confucian 
sense.
From that time on, when the inevitable question 
came, "To how much am I entitled under the code?"
Mr. Liu did not hear it. Instead he countered with 
another question: "Have you got together with your 
adversary?" Immediately a look of understanding 
appeared on the client's face. Mr. Liu had passed 
the moral examination in the Confucian, and, one 
may add, Asiatic, meaning of the word "moral." He 
was proceeding with his client like a peacemaker, 
not like a litigation maker. Clients felt "This is 
a man in whose hands one can put one's difficulties 
with confidence." Forthwith Mr. Liu kept his 
Chinese clients.25
Northrop concludes this anecdote about Liu by noting
Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, o p . cit., 
pp. 159-160. Northrop cites an unpublished manuscript by 
Liu as a supporting source: Liu, Francis (Liu Shih-fang) 
"Westernized Administration of Justice and Chinese Racial 




He found that when the lawyers of the two parties 
in a dispute under the classical Chinese procedure 
fail to bring their clients to agreement between them­
selves either through a middle man or directly, and 
the dispute goes to a judge, the judge in turn uses 
the same procedure. He has interest neither in evi­
dence nor in witnesses, nor in statutes, codes, or 
precedents. He asks the disputants instead if they 
have got together, and when they reply, "Yes, many 
times to no avail," he often answers, "Then go back 
and try it again."26
This anecdote is used by Northrop only in the way of 
illustrating his basic theory that there is a direct relation­
ship between radical empiricism as an epistemology and an 
intuitive "fellow feeling," "man-to-manness" and "ultimate 
compassion" which he regards to be one "type" of democratic 
ethics and law. True, this law is not the only law in many 
parts of Asia. But other determinate rules and codes many of 
which are "naive realistic" in character are due to naive 
realistic theories or institutions such as the Hindu caste 
system. Even then the "codes" are often regarded as "second- 
best" methods of solving legal problems .
In any case what Northrop persistently drives at is 
that radical empiricism in ethics and in law sees particular 
men as essentially related to the continuum of men and that 
this "feeling" (actually an aesthetic experience) is one
Ẑ ibid.
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source of democracy. Thus in the ideal society inter-person­
al relationships will have an intuitive base of this "man-to- 
manness” or compassion.
Thus Northrop's democracy is not actually based only 
on a "mathematical” conception of abstract contractual rights 
but on aesthetic "feeling” as well. Both are needed in order 
to provide the "epistemic correlations" of an ideal state, 
with its ideal law and its ideal ethics all of which are "demo­
cratic" in character.
By itself the "theoretic” component will create a 
technically productive but an aesthetically impoverished so­
ciety. By itself aesthetics will not build dams and auto­
mated machinery, nor will it create the technical institu­
tions to fight mass poverty and disease.
The "ideal” state of Northrop is not regarded by him 
as only a "City of God” or a "pie-in-the sky.” Thus the main 
purpose of this sketch is to look at the "scientific” and 
"desirable” goals that are theoretically necessary in order 
that there may be simply guidelines of the direction that 
politics should move practically. Northrop himself suggests 
some "practical" methods of implementing his theory as well 
as some concrete illustrations of what his theory would "mean" 
to the layman or the political scientist.
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Practical Politics
"Practical politics" is a term Northrop himself uses 
to describe his method of implementing his political theory 
in the light of existing political "reality" as he sees it. 
Consequently his "practical politics" should not be construed 
to mean the same thing as the methods necessary for implement­
ing an interest group theory of politics or a Marxist theory 
of politics . But it ought to be noted that the term "practi­
cal politics" does have "meaning" in the sense that it con­
sists of an attempt to actualize the "ideal" in Northrop's 
theory.
The process of actualization presupposes two facts.
The first is that we have a set of concrete or "meaningful" 
or "true" ideals which we are attempting to implement. The 
second is that we have an adequate "scientific" understanding 
of reality. This, as we have seen in our discussion of 
"sociological jurisprudence," consists not of specifying the 
numerous facts of "real" politics but of indicating the 
"inner order" of all the facts or the theoretical presuuposi- 
tions of political and legal systems. Thus, if we are at­
tempting to "reform" the American political system we must 
make sure before we begin that we isolate the "living law" 
of the United States which would include the major value
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systems and their epistemologies of each section of the 
country, the North and the South, East and West, and socio­
economic strata as well.
After the "ideal" and the "real" values are speci­
fied, the procedure of practical politics will involve deal­
ing with and then modifying the institutions within which 
the old "living law" values are operating. It should be 
noted again that an institution for Northrop is any instru­
ment that is used for implementing ideals. Institutions, 
therefore, in a sense are teleological facts or value facts. 
Thus, the United States stock market is not only the "physi­
cal building" but it also is the embodiment to an extent of 
the prevailing economic living law of the United States. The 
United States Congress is not only the Capitol Building, the 
myriads of technical rules, but also the embodiment of Lock­
ean ideals of compromise (except for Lockean "natural rights" 
which are not to be compromised). Institutions, therefore, 
provide the arena wherein "fact" meets "value," provided we 
keep in mind that to a large degree we are talking about cul­
tural "facts" and cultural "values." Just as "procedures," 
"operations" and "epistemic correlations" relate the theo­
retical with the aesthetic or sensed aspects of reality in 
the natural sciences so also institutions "relate" and
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"correlate” political and social theories with existing 
factso Institutional "life,” therefore, is in essence the 
process of epistemic correlations in man's socio-political 
knowledge. A temple to the sun-god may then well be the cul­
mination of the epistemic correlation between a particular 
intuitive philosophy of nature and the physical stones and 
the available men in a given t r i b e . 27
A "practical" theory of politics is one which is 
successful in dealing with existing institutions. Northrop 
himself certainly regards his own total theory of politics 
as being "practical" in this sense. Nowhere does Northrop, 
in the view of this writer, ignore the theoretical need of 
dealing with the "raw," "brutal" facts of existing politics. 
In contrast, Northrop feels that much of today's politics is 
not very "practical." The Dulles policy in the Aswan Dam 
affair, ignoring nationalism and the revival of Egyptian val­
ues, civil right reform in the South and in the big cities in 
the United States, the Indo-Pakistani conflicts all have in­
volved "practical" failures because of ignoring the existing 
values and the "living law" in each of these problematic 
situations.
27The example is the writer's own but it is believed 
to be a "faithful" abstraction from Northrop's theory.
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Since institutions per se embody ideals which in 
turn rest on certain primitive or irreducible symbols and 
epistemologies, political reform must introduct the most re­
liable and valid values of the time and "institutionalize" 
these. Northrop*s theory of reform through "institution­
alization" involves then to an extent what he sometimes calls 
the "wedge" technique. This process itself basically in­
volves several steps. First the r e f o r m e r s ^ S  examine the 
ideal theory and the actual "living law" side by side. Then 
they are to find the "substances" which are "compatible" 
i.e., areas of agreement. Next they isolate what is "philo­
sophically incompatible" in each. Finally like a "wedge"
(used as an analogy only) the new theory or set of values is 
"slowly" introduced. The introduction of a new theory in­
volves great demands on the educational techniques of any po­
litical system. Northrop here is of course assuming, in the 
light of his "trapped symbols" theory, that man tends to 
conserve his existing values. Therefore the "curriculum re­
form" that professional educators often talk about must be 
more than adjusting the "number of credits" of this subject
2 8Who the reformers are will vary from existing 
society to existing society. Ideally, in a democracy the 
reformers must come from a wide base within the citizenry-- 
students, teachers, artists, musicians as well as politicians.
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and that at least; in the United States educators will have 
to see clearly that institutions^ including educational ones 
are actually based on certain specific ideals more valid to 
the times V "Progressive Education" and classroom techniques 
of "adjustment" are isolated but clear examples of the rela­
tionship between social fact and value, i.e., Dewey's prag­
matism as an ideal is applied to create the "facts" of educa­
tion. In education, therefore, the wedge technique would in­
clude the careful introduction of new values. Conceivably, 
therefore, in a state run school in India there would be more 
symbolic logic and less "rationalization" of the caste system.
The process of education, however, as any "educator" 
knows is not limited to formal schools. The "arts," "commu­
nication media" are also instruments of education. Northrop 
seems to be saying:, Wherever there is symbolization in 
society there^ too, is the possibility of educational change. 
Then, in American society the artist must introduce the aes­
thetic touch of the orient if Northrop's theory is correct. 
Indians in their radio music must hear not only the "drone" 
of Indian music but also must have Western music which has 
"geometric" forms., At this point it may be noted that some 
of this mixture of "cultures" is already taking place but not 
always in the way that Northrop would wish. It is unlikely
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that he will regard "rock and roll" and "twist" music as the 
embodiment of his "theory of forms."
Political institutions as such inevitably play a role 
in the scheme of social change. But to be successful through 
them the change must proceed in the epistemologically sophis­
ticated method that he describes. A "concrete" example of 
how his method would operate to bring social change through 
politics as illustrated by his discussion of the case of Brown 
et a l . V .  Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 
e^ is extremely helpful. This well known and landmark
case decided that "in the field of public education the doc­
trine of 'separate but equal' has no p l a c e . " ^ 0
Thus Northrop sees the "meaning" that was given to 
equal protection in Brown v. Board of Education as one that 
was in keeping with his own views of "natural law" which we 
have examined. Briefly, the concept of "any man," "universal 
man," is the same as the concept of "man" shown in the Brown 
decision. That is, the "man" in the Brown case as well as 
in Northrop's "ideal" theory is theoretically known man
Brown ^  al. v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Shawnee County, Kans., et a l . (1954) 347 U. S. 483, 98 L. Ed. 
873, 74 S. C t . 6 8 6 . Hereafter referred to as either "Brown v. 
Board of Education" or "the 1954 de-segregation case."
3°Ibid.
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rather than "sensed" man. Since the "theoretically" known 
"man" is compatible with the epistemology of m o d e m  science 
wherein deductive theory "drops" images it follows that theo­
retically known man is a conceptualization of man which is 
reliable.
As Northrop views it, the Brown case can not be 
"morally" justified by any theory of jurisprudence except by 
a "natural law" jurisprudence that had a clear conception of 
ideals. "Subjective" ethics can not very well support the 
"objectivity" of the norms in the case. Neither can "socio­
logical jurisprudence." The latter can easily show that the 
norms of the Brown case conflict directly with the normative 
patterns of the South in particular. But sociological juris­
prudence cannot show why the norms of the South "ought" to be
31changed. To justify the Brown case a philosophy of law to 
some extent must go beyond the facts of the immediate case, 
as well as the socio-cultural behavior of southerners to be 
able to tell them "You are in error."'
Further, positive law jurisprudence of an Austinian 
or a Kelsenian or a Frankfurter variety could not objectively 
"require" the Supreme Court to decide the way it did. The
31 The socio-psychological fact that segregation hurts 
people psychologically does not by itself demonstrate "why" 
people "should" not be hurt psychologically.
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statutes which were judged "required" segregation except for 
the Kansas Law which "permitted" segregation.^^ The Supreme 
Court's new "positive" law thus surely pointed beyond itself, 
and as Northrop sees it this was a valid "direction" in which 
the court pointed^
But to be "practically" successful "natural law" 
must be in part compatible with existing norms. The Brown 
case was "partly" successful in following the "wedge" tech­
nique. In analyzing the comparative merits of Austinian and 
sociological jurisprudence and their bearing on the Brown 
case Northrop declares;
The situation is better, but still unsatisfactory, 
if one considers this decision from the standpoint of 
the sociological philosophy of law. An examination of 
the original living law of this country and of its 
Southern component enables us, at least, to understand 
what has happened— namely, the general approval of the 
decision from the country as a whole and the bitter­
ness with respect to it in the Southern states.33
It should be noted that "approval" in this context 
should be interpreted in the light of Northrop's theory of 
"consent" which we have examined in the last chapter. Con­
sent can be implicit or explicit, passive or active.
32See first footnote in Brown v. Board of Education.
33isiorthrop. The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Ex­
perience , op. cit,. p 40
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Northerners did not have to dance in the streets to express 
their consent « The fact that they did not protest in any 
significant numbers when they could have done so is a rough 
and ready measure of their consent, But the riots in Cleve­
land, Philadelphia and elsewhere are also "facts" in connec­
tion with civil rights and racial problems. However, they 
are exceptions to the rule in the North. How this may become 
a major problem, however, will be touched on later.
The "ideological" reason for at least a passive atti­
tude of "consent" to the Brown case is the Lockean factor 
trapped in the minds of the Northerners. Although other value 
orientations such as the positive law training of Northern 
lawyers, the naive realism of many unskilled and uneducated 
persons among others have supplemented the Northerner's 
Lockean symbols, the latter values are there in a much stronger 
fashion in the North than in the South.
New England was founded in major part by non­
conformist Protestants who came to the western 
hemisphere to escape from the rule of the religious 
majority in Europe and who, like Jefferson, were 
heavily under the influence of the philosophy of 
natural rights and natural law of Locke. With the 
opening of the frontier, this living law spread to 
the Middle West and the Far West. It is exceedingly 
unlikely that legal positivism has seeped down from 
Thayer to the masses to a sufficient extent to alter 
this original and basic philosophy of American cul­
ture. The coming of Roman Catholics in large num­
bers brought in a natural law philosophy also.
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These two portions of the Living law of the United 
States constitute a statistical majority of the 
people. Sociological jurisprudence tells us that 
when a positive legal decision has such qualitative 
and quantitative support from the living law it 
can come into being and be effective. Hence, this 
legal philosophy enables us to understand why, even 
though there was no positive federal legislative 
statute on the matter^ the unanimous decision of 
the United States Supreme Court has occurred without 
a bitter reaction from the majority of the people.
But the Court is only one institution among many and 
for the "wedge" to succeed he admits that several additional 
facts must be noted. The South in Northrop's analysis con­
tains a strong naive realistic factor in its value system.
In the Southeastern states, however, an addi­
tional, quite different living law came into being 
through the founders of the Virginia Company and 
their bicod and cultural descendants who spread 
out to the South and Southwest. The English scholar 
Mr. Peter Laslett has recently shown that this liv­
ing law derives from the Patriarche of Sir Robert 
Filmer, instead of from Locke and Jefferson. Ac­
cording to this patriarchal ethics and law, good 
government is government by the first families, and 
a good educational system is one modeled after 
seventeenth-century Episcopal Oxford and Cambridge--a 
system in which the best education goes to those 
carrying the greatest familial and social responsi­
bility, namely sons rather than daughters, the eldest 
son rather than the younger son because of primo­
geniture and with few exceptions, the sons of the 
first families only. Equality of education for all, 
regardless of status and blood of birth, is foreign 
to the political, legal and educational ideals of 
such a society Jefferson's Lockean democratic 
egalitarianism modified this aristocratic patriarchal
^̂ Ibld.. p. 40
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Filmerian living law of the South, but it never re­
moved it.35
The violence that has followed the "new era" of the 
introduction of the concept of "universal man" in the South 
is an indication that the Court as it exists as only one in­
stitution in the American political context can be only partly 
effective in "reforming" the living law. This does not mean 
according to Northrop that morals cannot be legislated. The 
Sterling Professor of Law at Yale would be least likely to be 
unappreciative of the role of the courts in American life. 
Still, the courts must continuously make sure that they do 
not go too far beyond the Filmerian "living law" of the South 
in order to be successful "practically." Although Northrop 
does not. develop this thesis he very probably would approve 
of the courts implementing natural law on the basis of the 
particular and peculiar customs in a given area, so long as 
the goals are kept in mind. Thus his theory is to some extent 
a "gradualistic" theory of reform. Some "practical" poli­
ticians and positive law reformers might well attack North­
rop 's position here as a justification for and rationalization 
of the status quo. But it should be noted that although the 
role of positive law in social change is not "clearly" defined
35Ibid ., pp . 40-41
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by Northrop he does maintain that the "positive" law must 
not go too far beyond the existing norms of society, par­
ticularly without the cooperation of the non-political in­
stitutions of society. To attempt reform through legislative 
acts alone would be self-defeating. Positive political ac­
tion is of course necessary for change but the exact rela­
tionship between politics and other techniques of social 
change is not precisely worked out in Northrop*s theory. One 
wonders, however, whether given the intensity of the current 
Negro "consciousness" of rights whether such a gradualistic 
theory can prevent anarchy in time.
But the "wedge" technique also requires the use of 
other institutional activities besides those of the Court. 
Education, Religion, Presidency, and Congress all must also 
play the role of appealing to the "little" Jeffersonian com­
ponent of the "living law" in the South. In an answer to a 
query from this writer as to an example of how such a method 
could work Northrop made the following comment:
You ask what can be done to "prevent the demands 
for rights from deteriorating into an irrational 
movement." The only answer seems to be the philo­
sophically anthropological one of educating all 
parties concerned to look at the desegregation issue 
in culturally philosophical terms, . . .  In short, 
one must apply first the descriptive method of Philo­
sophical Anthropology and Practical politics . Then
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one must turn to the evaluative method  »
To illustrate his point further. Northrop gives a "personal" 
example of one way among many as to how this can be done in 
the South, relative to change in racial relations.
I may add that some years ago I was asked to 
address a group in Richmond under the auspices of 
the Virginia Universities., In this address I used 
only the descriptive method, but pointed the issue 
up by asking why the Virginians, who made so much 
of Jefferson when I taught at the University of 
Virginia in the early 30*s, did not follow Jefferson 
in this issue with Filmer. The audience was composed 
of many of the present. Virginian First Families.
Afterward some of them came up to me and thanked me, 
saying that this was the first time they ever saw 
the conflict that was in them.. Once it. was seen, 
some of them added that it was clear that Jefferson 
rather than Filmer is the Virginian we have to be­
lieve. My friend Harry Dillard, who is now the Dean 
of the Law School of the University of Virginia, is 
such a Jeffersonian Virginian and has been such from
the very beginning.37
Northrop's theory of "practical" politics thus does 
not claim to offer a "quick" remedy., As applied to "Civil 
Rights" it seems to consist of a very intricate "middle road" 
between two very possible disasters in American politics.
One disaster could arise if "progress" in civil rights is 
too slow to satisfy vigorous elements in the "Rights"
1963.
36Personal letter to this writer dated November 20
^^Ibid.
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movement., Another disaster could arise from ignoring "socio­
logical jurisprudence" and forcing a militant south to combine 
together with the more strongly property oriented elements in 
the North into an "interest" bloc for resisting social change. 
Governor Wallace's strong showing in Northern primaries in 
1964 in spite of his background as a Southerner might well 
indicate the possibility of an alliance between "property" 
oriented Lockeans and status oriented Filmerians aimed at "con­
serving" existing values. The major hope that Northrop holds 
forth is the appeal to the persisting Jeffersonianism in the 
various areas of the south and demonstrating the error of the 
Lockean theory of property everywhere.
Northrop*s referemce to the possibility of appealing 
to "Jeffersonian" theory illustrates one final aspect os his 
"wedge" theory of practical politics. Old "values" even when 
unused for a long time and dormant in a "culture area" can be 
consciously used for building new institutions. That this 
can be done, according to Northrop, is demonstrated by the 
coming of the Common Market in Europe. Thus, the major theme 
of his work in international relations entitled European 
Union and United States Foreign Policy38 ig that a substantial
38F . S. C. Northrop, European Union and United States 
Foreign Policy, A Study in Sociological Jurisprudence (New 
York; Macmillan Company, 1954).
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reason for the success thus far of the Common Market is the 
fact that the underlying norms of the nations involved in­
cluded old unused Roman Catholic concepts of trans-national 
and trans-tribal man. These norms have been overwhelmed but 
not destroyed by the naive realistic theories of national 
man with his Hobbesian or Machiavellian or Hegelian values .
Gandhi's appeal to the radical empirical aspect of 
Hinduism, while rejecting the naive realistic caste system 
is another example of the wedge technique. The "wedge" 
technique and practical politics have many uses in several 
areas of "inter-national relations" as well. But since our 
inquiry has avoided a specific analysis of international re­
lations in order to examine the substantial aspects of 
Northrop's political theory per se we can only refer the 
reader for illustrations in this field to the bibliography 
that is attached to this w o r k , ^ 9
The major themes of Northrop's "practical politics" 
as developed here do in any case give a basic view of both 
political ideals and "political change" as he sees them. His 
theory of political change springs from the basic assumption
^^The Meeting of East and West, The Taming of the 
Nations and European Union and United States Foreign Policy 
are some of the useful sources, provided one understands 
Northrop's epistemology,
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that the dynamics of a culture is based on its ideas and 
that in a very ''practical” way revolutions begin in the 
"minds” of men and that if men do not pay attention to "cor­
rect” ideas they are often condemned to live by false moral, 
social and political imperatives, and tragic existential 




Since F„ S, C . Northrop's philosophy is an attempt 
to create a comprehensive philosophy of human experience the 
task of abstracting his "politics," his "jurisprudence," his 
"anthropology" or his "ethics" is an extremely difficult one.
Thus, few political scientists have examined North­
rop 's theory in much detail. As the review of the literature 
on Northrop in our first chapter shows, it is primarily in 
the field of international relations and to some extent in 
legal theory that treatments of Northrop's ideas have ap­
peared. Even then, it has been mostly in the form of book 
reviews. Therefore, our task was conceived to be one of ex­
amining his total philosophy and then abstracting his "poli­
tics" from i t . In this attempt care has been taken to remain 
as faithful as possible to the original "intent" of Professor 
Northrop*s language and ideas. In some cases this may have 
resulted in an appearance or a tone of hesitancy with respect
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to critical évaluation,, The hesitancy was to a considerable 
extent deliberate since we hold with Bertrand Russell that
In studying a philosopher, the right attitude 
is neither reverence nor contempt, but first a kind 
of hypothetical sympathy, until it is possible to 
know what it feels like to believe in his theories, 
and only then a revival of the critical attitude, 
which should resemble, as far as possible, the state 
of mind of a person abandoning opinions which he has 
hitherto held. Contempt interferes with the first 
part of this process, and reverence with the second.1
Before we "revive" our critical attitude a brief 
demonstration of "hypothetical sympathy" is offered in the 
way of a summary of Northrop*s views on politics. In reading 
this summary, however, it should be pointed out that without 
a careful examination of our complete thesis no summary can 
provide the complete "meaning" of Northrop's political theory,
A Summary
Politics to Northrop is only a part of man's total 
"experience." But any experience of man because of his neuro- 
physiological nature is based to a considerable extent on 
theories, philosophies and symbols which are antecedent to 
the experience of any man and which then structure and clas­
sify the experience of the latter. Experience, then, has no
^Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 39.
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existential " m e a n i n g s T h e  content of these theories and 
symbols are, however, not given a priori, They are the crea­
tions of man in the form of underlying "patterns" of cultures. 
Logically, therefore, a comonly held pattern of ideas 
gives man a "public" culture and "public" politics. Northrop 
does not deny that the natural habitat, the availability of 
water and food and other "economic" factors also contribute 
to the making of particular political and cultural systems 
but since these "irreducible" economic factors are "seen" by 
man in the light of his "ideas" he feels that the social 
sciences will do well to focus on the "ideas" which like the 
"program" of the computer or the "feedback mechanisms" of 
modern automatic weapons "determines" and adjusts man's be­
havior to external stimuli, natural, social and political, 
Man's particular nominalistic, political ideas such 
as his views on whether accommodations in a motel "ought" to 
be made available through law to all races are outgrowths or 
manifestations of his most "basic" symbols or epistemologies„ 
Locke's epistemology involving mental substances, physical 
substances, and the secondary qualities of colors and sounds 
is such a "basic" set of symbols, The Hindu Shankara's view 
that nature is known not through discourse but by apprehension 
is another, Marx's view of "man" as the product of the
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dialectical processes of history is a third. As men use 
these epistemologies varieties of ideas can emerge. Thus 
one can be a Trotskyite or Stalinist and still "see” nature 
" d i a l e c t i c a l l y I n  other words the relationship of an epis­
temology and the ideas that grow from it is in many cases a 
one-many relationship.
The political consequence of Northrop's theory of 
ideas is the thesis that politics is simply part of a public 
and social process of implementing these basic ideas. The 
"state," then, is simply a set of institutions which order 
men’s relationships to each other in a way that is in keeping 
with a set of ideas held in common by a group of people. The 
"state," therefore, does not have the same concrete meaning 
in all cultures. The "meaning" will vary with the ideology.
The Marxist "state" is different from a Buddhist "state." A 
Lockean contractual "state" is different from a Saudi Arabian 
"law of status" state. The "state" can be a patriarchal mon­
arch or an American system with a separation of powers. Then 
"politics" in part is the process by which people with a com­
mon ideology go about setting up rules which are considered 
to be binding. Thus, again politics has variable content in 
various cultures. If a small tribal patriarch who is the 
"leader" in a patriarchal law of status society issues a "rule"
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that "Today you will all hunt tigers or else you will be 
ostracized" this is as much a process of politics as the 
United States Congress after consultation and deliberation 
making kidnapping a physically punishable offense.
Further, political institutions are the counterpart 
of "operations"^ in the natural sciences, provided we keep 
in. mind the difference between the "normative" rule or "ought" 
producing nature of institutions and "fact" producing char­
acteristics of physical operations. Institutions, therefore, 
produce a socially desired "ought." Tax laws, criminal laws, 
court decisions, presidential directives and ordinances are 
examples of such "oughts" in the area of politics. Unlike 
"power-oriented" political scientists, Northrop emphasizes 
the context of philosophical purpose within which power ac­
quires "meaning."
The line of demarcation between "politics" and other 
social patterns of interaction and behavior is not fixed for 
all societies and for all cultures. They, too, vary with the 
content of an ideology. In the United States the arena of 
politics and the arena of religious activity are separated 
more efficiently than in other social systems such as Catholic
2
Methods of relating ideas to observations.
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Spain. Consequently "politics” does not for Northrop have a 
fixed and concrete subject matter, which is the same for any 
society.
The foregoing discussion appears to make Northrop a 
complete relativist with respect to political symbols and 
meanings. To arrive at such a conclusion is only part of 
the truth. Although Northrop is quite sensitive to the cul­
tural basis of meanings he does attempt to construct a method 
by which we can create meanings which are to be "reliable" 
and "valid" for men anywhere. Briefly, his theory implies 
that since man's institutions have always reflected his con­
ceptions of nature which are for man his "science," there is 
the possibility of showing that the conceptions are wrong and 
erroneous in the light of ever more adequate theories of 
nature. The most adequate theory of nature is one which ac­
counts for every single verifiable fact of nature that other 
theories have discovered as well as more "facts" or "new" 
facts that older theories did not account for. In creating 
a synthesis of Western science and non-Westem aesthetics, 
Northrop feels that there is such an adequate theory at hand.
This theory he thinks turns out to be a novel "demo­
cratic" theory which sees man in terms of "qualities" which 
are not just directly felt or sensed but also mathematically
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"postulated," like the entities in Einstein's physics. Still, 
the empirically verified, i.e., by direct experience, theo­
ries of Shankara and Buddha also give support, in Northrop's 
view, to such a democratic (in his sense) theory of man. The 
availability of this theory, however, does not mean that re­
form will "automatically" happen even in the course of time. 
The cultural history of man for Northrop is not a process of 
inevitable evolution, or progress. "Progress" or the imple­
mentation of new theories requires first the clear under­
standing of these theories as well as the old theories which 
are at least in part, erroneous. Also the process of grafting 
the old to the new requires the active conscious and 
"thoughtful" efforts of man in the creation and the growth 
of new institutions.
Northrop's conception of science is a unique combi­
nation of (1) Platonism, i.e., deductively obtained univer­
sels (2) operationally or pragmatically verified "epistemic 
correlations" and (.3) the raw empiricism of pure "feeling" 
and sense-awareness. Even for the political theorist who be­
lieves in the "is" and the "ought" dichotomy, Northrop's phi­
losophy of science offers the argument that the need for 
"reliable" political speculation has not ceased to exist.
If anything, the complexities of modem experience necessitate
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more complex theories than ever before.
Nevertheless, Northrop"s system also requires that 
political theories using the correct "epistemology” be ex­
pressed in such symbols that their "meanings” are public, 
open and unambiguous, and that political theories must be 
verified indirectly and operationally through sensed data in 
the descriptive sphere and through "consent" in the prescrip­
tive sphere of politics.
Although this view gives new hope to political think­
ers regarding the importance of theories it also places new 
demands on political science as a whole. If Northrop is cor­
rect then today's political science to a considerable extent 
is a culture bound discipline both descriptively and norma- 
tively and to reform political science students of politics 
have to turn once again for their views on nature to those in 
the mature sciences who have actually been dealing with nature.
As Northrop sees it, his philosophy can be applicable 
to all the areas of what we today call politics. Since 
"ideology” affects all aspects of human behavior there are 
ideological factors in not only theory, but constitutional 
law, public administration, public opinion, comparative gov­
ernment, and international relations as well. In each of 
these areas, especially when "conflicts" are basically between
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conflicting "assumptions” the importance of paying attention 
to his kind of "scientific” analysis becomes imperative ac­
cording to him. In constitutional law, e.g., the case of 
Brown v. Board of Education dramatizes the conflicts between 
jurisprudential theories. Also, in the legislative process 
in the United States, the conflicts and debates over the cur­
rent (1964) civil rights bill are inescapably ideological in 
character and require "his” kind of analysis. That is, the 
white constituents of Southern legislators often sincerely 
feel that their Filmerian (according to Northrop) living law 
is at stake. On the other hand, some New Englanders and Mid- 
westerners, depending on the abstract (not empirical) Lockean 
and Jeffersonian concept of man, feel that they are doing the 
"right” thing in supporting the call for civil rights legis­
lation. Still, other Americans because of the confused and
confusing relationship in Locke's theory between "human” 
rights and "property” rights carry their confusion into their 
political views wherein they feel that the Negro's cause is 
"just” but they hesitate at destroying "the rights of private 
property.”
In this veritable Babel of tongues and ideologies
Northrop claims his theory purports to offer a long range
solution: briefly this involves that of retaining whatever
432
consensus exists regarding Lockean "abstract" concept of 
rights but rejecting the erroneous assumptions about property 
throughout the United States and the Filmerian notions of a 
patriarchal society in the South and then educating students, 
citizens and politicians as to the truth. Admittedly this is 
easier said than done, but Northrop maintains that unless the 
symbols of property and status are replaced with Stoic- 
Northropian concepts of rights the "economic development" of 
the South, more general "literacy" everywhere and legislative 
"balancing of interests" will not do the job by themselves. 
Only educated bigots and rich bigots will result. "Balancing 
of interests" and a civil rights bill achieved through "com­
promise" may temporarily "solve" the crisis but there will 
be another one tomorrow if we do not become clear about the 
goals which are beyond pragmatism and which alone tell us 
whether our trial and error is trial or error.
Northrop's theories also can have certain applica­
tions for "comparative government." Focusing our attention 
on superficial legal comparisons of certain institutions in 
various countries such as "parties," "legislatures," "courts" 
or even "decision making" will not give us "real" comparisons 
since Northrop regards institutions as embodiments of spe­
cific sets of "ideas" and "purposes." For Northrop the
4.33
"purposes" of an institution are not the same as the "func­
tions" that some scholars in recent comparative government 
literature suggest as the meaningful categories,3 such as 
"communication" or "allocation of goods and services." Pur­
poses are outgrowths of ingrained and usually inarticulated 
ideologies. Thus, the United States Congress as a "structure" 
not merely serves the "function" of allocation of values but 
also does this in the light of a specific Lockean epistemology 
which requires a particular type of institution in order to 
obtain "conventions" that are to be binding. Comparative 
politics, then, must begin with epistemological formulation 
and sophistication in examining the ideological theories which 
give "meanings" to "functions," "institutions," "structures" 
and "interests."
The same is true in international relations wherein 
Northrop's theory attempts to deal with the "ideological" 
character of conflict and cooperation. Thus the success of 
the European common market in this view is due to the hitherto 
"untapped" but "trapped" notion of Catholic and universal man 
in the countries of Western Europe. That is, Northrop claims
3gee D . F. Aberle and others, "Structure-Function 
Analysis," in Comparative Politics. Edited by Roy C.
Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Homewood, Illinois: The Dor­
sey Press, Inc., 1961), p. 67.
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that if Protestant East Germany and the United Kingdom be­
longed to the market the institutions would have to be dras­
tically reshuffled into a looser confederation in order to 
survive. The "conflicts” of international relations between 
U.So-U.S.S,Ro 5 India-Pakistan; and other nations are also 
not merely conflicts of influence, power and interests. They 
are also "conflicts" arising out of differing cognitive 
orientations. To "reconcile" conflicting "interests," there­
fore, Northrop claims that there have to be "compatible" 
ideologies. Thus unless and until the U.S.S.R. creates a 
"living law" that does not depend on a "dialectical" view of 
man and the United States modifies its Filmerian law of the 
South and the Lockean "property" orientation that exists, the 
situation will continue to be one of "protracted conflict" 
within the shadow of "the bomb." Northrop agrees with the 
"realists" that "power" is important in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations 
but only because the naive realism of Leninism respects power. 
But "power" or "force" alone does not build community. Also, 
the effectiveness of "power" in areas such as parts of Asia 
where "power" does not have the same haloed status is dimin­
ished. On the other hand, the exercise of power in Asia 
without accompanying clarity on goal values is partly the 
"cause" of neutralism in Asia, according to Northrop.
435
Dealing with a Northropian analysis of international 
relations is a dissertation in itself and is not within the 
scope of our present inquiry, but since in the summary we 
have completed the process of "hypothetical sympathy" that 
Bertrand Russell requests we will next attempt to re-discover 
a "critical attitude" towards the politics of F . S. C. 
Northrop.
A Critique
In an age of specialization F. S. C . Northrop, even 
as a philosopher, is a remarkable thinker. Pursuing the 
labyrinths of specialized disciplines with the help of his 
philosophy is an enriching and rewarding experience and if 
nothing else, it is its own reward. His own particular ef­
fort in approaching the unity and integration of the various 
modes of human "knowing" is indeed a remarkable feat of 
scholarship and bears the imprint of a lifetime of devotion 
to sheer intellectual curiosity. Such an attempt at a re­
construction of human thought often seems "un-scientific" 
because he pushes disciplined thought to its farthest hori­
zons . But there are only a few living scholars who have even 
attempted such a macro-cosmic view of life and experience. 
Further, Northrop maintains that such a re-construction is
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not merely ''philosophy"; it is essential to science as well.
His efforts seem to be an answer to the following warning
given by Jose Ortega y Gasset:
. . . science needs from time to time, as a neces­
sary regulator of its own advance, a labour of re­
constitution, and, as I have said, this demands an 
effort towards unification, which grows more and 
more difficult, involving, as it does, ever-vaster 
regions of the world of knowledge.4
In the thirty years since Ortega y Gasset's comments 
first appeared, the "regions of the world of knowledge" have 
expanded even more and with the continued threat of atomic 
destruction, the need for integrating "natural science" with 
"social science" seems to be even greater than ever before. 
Northrop's analysis of the relationship between "scientific 
ideas' and "social ideas" certainly seems to constitute a 
major effort to bridge the gap. For the social scientist, 
however, Northrop's thesis may be a disconcerting one, for he 
attempts to make us painfully aware of the extent of the "lag" 
between the philosophies of science on the one hand and the 
philosophies of culture on the other. The task of evaluating 
Northrop's total philosophy must truly belong to other philos­
ophers with a similar breadth of experience and scholarship.
4jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1960), p. 113.
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Concerned as we are with ''political" philosophy, Northrop's 
theory of society and politics has perhaps been viewed in 
far narrower terms than his philosophy deserves.
The complex and difficult language with which North­
rop expresses himself very possibly prevents the wider read­
ing of his works by a larger group of political and social 
scientists than is the case at the present time. It is true 
that simplicity in language sometimes gives a deceptive sim­
plicity in substance to complex ideas, but one often wishes 
as well as feels that some of Northrop's theories could very 
well have been simplified, particularly with the help of de­
tailed examples. Rather than the repetitious use of phrases 
and terms, more detailed illustrations could have been far 
more profitably used to "pin down" his conceptions. But this 
is a complaint that is often made of philosophers.
It is the more substantial contribution to social 
theory that is really important in his work. Here, his 
analysis of the "scientific" presuppositions of political and 
legal theories presents a novel thesis in the literature of 
political science. That political theories and methods to an 
extent have metaphysical and epistemological assumptions is 
not of course new. But what is new is his assertion that 
these assumptions are based on particular philosophies of
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science and that this fact has specific practical political 
importance. Also, the conclusion that cultures are based on 
shared philosophies of science is also significant socially 
and politically. But the most important contribution, per­
haps, is his analysis of scientific methods per se and their 
relevance for the study of politics--a contribution, we think, 
which points out correctly the methodological weaknesses of 
much of present political science.
Northrop's argument that most "natural law" thinkers 
are not always sure what the "nature" in "natural law" actu­
ally consists of is an important one. Also significant is 
his critique of the over-emphasis on inductive data gathering 
or what Easton called "hyperfactualism." Too, his warnings 
against too naive a conception of empiricism are noteworthy. 
To take Hume too seriously, which Hume himself apparently did 
not, is not only a good tonic for over-intellectualized and 
abstract speculative political theories but it is a cure that 
may well kill the patient as well.
For his discussion of "scientific method" alone 
Northrop deserves the careful attention of students of polit­
ical science since the discipline is at a stage where the 
search for "science" and "objectivity" is intense. Since he 
attempts to deal with the "logic of the sciences" and "the
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humanities" as well there is also an added reason for ex­
amining his works. Finally, the unique blending of realism, 
idealism, pragmatism, positivism, serves as a useful model 
for a convenient integration of labor among social and polit­
ical scientists without the seemingly endless dissipation of 
energy over definitions of boundaries and subject matter.
In spite of our general intellectual sympathy and 
appreciation of Northrop's ideas and for the most part his 
convincing exposition of them, some unanswered problems and 
perplexing questions remain.
The first of these is the concept of the "unity" of 
a culture. Northrop makes a convincing case for paying 
greater attention to the "ideational" or "ideological" pat­
terns of a culture. Also Kluckhohn'S exposition of the 
"philosophy" of the Navahos gives added support to Northrop*s 
position. However, until Kluckhohn'S "conclusions" about 
the postulates of Navaho pn_iosophy are verified by other 
investigators using Kluckhohn's methods, his conclusions must 
be regarded as somewhat tentative. The following comment by 
an anthropologist and colleague of this writer illustrates 
the controversial nature of Northrop's and also Kluckhohn’s 
position.
His [Northrop's] following of Philosophical An­
thropology is only one phase of the field. Insight
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on social systems may be gained through the struc­
tural approach as done by British social anthropolo­
gists . Also, with an anthropological approach one 
hardly goes into a culture "blind" and attempts to 
work out the postulates. We know in part the mechan­
isms of culture and how they work. This gives us a 
clue to many yet undescribed systems. Northrop 
neglects the whole scientific approach to culture.
Yet it is difficult to attack him or his use of 
Kluckhohn, etc., because this is another approach. 
Namely, he has used only one side of the coin for 
his point of view though that one-side is not com­
pletely unchallenged.5
Not only are the Kluckhohn findings unproved beyond 
a doubt as of yet but even if it were true additional diffi­
culties would arise in analyzing a larger or more complex 
culture than that of the Navaho. This is particularly true, 
since as Northrop himself notes :
Operational definitions for testing whether one's 
descriptive method has designated the correct postulate 
set in describing any particular nation or culture are 
yet to be developed by cultural anthropologists.&
Also, the McCulloch-Pitts theory upon which Northrop 
relies, regarding the structure of the mind presents certain 
difficulties. In the first place it is still a theory and a 
hypothetical model although Northrop attempts to show that 
it is a more reliable model than other previous models of
1963.
89.
^Dr. Aram Yengoyan, personal note to writer. May 20, 
^Northrop, Philosophical Anthropology, o p . cit., p.
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m an’s cognitive processes. But even if the model was a 
physically "true" one it would not necessarily imply that 
basic symbols and ideas are free creations of the genius of 
men. As one scholar whose interests include the communica­
tion system of the brain notes in the course of a symposium 
headed by Northrop:
If our anthropological colleagues want to 
squeeze the juice out of current neurophysiology for 
their present purpose, it amounts to little more 
than, this one general principle, that the in-built 
logic of a brain inevitably conditions its owner's 
perceptual framework. What I want to guard against 
is any suggestion that Northrop's point is dependent 
on current speculative physiology. The McCulloch- 
Pitts theory, for instance (as I know McCulloch would 
agree), makes no claim to physiological realism and 
stands in history as an "existence theorem" rather 
than a description of the actual brain. It would be 
a disaster, I think, if anthropologists were to start 
founding anthropological arguments explicitly on the 
McCulloch-Pitts theory.7
Consequently, the nature of the exact relationship 
between the content of an idea and its source or origin is 
far from clear even in the light of Kluckhohn and McCulloch's 
"findings." Granted that men have a built in logic in their 
brains and even granting that cultures may have relatively 
ordered and logically "related" meanings what does not neces­
sarily follow is that these "ideas" have a status that is
^Northrop (ed.), Cross-Cultural Understanding, op. 
cit., pp. .349-350.
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"primitive," "irreducible" and have an independent role to 
play in human causality. "External" conditions such as 
travel, higher income, marriage, force, certainly seem to 
change the basic attitudes of men. At least, to this writer 
the reasons why some people seem to change their ideas as a 
result of external conditions while others show persisting 
and stubborn frames of reference still seem to be shrouded 
in mystery. It is also far from clear as to what causes 
people’s cortex to dislodge old symbols and trap new ones, 
at least in the case of political symbols such as "universal 
man" or "tribal man," "law of contract" and "law of status." 
Without this clarity the "freedom" of man to trap or untrap 
his symbols can have only a hypothetical status, at least as 
far as the evidence Northrop presents seems to indicate.
Turning to another related thesis of Northrop, his 
emphasis on the need for "objective" methods in describing 
political reality is commendable. But in the absence of 
more reliable "operational" methods and theories than those 
so far developed, political scientists will have to continue 
to use a "naive realistic" mixture of observation and specu­
lation as Northrop himself seems to use in his own analysis 
of political ideologies. This, however, should not diminish 
the need for the continued search for methods of adapting the
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procedures of physics to the problems of politics. However, 
Northrop-s own "intuitive" and highly sophisticated gues work 
is so incisive at times that more conscious and thoughtful 
use of naive realism may itself provide further advances in 
our descriptive knowledge of politics, until at least North­
rop ’s ideal method can be further concretized.
In shifting to the prescriptive mode or level of dis­
cussion Northrop's essay in political theory gives a novel 
theory of democracy. Some of the similarities between North­
rop "s theory and certain aspects of current American ideas 
and practice may result in the charge by some political sci­
entists chat he, too, is culture bound to a considerable ex­
tent. Northrop is aware of the possibility of this charge 
and seems to feel that since his concept of man is a "logi­
cally realistic" concept its "meaning" is a "public" one.
Yet since "logical realism" itself is the result of the cul­
mination of Western trends in science and mathematics there 
does not. seem to be an "objective" reason why the East 
"ought" to adopt them except as a means to some ends such as 
having a "Western" type society. There seem to be in North­
rop ' s normative theory certain subtle existential leaps of 
faith and nominalistic or particular values such as "man must 
survive," "technology is good," "human conflict is evil" which
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are not made explicit in the theory and which do not appear 
to have anything to do with an application of Einstein's 
epistemology 0
Finally, Northrop s conception of natural law re­
quires a brief comment. It is true that many natural law 
theories contain conflicting "subjective” notions of just 
what nature consists. However, Northrop's own attempt to 
rest law on a "scientific conception” of nature contains a 
few "subjective” assertions as well. Thus, liis claim that 
the oriental tendency to see nature with "immediacy” is an 
"objective” view of the aesthetic component of nature, and 
is likely to be regarded as a subjective assertion by many 
Westerners. Again, in spite of Northrop's dependence on the 
McCullough-Pitts "model” or "theory” about the brain for sup­
porting evidence of his theory of the cognitive nature of 
man besides "answering” some questions also raises others. 
Since the theory on the one hand is still a hypothetical ex­
planation, while it "gives” us a new conception of the cogni­
tive abilities of man, to rest new normative political in­
stitutions on this temporarily held theory is to risk chang­
ing fundamental values on far too little solid evidence. Of 
equal importance is the fact that among philosophers there 
seems to be disagreement as to whether Einstein’s epistemology
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has actually made Whitehead's "naive realism" an inadequate 
tool for viewing the world around u s . This results in a sad 
lack of unanimity among reputable modern philosophers of 
science. Consequently the task of finding "reliable" and 
"scientific" social and political thought is even more com­
plex than Northrop himself admits.
The foregoing discussion has attempted to point out 
some of the ambiguities in Northrop's political theory. Much 
of the ambiguity may be due to the distortion of ideas that 
ordinary language imposes upon u s . It may even be due to the 
misjudgment of Northrop's theory by a reader such as this one. 
The ambiguities, therefore, may well be more apparent than 
real. In any case this should not detract from the general 
work of examining Northrop's social and political theory. For 
because of his thorough gounding in the philosophy of science, 
political "scientists" have much to learn from him about the 
varieties of "scientific methods." Besides this, his specu­
lative theory about political ideals when separated from their 
aura of scientific "legitimacy" is a bold and novel statement 
of political ends, pointing towards the road that "ought" to 
be taken in an era when men all over the world are increasingly 
demanding that they be fed, sheltered, consulted, and that they 
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